

**Evaluation in Media
Discourse:
Analysis of a Newspaper
Corpus**

Monika Bednarek

Continuum

Evaluation in Media Discourse

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Evaluation in Media Discourse

Analysis of a Newspaper Corpus

Monika Bednarek

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Perhaps . . . it is time to explore strange new worlds, seeking out new life, where few linguists have gone before (Martin 2000: 175).

The world passing through a newsroom. Processed, bundled and delivered through your door (Brenton and Hare 1985: 10).

Comment is free but facts are sacred (C. P. Scott, quoted in Bagnall 1993: 120).

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'Sentenced to death by aids-virus fiend' by Tony Leonard (15 Oct 2003)
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 '1,000 Diana tapes held by U.S. spies' by Gordon Thomas (21 Oct 2003)
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 'A life sentence' by Lorraine Fisher, Don Mackay (15 Oct 2003)
 'Barclays Plank' by Gary Jones (17 Oct 2003)
 '"They're planning 'an accident' in my car so Charles can marry again"' by Jane Kerr (21 Oct 2003)
 'BLOWN UP' by Oonagh Blackman (22 Oct 2003)
 'BARBARIANS' by Jan Disley (23 Oct 2003)
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'Israel bombs Syria after beach horror' by Ben Raymond (6 Oct 2003)
 'Real reason Rio skipped drug testing' by Harry Harris (8 Oct 2003)
 'IDS to carpet Tory plotters' by Alison Little, Patrick O'Flynn (10 Oct 2003)
 'Spy HQ hit by bombers' by John Chapman (13 Oct 2003)
 'How many did he infect?' by John Chapman (15 Oct 2003)
 'Barclaycard? Er, not likely' by Amy Vickers (17 Oct 2003)
 'Crash probe reopens' by Nick Fagge, David Pilditch (21 Oct 2003)
 'IRA's bid for peace blown up' by Alison Little (22 Oct 2003)
 'Racist cops quit' by Paul Broster (23 Oct 2003)
 'Queen of tarts given 4 years' by Kim Willsher (24 Oct 2003)

The owners for extracts from the following articles could not be contacted despite all efforts:

‘Israeli jets strike Syria after suicide bomb horror’ by Matthew Kalman (*Daily Mail*, 6 Oct 2003)

‘Man who sentenced his lovers to death’ (author unknown, *Daily Mail*, 15 Oct 2003)

‘Five racist policemen quit force in disgrace’ by Jaya Narain, Adam Powell (*Daily Mail*, 23 Oct 2003)

‘An elegant box of sharpened knives’ by J. Freedland (*The Guardian, International Edition*, 15 July 2004)

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Abbreviations and typographical conventions

The following abbreviations are used in this book:

- N = noun; NP = noun phrase
- V = verb; VP = verb phrase
- Adj = adjective

- C = COMPREHENSIBILITY
- E = EMOTIVITY
- EV = EVIDENTIALITY
- EX = EXPECTEDNESS
- I = IMPORTANCE
- MS = MENTAL STATE
- PN = POSSIBILITY/NECESSITY
- R = RELIABILITY
- S = SERIOUSNESS
- ST = STYLE

- FT = *The Financial Times*
- Times = *The Times*
- Guardian = *The Guardian*
- Independent = *The Independent*
- Telegraph = *The Daily Telegraph*
- Sun = *The Sun*
- Mail = *The Daily Mail*
- Mirror = *The Daily Mirror*
- Star = *The Daily Star*
- Express = *The Daily Express*

In the examples from the newspapers the numbers 1–10 correspond to the following dates:

- 10.10.2003 = 1
- 13.10.2003 = 2
- 15.10.2003 = 3

- 17.10.2003 = 4
- 21.10.2003 = 5
- 22.10.2003 = 6
- 23.10.2003 = 7
- 24.10.2003 = 8
- 6.10.2003 = 9
- 8.10.2003 = 10

Thus, *FT 1* refers to the news story about Iain Duncan Smith published on October 10, 2003 in *The Financial Times*.

As far as typographical conventions are concerned I use small capitals for the evaluative parameters identified (e.g. the parameter of EMOTIVITY) and for their sub-values (e.g. EMOTIVITY: POSITIVE). Italics (unless used for emphasis) refer to word forms (*moves*, *moving*, *move*), capitals refer to lemmas (MOVE). Double quotation marks signal quotations within quotations; single quotation marks are used for meaning (including a problematization of meaning) and quoted material. (Regarding the corpus examples it is usually clear from the context which emphases are original and which have been added. The quotation marks, spelling and punctuation in the examples are the same as in the original.)

Part One

Evaluation and newspaper discourse

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1 Analysing evaluation in the news

1.1 About this book

This book is about the expression of opinion in news discourse, in particular the expression of opinion *through language*. How do news writers¹ express their opinions about the events, people, and situations they report on? Do tabloid news writers really express more opinion than broadsheet news writers? And do these two types of newspapers differ in terms of *how* they express opinion? These are all questions that I want to address in this book.

To analyse the phenomenon of speaker opinion – variously known as *evaluation*, *appraisal* and *stance* within linguistics – a new framework of evaluation is introduced as an alternative to and a synthesis of existing approaches. As a springboard for this framework I take Thompson and Hunston’s definition of *evaluation* as

the broad cover term for the expression of the speaker’s or writer’s attitude or stance towards, viewpoint on, or feelings about the entities or propositions that he or she is talking about. That attitude may relate to certainty or obligation or desirability or any of a number of other sets of values.

(Thompson and Hunston 2000: 5)²

I identify these ‘sets of values’ as *evaluative parameters* (a term adopted from Francis 1995), assuming that speakers can evaluate aspects of the world as:

- good or bad (the parameter of EMOTIVITY)
- important or unimportant (the parameter of IMPORTANCE)
- expected or unexpected (the parameter of EXPECTEDNESS)
- comprehensible or incomprehensible (the parameter of COMPREHENSIBILITY)
- (not) possible or (not) necessary (the parameter of POSSIBILITY/NECESSITY)
- genuine or fake (the parameter of RELIABILITY).

Moreover, I presume that speakers can evaluate propositions as more or

less reliable (RELIABILITY: LOW/MEDIAN/HIGH), and that they can make evaluative comments on the language that is used (the parameter of STYLE), on other social actors' mental states (the parameter of MENTAL STATE) and on the source of their knowledge (the parameter of EVIDENTIALITY).

With the help of this framework the present book will provide a rather different account of evaluation from those which are so far available. It will both present a new method to study evaluation and apply this method to study differences between tabloids and broadsheets.

Chapter 1 sets the work in context, answering questions such as why and how to study evaluation, and commenting on the 70,000 word corpus of newspaper discourse that was used for the analysis. Chapter 2 outlines some of the most important characteristics of the news story, Chapter 3 delimits the notion of evaluation and Chapter 4 explains the parameter-based framework of evaluation. Chapters 5, 6 and 7 outline the findings of the empirical analysis of the corpus. Finally, in Chapter 8, I consider some of the implications of this work for a new theory of evaluation.

1.2 Why study evaluation?

But why should it be of interest to study evaluation in the first place? And why study evaluation in the press? Several answers to these questions suggest themselves: Firstly, there is still much research to be undertaken regarding the phenomenon of evaluation. Although it is true that much recent research in linguistics concerns evaluation, this is true only for some areas of inquiry. Thus, evaluation/stance has been researched widely and systematically in the context of English for academic purposes (e.g. Bondi and Mauranen 2003), and, under the name of *appraisal*, within systemic-functional linguistics (e.g. Macken-Horarik and Martin 2003, Martin and White 2005). Additionally, there is some (mostly) large-scale corpus research which analyses markers of stance in different registers (e.g. Biber *et al.* 1999). However, there is hardly any research that tries to apply a parameter-based approach of evaluation to text (exceptions are Lemke 1992, 1998, Thetela 1997 and, to some extent, Hunston 1994), and the only grammar that devotes a section to stance is Biber *et al.* (1999). All in all, nothing is settled: the ground is still shifting beneath our feet, and evaluation remains a mostly unexplored territory within linguistics.

Secondly, evaluation itself is a significant element of our lives: as a device for interpreting the world and offering this evaluation to others, it pervades human behaviour: when we interact with the world around us, we perceive, categorize and evaluate what we encounter. Our short-term evaluations may then turn into long-term values, which are as important to our lives as our beliefs. Our values arguably determine to a large part who we are personally, which path of life we choose to take, and which friendships we form. Furthermore, evaluation is extremely important in actual discourse,

in that it is difficult if not impossible for human beings (and perhaps not even desirable) to speak with a completely ‘objective’ voice, *not* to impose evaluations on one’s utterance, and *not* to communicate value judgements (compare e.g. Vološinov 1986: 105). The importance of evaluation also derives from its multifunctionality: it can simultaneously be used to express the writer’s opinion, to construct relations between the writer and the reader, and to organize the text (Thompson and Hunston 2000: 6ff).

Thirdly, it must be pointed out that although we can find a wealth of research on the media in general, much of it is either non-linguistic (in a strict sense) or of a limited scope (focusing on a few aspects of media language, offering case studies, etc.). Neither is there much linguistic research on tabloid newspapers. Such research would help to challenge traditional assumptions of the objectivity of news discourse (on such assumptions and their critique see White 1998: 1f, 279ff; Gruber 1993: 469, Iedema *et al.* 1994, Bell 1991: 212, Almeida 1992: 234ff). For instance, Biber and Finegan (1989) label the cluster that includes press reportage ‘faceless stance’ (Biber and Finegan 1989: 108), noting that this cluster is ‘marked by the relative absence of all affective and evidential stance features considered here’ (Biber and Finegan 1989: 108).

1.3 The corpus

Since media language is very complex in terms of its socio-economic and communicative context (Chapter 2), any analysis of it must first deal with a number of methodological decisions. According to Bell (1991: 12) the analysis of media language demands decisions in three areas:

- the genres: news, advertising, etc. (type of media content)
- the outlets: the publications, radio stations, etc. (carriers of content)
- the outputs: specific newscasts, programmes and the time period to be covered (and the days to be sampled within that period).

In this book I concentrate on the print media, in particular the ‘hard news’ (Bell 1991: 14) story in British English tabloids and broadsheets. The corpus on which my analysis is based consists of 100 news stories taken from ten British national newspapers: five broadsheets (*The Financial Times*, *The Guardian*, *The Independent*, *The Times*, *The Daily Telegraph*) and five tabloids (*The Sun*, *The Star*, *The Daily Mail*, *The Daily Mirror*, *The Daily Express*). I have chosen to keep the subject matter constant in all of the ten newspapers so that the corpus consists of ten topics that are reported in each of the ten newspapers. This was felt to be necessary for the establishment of a comparable corpus and simultaneously it ensured that a topic which is central to society was chosen (a topic that is covered in all newspapers seems to be most significant). More importantly, this also avoids the influence of the topic on the analysis of evaluation to a certain degree. Since I shall comment on the content of these topics in the analyses in Chapters 5 and 6, a short summary of them follows:

Topic (date)	Content
'Israel' (6.10.2003)	an Israeli attack on Syria and a suicide bombing in Israel.
'Rio' (8.10.2003)	the decision of the Football Association to exclude Rio Ferdinand (then defender with Manchester United) from the English team for the 2004 European championships because Rio Ferdinand did not provide a sample to drug testers on 23 September.
'IDS' (10.10.2003)	Iain Duncan Smith's (leader of the Conservative Party at that time) conference speech at the Conservative Party conference in Blackpool.
'Iraq' (13.10.2003)	an attack on a hotel in Baghdad by a suicide car bomber in Iraq.
'HIV' (15.10.2003)	the sentencing of Mohammed Dica, who was found guilty of infecting two women with the HIV virus.
'Barclays' (17.10.2003)	Matthew Barrett's (then chief executive of Barclays) utterances concerning the expensive-ness of credit cards at a hearing with MPs.
'Di' (21.10.2003)	a note written by Princess Diana to her former butler, Paul Burrell, published by him to coincide with the publication of his book, <i>A Royal Duty</i> . In the note she writes about someone planning an 'accident' involving her car.
'IRA' (22.10.2003)	the Northern Irish peace process and David Trimble's (Ulster Unionist leader at that time) rejection of the destruction of weapons by the IRA because not enough details were given about this destruction by General John de Chastelain (then leader of the independent body overseeing arms decommissioning).
'Police' (23.10.2003)	racist utterances by police recruits that were pronounced on a documentary made by Mark Daly, an undercover reporter for the BBC.
'Madam' (24.10.2003)	the sentencing of Margaret MacDonald, a British woman who was convicted of prostitution by a court in Paris, and sentenced to four years in prison and a €150,000 (£104,000) fine.

Table 1.1 lists the word count (based on an automatic count with Word 2000 for Windows) for the individual news stories in the corpus (see Appendix 1 for additional methodological decisions).

As becomes evident, the corpus is quite balanced in that there are only slightly more words in the broadsheets than in the tabloids.

1.4 How to study evaluation

This book aims at providing an account of evaluation in news discourse that combines corpus analysis with discourse analysis, trying to integrate corpus-based research with manual text analysis. It therefore includes *quantitative* calculations of the distribution of evaluations, and *qualitative* comments on their discourse functions, and involves both manual and automatic analyses. The manual analyses demand the use of a small-scale corpus and are required because of the special nature of evaluation:

- Evaluation shows ‘context-dependent polysemous functionality’ (White 2001a: 18), and in its analysis the wider context must consequently be included.³
- Evaluation is a very complex *textual* phenomenon, as many researchers have pointed out:

[W]hen we consider the meanings made by extended, cohesive texts that are not made in individual clauses, we often encounter phenomena of language that reveal new semantic resources at the text level. This is particularly true of the semantics of evaluation because of its tendency toward ‘prosodic’ realizations, i.e. realizations that tend to be distributed through the clause and across clause and sentence boundaries.

(Lemke 1998: 47; for similar assumptions see Thompson and Ye 1991 and Bublitz 2002)

This suggests that the phenomenon of evaluation can only be correctly understood, interpreted and analysed when looking at its context. On the one hand, linguistic means of evaluation are highly context-dependent; on the other hand, analysing the discourse semantics of evaluation shows how evaluation extends like a wave over the text and lends a specific ‘evaluative prosody’ to it (for the wave metaphor in connection with evaluation see Hunston 1994: 200). Martin states the case strongly: ‘we will never understand the function of evaluation in a culture if our studies are based, however quantitatively, on the analysis of “deco-textualized” examples’ (Martin 2003: 177). Thus, the evaluative force of linguistic expressions may not be noticeable in an automatic corpus-based study (Stotesbury 2003: 331). Moreover, such an analysis would not only pick up instances of writer evaluation but also instances where evaluation is simply quoted.

- Many evaluative means belong to open classes. There is no clearly defined list of linguistic means of evaluation (called *evaluators* in the following) that could be looked for in a large-scale corpus with the help of a computer. The list of lexico-grammatical means that can be used for evaluation is endless, and it would be futile to take a list of possible evaluators as a starting point and check which of them occur in the corpus, since this would only provide a limited perspective on the evaluation present in this corpus.

Furthermore, there are no existing large-scale corpora that are suitable for

the analysis of the object of investigation. Corpora such as LOB/FLOB (www.helmer.aksis.uib.no/icame.html) contain only a mixed category (A) called *press: reportage* which does not distinguish between daily and Sunday newspapers, between regional and national newspapers or between the categories of political news, sports news, society news, spot news, financial news and cultural news (www.khnt.hit.uib.no/icame/manuals/flob/kata.htm). This is a problem because these categories differ so much from each other (Bell 1991: 14). Moreover, these corpora include samples rather than complete texts, and in total, category A consists of only 44 texts of roughly 2,000 words each, i.e. only marginally more than my own corpus. Other potentially suitable corpora like the BNC (Aston and Burnard 1998, Burnard 1995), the Bank of English (www.ccl.bham.ac.uk/phrasebox/svenguide.html#Somereferences), the Reuters corpus (www.about.reuters.com/researchandstandards/corpus/LREC_camera_ready.pdf), the Rostock Historical English Newspaper Corpus (www.phf.uni-rostock.de/institut/iangam/sitemap.htm; on its design see Schneider 2000), the Longman Grammar of Spoken and Written English (LGSWE) corpus (Biber 2003), and the Zurich English Newspaper (ZEN) corpus (Fries and Schneider 2000) either consist of samples rather than complete texts, or do not include all of the ten national newspapers considered in this book, are diachronic rather than synchronic, or do not distinguish between the category of hard news and other categories. To my knowledge there are thus no existing corpora that would have been suitable for my purposes. The only other alternative, to design a large-scale corpus myself, would have been far too time-consuming (although broadsheets are obtainable on CD-ROM, the tabloids are not).⁴

In view of these issues I decided upon a smaller corpus as a basis for my analyses. Even though this may mean that the conclusions are not always statistically definite and wholly representative of British newspaper discourse as a whole, I believe that the analysis of the corpus strongly indicates certain trends in this variety of English. Furthermore, representativeness is a thorny issue in corpus linguistics in any case, and it might be more important to linguistic analysis to know the corpus that is used very well, and to interpret the results accordingly (Mahlberg 2004).

A different methodological issue involves the identification of evaluation. How can we determine that linguistic items are evaluative or not? In this book a combination of methods was used:

- previous (often corpus-based) research was surveyed to identify potential evaluative means
- native speakers were questioned: when they gave contradictory responses (as was frequently the case) or when expressions were only identified as ‘a bit/slightly negative’, or ‘hard to say’ the linguistic expressions were excluded (as not unequivocally evaluative)
- the Bank of English (BoE, a general corpus of spoken and written English from Britain, the US, Canada and Australia, which stood at

450 million words at the time of the analysis) was the basis for extensive corpus research concerning the evaluative potential of individual linguistic devices. If this did not yield satisfying results (because there were not enough occurrences), WebCorp (a search engine for the Internet which was designed for use by linguists; www.2002.org/CDROM/poster/67/) was employed for the same purpose

- a corpus-based dictionary was used to check the evaluative force of linguistic expressions (COBUILD, COBUILD 1995).

Thus, the manual analysis of my news story corpus is based both on 'first level' corpus research (Bank of English, WebCorp) and on the 'second level use of corpora' (Neale 2006) (corpus-based research such as Thompson 1994, COBUILD); in other words the discourse analysis is supported by what Louw (2005) calls 'data-assisted reading'. The study analyses 5,158 individual evaluators, and is to be regarded as a contribution to the 'prolonged fieldwork' on interpersonal meanings demanded by Stubbs (1996).

Notes

1. In this book the terms *writer/speaker* and *reader/hearer* are used alternatively – the one implies the other, though we are only concerned with writers and readers in news discourse.
2. Thompson and Hunston's (2000) definition is similar to Biber's concept of 'social evaluation' (1988: 32). For different views of evaluation see Gruber (1993) on the concept of *evaluative utterance*, Jordan (2000) on the notion of *assessment* and Bayer (1982) on *Bewertungen*. Opinion/attitude in itself is a concept that is notoriously difficult to define (and no attempt to do so will be undertaken here) (see van Dijk 1998: 29f for one proposal and Almeida 1992 for theories of factuality).
3. I use the term *context* in this book to refer to the textual, the situational and the socio-cultural environment of linguistic expressions, although it will mostly be the textual environment that is particularly significant.
4. Concerning the advantages and disadvantages of designing a newspaper corpus from CD-ROM see Ljung (1996) and Minugh (2000). Charles (2004) mentions four overlapping problems concerning large-scale corpus-based research on stance (i.e. evaluation): (1) corpus-based methods cannot retrieve implicit stance; (2) they cannot retrieve combinations of stance; (3) they cannot reveal indeterminacy; (4) the multi-layering of stance leads to uncertainty in quantification. What corpus linguistic research can do, however, she concludes, is to quantify certain linguistic realizations of stance as well as to identify key sites of stance construction. For examples of corpus-based research on stance/evaluation see, for example, Hunston and Sinclair (2000), Charles (2003), Biber and Finegan (1989), Conrad and Biber (2000) and Precht (2003).

2 The news story in its context

This chapter discusses previous research on media discourse, and examines the socio-economic and linguistic context of the news story. This provides the background to the empirical study in Chapters 5 and 6.

2.1 Approaches to media discourse

There is in fact a great diversity of scientific research devoted to describing the media, of which I shall only mention the major and most influential approaches. The non-linguistic approaches among this research are often concerned with issues such as ideology, mediation, mass communication (van Dijk 1988a: 5–16), the semiotics of the news (Hartley 1982), the concept of popular culture (Conboy 2002), and media standards (Sparks and Tulloch 2000). However, although these studies shed some light on the nature of mass media and newspaper bias, they offer little in terms of a systematic linguistic analysis of media language.

Within linguistics, we can distinguish between two vantage points of linguists: that of discourse structure and linguistic function, or according to its effect as ideology-laden discourse (Cotter 2001: 417) or, as Scannell calls them, ‘the ideological and the pragmatic’ (Scannell 1998: 251) approach to media and language. More specifically, there are at least eight major approaches to media language (elaborated from Cotter 2001, Jucker 1992, Bell 1991, Fairclough 1995a and Bell 1995):

- *the critical approach*: studies that work to reveal power relations and ideology, and often invoke a call to social responsibility (e.g. Hodge 1979, Trew 1979, Fairclough 1988, 1995a, 1995b, Fowler 1991, Talbot 1995, van Dijk 1988a, 1988b, White 1998, Weiss and Wodak 2003, Caldas-Coulthard 2003)
- *the narrative/pragmatic/stylistic approach*: work which focuses on discourse-level elements and explanations, concerned with the structure and language of news discourse (often involving pragmatic analyses, discussions of presentation and perspective, genre status, style and register) (e.g. Crystal and Davy 1969, Verschueren 1985, Carter 1988,

Bell 1991, Almeida 1992, Ljung 1997, White 1997, 1998, Ungerer 2004)

- *the corpus-linguistic approach*: research on newspaper discourse with the help of corpora (e.g. Short *et al.* 1999, Schneider, K. 1999, Schneider, D. 1999, Schneider 2000, Minugh 2000, Ljung 2002, Ni 2003, Biber 2003)
- *the practice-focused approach*: work on aspects of newsmaking practices (e.g. Bell 1991)
- *the diachronic approach*: research on the history of newspaper discourse (e.g. Cotter 1996, Schneider 1999, Schneider 2000, Herwig 1999)
- *the socio-linguistic approach*: studies of the correlation between style and social factors (e.g. Bell 1991, Jucker 1992)
- *the cognitive approach*: analyses of the relations between cognitive processes, conceptual metaphor, social meaning, and discourse (e.g. van Dijk 1988a, 1988b)
- *the conversationalist approach*: research on media discourse with the methods of conversation analysis (e.g. Clayman 1990, Greatbatch 1998).

However, none of these approaches is interested in evaluation as such – apart from some studies within CDA and appraisal theory. Neither are there many *systematic* synchronic analyses of the linguistic differences between British tabloids and broadsheets – most research compares only a few different broadsheet and tabloid newspapers, sometimes not even distinguishing between different national varieties of English, or it analyses only a limited number of aspects of newspaper discourse (e.g. noun phrase structure in Jucker 1992, Ni 2003, Biber 2003, sports stories in Knobbe 1997, headlines in Lindemann 1990, allusions in Lennon 2004). In general, we may even speak of the popular press itself as ‘an underdeveloped area of journalism for examination’ (Conboy 2002: ix). It is my intention in this book to at least partly fill these gaps with the help of a corpus-based pragmatic/discourse analytic approach, including some elements of other methods (practice-focused, critical).

2.2 Socio-economic and communicative context

Socio-economic context

As Fowler points out, considering socio-economic processes is of ‘overwhelming importance in an overall account of the media’ (Fowler 1991: 20). Such information is also necessary as a background to the linguistic analysis undertaken in Chapters 5 and 6. Concerning the socio-economic context of the British news story, a number of specific characteristics must be mentioned: the British are the third biggest newspaper buyers of the world; nearly 80 per cent of all households buy a copy of a newspaper each day (O’Driscoll 2000: 151), and no country has as many national daily and Sunday newspapers as Great Britain (www.cpu.org/uk). The national

newspapers are particularly important. Here we can distinguish between the popular press and the quality press, also traditionally called the tabloids (*The Daily Mail*, *The Daily Express*, *The Daily Mirror*, *The Star*, *The Sun*) and the broadsheets (*The Guardian*, *The Independent*, *The Daily Telegraph*, *The Times*, *The Financial Times*).¹ It is a truism that the popular press and the quality press differ in a number of factors, both linguistically and non-linguistically:²

- The tabloids sell about four times as many copies as the broadsheets (Source: Audit Bureau of Circulation, net circulation of British national newspapers, August 2004, www.abc.org.uk).
- 52.4 per cent of the population read a particular (national) tabloid, compared to 12.9 per cent who read a particular broadsheet newspaper (*National Readership Survey* analysing data from April 2000 to March 2001, accessible via www.nrs.co.uk). (The rest of the population read a local/regional newspaper or any daily newspaper.)
- The broadsheets draw 80–90 per cent of readers from the middle classes, compared to around 60 per cent with the middle-range tabloids and around 30 per cent with the tabloids (Tunstall 1996: 9). The readers of the quality papers are also, on the whole, better educated than those of the popular press.
- Since the broadsheet newspapers address different readerships than the popular newspapers, they are distinct in language and content: whereas the quality papers are largely concerned with politics, economics and sports, the popular papers cover less politics and more human interest stories. They also differ in quantity, design, typography, the use of photographs and other visual techniques, and the formality of language (see also Jucker 1992: 48–58, Lennon 2004: 8, and Conboy 2003). The two types of newspaper are thus distinct in selection (content) and presentation (language, style).
- The broadsheets and the tabloids also differ in political partisanship. In spite of this, they are free from interference from government influence. This is why the press is sometimes called ‘the fourth estate’ (on a par with the Commons, the Lords, and the monarch). However, the owners of the newspapers as well as the advertisers have the power to influence the content, the political stance and the editorial perspective of the paper, for example by appointing key personnel (e.g. senior editors), and the proprietors of newspapers tend to exercise their right to greater or lesser degrees (McNair 1994: 62).

Nowadays, ownership of the British national press is concentrated in the hands of large organizations of which Rupert Murdoch’s NEWS INTERNATIONAL is the best known. There is thus a great tendency towards monopolization, although there are regulations concerning cross-ownership (as set down in the Communications Act 2003; www.legislation.hmso.gov.uk/acts2003/20030021.htm).

Communicative context

Apart from socio-economic aspects, one of the most important factors that must be considered in an analysis of news stories is their communicative context, or 'production format' (Goffman 1981: 145). Some of the features that characterize newspaper discourse are (see also Bell 1991: 85, Fairclough 1995a: 36ff, and Biber 1993: 246):

- Multiple originators and complex process of news writing: news is to be regarded as 'the product of organizational structures and professional practices' (Bell 1991: 38). Accordingly, it is not possible to regard any story as the solo, first-hand product of the respective source journalist (unless we have witnessed the journalist at work): a newspaper byline is 'no guarantee of authorship' (Bell 1991: 42). There are many layers of communicative 'creation' and many versions of news stories edited by subeditors, editors, chief reporters, journalists, etc. (Bell 1991: 39, 51). I shall nevertheless use the terms *speaker/writer* or, alternatively, *the newspaper* to refer to the stance that is expressed in a news story. This speaker/writer is an idealized construct and does not necessarily refer to a real person.
- Absence of direct feedback, anonymity, fragmentation and impersonality of mass communication (non-interactive, non-present audience): although the producers of the news can draw some information regarding their readers from readership surveys, advertising and circulation, as well as direct audience response (letters to the editor, phone-ins), mass media communication remains impersonal and its audience fragmented.
- Stereotyping: on account of the impersonality of mass media communication, both readers and speakers work with a stereotyped image of the other. As far as the readers' perspective is concerned, they usually know little about the journalist who wrote the article. In any case, it seems highly unlikely that readers take the journalist 'as a person' as the presumed 'principal' (Goffman 1981: 144) of the article. It is more likely that they identify the newspaper (as institution) as the definite, or ultimate, source of what they are reading, since they presumably know that journalists have to adhere to the rules and regulations of their employers. In other words, the journalist is seen by them as merely an 'institutional voice' (Lindgren-Lerman 1983, cited in van Dijk 1988a: 75). Every newspaper carries with it a particular prestige, or a stereotyped image. This makes up the image of the sender which newsreaders bring to the text, and may be called the 'stereotyped speaker'. Similarly, the addressee in media communication is not *known*, s/he is *envisaged/expected* (Bell 1991: 92), as is the implied reader of literary theory. A considerable amount of shared knowledge, beliefs, norms, values, etc. must therefore be presupposed, and writers as well as readers work with stereotypes of the supposed Other. The 'stereotyped' speakers and readers stand in contrast to the




Figure 2.1 The stereotyped speaker/reader of the news

actual producers and actual receivers of the message, as visualized in Figure 2.1.

In fact, stereotyped readers exist both in the minds of the communicators as well as in the text, i.e. they are (partly) constructed, or construed through the text, as has repeatedly been pointed out. It is not actual, individual readers that are addressed, but 'the reader' as a social group.

- **Embedding:** news is always embedded talk: within the news text generated by the author, other speech events are embedded. Each has its own sender, receiver, and setting of time and place (Bell 1991: 52). The use of quotations makes overt this embedding of speech events in the press. This is why quotations are such a significant and frequent device in news stories as we will see later (for an extensive analysis of the intertextuality of media texts see Fairclough 1995a).

News style is also constrained by other, more general factors (after van Dijk 1988a: 74ff):

- it is a type of written discourse and must meet the general constraints of written/printed text
- it is controlled by the possible topics of news discourse: national politics, international politics, military affairs, social life, violence, disasters, sports, arts, science, human interest
- it is usually restricted to a formal communication style: colloquial, spoken language is deemed inappropriate, and only admitted within quotations (at least in the broadsheets). However, Fowler (1991: 59ff) underlines that newspaper language includes a number of features (typography and orthography, syntax and morphology, deixis, modality and speech acts) used to suggest the presence of spoken language, contributing to the illusion of conversation and thus 'cue[ing] . . . an oral model' (Fowler 1991: 64). And Zelizer (1995) reports that quotes present an 'interface' between spoken and written language in print (Cotter 2001: 424)

- it is affected by time and space constraints: deadlines require fast writing and editing (syntax and lexicalization must be routinized to some degree: fixed patterns of sentences are taught by journalism textbooks); space requires a compact writing style: to avoid repetitions, sentences are packed with much information in relative clauses; and nominalizations (which capture whole propositions) are significant too
- it is influenced by the specifics of printing and layout
- last, but not least, mass media outputs appear periodically and are accessible to a large audience (Jucker 1995).

2.3 News values

News stories are selected and structured according to what are generally called *news values*, i.e. the values by which events or facts are judged more newsworthy than others (Galtung and Ruge 1965, Hartley 1982, Fowler 1991, Tunstall 1996). These values reflect social beliefs and attitudes (Bell 1991: 156, Hartley 1982: 80f), i.e. are ethno-centric (probably Anglo-American or Western). They are shared both by the producers (the professionals) and the audience (the public) of news media (van Dijk 1988a: 119). According to Bell's (1991) classification there are three classes of news values: (1) values in news actors and events, (2) values in the news process and (3) values in the news text.

The first class, *values in news actors and events*, refers to the content of the news and the nature of its events and actors. There are twelve factors in this class:

- (1) *Negativity* can be regarded as the basic news value. It means that the negative – damage, injury, death, disasters, accidents, conflicts, wars, etc. – makes the news. It is difficult to say why negativity should be of such significance: there is no natural reason why negative events should be more newsworthy than positive events (Fowler 1991: 16). Perhaps it has psychological reasons: what is forbidden, taboo, 'off-limits', etc. appeals simply because of its illegitimacy. By consuming what they are not allowed to commit, newsreaders might experience some kind of vicarious satisfaction (*Ersatzbefriedigung*). Other potential reasons are mentioned by Galtung and Ruge (1965: 69f). An exception and counter-balance to negativity can be found in the 'feelgood' stories of the popular press (Conboy 2002: 174).
- (2) *Recency* means that the news concerns things that have only just happened. The more recent, the more newsworthy an event is.
- (3) *Proximity* concerns the geographical closeness of events. People are interested in what happens close to them, in their town, their city, their region, their country.
- (4) *Consonance* relates to the extent to which a story fits in with stereotypes (frames) about the events and people portrayed in it. Events will be

seen in terms of these preconceptions when they deviate from expectation.

- (5) *Unambiguity* says that the more clear-cut a news story is, the more it is covered.
- (6) *Unexpectedness* means that the rare, the unexpected, the 'new' factors are covered.
- (7) *Superlativeness* says that the bigger, the faster, the more destructive, the more violent, the more *x* the better. News stories often concern these superlatives.
- (8) *Relevance* concerns the importance of the story for the news audience. This need not be the same as proximity, since decisions may be made in Moscow or Washington that turn out to be relevant to many countries in the world besides Russia or the USA.
- (9) *Personalization* indicates that news stories that are personalized attract the audience more than the portrayal of generalized concepts or processes. This aspect is most striking in the popular press, and works to promote straightforward feelings of identification, empathy or disapproval (Fowler 1991: 15).
- (10) *Eliteness* refers to the status of the news actors. Reference to elite persons (politicians, film stars) or elite nations of the First World are judged more newsworthy than reference to ordinary people or non-elite nations.
- (11) *Attribution* concerns 'the eliteness of a story's sources' (Bell 1991: 158). Sources that are backed by affiliation with some organization/institution are socially validated authorities and are preferred to unaffiliated individuals.
- (12) *Facticity* is the degree to which a news story contains facts and figures, thus seeming to make it objective 'hard news'.

The second class, *values in the news process*, concerns the news process as such. According to Bell there are six factors in this class:

- (1) *Continuity* means that stories that are covered in the news tend to stay there, in other words: 'news breeds news'.
- (2) *Competition* concerns many aspects of the news process. Newspapers strive for 'exclusives', stories are in competition with each other, and journalists compete with their colleagues.
- (3) *Co-option* means that 'not-so-newsworthy' stories can be presented in terms of a highly newsworthy story to which they are tangentially related and thus gain newsworthiness.
- (4) *Composition* concerns the preference of news editors for a mixture of different kinds of news and some common threads. If a bulletin is all overseas news, a domestic story may be covered, which would otherwise not be newsworthy.
- (5) *Predictability* is important for the news process in as far as a pre-scheduled event is more likely to be covered than an unexpected one. This is in paradox with value six above, unexpectedness.

- (6) *Prefabrication* relates to the fact that the existence of ready-made texts (written inputs), which journalists can use in writing their story, increases the chances of events appearing in the news.

The third class, *values in the news text*, relates to the quality of the news text. These values are of great importance in the process of news editing (Bell 1991: 56ff). There are three factors in this class:

- (1) *Clarity* means that news stories should not be confused or inexplicit, but unambiguous and clear.
- (2) *Brevity* indicates that news stories should not be longer than their content warrants. Otherwise they lose news value.
- (3) *Colour* suggests that news stories should highlight emotionally relevant aspects (Ungerer 1997: 318).

News values explain what makes news. They are of great importance in deciding *what* gets covered and *how* it gets covered, i.e. concerning the selection and presentation of news stories. Two principles seem to be at work: (1) news stories are more newsworthy if they register on more than one factor, and (2) lack of one factor can be compensated for by possessing another (Galtung and Ruge 1965: 71f). These news values, of course, vary across cultures and across media (McNair 1994: 34), and will become very significant in helping to explain the kinds of evaluations that occur in news stories (Chapters 5, 6 and 7).

Notes

1. On the history of the popular press, or the 'Yellow Press' as it is sometimes called, see McNair (1994: 160ff) and Conboy (2002). In Britain the tabloid emerged in the beginning of the twentieth century (Sparks 2000: 17, but see also Schneider 2000). Strictly speaking, the term *tabloid* refers to the small format of the respective newspapers. However, nowadays even some quality papers have adopted the tabloid format (*The Independent*, *The Times*) so that this strict definition does not apply any more. In its extended sense, *tabloid* rather refers to a type of newspaper that is characterized by a variety of features, some of which are listed below. Although the proposals below are consistent in identifying certain publications as either tabloids or broadsheets, it must be pointed out that 'there is no very clear definition of what a tabloid might actually be' (Sparks 2000: 9).
2. I agree with Jucker (1992: 47) that the terms *popular* and *quality* are problematic because they imply certain value judgements about these types of newspapers. I nevertheless employ these terms simply to have readily available synonyms for *the broadsheets* and *the tabloids*.

3 Delimiting evaluation

In this chapter I will look in more detail at what evaluation actually is and show how it contrasts with a number of other approaches that overlap with it. I shall consider notions such as affect, subjectivity, modality, hedging, evidentiality, commitment and the use of the term *evaluation* in relation to narrative structure and clause relations.¹ The chapter also discusses competing terms like *stance* and *appraisal* and parameter-based approaches to evaluation.

3.1 Affect

The relationship between evaluation and affect is far from straightforward. The connection between the two notions has for instance been pointed out by Thompson and Hunston (2000: 2). However, whereas evaluation deals with the expression of opinion, the term *affect* is mostly used to talk about the expression of emotions and feelings. The manifold studies of language and affect (e.g. Athanasiadou and Tabakowska 1998a, 1998b, Besnier 1990, Caffi and Janney 1994, Harkins and Wierzbicka 2001, Janney 1996, Kövecses 1998a, 1998b, Labov 1984, Ochs 1986, Ochs and Schieffelin 1989, Palmer and Occhi 1999, Ungerer 1997, Wierzbicka 1992) differ widely in their approach and focus, and are in some way connected to the parameter of EMOTIVITY (the expression of speaker approval or disapproval), iff approval/disapproval is considered an emotion rather than an opinion.² However,

- there is no implication that the evaluation which is expressed by speakers relates to their ‘real’ feelings about what they are talking about
- emotive evaluation excludes expressions of the general emotional state of speakers, or their personality
- evaluation is not concerned with the question of how far speakers are ‘emotionally engaged’ in discourse
- with EMOTIVITY, speakers do not ‘express’ their emotions, but rather evaluate things in terms of how good and bad they are in their view
- evaluation is not concerned with establishing which kinds of expressions may be used to arouse or provoke the hearer’s emotions.

Consequently, affect should not be considered a 'type' of evaluation (as in Thompson and Hunston 2000) but rather a broad cover term for various approaches analysing the relationship between language and emotion.

3.2 Subjectivity

Evaluation is also connected to the notion of subjectivity (derived from Benveniste's 1966/1971 observations on subjective features of language and introduced by Lyons 1977 into Anglo-American linguistics). Although there are now many competing views of subjectivity, broadly speaking, it is defined as being concerned with *self-expression*, i.e. the expression of the speaker's attitudes, beliefs, feelings, emotions, judgement, will, personality, etc. (Lyons 1982: 103, 110). Studies of subjectivity are usually concerned with three aspects of language: (1) the speaker's *perspective* as shaping linguistic expression; (2) the speaker's expression of *affect* towards the propositions contained in utterances; (3) the speaker's expression of the *modality* or epistemic status of the propositions contained in utterances (Finegan 1995: 4). In particular, studies of subjectivity are often concerned with 'the notion of the "subject" from the point of view of its incarnation as self, as speaker, and as grammatical subject' (Wright 1994: 149), i.e. with 'subjecthood' (Yaguello 1994). In this connection, these studies deal with the analysis of first-person discourse which is seen as inherently more subjective than third-person discourse (Lyons 1994: 16f), deixis in general (Adamson 1994, Lyons 1982) or tense and aspect (Wright 1994: 149, Lyons 1982). In addition, studies of subjectivity are also specifically interested in how subjectivity is encoded in language and how it interacts with linguistic structure, i.e. in subjectification/subjectivization (Stein and Wright 1995) – 'the structures and strategies that languages evolve in the linguistic realisation of subjectivity or ... the relevant processes of linguistic evolution themselves' (Finegan 1995: 1).

The difference between evaluation and subjectivity is one of emphasis and scope. Subjectivity is even more speaker-centred than evaluation and has in general been very broadly, or extensively defined (Scheibman 2002: 166). Evaluation is a less broad concept and eschews notions of perspective in the above sense as well as discussions of subjecthood or subjectivization. Consequently, subjectivity encompasses other linguistic phenomena than evaluation and differs in focus/emphasis; additionally, it may be broadened to include the speaker-hearer relationship. Thus, Scheibman mentions a kind of 'interactive, or empathetic, subjectivity on the part of the speaker towards the addressee' (Scheibman 2001: 85), in that speakers express a subjective construal of hearers' agentivity and personalize their utterances in relation to hearers.

Despite these differences, there is still a great deal of overlap between the two notions of evaluation and subjectivity, especially in individual linguists' assumptions of subjectivity. It might hence be argued that the study of evaluation could be seen as being part of the greater study of subjectivity.

However, it seems rather more fruitful to discuss it on its own terms because this provides a sharper perspective.

3.3 Modality, hedging, evidentiality and commitment

Whereas the notions that have been elaborated on so far are all more related to emotional/emotive values, the approaches examined here (modality, hedging, evidentiality, commitment) deal mostly with epistemic values.

Approaches to modality are far too manifold and complex to discuss here in detail; this alone would fill a book.³ Depending on how modality is defined, the relation between studies of modality and studies of evaluation varies greatly. I concentrate here only on the widespread distinction within modality between epistemic, deontic and dynamic modality. Broadly speaking, epistemic modality conveys the speaker's degree of confidence in the truth of the proposition, deontic modality is defined as 'the possibility or necessity of acts in terms of which the speaker gives permission or lays an obligation for the performance of actions at some point in the future' (Hoye 1997: 43), and dynamic modality is mainly concerned with the ability and volition of subjects as well as with some kinds of objective possibility (Palmer 1995a, Perkins 1983, Hoye 1997). As far as the evaluative framework established in this book and its respective parameters are concerned, epistemic modality is related to the parameter of RELIABILITY, deontic modality is connected to the parameter of POSSIBILITY/NECESSITY and dynamic modality has similarities with both the parameter of POSSIBILITY/NECESSITY (ability) and the parameter of MENTAL STATE (volition). These parameters are discussed below (Chapter 4).

Hedging, like modality, is used in various ways in linguistics.⁴ The term has, for instance, been employed in connection with *hedged performatives* (Lakoff 1972, Stubbs 1986, Brown and Levinson 1987). The definition has been further developed by linguists working on hedges and stance in academic discourse; here also, there has been little consensus on what hedges are said to denote (Crompton 1997: 280). In some frameworks, *hedging* would seem to be 'a catch-all term for an assortment of features noticed in academic writing' (Crompton 1997: 286). As such, the notion is at the same time broader (it includes IF-clauses and time adverbials which are usually excluded from evaluation) and narrower than evaluation (it is mostly restricted to expressions of the parameter of RELIABILITY). In other frameworks, *hedging* seems to be used as a competing term for epistemic modality (Hyland 1994, Crompton 1997). Here there is an overlap only with the evaluative parameter of RELIABILITY.

The concept of evidentiality is a relatively new one. Initially, the concept originated with the early Americanists (Boas, Sapir, Swadesh, Hoijer), but the term *evidential* was probably introduced by Roman Jakobson (1957) as a provisional label for a verbal category that indicates the source of the information on which a speaker's statement is based (Jacobsen 1986: 3–7,

Bybee and Fleischman 1995b: 13). However, it was only in the mid- to late 1980s that a swell in interest in evidentiality occurred (e.g. Givón 1982, Chafe and Nichols 1986, Willet 1988), which has resurged in the mid- to late 1990s (Comrie 2000: 1) – for example, Hill and Irvine (1993b), DeLancey (1997), Johanson and Utas (2000). Evidentiality and markers of evidentiality, evidentials, are nowadays defined in diverse ways, but, broadly speaking, two main approaches can be distinguished.

In a narrow definition, which takes Jakobson's discussion of evidentials as a springboard for the description of evidentiality, 'evidentials express the kinds of evidence a person has for making factual claims' (Anderson 1986: 273). Included are linguistic forms that mark the speaker's source of knowledge: as something seen, inferred, heard or told (see e.g. Du Bois 1986, Hill and Irvine 1993a).

However, the term *evidential* has come to '[cover] much more than the marking of evidence per se' (Chafe and Nichols 1986: vii). In a broad definition, evidentiality involves various 'attitudes towards knowledge' (Chafe 1986: 262) and evidence in this approach is only one of the epistemological considerations that are linguistically encoded (Chafe 1986: 262). Evidentiality in this sense is concerned with matters of truth, certainty, doubt, reliability, authority, confidence, validity, circumstantial inference, evidence, confirmation, surprise and expectedness (Chafe and Nichols 1986, Caffi and Janney 1994, Stubbs 1996).

The first, narrow definition of evidentiality has in fact been taken as a springboard for establishing the parameter of EVIDENTIALITY in my proposed evaluative framework. This parameter includes the speaker's evaluations of the source of his/her knowledge. However, unlike much of the linguistic research involving evidentiality, the parameter of EVIDENTIALITY is not restricted to the *grammatical* expressions of the writer's source.

The broad definition of evidentiality has been developed for English by Chafe (1986). For him evidentiality includes marking the reliability of the speaker's knowledge, marking the source of knowledge (as evidence, language or hypothesis), the mode of knowing (as belief, induction, hearsay or deduction) and marking the matching of knowledge against the verbal resources that are employed by speakers or against discourse expectations. Although I believe that it is better not to broaden the notion of evidentiality unnecessarily, the categories proposed by Chafe are nevertheless useful in terms of my approach. Table 3.1 lists the equivalence of Chafe's categories and the parameter-based approach to evaluation.

As becomes evident, all of the phenomena mentioned by Chafe (1986) are included in the framework of evaluation. The main differences are: (1) the evaluative parameter of EVIDENTIALITY is restricted to the marking of evidence/source; (2) all (epistemic) modal expressions (MUST, SHOULD, WOULD) are regarded as primarily evaluating the RELIABILITY of propositions rather than marking the speaker's evidence; (3) the parameter-based classification of what Chafe calls 'modes of

Table 3.1 Chafe's categories of evidentiality and the parameter-based approach

Chafe (1986)		Evaluation
<u>reliability</u>	MAYBE, PROBABLY, CERTAINLY, MIGHT, MAY, POSSIBLY, UNDOUBTEDLY, SURELY	RELIABILITY
markers of <u>belief</u>	<i>I think, I guess, I suppose</i>	EVIDENTIALITY: BELIEF
markers of <u>induction</u>	MUST, SEEM, EVIDENTLY	RELIABILITY (MUST); EVIDENTIALITY: PERCEPTION (SEEM); EVIDENTIALITY: PROOF (EVIDENTLY)
markers of <u>hearsay</u>	<i>people say, they say, I've been told, Sarah told me</i>	EVIDENTIALITY: HEARSAY
markers of <u>deduction</u>	SHOULD, PRESUMABLY, CAN, COULD, WOULD	RELIABILITY
source of knowledge: markers of <u>sensory evidence</u>	SEE, HEAR, FEEL	EVIDENTIALITY: PERCEPTION
matching knowledge against <u>verbal resources</u>	SORT OF, KIND OF	RELIABILITY/STYLE
matching knowledge against <u>expectations</u>	OF COURSE, ODDLY ENOUGH, IN FACT, ACTUALLY, AT LEAST, EVEN, ONLY, BUT, HOWEVER, NEVERTHELESS	EXPECTEDNESS

knowing' is more refined and includes various sub-categories not mentioned by Chafe (cf. Chapter 4); (4) evaluating the language-knowledge match as well as evaluating expectedness are regarded as phenomena different from evidentiality and express parameters in their own right.

Finally, commitment (Stubbs 1986, 1996) refers to

ways in which language is used in communication, to express personal beliefs and adopt positions, to express agreement and disagreement with others, to make personal and social allegiances, contracts, and commitments, or alternatively to disassociate the speaker from points of view, and to remain vague or uncommitted.

(Stubbs 1986: 1)

Markers of commitment include modal verbs, adjectives, adverbs, nouns and lexical verbs: reported speech (and mentioning propositions in general), sources of propositions (e.g. *according to*), performative verbs (e.g. ADVISE), hedged performatives (modal plus performative verb, e.g. *I would advise you that p*), illocutionary nouns and other parts of speech (e.g. SUGGESTION), hedges (e.g. SO-CALLED), vague language (e.g. *things like that*), simple versus *-ing* forms of verbs, private verbs (e.g. BELIEVE), ergative verbs, logical and pragmatic connectors (e.g. BECAUSE), sentence adverbs (e.g. FRANKLY), passivization, presuppositions, nominalization, SOME and ANY, past tense forms (e.g. *I did wonder if I might ask you a favour*), tag questions and even morphologically encoded connotations of nouns (e.g. AUNT vs. AUNTIE).

As such, evaluation is both a broader and a narrower concept than commitment. On the one hand, it excludes vague language and other features that are included by Stubbs; on the other hand, it includes evaluations along a number of parameters not mentioned by Stubbs.

3.4 Evaluation and narrative structure/clause relations

So far, I have conveniently ignored the fact that the term *evaluation* itself is also employed in different ways within linguistics. Apart from the fact that it is often invoked in its non-technical, everyday sense, as a nominal derivation of *to evaluate*, i.e. 'to assess or form an idea of the amount, quality or value of sb/sth' (OALD), it is also used in a technical sense by various linguists to refer to positive and negative judgements, rather than as a cover term for evaluation along a range of different parameters (e.g. Vestergaard 2000, Caffi and Janney 1994, Thetela 1997). In addition, the term *evaluation* is used in connection with narrative structure and clause relations. (In order to distinguish better between the use of *evaluation* in this paper and its use by other linguists, I will use underlining (evaluation) when referring to their concepts.)

Thus, evaluation is an important category in analyses of narrative structure. In such studies (e.g. Ramage 1994, Toolan 1988, Bamberg 1991, Bell 1991) its use is based on Labov and Waletzky's (1967), Labov's (1972), or Labov and Fanshel's (1977) observations on the elements of narrative structure. For Labov (1972: 362–70), a fully formed oral narrative consists of six elements: the abstract, the orientation, the complicating action, the evaluation, the result and the coda. Evaluation is defined as 'the means used by the narrator to indicate the point of the narrative, its *raison d'être*: why it was told, and what the narrator is getting at' (Labov 1972: 366). Evaluation is hence regarded as an extremely important element of narrative, forestalling the question 'so what?' It comprises all those means that are 'used to establish and sustain the *point*, the contextual significance and tellability, or reportability of a story' (Toolan 1988: 156). Although evaluation in this sense and respective evaluative means overlap to some

degree with the notion of evaluation, this is a rather specialized use of the term which need not concern us any further, because it is beyond the scope of this study to include an analysis of the narrative structure of news stories in terms of Labov's categories. In any case, this has already been undertaken by Bell (1991: Chapter 8; see also Fairclough 1995a: 91ff).

Evaluation is also invoked as a technical category where clause relations are concerned. The analysis of clause relations, 'the logical connections that readers perceive between clauses and which give texts their coherence' (Thompson and Hunston 2000: 28), is closely connected with both Winter's (e.g. 1982, 1994) and Hoey's (e.g. 1983, 2000) research. As they note, there are several kinds of relations between clauses, one of them, 'the most fundamental relation in discourse organization' (Hoey 2000: 32), being situation-evaluation:

For purposes of illustration, we can take the element Situation to represent a question which the encoder asks of him/herself: 'What/who am I talking about (in this Situation)?', the element Evaluation as 'What do I think about it?', 'How do I feel about it?' and 'How do I see/interpret it?'

(Winter 1994: 57)

In other words, the situation clause gives a description, whereas the evaluation clause tells us something about the writer's thoughts, feelings and interpretations in connection with this situation. Thus, evaluation is a function of a clause. While acknowledging the importance of such approaches (e.g. Bolívar 2001) and while, in theory, believing that evaluation in connection with clause relations should be part of the larger concept of evaluation, the present book is not concerned with patterns of clausal relations. This being the case, no more will be said about evaluation in this sense.

3.5 Stance

There are even more overlaps between evaluation and the two notions introduced in this section and the following, namely, *stance* and *appraisal*. These are therefore examined in more detail, because they will be referred to throughout the present study. In this context I shall also address the question of why one of these approaches has not simply been adopted as a methodological tool instead of establishing a new framework of evaluation. In other words: what makes a new theory of evaluation necessary?

Biber and Finegan's (1988, 1989), Biber *et al.*'s (1999) and Conrad and Biber's (2000) notion of stance is very closely related to the concept of evaluation as employed in this book. In their earlier work (Biber and Finegan 1988), *stance* is defined as the overt expression of the speaker's attitudes, feelings, judgements, or commitment concerning his/her message, including the indication of the speaker's degree of commitment towards the truthfulness of the message. Here (Biber and Finegan 1988) they are primarily concerned with adverbials (adverbs, prepositional

phrases or adverbial clauses), distinguishing between six categories of stance (manner of speaking, approximation, conviction/certainty, actuality/emphasis, possibility/likelihood, attitude). Other markers of stance include modals and ‘opinion’ or ‘perception’ verbs. These are discussed in Biber and Finegan (1989), which broadens the analysis to lexical and grammatical markers of stance, and where stance is defined as the lexical and grammatical encoding of both evidentiality and affect (speakers’ emotions, feelings, moods, etc.):




Figure 3.1 Stance I

In Biber *et al.* (1999) and in Conrad and Biber (2000), the notion of stance is broadened to include three general categories: epistemic stance and attitudinal stance (as before) and, in addition, style stance:




Figure 3.2 Stance II

Epistemic stance includes speakers’ comments on the certainty, doubt, reliability, or limitations of a proposition (including comments on the source of information) and is thus related to both modality and evidentiality. Attitudinal stance conveys speakers’ attitudes, feelings or value judgments, including both evaluations and emotions of all kinds (Biber *et al.* 1999: 974), although they acknowledge that ‘the distinction between attitudes and emotions is often fuzzy’ (Biber *et al.* 1999: 974). Style stance is concerned with ‘speaker/writer comments on the communication itself’ (Biber *et al.* 1999: 975) – for example, comments on the manner in which the information is being presented as expressed by adverbs such as HONESTLY, LITERALLY and BRIEFLY (Conrad and Biber 2000: 60).

Research on stance represents an invaluable contribution to the analysis of evaluation: *stance* is in fact a competing term for *evaluation* (used in many studies of Academic English), and there is no reason other than practical considerations why we should not employ the term *stance* rather than *evaluation*. As Thompson and Hunston (2000) point out, the term *evaluation* has great syntactic and morphological flexibility, which allows the analyst to talk about the *values* ascribed to entities and about *evaluated* propositions (as well as about speakers that *evaluate*), etc. However, there are also some basic differences between evaluation and stance in that, for example, *style stance* is not always recognized as an evaluative category in research on evaluation, and in that other devices identified in research on evaluation are apparently not included as stance markers (e.g. the marking of con-

trust). In some conceptions of stance, the notion includes a relation akin to *involvement* (e.g. Hyland 1999), which is more related to affect than evaluation in my view. Furthermore, stance is not a very fine-grained framework; it has a different (more grammatical) focus; and it is usually (though not exclusively) associated with large-scale, semi-automated corpus analyses (e.g. Biber and Finegan 1988, 1989, Biber *et al.* 1999, Conrad and Biber 2000, Charles 2003), a methodology that is only satisfying to some degree where evaluation is concerned (Chapter 1).

3.6 Appraisal

Appraisal theory works within the framework of Halliday's (e.g. 1994) systemic functional linguistics (SFL), and is the result of research over a period of about 15 years undertaken by a group of researchers led by J. R. Martin (www.grammatics.com/appraisal/index.html). By now there is a large body of SFL research using the appraisal system (e.g. Christie and Martin 1997, Coffin 1997, Eggins and Slade 1997, Iedema *et al.* 1994, Macken-Horarik and Martin 2003, Martin 1995, 1997, 2000, 2003, Martin and White 2004, 2005, Rothery and Stenglin 2000, White 1998, 2000, 2001a, 2001b, 2001c, 2001d, 2001e, 2001f, 2002, 2003a, 2003b, 2004a, 2004b).⁵ Starting from the assumption that texts are essentially ambiguous, but position and reposition readers in certain ways, systemic-functional linguists focus on what they call *appraisal resources* (the linguistic devices of expressing appraisal). The notion of appraisal involves 'resources for modalising, amplifying, reacting emotionally (affect), judging morally (judgement) and evaluating aesthetically (appreciation)' (Martin 1995: 28). In SFL terms, the appraisal system realizes tenor at the level of discourse semantics (Martin and White 2005: 31) and is constituted by three semantic categories: Attitude, Engagement, and Graduation, with further sub-divisions:




Figure 3.3 The appraisal system

Attitude is concerned with 'values by which speakers pass judgements and associate emotional/affectual responses with participants and processes' (White 2001a: 1), with the three sub-systems of Affect, Judgement

and Appreciation. Affect systems characterize phenomena by reference to emotion:

Affect (emotion): *I'm happy, She's proud of her achievements, he's frightened of spiders*

Moreover, Affect includes not only 'authorial AFFECT but also emotional responses attributed to other social actors' (White 2001a: 10), as, for example, in:

Has Pauline Hanson been to Footscray? Is she aware of its **proud** tradition of struggle and hard work? Does she know about the waves of immigrants who have worked in its quarries, factories, workshops and businesses? Immigrants who have been part of the backbone of Australia's labour force and **thankful** for the opportunity to work and start a new life in this country (*The Australian*, 4/6/97).
(White 2001a: 11, original emphasis)

Judgement systems consist of resources for morally evaluating human behaviour, by reference to a set of norms:

Judgement (ethics: evaluating behaviour): *a brutal tyrant, a skilful performer, don't be cruel*

Judgement is subdivided in two broad categories: judgements of social esteem (normality, capacity, tenacity) and judgements of social sanction (veracity, propriety). These can be positive or negative judgements (speakers express admiration or criticism) and were developed in analogy to modality (Martin and White 2005: 54) (Table 3.2).

Appreciation systems include resources used to evaluate the (aesthetic) quality of processes and products (and human beings when they are seen as entities, and when they are not evaluated in terms of their emotions or behaviour):

Appreciation (aesthetics: evaluating text/process/phenomenon):
It's a fantastic book (cf. Martin 2000: 145f)

Like Affect and Judgement, Appreciation also has a positive and negative dimension; it is organized around three variables: Reaction, Composition, Valuation (Table 3.3). Reaction concerns the impact of the text/process on our attention (reaction: impact) and its emotional impact (reaction: quality). Composition concerns perceptions of proportionality/balance (composition: balance) and detail (composition: complexity) in a text/process. Valuation has to do with our assessment of the social significance of the text/process.

Table 3.2 Judgement categories

Social Esteem	positive [admire]	negative [criticise]
normality (custom) 'is the person's behaviour unusual, special, customary?'	standard, everyday, average . . . ; lucky, charmed . . . ; fashionable, avant garde . . .	eccentric, odd, maverick . . . ; unlucky, unfortunate . . . ; dated, unfashionable . . .
capacity 'is the person competent, capable?'	skilled, clever, insightful . . . ; athletic, strong, powerful . . . ; sane, together . . .	stupid, slow, simple- minded . . . ; clumsy, weak, uncoordinated . . . ; insane, neurotic . . .
tenacity (resolve) 'is the person dependable, well disposed?'	plucky, brave, heroic . . . ; reliable, dependable . . . ; indefatigable, resolute, persevering . . .	cowardly, rash, despondent . . . ; unreliable, undependable . . . ; distracted, lazy, unfocussed . . .
Social Sanction	positive [praise]	negative [condemn]
veracity (truth) 'is the person honest?'	honest, truthful, credible . . . ; authentic, genuine . . . ; frank, direct . . . ;	deceitful, dishonest . . . ; bogus, fake . . . ; deceptive, obfuscatory . . .
propriety (ethics) 'is the person ethical, beyond reproach?'	good, moral, virtuous . . . ; law abiding, fair, just . . . ; caring, sensitive, considerate . . .	bad, immoral, lascivious . . . ; corrupt, unjust, unfair . . . ; cruel, mean, brutal, oppressive . . .

(White 2002: 12)

Graduation is concerned with values by which (1) a speaker 'graduates' (increases or diminishes) the intensity, or force of an utterance and (2) 'by which they graduate (blur or sharpen) the focus of their semantic categorisations' (White 2001a: 2). It thus has two sub-categories: Force and Focus:

Force (intensity):	<i>slightly, somewhat, very, completely</i>
Focus (category membership):	<i>I was feeling kind'o woozy, they effectively signed his death warrant</i>

Table 3.3 Appreciation categories

	Positive	Negative
<i>Reaction</i> : impact 'did it grab me?'	arresting, captivating, engaging	dull, boring, tedious
<i>Reaction</i> : quality 'did I like it?'	lovely, beautiful, splendid	plain, ugly, repulsive
<i>Composition</i> : balance 'did it hang together?'	balanced, harmonious, symmetrical	unbalanced, discordant
<i>Composition</i> : complexity 'was it hard to follow?'	simple, elegant, intricate	ornamental, extravagant, simplistic
<i>Valuation</i> 'was it worthwhile?'	challenging, profound, original	shallow, insignificant, conservative

(after Martin 2000: 160)

Force corresponds to Martin’s (2000: 147f) amplification system, used for upgrading and downgrading evaluations and indicating how strongly we feel something. Focus is included in Graduation because it works to ‘up-scale’ and ‘down-scale’ intensity and ‘can be seen as the domain of the application of scales of intensity to ungraded categories’ (White 2001a: 8).

Engagement systems adjust a speaker’s commitment to what he or she is saying (Martin 2000), and are related to what has traditionally been described as epistemic modality. It concerns

the linguistic resources which explicitly position a text’s proposals and propositions inter-subjectively. That is, this set of rhetorical resources is concerned with those meanings which vary the terms of the speaker’s engagement with their utterances, which vary what is at stake interpersonally both in individual utterances and as the texts unfolds cumulatively.

(White 2001a: 8)

Engagement (resources for positioning the speaker’s voice): *I suppose*
... *I don’t think* ...

Engagement has been elaborated in connection with Bahktin’s (e.g. 1981) notions of heteroglossia and intertextuality (e.g. White 2000) and is sub-divided into heteroglossic options and monoglossic options (Figure 3.4) corresponding to the choice between the ‘bare’ declarative and all other choices. Appraisal theory sub-divides these two basic options further (for a full account see White 2002, 2003a, 2003b, 2004b, and Martin and White 2005).

One of the important distinctions that is made in appraisal theory is between inscribed (or explicit) and evoked (or implicit) appraisal (Affect,

Monoglossic (undialogized)

Assertion: *The behaviour of the Government and the police . . . was disgraceful*
 Presumption: *After nine years of the government's betrayal of the . . . agenda*

Heteroglossic (dialogized)

Dialogic contraction:

Disclaim:

Deny: *There's nothing wrong with meat, bread and potatoes* (negation)
 Counter: *yet, but, although, amazingly, surprising* (concession/counter expectation)

Proclaim:

Concur:

Affirm: *naturally, of course, obviously*
 Concede: *admittedly*
 Pronounce: *I contend, the truth of the matter is, there can be no doubt that . . .*
 Endorse: *X has demonstrated that, X has compellingly argued . . .*

Dialogic expansion:

Entertain:

perhaps, probably, may, will, must, in my view, I suspect/think, it seems, apparently, the evidence suggests, I hear

Attribute:

Acknowledge: *X said, X believes, according to X*
 Distance: *X claims that, the myth that, it's rumoured that*

Figure 3.4 Engagement

Judgement, Appreciation) (White 2001a: 12).⁶ Inscribed appraisal concerns instances where 'the evaluation is overtly "inscribed" in the text through the vocabulary choice' (White 2001a: 6), as in lexical expressions such as *skillfully, corruptly, lazily* (White 2001a: 6) or *aberrant* (White 2001a: 13). With evoked appraisal, the appraisal values are triggered by 'tokens' of appraisal, i.e. 'superficially neutral, ideational meanings which nevertheless have the capacity in the culture to evoke judgemental responses (depending upon the reader's social/cultural/ideological reader position)' (White 2001a: 6) – for example, a token for a judgement of negative capacity is the assessment that *the government has not laid the foundations for long term growth* (White 2001a: 6). In fact, the distinction is far from clear-cut and a cline between explicit and implicit evaluation is involved (White 2004a), although the dichotomy is theoretically valid. Concerning evoked judgements, the 'central dilemma' (Martin 1995: 33) (of appraisal analysis) is the question of how much of the ideational meaning in a text is read as evoking judgements: any text can be read judgementally. Appraisal systems are thus relatively open-ended (Martin 1995).

To sum up, *appraisal* as the cover-term for Attitude, Graduation and Engagement is employed in a similar way to *evaluation*. It reveals the significance of context and the interpersonal character of evaluation as well as the communicative importance of evaluation itself: it 'is given full value . . . as a vital part of the meaning negotiation that is at the heart of all communication' (Hunston and Thompson 2000: 143). Furthermore, the

theory is interested in objectives that are similar to the objectives of studies on evaluation: among others, to research the language by which speakers express ideological positions, explicit and implicit value patterns in 'objective' texts, and correlations between parameters of appraisal/evaluation (in appraisal theory e.g. probability, attribution, causality, negation; in this study the proposed parameters of evaluation) (White 2001a: 4). The contribution of appraisal theory to the study of evaluation can hardly be overestimated, since it provides the only systematic, detailed and elaborate framework of evaluative language. However, there are some potential drawbacks concerning its application.

Firstly, it appears to me that appraisal is very much rooted in SFL and also couched in these terms. For analysts (and students) unfamiliar with the theory it is not easily accessible. A goal of the present book is to develop an approach which uses an eclectic perspective, which tries to provide a synthesis of various approaches, and which does not require an exclusive commitment to, or a detailed prior knowledge of, any one particular theory of grammar.

Secondly, while agreeing with many of the suggestions made by appraisal theory, there are others which require some attention, in particular:

- The inclusion of both authorial and non-authorial expressions of emotion in one and the same category/system (Affect). For me, this somewhat blurs the important distinction between

I love linguistics (expressing writer approval; 'linguistics is good')
and

S/he loves linguistics (writer approval not clear).

Non-authorial expressions of emotion are not part of evaluation proper, which is concerned with the expression of the *speaker's* attitude per se.

- There is no separate parameter for IMPORTANCE; instead, it seems to be included as Appreciation (Valuation), although importance does not necessarily relate to the good-bad parameter.
- The sub-division of Attitude into three different systems of Affect, Judgement and Appreciation. This can be seen as problematic in terms of actual text analyses. As White himself acknowledges, the distinction between Judgement and Appreciation is a fine one (White 2001b: 4) and there are also connections between Affect and Appreciation (White 2001b: 3). In any case, for me the crucial issue is whether writer approval or disapproval is expressed, whether via Affect, Judgement or Appreciation. Although appraisal has closed a gap within the study of evaluation by providing a very fine-grained sub-classification of the Attitude system and by pointing out the differences 'in construal' involved with the three sub-systems of attitude (e.g. White 2002: 7f), for my purposes such a sub-classification would complicate matters unnecessarily. The methodological aim is to reduce the number of parameters as much as possible, without blurring important differences. All of the values involved in the above semantic dimensions (Affect,

Judgement, Appreciation) occur as either positive or negative (White 2001a: 7), and are hence reasonably reducible to the one parameter of EMOTIVITY. (The common aspects of these three sub-categories are of course recognized by appraisal theory which groups them under one label, Attitude, and regards Judgement and Appreciation as recontextualizations of Affect).

- The fact that, as far as I understand it, appraisal theory does not appear to work as well with expressions of deontic and dynamic modality such as:

... *our aid, naturally, must be theirs* (presumably analysed as Engagement: Entertain, though it is also regarded as closely connected to Judgement: Propriety; Martin and White 2005: 55, 110–11);
 ... *that there can be no winners but only the loss of innocents* (related to Judgement: Capacity).

Such cases are included as POSSIBILITY/NECESSITY evaluations in my framework, but are regarded by appraisal theory as part of interpersonal grammar rather than appraisal (even though the two notions are positioned on a cline and such expressions are connected to judgements of propriety and capacity; Martin and White 2005: 55).

- That expressions of counter-expectation are included both as Judgement (Normality, e.g. NORMAL, ODD, etc.) and as Engagement (Counter, e.g. SURPRISING, BUT; Deny: negation) (e.g. White 2002). It may be argued that evaluations of expectedness are fundamentally different from evaluations of Judgement (although they can evoke it), since they do not automatically carry with them meanings of approval or disapproval (that something is *surprising* can be good or bad), and it is also arguable whether negations and contrasts involve the notion of dialogicity more than they involve the notion of unexpectedness. It might be necessary to consider evaluations of expectedness per se in order to explore the notion in more detail. In earlier appraisal theory some evaluations of unexpectedness seem to be included as indirect means of disendorsement, under which writers ‘distances [sic] themselves from the utterance, indicating that they take no responsibility for its reliability’ (White 2001c: 2). However, this conflates two different notions: the expression of distance/doubt and the expression of disapproval. Attributed propositions can be evaluated as true (reliable) or not true (unreliable), and they and their Sayers can be evaluated positively (approval) and negatively (disapproval). In the given example, *Surprisingly, McGuinness is especially scathing about the ‘chattering classes’, of which he has long been a member*, there is no evaluation of unreliability, but there is, perhaps, an evoked evaluation of disapproval towards McGuinness.
- Within Engagement I find problematic that hearsay markers such as *apparently, is said to, I hear* (entertain) are not considered as attributions (e.g. White 2003b: 274, 281f) on the grounds that the Sayer is not

specified, as well as for grammatical reasons (White 2001a: 23f). However, expressions such as *the myth that, it's rumoured that* which similarly do not involve specific Sayers *are* included as attributions (attribute: distance) (White 2002: 17). (This problem has been recognized by the most recent outline of appraisal theory where the category of attribution now includes hearsay expressions such as *reportedly* and *it is said that* (Martin and White 2005: 112).)

- Similarly, I think it is questionable whether expressions such as *X compellingly argued* should be included in the same category as *naturally, of course, there can be no doubt that* (proclaim) rather than including it with attributions (e.g. White 2003b: 272). This classification seems to blur the distinction between explicit attribution (*X has said, shown, claimed that*) and non-attributions (*naturally, there can be no doubt that*). In other words, why not simply distinguish three categories of attribution:

Attribution	{	endorse:	<i>X has compellingly argued that</i>
		acknowledge:	<i>X said that</i>
		distance:	<i>X claims that</i>

In earlier approaches this appears to be the case (e.g. White 2001c), but it seems to have been abandoned in more recent approaches, where the focus is more on the extent to which 'an utterance ... actively makes allowances for dialogically alternative positions and voices (**dialogic expansion**), or alternatively, acts to challenge, fend off or restrict the scope of such (**dialogic contraction**)' (Martin and White 2005: 102, original emphasis). Martin and White discuss this issue to some extent, concluding that

[t]here may well be analytical contexts where we want to group together all externally-sourcing propositions on the one hand and all internally-sourcing propositions on the other hand. The dialogistically oriented typology ... is only structured as it is to enable us to explore a particular set of issues.

(Martin and White 2004: 17)

These problematic areas as well as the fact that appraisal is an ongoing research project 'with some of its analytical typologies still having the status of proposals or hypotheses requiring further investigation and testing' (White 2002: 3) suggest that evaluative frameworks outside systemic functional linguistics can and should be developed to provide alternative accounts of evaluation without denying the importance and value of the work that is being done within SFL. One such alternative account is provided by the new parameter-based framework of evaluation which is the subject of Chapter 4. In this framework I try to combine approaches to evaluation involving the theoretical notions of attribution and averral (e.g. Hunston 2000) with the kind of distinctions that have been pointed out by

appraisal theory and the different types of evidence that are mentioned in research on evidentiality. Before the establishment of this framework, however, it is necessary to make some remarks on approaches to evaluation which might likewise be considered 'parameter-based'.

3.7 Parameter-based approaches to evaluation

As Thompson and Hunston (2000) state, notions like modality and affect – which they classify as 'the two main types of evaluation' (Thompson and Hunston 2000: 20),⁷ can either be treated as separate phenomena (emphasizing the differences between them) or regarded as aspects of the same phenomenon (emphasizing the similarities between them and subsuming both under a single label) (Thompson and Hunston 2000: 4f). This basic dichotomy has also become apparent in the above delimitation of evaluation: broadly speaking, the discussed notions (affect, subjectivity, modality, commitment, stance, appraisal) essentially differ in whether they more or less focus on one aspect of evaluation (e.g. affect, modality, commitment) or whether they include different phenomena (e.g. subjectivity, stance, appraisal). Approaches which could be classified as 'parameter-based' in this respect fall into the 'combining' category, in that a variety of different types of evaluation are included as *evaluative parameters*.

There are several approaches to evaluation that distinguish between different kinds of evaluation, although most do not employ the term *parameter* to refer to them. A few of these approaches have already been encountered above. For instance, appraisal theory distinguishes between three 'axes' or 'systems' (White 1998: 75) of evaluation: *Attitude*, *Graduation*, and *Engagement*, and stance is divided into three 'domains' (Conrad and Biber 2000: 57) of stance: *epistemic stance*, *attitudinal stance* and *style stance*. Additionally, in earlier approaches to adverbial stance we find six 'semantic categories' (Biber and Finegan 1988: 3) of stance:

- manner of speaking: *honestly* adverbials, e.g. TRUTHFULLY, FRANKLY
- approximation, generalization, typical or usual case: *generally* adverbials, e.g. BRIEFLY, BROADLY, ROUGHLY
- conviction or certainty: *surely* adverbials, e.g. CERTAINLY, SURELY
- actuality, emphasis, greater certainty/truth than expected: *actually* adverbials, e.g. ACTUALLY, REALLY
- possibility, likelihood, questionable assertions, hedging: *maybe* adverbials, e.g. MAYBE, PERHAPS, POSSIBLY
- attitudes towards the content independent of its epistemological status: *amazingly* adverbials, e.g. CURIOUSLY, APPROPRIATELY, SADLY, ODDLY, IRONICALLY

(Biber and Finegan 1988)

Other parameter-based approaches include Francis (1995), Thompson and Hunston (2000) and Lemke (1992, 1998). Francis (1995) suggests that 'we evaluate clausally-encoded situations ... within several quite

well-defined parameters' (Francis 1995: 8) and mentions eight 'main parameters of evaluation' (Francis 1995: 9):

- Modality: IMPOSSIBLE (THAT); INCONCEIVABLE; UNLIKELY; IMPROBABLE; UNCERTAIN; QUESTIONABLE; DEBATABLE; POSSIBLE (THAT); CONCEIVABLE; LIKELY; PROBABLE; CERTAIN; SURE
- Ability: EASY; POSSIBLE (TO); HARD; DIFFICULT; IMPOSSIBLE (TO)
- Importance: IMPORTANT; NECESSARY; ESSENTIAL; VITAL; IMPERATIVE
- Predictability: SURPRISING; EXTRAORDINARY; ASTONISHING; AMAZING; STRANGE; NATURAL; UNSURPRISING; INEVITABLE
- Obviousness: OBVIOUS; CLEAR; EVIDENT: SELF-EVIDENT; UNCLEAR
- Value and appropriacy: WONDERFUL; BETTER; BEST; GOOD; WORTH; RIGHT; LEGITIMATE; APPROPRIATE; FITTING; ENCOURAGING; INTERESTING: EXCITING: NICE; WRONG; ILLEGAL; UNFORTUNATE
- Rationality: REASONABLE; FAIR; ABSURD; RIDICULOUS; STUPID
- Truth: TRUE; UNTRUE; FALSE

She observes that

what is interesting . . . is that these parameters are not thought up: they are generated by concordances of a single syntactic structure. There are a few adjectives which do not fit very well into any category, like *ironic* and *fashionable*, but these eight parameters account for the vast majority of all the occurrences of introductory *it* with an adjective.

(Francis 1995: 9)

Since the new framework established below (Chapter 4) includes all of these parameters in one way or another, this point cannot be emphasized enough: the validity of the parameter-based framework of evaluation is supported by research such as Francis's, whose categories are not established on an *a priori* basis but emerge from the analysis of large-scale corpus data (i.e. are corpus-driven and not corpus-based in Tognini-Bonelli's 2001 terms).

Thompson and Hunston (2000) mention four 'parameters' of evaluation: a good-bad/positive-negative parameter, a certainty parameter, an expectedness/obviousness parameter and a relevance/importance parameter (Thompson and Hunston 2000: 22ff). However, these parameters are said to be reducible to just one parameter, namely, the good-bad parameter, since, as they say, a certain knowledge claim is regarded as a good knowledge claim, and discourse that is coherent (i.e. expected/obvious) and important is judged to be 'good' discourse (Thompson and Hunston 2000: 25f).⁸

Finally, Lemke (1998, an extension of Lemke 1992) is the approach that

was most relevant to the establishment of my framework. He distinguishes between seven ‘dimensions’ (Lemke 1998: 36) of ‘attitudinal meaning’ (Lemke 1998: 33) or ‘evaluative semantic relations’ (Lemke 1998: 36):

- DESIRABILITY/INCLINATION [sic] (D)
It is simply *wonderful* that John is coming/that John may come.
It is really *horrible* that John is coming/that John may come.
- WARRANTABILITY/PROBABILITY (W)
It is quite *possible* that John is coming/that John may come.
It is very *doubtful* that/whether John is coming.
- NORMATIVITY/APPROPRIATENESS (N)
It is quite *necessary* that John come/is coming.
It is entirely *appropriate* that John come/is coming.
- USUALITY/EXPECTABILITY (U)
It is quite *normal* that John is coming/may come.
It is highly *surprising* that John is coming/may come.
- IMPORTANCE/SIGNIFICANCE (I)
It is very *important* that John is coming/may come.
It is really quite *trivial* that John is coming/may come.
- COMPREHENSIBILITY/OBVIOUSNESS (C)
It is perfectly *understandable* that John is coming/that John may come.
It is quite *mysterious* that John is coming/why John is coming.
- HUMOROUSNESS/SERIOUSNESS (H)
It is just *hilarious* that John is coming/that John may come.
It is *ironic* that John is coming/may come.
It is very *serious* that John is coming/may come.

(Lemke 1998: 37)

Lemke (1998) himself is interested ‘not so much in refining or disputing these semantic categories themselves as in understanding how we make meanings of these general kinds in extended, connected discourse’ (Lemke 1998: 40).

However, none of these ‘parameter-based’ approaches seem broad enough to capture all aspects of the complex phenomenon that is evaluation.⁹ In the next chapter I attempt to establish a new framework that aims to do so. This framework is both theory-driven (i.e. it takes into account previous research into different types of evaluation and tries to develop these further) and text-driven (i.e. it derives from the actual analysis of naturally occurring data which guided the establishment of the framework, in particular the various sub-values). In this sense, the methodology for establishing the framework is essentially dialogic.

Notes

1. Looking at evaluation from a historical point of view, it can ultimately be traced back to research on potential functions of language by Marty (1908), Bühler (1934) and Jakobson (1960), and hence also relates to more recent observations on functional models (Halliday 1973, Lyons 1977). However, to discuss these in detail was beyond the scope of the present study. Suffice it to say that for me evaluation clearly belongs to the interpersonal function of language. Semantic theories on emotive meaning (e.g. Leech 1974, Volek 1977, 1987 and Konstantinidou 1997) are also loosely connected to evaluation.
2. In my view it is questionable whether approval is in fact an emotion, but there is probably no strict dichotomy between the two notions. Janney (1996) suggests that adverbs such as FORTUNATELY, SADLY, REGRETTABLY can be paraphrased as 'I'm pleased/I'm not pleased' (Janney 1996: 221) and Fiehler (1990) mentions that emotions have been defined as a class of evaluations (Fiehler 1990: 118). On the distinction between affect and evaluation see also Volek (1987: 35). The notion of affect is also related to the parameter of MENTAL STATE (MENTAL STATE: EMOTION), where reference is made to the emotions of social actors other than the speaker.
3. To name but a few of the many approaches to modality: Bybee (1985), Bybee and Fleischman (1995a, 1995b), Bybee *et al.* (1994), Calbert (1975), Coates (1983), Coates and Leech (1980), Halliday (1970, 1994), Hermerén (1978), Høye (1997), Kiefer (1994, 1998), Ljung (1996), Lyons (1977), Nuyts (2001a), Palmer (1979, 1995a, 1995b, 2001), Perkins (1983), Quirk *et al.* (1985), Sanders and Spooren (1997), Simpson (1993), Traugott (1995), Winter and Gardenfors (1995).
4. In this section I do not discuss the term *hedge* (as based on Lakoff 1972) – see Chapter 6.3.
5. In the following outline I focus mainly on more recent research, thereby disregarding to a certain extent earlier establishments of the framework which partly differ from the more recent approaches. A full and up-to-date account of appraisal theory is provided by Martin and White (2005). It must be pointed out that Martin and White (2005) had not been published at the time the analyses in this book were undertaken, and when the parameter-based framework was established.
6. In this book I shall consistently use the term *evoked* appraisal/evaluation, although the term *invoked* is also employed in appraisal theory (e.g. White 2002: 6, Martin and White 2005). Additionally, White (1998: 105f, 2001d: 5) mentions *provoked* appraisal (which lies in between inscribed and evoked appraisal), a distinction not taken up elsewhere, and disregarded in this book where I only distinguish between inscribed and evoked evaluation/appraisal (but see Bednarek 2006c). Martin and White (2005: 67) make even more distinctions (inscribed, invoked, provoked, invited, flagged, and afforded attitude).

7. In fact, as noted above, it is perhaps better not to talk about modality and affect as being 'types' of evaluation: *modality* and *affect* are rather cover terms for a variety of linguistic approaches that overlap only to some extent with the study of evaluation. Epistemic modality could also be considered as a *means* of expressing the parameter of RELIABILITY, rather than as a parameter or a type of evaluation in itself.
8. Hunston (1994) concentrates on 'three kinds' (Hunston 1994: 193) of evaluation in academic discourse: status (certain–uncertain), value (good–bad) and relevance (important–unimportant). However, she points out that 'status is not the same as certainty nor value the same as the good–bad parameter. Rather, we might interpret status and values as functions, not parameters of evaluation' (Hunston 2000: 197).
9. Approaches to adverbial (and adjective) classification which could also have been considered in this section, e.g. Greenbaum (1969), Halliday (1994) or Dixon (1991), are not specifically concerned with establishing kinds of *evaluation*. Thetela (1997) lists usefulness, control, significance and certainty as four parameters of evaluation, but these are restricted to academic research articles. One might also mention Graham's (2003) 'evaluative dimensions' and Vestergaard's (2000) types of 'Assessives', i.e. illocutions 'whose truth can . . . not be established by empirical investigation, and which ultimately rely on human assessment' (Vestergaard 2000: 158ff).

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4 A new theory of evaluation

4.1 The parameter-based framework of evaluation

This chapter introduces the main features of a new, parameter-based theory of evaluation, which is based on the assumption that there are different parameters along which speakers can evaluate aspects of the world. This approach is hence very much a *combining* approach (Chapter 3). After all, what speakers are talking about can be evaluated in relation to a wide range of norms: do we feel that what we are talking about is ‘good news’ or ‘bad news’, do we evaluate the information we have as reliable or unreliable, is what we are talking about presented as expected or unexpected, obvious or surprising, important or unimportant, appropriate or inappropriate, etc.? In my view, these questions are all related to the phenomenon of evaluation. In other words, to employ a parameter-based framework of evaluation is not meant to imply that what we are concerned with are separate phenomena; it is still *one* phenomenon, that of evaluation, that is examined.

I suggest that there are (*at least*) nine parameters along which speakers can evaluate aspects of the world – though these parameters are rather different in kind (see below). Each of the proposed parameters involves a different dimension along which the evaluation proceeds, and includes what I call sub-*values*, which either refer to the different poles on the respective evaluative scale (core evaluative parameters) or to different types of the parameter (peripheral evaluative parameters) (Figure 4.1).

This framework of evaluation aims at a synthesis of the various parameter-based approaches introduced in Chapter 3 in a variety of ways (see Appendix 2).

On the one hand, it takes into account basic *similarities* between evaluations, for instance between those that indicate different degrees of RELIABILITY (e.g. Biber and Finegan’s *maybe* and *surely* adverbials) or those that all involve writer approval/disapproval (e.g. Francis’s rationality, value, appropriacy). On the other hand, it also acknowledges basic *differences* between evaluations, for instance between evaluations of IMPORTANCE, EXPECTEDNESS, COMPREHENSIBILITY and EMOTIVITY, which are sometimes

PARAMETER	VALUES: examples
Core evaluative parameters:	
COMPREHENSIBILITY	COMPREHENSIBLE: <i>plain, clear</i> INCOMPREHENSIBLE: <i>mysterious, unclear</i>
EMOTIVITY	POSITIVE: <i>a polished speech</i> NEGATIVE: <i>a rant</i>
EXPECTEDNESS	EXPECTED: <i>familiar, inevitably</i> UNEXPECTED: <i>astonishing, surprising</i> CONTRAST: <i>but, however</i> CONTRAST/COMPARISON: <i>not, no, hardly, only</i> (negation)
IMPORTANCE	IMPORTANT: <i>key, top, landmark</i> UNIMPORTANT: <i>minor, slightly</i>
POSSIBILITY/NECESSITY	NECESSARY: <i>had to</i> NOT NECESSARY: <i>need not</i> POSSIBLE: <i>could</i> NOT POSSIBLE: <i>inability, could not</i>
RELIABILITY	GENUINE: <i>real</i> FAKE: <i>choreographed</i> HIGH: <i>will, be to</i> MEDIUM: <i>likely</i> LOW: <i>may</i>
Peripheral evaluative parameters:	
EVIDENTIALITY	HEARSAY: [he said it was] <i>'a lie'</i> MINDSAY: <i>'well done'</i> [he thought] PERCEPTION: <i>seem, visibly, betray</i> GENERAL KNOWLEDGE: <i>(in)famously</i> EVIDENCE: <i>proof that</i> UNSPECIFIC: <i>it emerged that, meaning that</i>
MENTAL STATE	BELIEF/DISBELIEF: <i>accept, doubt</i> EMOTION: <i>scared, angry</i> EXPECTATION: <i>expectations</i> KNOWLEDGE: <i>know, recognize</i> STATE-OF-MIND: <i>alert, tired, confused</i> PROCESS: <i>forget, ponder</i> VOLITION/NON-VOLITION: <i>deliberately, forced to</i>
STYLE	SELF: <i>frankly, briefly</i> OTHER: <i>promise, threaten</i>

Figure 4.1 Parameters of evaluation

disregarded (e.g. Biber and Finegan 1988, Conrad and Biber 2000, appraisal theory). Evaluating something as important, comprehensible or expected is fundamentally different from evaluating it as good or bad (even

though the respective evaluations may ‘evoke’ positive or negative evaluation). If something is important, comprehensible, or expected this is not automatically good. For instance, if *an important omission* is mentioned in a book review this is usually regarded as bad (I am indebted to Nick Groom for pointing out this example). Or consider the following examples where a behaviour is evaluated as expected and bad:

- She threw her hands into the air. ‘That is just *typical* of you, isn’t it?’ (COBUILD, emphasis mine)
- ‘*Typical!*’ Hattie slammed down the receiver. ‘Absolutely *typical!*’ (COBUILD, emphasis mine)

In academic English, too, evaluations of EXPECTEDNESS can be used to evoke positive evaluation (Thompson and Hunston 2000: 25) as well as negative evaluation – compare the use of phrases such as *Surprisingly . . .* and *This is in line with findings by . . .* – and can also be employed more or less neutrally:

- The starting point of this chapter is probably *unexpected* – it is that most actual examples are unrepresentative of the pattern of the word or phrase for which they are chosen (Sinclair 1991: 99, emphasis mine). → more neutral
- The classic reference for corpus word-class tagging is Johansson (1986), *strangely* overlooked in Garside *et al.* (op. cit.) (Sinclair 1998, emphasis mine). → more negative

Similarly, evaluating something as expected is different from evaluating it as obvious (contrast Thompson and Hunston’s parameter of obviousness/expectedness). Expressions such as CURIOSLY, FUNNILY, STRANGELY, UNEXPECTEDLY, ODDLY ENOUGH, SURPRISING, SURPRISINGLY all primarily seem to denote EXPECTEDNESS rather than obviousness, whereas expressions like OBVIOUSLY, EVIDENTLY and APPARENTLY all make reference to the kind of *evidence* a speaker has for drawing a certain conclusion and primarily involve another dimension, namely that of EVIDENTIALITY.

Furthermore, the framework also takes into account non-combining approaches to evaluation, specifically research into evidentiality and develops this as a parameter of evaluation with various sub-types. Additionally, it encompasses all kinds of evaluation that have so far been identified in research,¹ including STYLE (only proposed by research into stance), MENTAL STATE (partly proposed by appraisal theory in Affect) and POSSIBILITY/NECESSITY (only proposed by Lemke).

The framework adopted here is also broader than some of the above-mentioned in that it includes not only evaluations of propositions (as e.g. in Francis 1995) but evaluations concerning all kinds of aspects: participants, processes, circumstances, events, actions, entities, states of affairs, situations, discourse, etc.; in short, everything that *can* be evaluated. The linguistic means that are used for evaluations are called *evaluators*, following

Lemke (1998), who defines them as 'lexicogrammatically segmentable elements of a text which function, as a whole, to evaluate' (Lemke 1998: 41) along one or more of the evaluative parameters established above.

The central question is whether these parameters are in general exhaustive. As far as the corpus at hand is concerned, this seems to be the case. However, research into different genres might point to additional parameters of evaluation. The parameter-based framework of evaluation is hence to be regarded as an *open-ended* approach, and in its present form allows the simple addition of more parameters as research into evaluation progresses. Both this open-endedness, and the fact that the parameters, as we will see below, can be *combined* in order to express complex evaluations, give this approach much more flexibility than competing notions such as stance and appraisal.

4.2 Core evaluative parameters

An important distinction that has so far only been touched upon is the difference between what might be called *core* and *peripheral* evaluative parameters.² Core evaluative parameters relate to evaluative qualities ascribed to the entities, situations or propositions that are evaluated, and involve evaluative scales with two poles, but also potential intermediate stages between them (on the scalar nature of evaluation cf. also Hunston 1993, Lemke 1998, Malrieu 1999). As a consequence, evaluative meanings can be located on a cline of low to high force/intensity. On the one hand, this is sometimes directly reflected in the language in that we find expressions of different 'intensity' such as: *good-great-brilliant/bad-horrible-disastrous* (EMOTIVITY), *unexpectedly-surprisingly-astonishingly* (EXPECTEDNESS), *important-vital* (IMPORTANCE), *allowed-supposed-required* (POSSIBILITY/NECESSITY), *possible-probable-certain* (RELIABILITY). In appraisal theory, this is called 'implicit scaling for intensity' (White 2001a: 26). On the other hand, intensifying and focusing adverbs (*slightly, somewhat, rather, really, very, completely*, etc.) as well as other intensifying expressions (e.g. *a great deal of*) can be used to express different degrees of the concepts involved, as in, for example, *it's incomprehensible – it's completely incomprehensible*. This notion of scaling is related to the concepts of emphasis, intensity and Graduation and is regarded as a dimension of affect (Janney 1996) and appraisal (Martin 2000). However, 'scaling for intensity provides for a broad semantic which operates *trans-systematically*' (White 2001a: 28, emphasis mine); it 'can be seen as an interpersonal coloration or tonality across the APPRAISAL [here: evaluation] system' (White 1998: 109). Intensity is thus *not* considered as a 'parameter' of evaluation in the framework adopted here, but rather as a *modulator* of evaluation. Moreover, there is no appropriate methodology available for identifying the exact position of an evaluator on an evaluative scale. (This is why, in the empirical analysis, the evaluators are classified as belonging to one of the two *poles* on the scale (e.g. as POSITIVE or NEGATIVE) rather than categorizing them according to their evaluative

intensity. For these reasons I will not examine the occurrence of intensity systematically in the corpus, but rather note it wherever it seems particularly significant. A disadvantage of this approach is that the distinction of evaluators in terms of intensity could be potentially very interesting where the tabloid–broadsheet distinction is concerned. Only with RELIABILITY was it possible to distinguish between *three* positions on the scale: LOW, MEDIAN and HIGH.)

The following parameters can arguably be regarded as core evaluative parameters: COMPREHENSIBILITY, EMOTIVITY, EXPECTEDNESS, IMPORTANCE, POSSIBILITY/NECESSITY and RELIABILITY, though more research is necessary into the parameters of POSSIBILITY/NECESSITY and RELIABILITY to ascertain their status. I shall now comment on these parameters in turn, outlining some of the theoretical and methodological aspects involved in their establishment.

Evaluations of COMPREHENSIBILITY have to do with the extent to which writers evaluate entities, situations or propositions as being within or beyond the grasp of human understanding. COMPREHENSIBILITY is treated as a broad notion comprising the related concepts of vagueness and explicitness (what is vague is less easily comprehensible, what is explicit is more easily comprehensible), expressed, for example, by *ambiguously*, *vague*, *complex*. It also includes the concepts of mental ‘clarity’ (e.g. *clarify*, *unclear*), inexplicability, and mystery, together with unsolved problems as well as states of affairs which are unknown to us, and which hence remain mysterious (e.g. *uncanny*, *inconsistencies*, *questions over*, *no explanations as to why*, *mysterious*). Such evaluations are situated on a cline ranging from more or less COMPREHENSIBLE to more or less INCOMPREHENSIBLE:

- *It was unclear* [COMPREHENSIBILITY: INCOMPREHENSIBLE] last night why Mr Burrell, 45, failed to make the letter available to the French judge who investigated the death of Diana and Dodi Fayed in a car crash in a Paris road tunnel in August 1997. (Times 5)
- In the second paragraph of the document, written in October 1996, Diana explained in the *plainest* [COMPREHENSIBILITY: COMPREHENSIBLE] possible language that she was convinced of the plot to mastermind an accident. (Mirror 5)

The parameter of EMOTIVITY is concerned with the writer’s evaluation of aspects of events as good or bad, i.e. with the expression of writer approval or disapproval. Evaluations of EMOTIVITY are situated on a cline ranging from more or less POSITIVE (POLISHED, STOUTLY) to more or less NEGATIVE (FANATIC, PERVERSE).

- They *showed ’em* [EMOTIVITY: POSITIVE]: Iain Duncan Smith with wife Betsy after his conference *tour de force* [EMOTIVITY: POSITIVE] (Mail 1)
- But some visibly flinched as he *stooped to* [EMOTIVITY: NEGATIVE] *gutter* [EMOTIVITY: NEGATIVE] politics with *vicious* [EMOTIVITY: NEGATIVE] *personal attacks* [EMOTIVITY: NEGATIVE] on political opponents. (Mirror 1)

In terms of methodology, EMOTIVITY is probably the most problematic of all parameters. Emotive meaning is not easily objectively verifiable or recognizable (there are no standardized procedures to identify such meaning), and its analysis is often highly subjective, even more than that of evaluative meaning in general. The reason for this is that emotive meaning is a very complex phenomenon involving different clines.

Firstly, there is a cline between EMOTIVITY and non-EMOTIVITY: certainly, lexical items such as CONFUSION, KILL, DAMAGE, BOMB, etc. have negative meaning; they have been described as ‘disaster vocabulary’ (Ungerer 1997: 315), and their paraphrases may even involve evaluative expressions (e.g. DAMAGE: ‘To **damage** something means to cause it to become less good, pleasant, or successful’, COBUILD, underlining mine). But if there was a bomb in Iraq and this bomb caused damage and killed people, such ‘negative’ lexical expressions must be used in the reporting of this event. Mentioning that a bomb killed 100 people in Iraq does not automatically and expressly tell us that the writer disapproves of this event (though this may in general be assumed). Similarly, labels such as OFFENCE or CRIME describe socially defined activities (and are thus highly dependent on society, culture and time), and can be regarded as originating not in the speaker but in ‘the institutionalised legal process’ (White 1998: 131). Such descriptions and labels are hence not strictly evaluative, although they may evoke an evaluative or emotional (Ungerer 1997) reaction of readers. However, as soon as some marked degree of higher intensity or emotion is involved with such descriptive labels, as in ASSASSIN, MAYHEM or MURDER, lexical expressions do seem to express the writer’s opinion and become evaluative – the difficulty is to say when this is the case (cf. also White 1998: 130):

evaluation ←————→ non-evaluation

Secondly, there is a related cline between explicit/inscribed and implicit/evoked EMOTIVITY (see Chapter 3 for this distinction):

inscribed evaluation ←————→ evoked evaluation

As White (2004a) has shown, there is a large range of variability in emotive expressions, a variability which is crucially dependent on the context in which they occur, and which provides some evidence against assuming a strict dichotomy of explicitness and implicitness. He concludes:


I am proposing, therefore, that rather than making a clear-cut distinction between explicit and implicit evaluation, we work with a notion of degrees of attitudinal saturation. The more limited the semantic variability of the term the more saturated it is, the less limited the semantic variability, the less saturated.

(White 2004a: 2f)

For example, the evaluation expressed by lexical items such as DISGRACEFUL, BRUTALLY or SHAM is quite stable compared to that of expressions

such as SINGLE-HANDEDLY, which varies enormously depending on the context. Accordingly, DISGRACEFUL would be considered as more saturated than SINGLE-HANDEDLY (White 2004a). Moreover, implicit evaluations 'are highly subject to reader position – each reader will interpret a text's tokens of judgement according to their own cultural and ideological positioning' (White 2001a: 13). As Martin has pointed out, implicit evaluation 'creates something of a coding nightmare' (Martin 2003: 173) for linguists.

Thirdly, there is a cline regarding the difference of emotive evaluators in terms of intensity or force: to take one example which Thompson and Hunston (2000) mention: '*execution, assassination, killing, murder, and slaughter* may all be used to describe the same incident, but the sense of moral outrage increases with each successive noun' (Thompson and Hunston 2000: 17f). To classify evaluators only according to whether they express 'goodness' or 'badness' is thus to falsify the actual discourse semantics to some extent. On the other hand, there is no scientifically valid method (yet) to enable an exact analysis of emotive evaluators, i.e. to put them on a specific position on this cline:



Fourthly, there is a cline in the amount of ideational and interpersonal meaning expressed in an emotive evaluator. This concerns the difference between expressions such as BEAUTIFUL, WRONG, UGLY which are said to be purely interpersonal, and expressions that have ideational as well as interpersonal meaning, such as the much-quoted examples of TERRORIST, GUERRILLA and FREEDOM FIGHTER. Such lexical items have been called 'hybrid' signs (Volek 1987: 28), because they combine both symbolic and indexical meaning (discussed in Lyons 1977: 99ff, Konstantinidou 1997: 86ff).

Fifthly, there is a cline in the degree of speaker involvement of evaluations of EMOTIVITY. Evaluators may refer to states of affairs that are (un)pleasant not for the writer but for someone else. In such cases the writer provides some sort of evaluation, but is not 'affected' (Hunston and Sinclair 2000: 99) by (or involved in) the (un)pleasantness of what is evaluated. For example:

They turned out to be a nuisance for match anglers.

(Hunston and Sinclair 2000: 99)

Here it is not clear whether the writer thinks that *they* are a nuisance for him/her as well. Although an evaluation of some kind is expressed I suggest that such cases are ultimately very different from instances where the writer is clearly involved in expressing his/her negative opinion.

Sixthly, there is a cline of 'accessibility to intuition', i.e. a cline concerning the question in how far emotive meanings are accessible to native speaker intuition. For instance, the negative/positive emotive meaning of 'emotionally charged' (Löbner 2002: 34) terms of address such as IDIOT, BASTARD, DARLING, HONEY are easily recognizable to readers, whereas other emotive evaluations are more subtle and less easily identifiable. A case in point is the difference between ASSIST, HELP, INTERFERE, MEDDLE, COLLUDE, COLLABORATE, ENGAGE, JOIN und PARTICIPATE, which are all 'concerned with being involved in something or taking part in an activity' (Francis *et al.* 1996: 198), but differ considerably in their evaluation of this involvement: ASSIST and HELP evaluate the involvement as good, or positive, INTERFERE and MEDDLE evaluate it as bad, or negative and COLLABORATE, ENGAGE, JOIN and PARTICIPATE do not evaluate the involvement at all (Thompson and Hunston 2000: 17). As Stubbs notes, interpretations of emotive connotations often diverge (Stubbs 2001: 153). The problem is that subtle emotive meanings may not be captured in the analysis, precisely because they are not easily recognizable by the researcher. The methodological decisions taken with regards to the classification of EMOTIVITY in view of these complex problems are presented in Chapter 5.

The parameter of EXPECTEDNESS involves the writer's evaluations of aspects of the world (including propositions) as more or less EXPECTED or UNEXPECTED. As with COMPREHENSIBILITY, I have adopted a broad approach to this parameter, and include notions of (un)expectedness in various guises (classified as EXPECTED/UNEXPECTED), such as (counter) expectation (e.g. *astonishing, stunning, unprecedented*), usuality (*unusually, routine*), familiarity (*familiar*), strangeness (*bizarrely, curious*), contrastive/unexpected emphasis (*fully, no fewer than*) and 'actuality' (*as it is, in the event*). These notions are present to greater and lesser degrees in the meanings of the evaluators (which I call *expectationals*) in this group. I also regard CONTRAST (e.g. *but, although*) as well as CONTRAST/COMPARISON (negation) as values of EXPECTEDNESS, while excluding addition signals (e.g. *additionally, also, further*) as well as *and* and *because* (but see Thompson and Hunston: 2000: 9). This is because much research has pointed out that the notions of contrast and concession are linked to expectations. Thus, already in 1934 Bühler notes how ABER is connected to expectation (referring to the example sentence *Er fiel um aber sprang wieder auf/He fell down but jumped up again*):

Ein solches *aber* setzt im Hörer ein Weiterdenken voraus und korrigiert oder bremst; es spricht zum Hörer ungefähr so: 'vielleicht hast du erwartet, daß der Gestürzte liegen blieb? Nein, sondern . . .' (Bühler 1934: 409).

This *aber* presupposes the hearer's inferences and corrects them or slows them down; it talks to the hearer, telling him something like: 'perhaps you expected him to remain lying on the ground? No, but . . .' (translation mine).

Similarly, Quirk *et al.* (1985) comment in connection with BUT: 'The contrast may be in the *unexpectedness* of what is said in the second conjoin in view of the content of the first conjoin' (Quirk *et al.* 1985: 935, emphasis mine), and in connection with concessive clauses they mention that these 'indicate that the situation in the matrix clause is *contrary to expectation* in the light of what is said in the concessive clause' (Quirk *et al.* 1985: 1098, emphasis mine).

In a similar way, much research suggests that negation – which I regard as expressing both a contrast with and a comparison to an alternative (positive) position (hence the classification as CONTRAST/COMPARISON) – is an important device for expressing evaluation along the parameter of EXPECTEDNESS: 'It has repeatedly been pointed out . . . that negation . . . is used to reflect the contrast between the expected and the unexpected, between what is assumed to be the case and the unexpected deviation from this assumption' (Bublitz 1992: 567).

Hence, negative statements are generally used to express something unusual, unexpected or unpredictable about a situation and are regarded as indicators of frames or schemas in cognitive linguistics (Tannen 1993, Shanon 1981). The classification of contrast and negation as part of EXPECTEDNESS is also supported by appraisal theory, where contrast is classified as part of counter-expectation, and where both counter-expectation and denial (negation) are considered as expressing the same category (Disclaim) of Engagement. Similarly, Biber *et al.* comment that '[n]egation and contrast are closely related concepts' (Biber *et al.* 1999: 82) and that both negation and the adversative conjunction BUT are 'devices to deny or counteract the expectations of those involved in dialogue' (Biber *et al.* 1999: 1047). However, both CONTRAST and CONTRAST/COMPARISON could arguably be regarded as *peripheral* rather than *core* evaluative sub-values. Since they are clearly linked to evaluations of unexpectedness, I nevertheless consider them to belong to the core evaluative parameter of EXPECTEDNESS. Examples are:


- The killer blow began when General John de Chastelain, head of the international decommissioning body, delivered an *unexpectedly* [EXPECTEDNESS: UNEXPECTED] brief and vague report on the IRA's latest disarmament. (Mail 6)
- English football has had better weeks. Even by the increasingly outrageous standards of the national side, this week has become a circus. *Little wonder that* [EXPECTEDNESS: EXPECTED] Sven-Göran Eriksson's yearning to return to club management seems to grow with each passing day. (FT 10)
- England manager Sven Goran Eriksson was also said to be seething about the decision. *But* [EXPECTEDNESS: CONTRAST] publicly he would only say that he would have to 'accept orders' and that Ferdinand's exclusion was 'a pity'. (Mail 10)

- Margaret MacDonald, who turned 44 yesterday, was given *no* [EXPECTEDNESS: CONTRAST/COMPARISON] chance to comment on the sentence which convicted her of ‘aggravated procuring for the purposes of prostitution’. (Guardian 8)

Evaluations along the parameter of IMPORTANCE evaluate the world (and discourse about it) according to the speaker’s judgement of its status in terms of importance, relevance and significance. As before, I have adopted a broad conceptual approach to the parameter of IMPORTANCE: it includes notions of stardom/famousness (*celeb, famous, celebrity, superstar*), influence/authority (*empire, leading, senior, top*), significance (*significant*), importance (*crucial, crunch, decisive, do-or-die, high-profile, high-rolling, historic, key*), as well as related notions (*climactic, exclusive, hot, showdown, emergency*). In this broad sense, evaluations of IMPORTANCE evaluate aspects of the reported event situated on a scale ranging from IMPORTANT to UNIMPORTANT:

- A *significant* [IMPORTANCE: IMPORTANT] weather vane among MPs, Mr Yeo claimed it had only been a ‘very small number of people who have been conspiring’. (Guardian 1)
- He provides no detailed explanation of which reports are incorrect and which *insignificant* [IMPORTANCE: UNIMPORTANT]. (COBUILD)

The parameter of POSSIBILITY/NECESSITY deals with what has traditionally been described as deontic or dynamic modality, i.e. with the writer’s evaluation of what is (not) necessary or (not) possible.³ The two notions (possibility and necessity) are in fact closely connected and can be associated with the same parameter because they are logically related: ‘It is not possible for you to leave’ is logically equivalent to ‘It is necessary for you not to leave/to stay’ (on logical relations and modality see Lyons 1977: 787, Coates 1983: 19f, Palmer 2001: 90ff). Semantically, and conceptually, possibility and necessity are located on a scale:



Examples of evaluations of POSSIBILITY/NECESSITY are:

- ... and this is how it *should* [POSSIBILITY/NECESSITY: NECESSARY] be: Pelé acting as an ambassador for the sport on a visit to Newcastle yesterday (Times 10)
- ‘She *didn’t need* to [POSSIBILITY/NECESSITY: NOT NECESSARY] tell us that she’d been to see Marlette in New York.’ (COBUILD)

- Britain's word *can* [POSSIBILITY/NECESSITY: POSSIBLE] still be of value in some parts of the world (Coates 1983: 90)
- His *inability* [POSSIBILITY/NECESSITY: NOT POSSIBLE] to answer a number of questions and his insistence that Labour MP James Plaskitt was 'wrong' – when it turned out his calculations were right – prompted Labour MP Angela Eagle to accuse him of 'barefaced cynicism'. (Express 4)

However, not all instances of POSSIBILITY/NECESSITY appear to be equally evaluative, and what is sometimes called *objective* modality (Lyons 1977) is better excluded from the analysis. Indicating deontic modality, a sentence such as *Alfred must be unmarried* can be paraphrased as 'Alfred is obliged to be unmarried' (objective) or 'I (hereby) oblige Alfred to be unmarried' (subjective) (Lyons 1977: 793). In other words, the central question is 'whether or not the modal in question involves the speaker in the utterance' (Verstraete 2001: 1509), whether the speaker is the 'deontic source' (Lyons 1977: 843) (for a different conception of subjective modality see Perkins 1983: 101–102, Halliday 1994: 355, Sanders and Spooren 1997: 107). Examples of objective modality are reports of permissions or obligations that seem to involve no speaker subjectivity, and are hardly instances of speaker evaluation:

- In it, she says: 'This particular phase of my life is the most dangerous – X (she names someone who *cannot* be identified for legal reasons) is planning "an accident" in my car. Brake failure & serious head injury in order to make the path clear for Charles to marry.' (Mail 5) (LEGAL REASONS)
- Her escorts were under *no obligation* to have sex and *could* cancel a date at any point. (Telegraph 8) (REPORTED OBLIGATION/ PERMISSION)
- England *must* win or draw Saturday's match in Turkey to qualify automatically for next year's European Championships. (Mail 10) (RULE)

Expressions of modality that refer to a news actor's ability (dynamic modality) have also been disregarded in the analysis, for example:

- Her mastery of languages, including Japanese, Arabic and Greek, *enabled* her to communicate with a wide-range of high-rolling clients, while her time at Reims management school rounded out her business education. (FT 8)
- Police sources were *unable* to say last night if either Dica's wife or children had become infected. (Mail 3)
- His *inability* to answer a number of questions and his insistence that Labour MP James Plaskitt was 'wrong' – when it turned out his calculations were right – prompted Labour MP Angela Eagle to accuse him of 'barefaced cynicism'. (Express 4)

However, such instances have affinities to evaluations of MENTAL STATE: they are comments on the ability or capacity of news actors, and can hence evoke negative evaluation, as in the final example above. As Hunston (p.c.) has pointed out, they can often act as a signal that some kind of evaluation is going on.

Just as evaluations of POSSIBILITY/NECESSITY are related to deontic and dynamic modality, evaluations of RELIABILITY are connected to what is generally described as epistemic modality, i.e. to matters of reliability, certainty, confidence and likelihood. The parameter of RELIABILITY goes beyond this, however, to include both the writer's evaluation of the reliability of a proposition and his/her evaluation of the genuineness of an entity or entities. There are hence five values subsumed under this parameter: FAKE, GENUINE, LOW, MEDIAN, HIGH:

- The sense of shock felt among Britain's senior police officers yesterday was *genuine* [RELIABILITY: GENUINE]. (Independent 7)
- Scores of defiant delegates sat on their hands rather than be whipped into a mood of *artificial* [RELIABILITY: FAKE] enthusiasm. (Sun 1)
- The Conservative party left its annual conference last night divided over whether to ditch Iain Duncan Smith as leader before Christmas, as rebels and loyalists geared up for a febrile weekend of politicking that *could* [RELIABILITY: LOW] determine his fate (FT 1)
- Dica's lawyers said they would appeal, and the case is *likely to* [RELIABILITY: MEDIAN] go to the Lords. (Independent 3)
- 'If she made about £100,000 in a year, after advertising, phone and travel costs, the poor woman was left with barely £5,000.' That is *certainly* [RELIABILITY: HIGH] not a view shared by the French police (Mail 8)

The first two values (FAKE/GENUINE) refer to the evaluation of the 'genuineness' of entities – writers evaluate aspects of reported events as real (e.g. *genuine, real*) or artificial (e.g. *artificial, choreographed, fake*). The remaining values (LOW, MEDIAN, HIGH) refer to the evaluation of the likelihood of propositions being true and have been adopted from Halliday (1994). He names three variables of modal judgements,⁴ one of them being the 'VALUE that is attached to modal judgement' (Halliday 1994: 358), which may be high (CERTAIN, MUST), median (PROBABLE, WILL) or low (POSSIBLE, MAY). Again, it is a scale or continuum of such meanings that we are concerned with rather than discrete values. So LOW actually means *lowest*, MEDIAN means *more or less median*, HIGH means *highest*, and even within these values, further scaling would be possible (if not practicable in terms of methodology). Furthermore, LOW does not indicate complete writer uncertainty and HIGH does not suggest complete certainty: in fact, unmodalized propositions always express higher reliability than propositions involving evaluations of RELIABILITY (Halliday 1994: 89). Unmodalized propositions should thus actually be seen as 'represent[ing] a particular intersubjective stance' (White 2003b: 265).

4.3 Peripheral evaluative parameters

Peripheral evaluative parameters do not involve evaluative scales as such, and do not indicate the same kind of qualitative evaluation of entities, situations or propositions as do core evaluative parameters. However, they do tend to occur in evaluative stretches of text, and can be related to evaluation in a variety of ways.

For example, the parameter of EVIDENTIALITY is mentioned in many studies of evaluation (e.g. in research on appraisal, stance, commitment), and evidential evaluators, or evidentials have been said to ‘*evaluate* the truth value of a sentence . . . with respect to the source of the information contained in the sentence’ (Rooryck 2001, emphasis mine). In other words, the parameter of EVIDENTIALITY deals with writers’ evaluations of the ‘evidence’ for their knowledge. In my sub-classification of EVIDENTIALITY (based on the corpus) there are six different dimensions (or sub-values) of this parameter: HEARSAY, MINDSAY, PERCEPTION, GENERAL KNOWLEDGE, (LACK OF) PROOF and UNSPECIFIED. For HEARSAY the utterance is evaluated as having been uttered by a ‘Sayer’ (Halliday 1994: 140) who is not the writer (*‘The whips will be on the phone over the weekend to all the constituency chairmen of those who have been identified as being involved in the plot,’ said one source* (Express 1)) (= quoted speech), whereas for MINDSAY the utterance is evaluated as having been thought/felt/experienced by a ‘Senser’ (Halliday 1994: 117) who is someone other than the writer (. . . ‘*and what is the use of a book,*’ *thought Alice, ‘without pictures or conversations’* (Carroll 1998: 9)) (= quoted mental experience). The value of PERCEPTION encompasses three different kinds of perception which have been reduced to one general parameter for methodological purposes: ‘mental perception’ (Greenbaum 1969: 205) (SEEM, APPEAR, LOOK), sensory perception (SEE, VISIBLY, AUDIBLY) and ‘showing’ (REVEAL, SHOW, BETRAY). Mental perception shades into sensory perception in any case, and the difference between sensory perception and showing is predominantly one of construal. With GENERAL KNOWLEDGE the propositional content of what is modified is evaluated as based on what is regarded as part of the communal epistemic background shared by the audience and the writer (FAMOUSLY, INFAMOUSLY), whereas PROOF relates to an evaluation of the sourced proposition as being based on some sort of ‘hard proof’ (PROOF THAT). The last value, UNSPECIFIED, is the most problematic. It encompasses a range of evaluators which express different evidential specifications that cannot be grouped under one functional label – for example, *it emerged that, meaning that/that means* (for other classifications of evidentiality see Chafe and Nichols 1986, Rooryck 2001):

EVIDENTIALITY: HEARSAY

He *said* they were right.

EVIDENTIALITY: MINDSAY

He *thought* they were right.

EVIDENTIALITY: GENERAL KNOWLEDGE

It’s *well known* they were right.

EVIDENTIALITY: UNSPECIFIED

It *emerged that* they were right.

EVIDENTIALITY: PERCEPTION

There are *signs* they were right.

EVIDENTIALITY: PROOF

Evidently, they were right.
(invented examples)

The different sub-values of EVIDENTIALITY thus do not directly relate to a cline of evaluative meaning, but rather refer to the different *sources* of propositions. However, these sources in turn carry evaluations of RELIABILITY, in that, for example, GENERAL KNOWLEDGE or PROOF are generally considered as more reliable sources than PERCEPTION. (This is discussed in detail in the section on EVIDENTIALITY/RELIABILITY in Chapter 6.)

The second peripheral evaluative parameter, MENTAL STATE, refers to the writer's evaluation of other social actors' mental states. Here the sub-values are associated with the different kinds of mental states actors can experience: beliefs, emotions, expectations, knowledge, wishes/intentions, etc. (see the section on EVIDENTIALITY/MENTAL STATE in Chapter 6):

- The letter is said to have been written to her butler, Paul Burrell, and was reproduced in yesterday's *Daily Mirror* after the name of the individual *suspected* [MENTAL STATE: BELIEF] by the Princess had been blacked out. (Times 5)
- But rookie officers face jail as *appalled* [MENTAL STATE: EMOTION] chiefs plan charges for hate views caught in BBC film. (Express 7)
- The day began with *high expectations* [MENTAL STATE: EXPECTATION] as No 10 announced that elections to the Stormont Assembly would be held on November 26. (Mirror 6)
- University researcher Dr Dominic Malcolm was involved in a recent study showing that nearly half of all players *knew* [MENTAL STATE: KNOWLEDGE] other pros who took recreational drugs. (Mirror 10)
- And the *weary* [MENTAL STATE: STATE-OF-MIND] PM flew back to London empty-handed, rather than chair gruelling all-night talks, after Unionists demanded proof the IRA had decommissioned its weapons. (Sun 6)
- For the conspiracy theorists who have spent six years *pondering* [MENTAL STATE: PROCESS] the significance of the missing white Fiat and the behaviour of the pursuing paparazzi pack, it was manna from a news stand – nine pages of newsprint detailing how Diana, Princess of Wales, believed she would be murdered in a staged car crash. (Independent 5)
- An asylum seeker who *deliberately* [MENTAL STATE: VOLITION] infected two women with the Aids virus was facing a long jail sentence last night. (Mail 3)
- So how did such an intelligent, cultivated and, in her youth, extremely attractive woman *end up* [MENTAL STATE: NON-VOLITION] running the world's biggest international vice ring? (Mail 8)

This parameter is clearly an instance of peripheral, or marginal evaluation: descriptions of social actors' mental states might be argued to be interpretative-descriptive, rather than evaluative (although the distinction between evaluation and interpretation may be rather difficult to pinpoint),

and are for instance excluded in Biber and Finegan's (1989) concept of stance:

we focused only on markers of stance that were direct and explicit expressions of speaker attitude, ignoring more integrated markers of attitude. Thus we counted constructions like *I fear xxx*, *it frightens me*, *I am frightened*, which directly express the speaker's own stance, but we did not investigate constructions like *it frightens her*, *he was frightened*, or *that must have been a frightening experience* because they are **primarily descriptive** rather than directly expressive of the speaker's *own* feelings, even when they give a secondary indication of those feelings.

(Biber and Finegan 1989: 97, italics in the original, emphasis mine)

It seems obvious that there is a crucial difference between reporting one's own mental state (*I love linguistics*) (which implies writer approval, and therefore combines the parameters of MENTAL STATE and EMOTIVITY; 'linguistics is good') and reporting mental states of other social actors (*She loves linguistics*) (which tells us nothing about the writer's approval or disapproval). (The former do not occur in my data, and will therefore not be discussed here.)

On the other hand, such descriptions are in fact included by other researchers on evaluation and related concepts – for example, in work on subjectivity (Scheibman 2002), research on 'assessives' (Vestergaard 2000) and in appraisal theory. Arguably, they do involve evaluation in some way: in an utterance such as *my mother's never happy* 'the mother's *happiness* is an **evaluation** of her character by the speaker (the daughter)' (Scheibman 2002: 133, italics in the original, emphasis mine). This type of evaluation is the result of the special character of mental state descriptions, which refer to A-events (Chapter 6.1.2, p. 155), and can therefore be regarded as expressing claims by the speaker

to have a knowledge or insight into the human subject's mental disposition, namely their desires or intentions, and through that claim suggests an *evaluation* of the human subject following from whether the 'inclination' is socially assessed as positive or negative, as appropriate or inappropriate.

(White 1998: 103, emphasis mine)

Clearly, in the sense that writers cannot evidentially experience mental states of others, descriptions of news actors' mental states cannot be considered factual and non-evaluative (Vestergaard 2000: 160).

Finally, such descriptions are arguably used to '[establish] a stance towards a particular socio-semiotic reality via the affectual values [the writer] attributes to representatives of that reality' (White 1998: 102). They do this by 'by trigger[ing] sympathetic or unsympathetic responses in the reader/listener' (White 1998: 102). In other words, descriptions of mental states *systematically* evoke evaluation while not inscribing it directly.

Now, *evoked* evaluations have normally not been included in the frequency calculation, but mental state descriptions differ from 'ordinary' evoked evaluation in the aforementioned *systematicity*. As such, they may be regarded as being somewhere between evaluation and non-evaluation, and

arguably have a very special status. They are neither completely evaluative nor completely non-evaluative. As a compromise, I propose to treat such instances as peripheral or marginal evaluation.

A different problem is that *when* mental states are included in research on evaluation, it is often only expressions of emotion and volition that are analysed (e.g. in appraisal theory). However, *all* mental state expressions refer to A-events, and are in that respect interpretative-evaluative. Moreover, there is a cline in their meaning. This continuum (between the categories of BELIEF, EMOTION, EXPECTATION, KNOWLEDGE, STATE-OF-MIND and PROCESS) would make it difficult to justify the exclusion of one but not the other. KNOWLEDGE, BELIEF and EXPECTATION are certainly epistemically connected (when does belief become knowledge, when does expectation become belief?), but there is also a cline between BELIEF and EMOTION: are RESPECT (paraphrasable as 'believe that worthy'), TRUST ('believe that honest and sincere') and TAKE SERIOUSLY ('believe that important/serious') evaluations of BELIEF or EMOTION? Furthermore, the boundaries between emotions and states-of-mind are far from clear (does PUZZLED refer to an emotion or to a state-of-mind? Does CAREFULLY suggest an emotion like Dixon (1991: 79) claims or cognition as one might also argue?). Finally, there is also a cline between STATE-OF-MIND and BELIEF (is UNSUSPECTING BELIEF or STATE-OF-MIND?).

To solve these problems I have adopted a broad definition of both BELIEF and EMOTION, in that the borderline cases RESPECT, TRUST and TAKE SERIOUSLY are included as BELIEF, whereas EMOTION encompasses prototypical emotional states such as anger, fear, or fury, as well as extensions of these states like bitterness, disaffectedness or optimism. All MENTAL STATE evaluations include both direct modifications of Sensors and metonymic modifications of Sensors, i.e. the description of a (speech) activity as FRANTIC, STORMY, VEHEMENTLY, HEATED or CHARGED. (These are metonymic in that there is a clear contiguity relation between the Sensor – the one who performs the activity – and the activity itself. Sometimes they just imply that there are strong feelings involved without specifying the type of feeling.) Moreover, I have included lexical items that only suggest mental states as some part of their meaning (FLINCH, SALUTE, PLUCK UP THE COURAGE, TIE ONESELF IN KNOTS) and those that *cause* a social actor to feel something (STRESSFUL, STRIKE A CHORD). The category of STATE-OF-MIND is a bit of a catch-all, unfortunately, but comprises all mental states which did not easily fit into either BELIEF, EMOTION, EXPECTATION or KNOWLEDGE. Let me point out again that I regard these sub-values not as distinct categories but as a continuum of related meanings, with a core semantic difference (rather like prototypicality).

Finally, evaluations of STYLE concern the writer's evaluation of the language that is used, for instance, comments on the manner in which the information is presented, or evaluations of the kind of language that is used (Biber *et al.* 1999: 975). These comments can relate to the speaker's own

discourse (STYLE: SELF) or the discourse of third parties (STYLE: OTHER). Since no examples of STYLE: SELF occur in my data, no further attempts at sub-classification have been made, and this sub-value is only included for the sake of systematicity in the framework above (Figure 4.1). In the newspaper corpus only examples of STYLE: OTHER occur. Such evaluations are important (and will be discussed) only in connection with reporting expressions (verbs, nouns, adjectives, adverbs) which can be classified according to the following sub-values:

- NEUTRAL: e.g. SAY, TELL
- ILLOCUTIONARY: e.g. DEMAND, PROMISE
- DECLARATIVE: e.g. ACQUIT, PLEAD GUILTY
- DISCOURSE SIGNALLING: e.g. ADD, CONCLUDE
- PARALINGUISTIC: e.g. WHISPER, SCREAM.

This classification has been adopted (in a modified form) from Caldas-Coulthard (1994), the modifications deriving from the empirical analysis of the corpus:

- NEUTRAL attributing expressions ‘simply signal the illocutionary act – the saying. By using these verbs, the author only gives the reader the “literal meaning” . . . of the speech. The intended meaning (illocutionary force) has to be derived from the saying itself’ (Caldas-Coulthard 1994: 305). In other words, the expressions do not tell us anything about the speaker’s purpose. Examples are: *according to*, *as far as X is/are concerned*, SAY, SPEAK OF, TALK, TELL.
- ILLOCUTIONARY attributing expressions on the other hand make explicit the speaker’s (supposed) purpose. They ‘convey the presence of the author in the text, and are highly interpretive. They name a supposed speech situation, they clarify and make explicit the illocutionary force of the quote they refer to’ (Caldas-Coulthard 1994: 305f). Some examples are ACCUSE, ADVISE, BEG, BLAME, CHALLENGE, COMPLAIN, DECLARE, DEFEND, INSIST, OFFER, ORDER, PERSUADE, PLEDGE, QUESTION, REQUEST, RUMOUR, STRESS, SUGGEST, THREATEN, URGE, VOW, WARN. No attempt has been made to sub-classify these (as types of illocution). Moreover, I adopt a very broad definition of *illocutionary* which is not completely equivalent to Searle’s (1976) classification in that it includes all sorts of comments on the Sayer’s purpose and the type of speech act involved.
- DECLARATIVE attributing expressions (not identified by Caldas-Coulthard) refer to linguistic acts that can only be ‘felicitous’ within a cultural-institutional setting, when specific constraining circumstances are fulfilled (such as who can be the Sayer). Thus, it is only in court that you can be *acquitted* of something and it is only the Judge who can ADJOURN, RULE or RETURN A VERDICT. Other examples in the corpus are AWARD, CHARGE, CLEAR, CONVICT, DIAGNOSE, FINE, FIND GUILTY, HEAR, SENTENCE. The category DECLARATIVE is thus

employed in a narrow definition, unlike Searle's (1976) category of *declarations*, which includes 'declarations that concern language itself, as for example, when one says, "I define, abbreviate, name, call or dub"' (Searle 1976: 14f). The reason for this is that, as Stubbs (1986) rightly points out, declarations such as EXCOMMUNICATE or CHRISTEN are different from declarations such as PROMISE. The first type (EXCOMMUNICATE) is 'institutional and conventional' (Stubbs 1986: 12) and can only be performed by someone 'by virtue of occupying some social role' (Stubbs 1986: 12), whereas the second type (PROMISE) can be performed by 'anyone whose English is good enough to convey their intention: that is, anyone can make promises, requests, complaints, etc.' (Stubbs 1986: 12). The above sub-classification reflects this distinction: type 1 of Searle's declarations corresponds to DECLARATIVE expressions, while type 2 expressions belong to the ILLOCUTIONARY value.

- The DISCOURSE SIGNALLING sub-value refers to expressions that 'mark the relationship of the quote to other parts of the discourse . . . or mark the development of the discourse' (Caldas-Coulthard 1994: 306), as for example ADD, CONCLUDE, GO ON, REPLY.
- PARALINGUISTIC attributing expressions give an indication of prosodic and other accompanying paralinguistic aspects of the act of utterance. There are only a few examples in the corpus: *muttered*, *shouts of*, *whispered*, *screamed*, *sobbed*.

4.4 Evaluative interplay

When we look at actual linguistic expressions of evaluative parameters we find that lexical items often realize two or more parameters at the same time (cf. also Lemke 1998: 37). In other words, evaluative parameters can be *combined*. For example, reporting verbs often combine an evaluation of EVIDENTIALITY (marking the source of the writer's knowledge as HEARSAY) with an evaluation of STYLE (commenting on the language used):

- He *said that* [EVIDENTIALITY: HEARSAY/STYLE: NEUTRAL] after the death of weapons expert Dr David Kelly 'Tony Blair said he'd had nothing to do with his public naming. That was a lie. 'He chaired the meetings that made the fatal decisions. He is responsible. He should do the decent thing and resign.' One delegate *muttered* [EVIDENTIALITY: HEARSAY/STYLE: PARALINGUISTIC]: 'Like you.' (Mirror 1)

Similarly, expressions of EVIDENTIALITY usually express RELIABILITY (Chapter 6). The phenomenon also becomes obvious when looking at individual linguistic expressions – for example, PAR FOR THE COURSE, which 'is almost always used about events or behaviours which are reported as "bad" and then claimed to be "expected"' (Channell 2000: 50). Hence, PAR FOR THE COURSE expresses the speaker's expectations (EXPECTEDNESS) as well as his/her disapproval (EMOTIVITY).

Furthermore, when we go to actual text there is a tremendous interplay between different parameters of evaluation (cf. also Lemke 1998: 43). In a single utterance, two or more parameters of evaluation can be expressed, though there may be potential restrictions on combinations of parameters. We can describe this as a 'collocation' of evaluative parameters:

- *Surprisingly, perhaps*, order is among them, as *can* be clearly seen where a passive is used in the subordinate clause (Palmer 2001: 195).

In this clause, we can find evaluations of EXPECTEDNESS (*surprisingly*) and RELIABILITY (*perhaps*), with the evaluation of RELIABILITY referring to the evaluation of EXPECTEDNESS itself (*perhaps* has only *surprisingly* in its scope). Additionally, there is an evaluation along the parameter of POSSIBILITY (*can*).⁵

Thus, there are two types of *evaluative interplay*:

- (1) linguistic expressions evaluate along two or more parameters at the same time (PAR FOR THE COURSE)
- (2) in a given text different linguistic expressions evaluate along two or more parameters (*Surprisingly, perhaps* . . .).

Both of these kinds of multilayering seem highly fascinating but largely disregarded phenomena; the first in particular will constitute one of the main foci of Chapters 5 and 6, where the evaluative combinations that occur in the corpus will be commented on. The second phenomenon plays a role when discussing evaluation within its context. As will be seen, one of the main advantages of a parameter-based approach to evaluation is that it is flexible enough to allow an appropriate analysis of both phenomena.

What remains to be emphasized at this point is that there are no hard-and-fast distinctions between the proposed parameters but rather overlaps and indeterminacies, and that the parameters themselves are not equal in status and type.

4.5 Attribution and averral

Before moving on to the empirical analysis a further matter remains to be discussed. This is the distinction between *authorial* and *non-authorial* evaluation (White 1998). As was mentioned above (Chapter 2), one of the characteristic features of newspaper language is its 'embeddedness': much of what features in the news is actually reported speech. As this book is concerned with *writer* evaluation rather than evaluation in general, it seems reasonable to exclude evaluations that are *attributed* to someone else. The distinction between authorial and non-authorial voice, and reported speech and non-reported speech has recently been discussed in terms of the difference between *attribution* and *averral*. These notions go back to Sinclair (1986, 1988), who states that

in a third person narrative, there is indeed no reference to the ultimate, external author, but frequently there are *attributions* made to other sources of what is said or written. These are reports in the text which have the effect of transferring responsibility for what is being said. The text *avers* that such and such a statement was made, but is not responsible for whether or not the statement was accurate. That responsibility is passed on to the attributed speaker or writer.

(Sinclair 1988: 8, emphasis mine)

The concepts of attribution and averral have been taken up and developed by the Birmingham School of Discourse Analysis, in particular in work on EAP (English for Academic Purposes) (e.g. Tadros 1993, Hunston 1995, Hunston 2000, Groom 2000). With its emphasis on the shifting of responsibility, and with the hypothesis that 'an act of attribution is also an act of evaluation' (Hunston 1995: 134; see also Hunston 2000: 178) this basic distinction seems more useful for the purposes of the present study than the traditional concept of reported speech. It is also a very important methodological tool for analysing *written* discourse: as Tadros (1993) proposes, 'averral and attribution are basic notions for the organization of interaction in written text' (Tadros 1993: 100).

Generally speaking, in a non-fictional text the writer is responsible for all statements unless a statement is attributed to someone else. The notion of *averral* thus refers to statements originating in the writer, whereas *attribution* 'refers to the use of a manifest intertextual marker to acknowledge the presence of an antecedent authorial voice' (Groom 2000: 15). Averral and attribution may be present in one and the same utterance, and the distinction is made even more complicated by the fact that 'every attribution is also averred' (Hunston 2000: 179), i.e. that 'every attribution is embedded within an averral' (Hunston 2000: 179). Thus, in an example taken from the *Daily Mail* (Table 4.1) the writer *attributes* one proposition to MacDonald (*she had little more than £5,000 in the bank*) and evaluates (*avers*) this as a CLAIM (*claimed* is both part of the averral and an act of attribution), as well as *attributing* a second proposition to the police and evaluating (*averring*) this as a BELIEF (*believe* is part of the averral).

Table 4.1 Averral and attribution I

Averral	Attribution
Although MacDonald CLAIMED during her trial that	she had little more than £5,000 in the bank
police BELIEVE	she earned anything up to £100,000 a day from her vice ring by taking a 40 per cent cut of her call girls' £800-an-hour earnings. (Mail 8)

All such (implicit or explicit) attributed propositions have been *excluded* from the analysis since the writer does not accept responsibility for them and the evaluations that they may express. Attribution and averral are also important for the framework in connection with the parameter of EVIDENTIALITY, as we will see now.

Attribution

I distinguish between two *types* of attribution which, respectively, are related to the parameters of EVIDENTIALITY: HEARSAY and EVIDENTIALITY: MINDSAY, depending on whether the attribution is said to be based on what someone said (HEARSAY) or on what someone felt, knew, or thought, etc. (MINDSAY).

attribution	EVIDENTIALITY: HEARSAY	He said: 'you're a fool'
	EVIDENTIALITY: MINDSAY	He thought: 'you're a fool'

Both involve (a) a source (of the attributed proposition), who is either a 'Sayer' (Halliday 1994: 140) in the case of EVIDENTIALITY: HEARSAY or a 'Senser' (Halliday 1994: 117) in the case of EVIDENTIALITY: MINDSAY, (b) an attributing expression (verbs, adjectives, nouns, adverbs, prepositional phrases) and (c) an attributed proposition, as visualized in Table 4.2.

Table 4.2 Averral and attribution II

	Averral		Attribution
Parameter of evaluation	Sayer	attributing expression	attributed proposition
EVIDENTIALITY: HEARSAY	He [Dica]	told [police] that	both women were long-term lovers who knew he was HIV positive before he had sex with them. (Mail 3)
	Senser	attributing expression	attributed proposition
EVIDENTIALITY: MINDSAY	[Now] police	fear	there may be others infected. (Mirror 3)

There is also a difference between structures of attribution (similar to the different kinds of reported speech proposed by Leech and Short 1981), but this difference has not been systematically analysed in this book (see Bednarek 2004 for a discussion of this and further methodological points).

Averral

As far as averral is concerned, I adopt Hunston’s distinction between non-sourced and sourced averrals (Hunston 2000). Sourced averrals give information about the source (or evidence) on which the writer’s averral is based – for example, via the use of evidentials (Hunston 2000: 181). These types of information are accordingly handled in my framework as evaluations of EVIDENTIALITY. Non-sourced averrals give no indication about the source of the writer’s knowledge. However, the distinction is not as clear-cut as it seems, as ‘there can be indeterminacy between sourced and non-sourced averrals’ (Hunston 2000: 192). There is also gradience between sourced averrals and attributions (Table 4.3).

Table 4.3 Sourced averral and attribution

<i>Attribution</i>	He said that Mr Duncan Smith was wrong.
<i>Sourced averral</i>	Yesterday’s poll of activists showed that Mr Duncan Smith was wrong.
<i>Non-sourced averral</i>	Mr Duncan Smith was wrong. (invented examples)

Attributions are based on what Sayers/Sensors said or thought (*He said that*), whereas sourced averrals can be based on the writer’s *interpretation of* a piece of writing (*Yesterday’s poll . . . showed that*). The distinction is a very fine one and shows the gradience between attributions and (some types of) sourced averrals. This overlap is explicable by the fact that both sourced averrals and attributions are evaluations along the same parameter, namely EVIDENTIALITY. In the parameter-based framework of evaluation, both HEARSAY and MINDSAY involve attribution, whereas PERCEPTION, GENERAL KNOWLEDGE, PROOF and UNSPECIFIED involve sourced averrals (Figure 4.2):




Figure 4.2 Attribution and averral

As will be seen later, the connection between evaluation and attribution/averral is even more multifaceted because the parameter of EVIDENTIALITY can be combined with other parameters, allowing for a complex manipulation of attribution and averral on the part of the writer (see Appendix 3 for a detailed and complete outline of this proposed system of EVIDENTIALITY).

Notes

1. Apart from Graduation: force; compare the discussion on intensity below, and SERIOUSNESS because this does not occur in my data. There is in fact one occurrence each of *ironically* both in the tabloids and in the broadsheets. But although Lemke (1998) mentions IRONIC as an evaluation of humorousness/seriousness (see Chapter 3), this assumption appears problematic. Rather than regarding *ironically* as evaluating an aspect of the reported event as HUMOROUS/SERIOUS, it could also be regarded as an evaluation of contrast. However, irony is too different a notion from the kind of contrast expressed by the contrastive evaluators BUT, ALTHOUGH, etc. to be included within the parameter of EXPECTEDNESS: CONTRAST. On the whole, irony seems to be a special case which is very complex and whose analysis is beyond the scope of this study (on irony see e.g. Marino 1994, Sperber and Wilson 1981). In any case, the parameter of SERIOUSNESS seems to be extremely rare in news stories. This is in line with Lemke's (1998) findings for seven editorials in American and Irish newspapers and his suggestion that SERIOUSNESS seems to be a marginal parameter (Lemke 1998: 46).
2. My thanks go to Geoff Thompson for suggesting this distinction.
3. No distinction is made between possibility, permission and ability (see Coates 1983 on the cline involved with these notions). The notion of appropriateness which is part of Lemke's parameter of normativity/appropriateness is for me best included as EMOTIVITY rather than POSSIBILITY/NECESSITY in that appropriateness usually implies the speaker's approval.
4. For Halliday (1994) modal judgements pertain to the notions of probability, usuality, obligation and inclination, and he also applies the concept of value to all of these notions. However, I have only adopted the distinction between HIGH, LOW and MEDIAN for RELIABILITY. Even here it is sometimes questionable as to how far expressions of RELIABILITY may be classified according to these three discrete categories. I agree with Nuyts (2001a) who states that

English ... [has] basic terminology only for, most precisely, certainty, probability, possibility, improbability, and impossibility. But speakers can further scalarize these positions by means of grading expressions (*very probable, rather certain, not entirely impossible*, etc.). And ultimately, if really needed, they can even quantify likelihood (e.g., *a 90 percent chance*). It is hard to see how a 'discrete categories' approach can handle these facts.

(Nuyts 2001a: 22)

On the other hand, if evaluators of RELIABILITY were only to be classified according to two values (HIGH–LOW) as with the other parameters, it would be extremely problematic to decide where to put evaluators such as *likely*, since it appears to express a higher degree of reliability than, for example, MAY/MIGHT but a lower degree of reliability than, for example, WILL/BE TO. As such, despite its drawbacks the adopted approach seems most suitable to the analysis of evaluations of RELIABILITY. In any case, the problem is the same with all parameters of evaluation which involve scales: the decision to focus on two or three positions on the scale falsifies the actual discourse semantics to some extent.

5. *Clearly* seems to retain its function as a manner adjunct here (rather than as a disjunct expressing COMPREHENSIBILITY).

Part Two

Evaluation in the press: a corpus-based analysis

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5 Evaluation in the press: core evaluative parameters

Chapters 5 and 6 report the findings of the analysis of evaluation in the newspaper corpus. This chapter deals with evaluation via core evaluative parameters. I will discuss:

- all *core evaluative parameters* and all their possible *combinations* that occur in the corpus more than three times (unless necessary for exemplifying the framework),¹ in alphabetical order (COMPREHENSIBILITY, EMOTIVITY, EXPECTEDNESS, IMPORTANCE, POSSIBILITY/NECESSITY, RELIABILITY)
- their *discourse functions*
- their *distribution* in the tabloids and in the broadsheets (frequency analysis).

I am also interested in what I call the *stylistic variety* of evaluations in the broadsheet and tabloid sub-corpora. By this I mean the extent to which texts use different lexico-grammatical expressions as evaluators. For instance, a text which employs KEY, IMPORTANT, VITAL and CRUCIAL as evaluators of IMPORTANCE has a greater stylistic variety than a text of the same length in which we can only find IMPORTANT and KEY. In the empirical analysis below, a relative ratio of stylistic variety is calculated by taking into account the different sizes of the two sub-corpora. The formula for this calculation is: number of *different* evaluators/number of words in the corpus $\times 1,000$.

Chapter 6 considers the same issues relating to peripheral evaluative parameters. (Appendix 4 offers detailed comments on the most important methodological decisions involved in the analysis undertaken in Chapters 5 and 6.)

5.1 COMPREHENSIBILITY

As proposed above, evaluations of COMPREHENSIBILITY have to do with the extent to which writers evaluate aspects of the reported event as being more or less within or outside the grasp of their understanding (COMPREHENSIBLE/INCOMPREHENSIBLE).

Discourse functions

Evaluators of COMPREHENSIBILITY can be connected to the parameters of STYLE and NEGATIVE EMOTIVITY as well as to dramatization. Some evaluations of COMPREHENSIBILITY are in fact evaluations in terms of STYLE and comment on a news actor's language activity (in a broad sense), as in the following examples:

1. More *ambiguously*, the Conservative trade spokesman, Tim Yeo, remarked that: 'The manner of his delivery shows how much progress he personally has made since last year.' (Guardian 1)
2. The chief executives of four of Britain's biggest banks yesterday received a mauling from MPs over the charges and *complex terms* they impose on customers through credit cards. (Independent 4)
3. Diana's bitter note *expressed in the strongest terms* her pain at the way she was treated by Charles and the Royal Family. (Mail 5)
4. Mr Yeo, the Shadow Industry Secretary and a contender in any future race, *was less than definite when asked* whether Mr Duncan Smith had done enough to see off the threat. (Times 1)
5. In the second paragraph of the document, written in October 1996, Diana *explained in the plainest* possible language that she was convinced of the plot to mastermind an accident. (Mirror 5)
6. The killer blow began when General John de Chastelain, head of the international decommissioning body, delivered an unexpectedly brief and *vague report* on the IRA's latest disarmament. (Mail 6)
7. Although he *talked* only *vaguely* of 'follow up' actions, the new Palestinian Prime Minister designate Ahmed Qorei acknowledged the 'very difficult' situation. (Times 9)
8. MPs yesterday also criticised Mr Barrett over a number of Barclaycard rates, twice trying to *clarify* the meaning of a brochure that promised '0% APR forever', but only succeeding in getting him to admit to the default rate after five minutes of questioning and help from an adviser. (Express 4)

This might be put forth as an argument for simply including COMPREHENSIBILITY as an evaluation along the parameter of STYLE (expressing comments on the language that is used), rather than establishing it as a parameter in its own right. However, this would neglect the fact that other dimensions of COMPREHENSIBILITY exist as well.

The evaluator *clarify* in example (8) in fact poses a major problem for classification. What is being evaluated is *the meaning of the brochure* as something to be clarified (i.e. as INCOMPREHENSIBLE), but simultaneously this *meaning* can potentially be made more COMPREHENSIBLE by the very act of clarifying it. *Clarify* could thus be described as expressing the values of COMPREHENSIBLE and INCOMPREHENSIBLE at the same time. For methodological purposes I have given precedence to the INCOMPRE-

HENSIBLE sub-value (note also that in the above example the MPs are described only as *trying to clarify*). The same holds for the evaluators *shed light on* and *offer some insights into*. Paradoxically, this means that both *shed light on* and *shed no light on* are classified as expressing the INCOMPREHENSIBLE value, since they both evaluate a situation as INCOMPREHENSIBLE, with *shed no light on* implying that it *remains* incomprehensible and *shed light on* implying that it has become more comprehensible. Perhaps SHED LIGHT ON might be described as an ‘implicative’ (Levinson 1983: 181) expression that pragmatically *presupposes* the incomprehensibility of its object; this would explain the constancy under negation (compare also the comments on EXPLAIN below).

Other evaluations expressing the INCOMPREHENSIBLE value are not connected to an evaluation of STYLE, but evaluate entities or aspects of situations as mysterious, unknown or inexplicable. Some of these might be regarded as more or less descriptive and presumably act as ‘disclaimer’ (van Dijk 1998: 54), as in van Dijk’s example *Although Jibril’s exact role is not clear*, allowing journalists to keep ‘some journalistic distance from the evidence of the intelligence reports’ (van Dijk 1998: 54). Others seem to function as ‘dramatizers’, i.e. they appear to dramatize the reported event to some extent, to make it seem more exciting and thrilling:

- Manchester United in takeover *mystery* (Independent 10)
- The *uncanny* similarity to the way in which she met her death prompted Mohammed Al Fayed, the father of Diana’s partner Dodi, to demand a public inquiry into the crash. (Mail 5)

In addition, some INCOMPREHENSIBLE evaluators seem to have the potential to trigger or contribute to negative evaluation in a specific context, in particular *unclear/not clear why*, *begs the question why*, *has raised other questions about*, *questions were raised over why*, *raised questions about*, *no explanations as to why*:

- *It was unclear last night why* Mr Burrell, 45, failed to make the letter available to the French judge who investigated the death of Diana and Dodi Fayed in a car crash in a Paris road tunnel in August 1997. (Times 5)
- ... *it was not clear why* Mr Burrell had not revealed the existence of the letter before now. (Times 5)
- But *questions were raised over why* Mr Burrell, who has a book out next week, waited so many years to release the letter. (FT 5)
- The extract also *begs the question why* Mr Burrell did not draw the authorities’ attention to it in the aftermath of the Princess’s death in August 1997. (Telegraph 5)
- The judgment which took only a few seconds to read marked an anti-climactic end to an extraordinary case, which shed light on the shadowy inner workings of the European escort industry and *raised*

questions about the blurred distinctions between marriage agencies, dating services and procurement for sex. (Guardian 8)

- He offered *no explanations as to why* he did not draw it to the attention of the French authorities, who conducted an inquiry into the Princess's death, or, indeed, the British coroner Michael Burgess, who will hold an inquest into the death of the Princess and her companion, Dodi Fayed. (Telegraph 5)
- But the bombing has also *raised other questions about* two of Mr Sharon's tactics in combating what he calls 'the terror' – the targeted killings of Palestinian fighters and the 'security fence' carved through the West Bank. (Guardian 9)

The evaluation expressed in these examples is the effect of an accumulation of evaluations; apart from evaluations of COMPREHENSIBILITY, there are evaluations along other parameters in the context – for example, *failed to* (EMOTIVITY), *had not revealed* (EXPECTEDNESS: CONTRAST/COMPARISON), *blurred* (COMPREHENSIBILITY: INCOMPREHENSIBLE), *did not draw it to the attention* (EXPECTEDNESS: CONTRAST/COMPARISON), *what he calls 'the terror'* (RELIABILITY/STYLE/EVIDENTIALITY), *the 'security fence'* (RELIABILITY/STYLE/EVIDENTIALITY). In this broader evaluative context the evaluations of COMPREHENSIBILITY: INCOMPREHENSIBLE clearly seem to result in a negative evaluation of the news actors and states of affairs concerned. Evaluating something as INCOMPREHENSIBLE here appears to suggest that no rational reasons or explanations can be given for the actions or states of affairs involved, and that they are therefore very much questionable indeed (and potentially wrong).

Distribution

Regarding the distribution of evaluations of COMPREHENSIBILITY, what is striking is that there are significantly more evaluations along the INCOMPREHENSIBLE value than there are along the COMPREHENSIBLE value (100 per cent of all evaluations of COMPREHENSIBILITY in the broadsheets, and 81.8 per cent of all evaluations in the tabloids). (I call the result of this kind of calculation – i.e. how much per cent of all evaluations of a given parameter in one or both of the two sub-corpora are of a certain type – the 'internal significance' of this type, in contrast to a calculation that compares the two corpora directly. This also means that when I talk about evaluators being more frequent in one sub-corpus than in the other I usually do not refer to *raw* frequencies. Furthermore, the findings represent tendencies, rather than facts, and no claims concerning statistical significance are made. The higher the occurrences, the more representative the findings.)

On the one hand, this may reflect the production format of the news story: newspapers and their journalists must strive to report on a story as quickly as possible, without waiting for all details to be confirmed, all

events to be clear and every problem to be solved (the news value of *recency* comes into play here). Additionally, this allows them to cover further details of the story in a follow-up (contributing to the news value of *continuity*). On the other hand, events and situations that are represented as 'mysterious' in a news story do seem to appeal to audiences in a particular way, and newspapers may aim to exploit this in order to attract a larger audience.

Compared to the other parameters, the frequency of occurrence of the parameter of COMPREHENSIBILITY is low: Only 0.7 per cent of all evaluations in the broadsheets, and only 0.4 per cent of all evaluations in the tabloids are evaluations of COMPREHENSIBILITY. The slightly higher percentage in the broadsheets might be explicable by the fact that it could be more important for the tabloids to deliver a 'full' story, without gaps, and without the admission that some information may be lacking. On the other hand, the occurrences are not frequent enough to allow a generalization to an overall difference in the evaluative style of the popular and the quality press.

In terms of the frequency of individual expressions, preferred evaluators in the corpus are *unclear/not clear* (four occurrences) as well as variations of expressions involving the lexical item QUESTION (*begs the question, has raised other questions about, questions over, questions were raised over, raised questions about*). Last but not least, let us compare stylistic variety: There are sixteen different evaluators in the broadsheets (*ambiguously, begs the question, blurred, complex, RAISE QUESTION, less than definite, mystery, no explanations as to, not clear, offer some insights into, shadowy, shed light on, shed no light on, there was confusion over, unclear, vaguely*) (a relative ratio of stylistic variety of 0.4) compared to eleven evaluators in the tabloids (*clarify, in the strongest terms, inconsistencies, mysterious, mystery, only MacDonald herself knows, plainest, questions over, uncanny, unclear, vague*) (a relative ratio of 0.3), so we can speak of a slightly greater stylistic variety in the broadsheets.

The combination of comprehensibility and reliability

Evaluations of COMPREHENSIBILITY can be combined with evaluations of RELIABILITY when writers evaluate aspects of the reported event as COMPREHENSIBLE and therefore of HIGH RELIABILITY or as INCOMPREHENSIBLE and therefore of LOW RELIABILITY. This is expressed in the corpus by only three evaluators: CLEAR (THAT), *clearly*, and *confused*. Altogether, there are twelve occurrences: four occurrences of CLEAR (THAT), seven occurrences of *clearly*, and one occurrence of *confused*. In the case of *confused*, its reliability evaluation depends on its co-occurrence with an expression of attribution (*confused reports that*). Moreover, this is the only example of an evaluation of COMPREHENSIBILITY: INCOMPREHENSIBLE/RELIABILITY: LOW in the corpus and thus will not be discussed here. However, the fact that INCOMPREHENSIBILITY has the potential to express

UNRELIABILITY seems to point to a general connection between COMPREHENSIBILITY and RELIABILITY, with RELIABILITY being ‘parasitic’ upon COMPREHENSIBILITY. But let us now look at evaluations of COMPREHENSIBILITY: COMPREHENSIBLE/RELIABILITY: HIGH (expressed by CLEAR and CLEARLY).

In the relevant literature, the adverb CLEARLY is in fact often identified with matters of truth and certainty (Hoye 1997: 157) – for example, listed as an epistemic modal adverb (Perkins 1983: 89), or as a ‘surely’ adverbial (Biber and Finegan 1988: 33). In my corpus, not only *clearly*, but also CLEAR as a premodifier and *clear that* fulfil this function. I have classified such instances as COMPREHENSIBILITY/RELIABILITY, because they still retain some of their meaning of COMPREHENSIBILITY, rather than ‘purely’ expressing RELIABILITY (like the modal adverbs SURELY and CERTAINLY), although CLEARLY may be on the way to becoming delexicalized in this respect.

Discourse functions

A listing of all occurrences of CLEAR and CLEARLY in the corpus helps to show their discourse functions:

- In those days IDS was a leading rebel, as today’s rebels *clearly* remember. (Guardian 1)
- But he was *clearly* walking a tightrope. (Guardian 1)
- Tory leader Iain Duncan Smith shakes his fist defiantly yesterday – just as his media advisers *clearly* told him to. (Sun 1)
- And, in a *clear* warning that the Opposition boss is still in trouble, Shadow minister Tim Yeo warned his fate will be sealed this weekend. (Sun 1)
- In parts of the hall, there were *clear* signs of resentment. (Sun 1)
- Although the ovations were *clearly* stage-managed, there was genuine sympathy in the Blackpool conference hall for a man who has been under the severest strain all week. (Times 1)
- The aim is *clearly* designed to rub out early any signs of an uprising before it begins to take hold. (Times 1)
- The *clearest* sign that the leadership realises the danger is not yet past came when it confirmed that Mr Maclean is calling in the plotters. (Times 1)²
- Much of the applause was orchestrated but was *clearly* genuine nonetheless as MPs voiced their sympathy with the leader after a torrid week. (Times 1)
- While it was not clear why Mr Burrell had not revealed the existence of the letter before now, it is *clear* that its publication will encourage those who have long considered Diana’s death to have been suspicious, and who have never accepted the conclusion of the two-year French inquiry. (Times 5)

- A meeting of the ruling Ulster Unionist council had already been called for next Wednesday and Mr Trimble *clearly* anticipated that the de Chastelain report would have given all the cover he needed to get a majority backing of the 900 members. Now he faces fresh criticism of his leadership. (Times 6)

In these examples the evaluators are predominantly employed to lend reliability to the writers' interpretations of participants' mental states (*remember, encourage, anticipate, realise, designed to*), their difficulties (*he was walking a tightrope*) and the illocutionary force of their utterances (*warning that*), as well as to his/her evaluation of the genuineness of aspects of the reported event (*just as his media advisers clearly told him to, stage-managed, genuine*) and to his/her evaluations of EVIDENTIALITY/RELIABILITY (*signs of, signs that*). CLEAR and CLEARLY are hence used to 'support' the reliability of subjective interpretations, rather than the stating of 'facts' (as in ²*It is clear that he cycled to school*/²*Clearly, he cycled to school*). This seems to be a general tendency in the usage of CLEARLY (Bednarek 2004); in Hoey's terms, the adverb is 'primed' for subjective expressions, which are its pragmatic associations:

Every word is primed for use in discourse as a result of the cumulative effects of an individual's encounters with the word. If one of the effects of the initial priming is that phrases are constructed, these are also in turn primed. Also, if a word is used in a particular way . . . , that use may also be primed. More specifically . . . [e]very word is primed to occur in association with particular pragmatic functions, its pragmatic associations.

(Hoey 2004a; on priming see also Hoey 2004b)

That is, CLEARLY can be regarded as being primed pragmatically for evaluations. Concerning large-scale corpus research on evaluation, the analysis of CLEARLY could thus yield very important results as far as the nature of evaluation is concerned.

The main function of CLEAR(LY) is to lend emphasis to the proposition(s) within its scope and to increase their reliability. However, compared to unmodalized propositions it can also be regarded as a mitigating device, and works as a defence against possible attacks ('how can you know?' – 'I couldn't be mistaken about it; it was clear'). In this sense, CLEAR(LY) provides a defence 'shield' against possible attacks (see Silver 2003 for the term *shield*).

Distribution

On the whole, evaluations of COMPREHENSIBILITY/RELIABILITY represent only 0.23 per cent of all evaluations in the corpus. Although there are therefore not enough occurrences in the corpus to draw general conclusions, CLEAR and CLEARLY are in my corpus internally more significant in the broadsheets than in the tabloids (0.3 per cent of all evaluations compared to 0.1 per cent). Additionally, the combination of the

COMPREHENSIBLE value with HIGH RELIABILITY is much more frequent (11 occurrences) than the combination of the INCOMPREHENSIBLE value with LOW RELIABILITY (1 occurrence). It is interesting to note that the tendency that was observed above (where the INCOMPREHENSIBLE value was preferred to the COMPREHENSIBLE value) is reversed.

5.2 EMOTIVITY

As noted in Chapter 4, the parameter of EMOTIVITY is concerned with the writer's evaluation of aspects of events as good (EMOTIVITY: POSITIVE) or bad (EMOTIVITY: NEGATIVE). On account of the inherent difficulties involved with the classification of EMOTIVITY (Chapter 4), the focus is on expressions with limited variability and a high degree of attitudinal saturation (i.e. inscribed EMOTIVITY), while excluding from the frequency analysis:

- negative expressions like KILL, DAMAGE, BOMB unless they are markedly emotive
- degrees of intensity of emotive meaning
- the difference in the amount of ideational and interpersonal meaning
- evaluations of unpleasantness that affect someone other than the writer
- evoked EMOTIVITY.

However, I will comment explicitly on less attitudinally saturated expressions and their evaluative functions in context (i.e. on evoked EMOTIVITY) in the detailed exploration of the discourse semantics of certain evaluators in the chapters below. Even with the focus on inscribed EMOTIVITY, the actual text analysis remains a challenge: how can it be ascertained that a specific expression is in fact 'explicitly evaluative', 'attitudinally saturated', or 'inscribes' EMOTIVITY, other than by relying on intuition? The methodology that has been adopted here was the second-level use of corpora (Chapter 1). Thus, expressions in the corpus were identified as emotive if:

- their definition in COBUILD includes information about the speaker's feelings (they are marked as signalling approval or disapproval) which shows that the words are used 'to express your attitude to the person or thing that you are talking about' (COBUILD 1995: xxxvi)
- their definition in COBUILD involves a subjective *you*: 'In these definitions, the expressions "if you describe", "if you say that", and "you mean that" indicate that these words are used subjectively, rather than objectively' (COBUILD 1995: xix).

For a discussion of why it is problematic to include other kinds of emotive meaning in the frequency analysis (identified with the help of corpus analyses in the Bank of English, native speaker informants/intuition, research on evaluative items, etc.), see Bednarek (2004).

Discourse functions

Even though EMOTIVITY is challenging in terms of its objective ‘extraction’ from the text, its discourse functions seem straightforward. Negative EMOTIVITY expresses disapproval/criticism; positive EMOTIVITY signals approval/praise. The aspects that can be emotively evaluated range from people (*predator*, *wannabe*) to events (*fiasco*), behaviour, views and actions (*racist*, *clanger*, *cash in*) and reflect the respective newspaper’s editorial stance:

- The 6ft 4ins tall sexual *predator* [Mohammed Dica] remained impassive as a jury returned unanimous guilty verdicts on two counts of inflicting ‘biological’ grievous bodily harm – the first person in 137 years to be successfully prosecuted in England and Wales for transmitting a sexual disease. (Express 3)
- It was meant to convince his [Iain Duncan Smith’s] party he’s tough. Instead it evoked images of another *wannabe* urged to make the clenched hand his trademark – tennis ace Tim Henman (insert). (Sun 1)
- Ferdinand test *fiasco* derails England (FT 10)
- A group of recruits had been captured on film while expressing shocking *racist* views, and one had donned a Ku Klux Klan-style hood. (Guardian 7)
- THE boss of Barclays made an amazing gaffe yesterday – admitting credit cards were too expensive for him. . . . The *clanger* comes 12 years after tycoon Gerald Ratner, 53, called products in his jewellery stores ‘crap’. (Sun 4)
- Anger as Diana’s butler *cashes in* by revealing secret letter (Mail 5)

Such emotive evaluation may have the potential for manipulation (though this depends crucially on the reader’s position; compare Chapter 7.5), may evoke emotions and evaluations and may be used in one of the main functions of evaluation in general, namely, ‘to construct and maintain relations between the speaker or writer and hearer or reader’ (Thompson and Hunston 2000: 6). Rather than ‘manipulating’ opinion, it can also reinforce readers’ already existing attitudes (related to the news value of *consonance*).

Distribution

The problem that arises from the methodological decisions discussed above is that not all emotive meanings are captured in the frequency analysis (but cf. Chapter 7), and it might be argued that a distinction that arises from a comparison of merely the evaluators in the two groups of subjective/(dis)approval is not valid. However, when calculating the differences that arise when including and excluding various types of EMOTIVITY, it was found that even if the absolute numbers change, the tendencies

remain the same (Bednarek 2004). No matter how EMOTIVITY is calculated (whichever methodology is used), it is *always* more frequent in the tabloids than in the broadsheets. This may be explained by virtue of the aim of the broadsheets to offer more 'objective' reporting than the tabloids. Additionally, NEGATIVE EMOTIVITY is *always* more frequent than POSITIVE EMOTIVITY, which can be explained by reference to the news value of *negativity*. The analysis of various types of EMOTIVITY also showed that explicitly evaluative lexical items are internally more significant for the tabloids than for the broadsheets. Such explicitness is mostly avoided in the broadsheets because their readers seem to want ostentatiously 'objective' news reporting, and try to attract readers by not appealing too explicitly to a common value system (though implicitly they may still express values). The tabloids do not really aim for objectivity to the same extent, and want to attract their readers by explicitly appealing to a common value system. In other words, the aim of both newspapers may be the same (to attract readers and to establish a relationship with them), but their strategy is different.

The combination of emotivity and importance

EMOTIVITY can be combined with all sorts of meanings (in that emotive connotations can be added to ideational meanings), but what is important for this analysis is the combination of EMOTIVITY with other *evaluative* parameters. (In this section I shall only comment on the combination of EMOTIVITY and IMPORTANCE; other combinations will be discussed in the chapters below.)

The combination of EMOTIVITY with IMPORTANCE refers to evaluators that suggest that something is at the same time IMPORTANT or UNIMPORTANT and POSITIVE or NEGATIVE. In my corpus, only evaluations of aspects of the reported event as (UN)IMPORTANT and NEGATIVE occur (as opposed to evaluations of aspects as (UN)IMPORTANT and POSITIVE, which one might expect to find in other genres). Like the prevalence of NEGATIVE EMOTIVITY in general this can be explained by reference to the news value of *negativity*. Evaluations of IMPORTANCE/EMOTIVITY evaluate something as both UN(IMPORTANT) and somehow connected to NEGATIVE EMOTIVITY (e.g. likely to have negative effects, restricted to negative states of affairs, etc.). Examples are: *snag, time bomb, grave, explosive, serious and critical*.

Discourse functions

Generally speaking, evaluations of EMOTIVITY: NEGATIVE and IMPORTANCE: IMPORTANT contribute to the 'newsworthiness' of a story, expressing at the same time the news value of *negativity* and the news value of *relevance* (i.e. the importance of the event covered in the news story). They seem to dramatize the reported events to some extent:

- The repercussions of the rape allegations against unnamed Premiership players continue to rumble on, but *grave* as they are, a more immediate concern to Eriksson is the loss of Manchester United centre-back Rio Ferdinand, following his failure to provide a sample for a routine drugs test a fortnight ago. (FT 10)
- As the relationship deepened, he told her he wanted to spend the rest of his life with her and start a family. But the harsh truth was that he was a walking health *time bomb* and a serial liar. (Mail 3)
- Still to be disclosed are *explosive* video tapes Diana is said to have made herself earlier in her final year. (Star 5)
- Princes William and Harry were feeling a bitter sense of betrayal last night after Paul Burrell published an *explosive* letter in which Princess Diana predicted her death. (Mail 5)

These are the prototypical evaluations of EMOTIVITY/IMPORTANCE (not in that they are most frequent, but in that they best exemplify this combination), whereas examples such as the following verge on the descriptive and are much less dramatizing:

- Those killed, aside from the bomber, were Iraqis. At least 32 wounded were being treated in hospital. Four were *critically* injured. (Express 2)
- With the royal family and others involved, including Trevor Rees-Jones, the princess's bodyguard, who was *severely* injured in the crash but survived, keeping a dignified silence, it was left to others yesterday to consider motives. (Guardian 5)
- Two other roadside bombs yesterday wounded five Iraqis and three US soldiers – one *seriously*. (Mirror 2)

They nevertheless seem to contribute to the news value of *negativity*, and hence to the newsworthiness of the reported event as such. This explains why evaluations of EMOTIVITY: NEGATIVE and IMPORTANCE: UNIMPORTANT are rare (there are only three occurrences in the broadsheets, and one in the tabloids), since what is unimportant is arguably not very newsworthy. In those instances that occur, the evaluation of an aspect as UNIMPORTANT is reduced by the context:

- The *hitch* was a serious blow to Mr Blair, who had flown to Belfast amid continuing concerns for his health only two days after a heart scare. (Times 6)
- IRA arms *snag* delays Ulster peace process. The Northern Ireland peace process was thrown into confusion last night, after negotiations aimed at restoring the power-sharing assembly hit a last minute snag when David Trimble, the Ulster Unionist leader, demanded further movement on IRA decommissioning. (FT 6)
- The blast blew a crater three yards wide in the road and caused extensive damage to surrounding buildings. A concrete bomb wall

protecting the hotel was blown over by the force of the blast and the lower floor of the building next door caught fire but the hotel itself escaped serious damage. (Express 2)

Here, the immediate contextual evaluations of IMPORTANCE and UNEXPECTEDNESS (underlined) as well as dramatizing expressions or descriptions (underlined) seem more than enough to give 'newsworthiness' to the respective stories.

Distribution

There are only 17 occurrences of EMOTIVITY/IMPORTANCE in the corpus (i.e. 0.33 per cent of all evaluations). Most occurrences of it are combinations of EMOTIVITY: NEGATIVE/IMPORTANCE: IMPORTANT. The majority of these are evaluations of IMPORTANCE that are restricted to qualifying 'negative' events (such as injuries, wounds, damage), as in *severest strain*, *critically injured*, *seriously wounded*, *serious damage*, *serious blow*, *critical* [injuries], *critical* [wounded], *severe disappointment*, in contrast to qualifying 'neutral' entities such as *letters* and *tapes* as *explosive* or *identifying* news actors – for example, as *time bomb*.




Figure 5.1 Discourse functions of EMOTIVITY/IMPORTANCE

These are, as suggested above, less evaluative. It is not surprising, then, that they are more frequent in the broadsheets (85.7 per cent) than in the tabloids (50 per cent).

As far as a general comparison of broadsheets and tabloids is concerned, the combination EMOTIVITY/IMPORTANCE is only slightly more important in the broadsheets than in the tabloids (0.4 per cent vs. 0.3 per cent of all evaluations). However, when we look at the sub-values that are expressed it can be found that NEGATIVE/UNIMPORTANT is internally more significant in the broadsheets (30 per cent of all evaluations of EMOTIVITY/IMPORTANCE)

than in the tabloids (14.3 per cent), whereas NEGATIVE/IMPORTANT is more important in the tabloids (85.7 per cent versus 70 per cent). Regarding stylistic variety, there are no great differences in the two sub-corpora: there are eight evaluators in the broadsheets (SEVERE, *severely*, *critical*, *explosive*, *snag*, *hitch*, *serious*, *grave*) (a ratio of 0.21) compared to six evaluators in the tabloids (*escaped serious*, *seriously*, *critical*, *critically*, *time bomb*, *explosive*) (a ratio of 0.18).

5.3 EXPECTEDNESS

The parameter of EXPECTEDNESS concerns evaluations of (1) unexpectedness, (2) expectedness, (3) contrast and (4) contrast/comparison (negation). The discourse functions of these will now be considered in turn.

EXPECTEDNESS: UNEXPECTED

This sub-value is expressed by evaluators such as *amazing*, *astonishing*(ly), *bizarrely*, *curious*, *dramatic*(ally), *even*, *extraordinari*(ly), *fully*, *sensational*(ly), *spectacular*(ly), *strikingly*, *stunning*, *unexpected*(ly), *unprecedented*, *unusually*. In general, evaluators in this group relate to the news value of *unexpectedness*, i.e. to the importance of the unexpected, the 'new' factors of reported events for their 'newsworthiness', albeit to greater and lesser extents. Lexical items such as *amazing*, *astonishing*, *dramatic*(ally), *extraordinari*(ly), *sensational*(ly), *spectacular*(ly), *stunning*, *strikingly*, *unexpected*(ly), *unprecedented* are particularly powerful devices to evaluate (various aspects of) the news story as UNEXPECTED and hence newsworthy, whereas other lexical items intuitively seem to express unexpectedness to a lesser degree (*as it is*, *in the event*, *not normally*, etc.). Compare:

- America's 'spies in the sky' eavesdropped on Princess Diana in the months before she died, it was revealed last night. And transcripts of their *amazing* 1,050 tapes are believed to contain shattering evidence to support her alleged fears that she could be killed in a car crash. (Star 5)
- The boss of Barclays Bank admitted yesterday that he would not use his company's own Barclaycard to borrow money – because it is too expensive. The *astonishing* confession came as Matthew Barrett was grilled by MPs over excessive interest rates charged by some credit-card firms. (Express 4)
- *Dramatic*: Six years after her death, world attention focuses once again on Diana (Express 4)
- The judgment which took only a few seconds to read marked an anti-climactic end to an *extraordinary* case, which shed light on the shadowy inner workings of the European escort industry and raised questions about the blurred distinctions between marriage agencies, dating services and procurement for sex. (Guardian 8)

- The convent-educated supermadam is now set to *sensationally* name and shame her celeb clients. (Sun 8)
- But then Mr Trimble announced he had not yet heard enough for the process to resume. In a *spectacular* show of brinkmanship, he gave the IRA until next Wednesday to release more details of exactly what arms it had given up. (Express 6)
- Now, plagued by that meeting and deeply troubled that there has still been no inquest in Britain into the death of Diana and her boyfriend Dodi Fayed, Burrell has come forward with the *stunning* new evidence. (Mirror 5)
- It was written in October 1996, two months after the princess's divorce from Prince Charles and reveals a *strikingly* self-pitying, not to say paranoid, mindset not dissimilar to that on show in her Panorama interview a year earlier. (Guardian 5)
- The killer blow began when General John de Chastelain, head of the international decommissioning body, delivered an *unexpectedly* brief and vague report on the IRA's latest disarmament. (Mail 6)
- Mr Blair was forced to suspend Stormont last October amid allegations of an IRA spy ring, but the collapse of this deal is a particular shock because it comes after intense negotiations between unionists and republicans and what seemed to be the budding of *unprecedented* trust between Mr Trimble and Mr Adams who have had more than a dozen face-to-face meetings in recent weeks. (Guardian 6)
- The game against Turkey will be difficult enough, particularly given the precarious security situation. *As it is*, England have managed to derail their pre-match build-up themselves. (FT 10)
- On Monday, fearing that there may be problems looming, Mr Blair's chief of staff, Jonathan Powell, was desperately trying to reach General de Chastelain to work out precisely what he was going to be able to say. *In the event*, the general stuck rigidly to a strict interpretation of his remit and felt prohibited from giving details of the destruction of weapons he had witnessed. (Times 6)
- Mr Maclean's decision to call in the rebels – the chief whip does *not normally* speak publicly – was an acknowledgement that the leadership is taking the threat of a challenge seriously. (Telegraph 1)

Perhaps more interestingly, evaluations of aspects of a reported event as UNEXPECTED often occur in the context of (partly inscribed, partly evoked) NEGATIVE and POSITIVE EMOTIVITY. Here are some examples (EMOTIVITY is signalled by underlining):

NEGATIVE EMOTIVITY:

- THE boss of Barclays made an *amazing gaffe* yesterday – admitting credit cards were too expensive for him. (Sun 4)

- How the millionaire boss of Barclays Bank stunned MPs yesterday with an astonishing admission (Mail 4)
- The game against Turkey will be difficult enough, particularly given the precarious security situation. As it is, England have managed to derail their pre-match build-up themselves. (FT 10)
- David Trimble . . . was then astonishingly presented with a deal that he said he could not accept (Times 6)
- *In the event*, the general stuck rigidly to a strict interpretation of his remit and felt prohibited from giving details of the destruction of weapons he had witnessed. (Times 6)
- It was written in October 1996, two months after the princess's divorce from Prince Charles and reveals a strikingly self-pitying, not to say paranoid, mindset not dissimilar to that on show in her Panorama interview a year earlier. (Guardian 5)
- One of the wheels spun off the Irish peace process wagon in Belfast last night, causing a potentially momentous day to degenerate into an unexpected shambles. (Independent 6)
- Extraordinarily, naïve Deborah still loved him and their relationship continued (Mirror 3)
- The FA's decision to dump Ferdinand before he has been charged with any offence is unprecedented. (Mail 10)

POSITIVE EMOTIVITY:

- The activists interrupted his speech with no fewer than 20 standing ovations – plus a final salute lasting fully eight minutes (Mail 1)
- Mr Duncan Smith, speaking softly after a week in which his vocal chords have been strained by at least 50 interviews as he has fought for his political life, was given no fewer than 17 standing ovations (Times 1)
- what seemed to be the budding of unprecedented trust between Mr Trimble and Mr Adams (Guardian 6)

Although there are more instances of EXPECTEDNESS in the context of negative evaluations than there are in the context of positive evaluations, it seems as if the parameter of EXPECTEDNESS is not *exclusively* associated with NEGATIVE EMOTIVITY. Rather, it seems to function as a *signal* of evaluation, or as a special type of *intensifier*. White (2004b) also mentions intensification, counter-expectation and ventriloquism as pointers or alerts to attitudes. The interpretation of linguistic evaluators of EXPECTEDNESS as intensifiers is additionally supported by research into emotions, which indicates that increases in unexpectedness intensify the emotion that is experienced by human beings. Thus, Ortony *et al.* state that 'unexpected positive things are evaluated more positively than expected ones, and unexpected negative things, more negatively than expected ones' (Ortony *et al.* 1988: 64).

Occasionally, an evaluator of EXPECTEDNESS appears to carry some negative evaluation in itself, as in:

- Mr Duncan Smith spent most of the time staring at his own feet – because the autocue was *bizarrely* at floor level. (Mirror 1)

Here the ‘factual’ description of Iain Duncan Smith’s posture clearly evokes negative evaluation (our world knowledge tells us that staring at your feet is definitely not a good thing for public speaking), and the causal conjunction *because* gives us the reason for this behaviour (the fact that the autocue was at floor level), which, in turn, causes this fact to be negatively evaluated as well. This negative evaluation seems then to be intensified by the writer’s evaluation of it as UNEXPECTED, as a deviation from the norm (prompting the reader’s questioning ‘Why on earth did they do this? Can’t the Tories even get this right?’). The utterance hence not only evaluates Iain Duncan Smith as negative, but the whole organization of the conference, i.e. the Tory Party.

The emotive nuances evoked by expectationals are sometimes quite complex and depend on the wider context. For instance, they can refer to contrasts between the content of attributed propositions and ‘actual facts’, hence evaluating the Sayer of the attributed propositions as negative:

Paul Burrell, the former royal butler, yesterday claimed that Diana, Princess of Wales believed that her life was being threatened and feared a car ‘accident’ would be rigged, 10 months before her actual death in a Paris car crash.

Believing that her enemies were out to get her, she entrusted him with a letter, he claimed, setting out her belief that her car brakes would be tampered with to cause her serious injury and so clear the way for the Prince of Wales to remarry.

And as proof, he published extracts from the alleged letter in a tabloid newspaper, claiming that she told him: ‘I’m going to date this and I want you to keep it . . . just in case.’

The ‘letter’, extracts from which were published in the *Daily Mirror* yesterday to launch Mr Burrell’s latest book is hand-written, in a style similar to the Princess’s hand-writing.

But, there appeared no proof that the letter was addressed to Mr Burrell, her butler at Kensington Palace, who was acquitted last November of stealing hundreds of items from her estate, including correspondence.

Rather than being addressed ‘Dear Paul’, the extracts published appear not to be addressed to anyone. Mr Burrell claims that the four-page letter was given to him by the Princess in a sealed envelope with his name on it. Neither is there any proof of when the Princess might have written it. It appears not to be dated, and the only reference is its curious first sentence: ‘I am sitting here at my desk today in October . . .’. (Telegraph 5)

In this extract, a lot of evidence is presented which suggests that Paul Burrell’s statements are highly unreliable. There is an accumulation of evaluators in this example which, together, work to discredit Paul Burrell’s

statements. Here I shall concentrate only on those following the first evaluator of EXPECTEDNESS (*but*):

- *But* (EXPECTEDNESS: CONTRAST) there *appeared* (EVIDENTIALITY: PERCEPTION/RELIABILITY: MEDIAN) *no proof that* (EVIDENTIALITY: LACK OF PROOF/RELIABILITY: LOW)
- *Rather than* (EXPECTEDNESS: CONTRAST)
- *appear* (EVIDENTIALITY: PERCEPTION/RELIABILITY: MEDIAN) *not* (EXPECTEDNESS: CONTRAST/COMPARISON) to be addressed to anyone
- *claims that* (EVIDENTIALITY: HEARSAY/STYLE: ILLOCUTIONARY/RELIABILITY: LOW)
- *Neither* (EXPECTEDNESS: CONTRAST/COMPARISON) is there any proof of
- *appears* (EVIDENTIALITY: PERCEPTION/RELIABILITY: MEDIAN) *not* (EXPECTEDNESS: CONTRAST/COMPARISON) to be dated
- *only* (EXPECTEDNESS: CONTRAST/COMPARISON) reference is its *curious* (EXPECTEDNESS: UNEXPECTED) first sentence.

By constantly contrasting the 'facts' with alternative possibilities (CONTRAST/COMPARISON) and with what is to be expected (CONTRAST, UNEXPECTEDNESS), a negative evaluation of Paul Burrell accumulates, without the writer's actually using any explicit evaluations of NEGATIVE EMOTIVITY. This extract also shows how evaluation 'attracts' evaluation: there are additional evaluations of EVIDENTIALITY and RELIABILITY, which both mitigate the newspaper's assertions (*appeared, appear, appears*) and throw further doubt on Paul Burrell's reliability (*claim that*). This accumulation of evaluation in some types of discourse has already caught the attention of several linguists recently (Biber *et al.* 1999: 979, Hunston 2006). On account of this wealth of supporting evaluators, Burrell would be negatively evaluated even without the evaluator *curious*. However, the negative evaluation of the extract is strengthened by the evaluation of the *sentence* as UNEXPECTED. Note the effect of deleting *curious*, which seems to suggest slightly higher reliability: *It appears not to be dated, and the only reference is its first sentence: 'I am sitting here at my desk today in October . . .'* Thus, the writer's evaluation of the sentence as *curious* appears to imply that something is wrong with the letter, that it is perhaps faked, because it is unnatural, unusual, strange. On the whole, such evaluations of EXPECTEDNESS may be regarded as important devices for contributing to, or intensifying negative and positive evaluations.

Evaluations of EXPECTEDNESS may also function as basis for the writer's evidential judgement, as in this example:

Mr Maclean's decision to call in the rebels – the chief whip does *not normally* speak publicly – was an acknowledgement that the leadership is taking the threat of a challenge seriously. (Telegraph 1)

→ Evidential judgement: *Mr Maclean's decision to call in the rebels* = *an acknowledgement that . . .*

→ Evidential reasoning: *the chief whip does not normally speak publicly*

With this utterance, the writer evaluates the RELIABILITY of the following proposition (*the leadership is taking threat of a challenge seriously*) as HIGH, but also gives a reason for his/her evaluation: the basis of that evaluation is the writer's interpretation of Mr Maclean's decision to call in the rebels, because it is an unusual (UNEXPECTED) act, as *an acknowledgement that p*.

EXPECTEDNESS: EXPECTED

This sub-value is expressed by units of meaning such as *can expect, familiar, indeed, little wonder that, normal, routine, will/ would* (in their 'usuality' sense). As with evaluations of the sub-value UNEXPECTED, there is an affinity between the sub-value EXPECTED and negative EMOTIVITY. For instance:

- Bombings have become *routine* in Baghdad since August 19 when a truck bomb devastated the United Nations headquarters there, killing 22. (FT 2)
- In the past two months alone there have been six suicide car bombings that have made innocent deaths an increasingly *familiar* tragedy. (Guardian 2)
- English football has had better weeks. Even by the increasingly outrageous standards of the national side, this week has become a circus. *Little wonder that* Sven-Göran Eriksson's yearning to return to club management seems to grow with each passing day. (FT 10)

In the first two examples, the negative (*bombings, innocent deaths, tragedy*) has become the expected (*routine, familiar*) – a connection which will be discussed in more detail below. In the third example, *little wonder that* evaluates the following proposition both as given and as expected. This evaluation is based on what has been said by the writer before (the bad state of English football) and *little wonder that* thus is an evaluation of EXPECTEDNESS that works as a cohesive device linking two additional evaluations (an evaluation of EMOTIVITY: *this week has become a circus* and an evaluation of MENTAL STATE: *Sven-Göran Eriksson's yearning to*). The connection between cohesion and EXPECTEDNESS seems to be an area delineated for further detailed research.

Other evaluations in this sub-group are more descriptive (*routine sample/ drug test/doping test*) and probably relate to the news value of *consonance* and/or are closer to modality (*can expect, will, would*). Although there are not many occurrences of evaluations of EXPECTED aspects of events in the corpus, it does seem that they are as context-dependent and poly-functional as evaluations of aspects as UNEXPECTED and certainly merit further research.

EXPECTEDNESS: CONTRAST

In this sub-group evaluators such as *although, as opposed to, but, despite, however, in contrast with, yet* express some notion of contrast. In Chapter 4, it was

argued that CONTRAST is concerned with evaluations of aspects of events as contrary to expectations. In this respect it, too, relates to the news value of *unexpectedness*, albeit in a more inexplicit way, since it is mostly expressed by conjuncts and subordinators (BUT, ALTHOUGH, etc.). As Thompson and Hunston point out, 'the less obtrusively the evaluation is placed in the clause, the more likely it is to successfully manipulate the reader. Perhaps the most extreme example of this is the use of a conjunct or subordinator to imply evaluation' (Thompson and Hunston 2000: 9).

Generally speaking, one of the overall discourse functions of evaluators of CONTRAST, then, is to express implicit, subtle evaluations. The use of BUT, for instance, gives rise to conventional implicatures (Bublitz 2001: 196) and may 'mark a situation which is in contrast to some model that serves as a norm' (Lakoff 1987: 81). The notion of unexpectedness that is expressed by BUT crucially 'depends on our presuppositions and our experience of the world' (Quirk *et al.* 1985: 935).

As far as more specific discourse functions of contrastive evaluation are concerned, these are manifold, and I shall restrict myself to mentioning only the most interesting ones, exemplifying them with instances from the tabloids. I shall also restrict the analysis to the most frequent evaluator, BUT (for a more detailed analysis see Bednarek 2006a).

One function of BUT in the news stories of the tabloids is simply to contrast two quotations (or points of view) by different speakers (or to contrast the conventionally implied proposition that follows from a quotation with a second quotation); this contributes to bias when more reliability is given to one of the sources, or when one source is evaluated negatively as in:

- Shadow home secretary Oliver Letwin called the speech 'barnstorming' and shadow chancellor Michael Howard said IDS had been 'outstanding'. *But* IDS's aides admitted that [EVIDENTIALITY: HEARSAY/STYLE: ILLOCUTIONARY/EMOTIVITY: NEGATIVE/RELIABILITY: HIGH] some influential Tories still wanted him removed. (Star 1)
- 'The whips will be on the phone over the weekend to all the constituency chairmen of those who have been identified as being involved in the plot,' said one source. 'The hope is that most of the associations will have had their faith in IDS restored and will come down on their MPs hard.' *But* a YouGov poll of grassroots Tory members, published yesterday, put that in doubt [RELIABILITY: LOW] by revealing [EVIDENTIALITY: PERCEPTION/RELIABILITY: HIGH] 53 per cent thought they had made a mistake in electing Mr Duncan Smith in the first place. (Express 1)
- Western diplomats believe many Islamic Jihad operations are directed from Syria, *but* yesterday the terror group [EMOTIVITY: NEGATIVE] claimed [EVIDENTIALITY: HEARSAY/STYLE: ILLOCUTIONARY/RELIABILITY: LOW] its figures were not based at Ein Sahev. (Star 9)

In these examples, expressions that evaluate the attributed proposition as of LOW RELIABILITY (*put that in doubt, claim*), evaluate its Sayer negatively (*the terror group*), or evaluate the contrasted attributed propositions as being of HIGH RELIABILITY (*admitted that, revealing*), contribute to a general evaluation of one of the accessed voices as more reliable. However, there is a cline from simply contrasting quotations to contrasting and evaluating the RELIABILITY of the attributed propositions. For instance, some attributing expressions are only potentially evaluative, and credentializing can be used so as to imply reliability:

- The claims about how Diana died came two days before Paul Burrell's book *A Royal Diary* is published. *But* others who served the Princess dispute suggestions she was 'got at'. (Sun 5)
- 'She never made much money. If she made about £100,000 in a year, after advertising, phone and travel costs, the poor woman was left with barely £5,000. Her adverts were innocent offers for escorts. There was no mention of sex.' *But despite* MacDonald's claims of innocence, there were reports yesterday that she had been involved in people-smuggling operations. (Express 8)
- Dica, an unemployed former office cleaner, of Mitcham, South London, denied the charges. He told police that both women were long-term lovers who knew he was HIV positive before he had sex with them. *But* prosecutor Mark Gadsden told Inner London Crown Court that Dica had behaved 'coldly and callously'. (Mail 3)

Here the evaluators *claims, suggestions, reports that* have the potential to be interpreted as indicating higher or lower degrees of RELIABILITY (cf. Chapter 6). This may also be the effect of the appositional noun phrases in the last example (*Dica, an unemployed former office cleaner* versus *prosecutor Mark Gadsden*).

Equally interesting are cases where the attributed proposition is not contrasted with a different attributed proposition but with a contrasting prediction or contrasting 'evidence'. Table 5.1 shows some examples.

In all examples, the contrast expressed by BUT seems to contribute to an impression that the attributed proposition must be regarded as being of extremely LOW RELIABILITY, and consequently, its Sayer can be evaluated negatively by readers.

In some occurrences it is the same speaker whose attributed propositions are contrasted (see Table 5.2). The scope of the contrast varies according to the type of attribution used: sometimes the contrast encompasses only the attributed propositions, sometimes it encompasses the attributing verb in addition, and sometimes its scope is not entirely clear. In some cases, the *but* might conceivably have originally been uttered by the Sayer (e.g. 'Israel does not wish to pick a fight with Syria, *but* it has been warned more than once by the US that' or 'We'll exercise restraint *but* demand an emergency meeting'), but in retrospect, readers cannot tell whether this is in fact the case.

Table 5.1 Contrasting propositions

	Attributed proposition		Contrasted proposition
Contrasting 'prediction'	he warned plotters to 'get on board – or get out of the way'	BUT	despite 20 rigged ovations, rebels will be on track for November coup (Sun 1)
	'It won't happen because they are all cowards,' predicted one Duncan Smith supporter	BUT	disaffected MPs will be taking soundings of their own (Mail 1)
Contrasting 'evidence'/ 'truth'/'facts'	told her he wanted to spend the rest of his life with her and start a family	BUT	the harsh truth was that he was a walking health time bomb and a serial liar (Mail 3)
	according to Burrell . . . she had 'an overpowering feeling that she was "in the way".'	BUT	Diana . . . was enjoying huge public support (Mirror 5)
	Burrell vowed that he would never betray the Princess's secrets	BUT	days later he sold his story to the Daily Mirror (Mail 5)
	He now claims his forthcoming book, which is being serialised in the Daily Mirror this week and is published later this month, was written because he wanted to 'stand in the princess's corner and fight for her'.	BUT	having already made up to £500,000 out of his relationship with Diana through newspaper deals, TV interviews and public speaking engagements, Burrell knows that sales of his book could double that figure. (Mail 5)
	Former call girl Axelle Guerin had said MacDonald was pessimistic about the outcome and was 'very nervous'.	BUT	in the dock she seemed relaxed, smiled broadly and waved at friends on the public benches. (Express 8)
	His excuse for not being available on September 23 was that his mind was on moving house.	BUT	at 4pm that afternoon he was seen climbing into the passenger seat of a silver Chrysler Voyager near Manchester city center shops and was driven off by a chauffeur. (Star 10)
	Dica, who claims to be Somalian	BUT	carries an out-of-date Kenyan passport (Mirror 3)

Table 5.2 Contrasting attributed propositions

Attributing expression 1	p1		Attributing expression 2	p2
Diana went on to write about how	she had been ‘battered, bruised and abused mentally by a system for 15 years now’	BUT	added that	she felt no resentment or hatred. (Express 5)
Avi Pazner said	Israel did not wish to pick a fight with Syria,	BUT	added:	‘It has been warned more than once by the US that it should close all the facilities of the Islamic Jihad’ (Star 9)
Farouq al-Shara promised	his country would exercise restraint against its neighbour for the moment.	BUT	he demanded	an emergency meeting of the United Nations Security Council to discuss Israel’s ‘provocative and aggressive policies against Syria’. (Mail 9)
Mr Wolfendale said	police were grateful to the BBC for revealing the racism.	BUT	he blasted	the corporation for failing to share its evidence in the months before the broadcast, which would have exposed Pulling sooner. (Sun 7)
He [Trimble] praised the speech by Sinn Fein’s Gerry Adams,		BUT	said	the report from General de Chastelain about the IRA’s latest disarmament had not been ‘clear and transparent’. (Express 6)

More interesting are instances of CONTRAST between a Sayer's propositions where one of the attributing expressions implies HIGH RELIABILITY and NEGATIVE EMOTIVITY, as ADMIT does:

Table 5.3 Contrasting attributed propositions by the same Sayer

Attributing expression 1	p1		Attributing expression 2	p2
MacDonald had admitted	running an escort agency	BUT	denied	telling her girls to have sex with clients (Star 8)
admitted	running an escort agency	BUT	insisted	the 600-an-hour charge was not for sex (Mirror 8)
She claimed	sex was not part of the service which clients paid for,	BUT	admitted that	both she and her call girls sometimes slept with clients 'for pleasure'. (Mail 8)
It [the FA] said	it was 'wide of the mark' to suggest there was a threatened walkout,	BUT	admitted	the players wanted to put their thoughts across. (Mail 10)

This may contribute to the impression that what is *denied/insisted upon* is less reliable than what is *admitted* (compare the discussion of ADMIT in Chapter 6).

Although the most frequent use of BUT is to contrast attributing propositions, sometimes it also juxtaposes POSITIVE and NEGATIVE EMOTIVITY. In the following examples, propositions are contrasted that would be considered as positive or negative for a news actor, in this case for Iain Duncan Smith, and that can thus trigger positive or negative EMOTIVITY on the part of the reader depending on his/her opinion. The contrast sometimes also involves NEGATIVE EMOTIVITY that is explicitly expressed (inscribed) rather than evoked:

- They also loved his brief impersonation of Tony Blair's trademark grin and his lampooning of a PM fantasy land, which he labelled 'BlairWorld'. *But* he shocked observers with a savage attack on Mr Blair over the suicide of MoD Iraq weapons expert Dr David Kelly. (Sun 1)

- Delegates cheered and clapped as he railed against Europe, asylum seekers, taxes, the NHS and the school system. *But* some visibly flinched as he stooped to gutter politics with vicious personal attacks on political opponents. (Mirror 1)
- The applause flowed thick and fast – *but* party stooges wearing earpieces, and strategically seated near the platform, kept leaping to their feet on cue. (Sun 1)

There might perhaps be a case in arguing that to place the contrasted negative evaluation at the end of the contrast (as is the case in these examples) has the effect of giving it more strength, of weakening the positive evaluation.

Since the different discourse functions of BUT are not always so easily discernible, I have refrained from comparing their distribution in detail, but it is interesting to note that not all of these functions occur in the broadsheets. On the whole, BUT is concerned with the following discourse functions in the corpus:

- implicit evaluation of aspects of reported events as contrasting with some norm (general discourse function)
- contrasting attributed propositions of different Sayers (tabloids and broadsheets)
- contrasting attributed propositions of different Sayers, explicitly evaluating one of them as more reliable (tabloids only)
- contrasting attributed propositions with contradictory averred predictions/‘evidence’/opinions (broadsheets and tabloids)
- contrasting attributed propositions of same Sayer (broadsheets and tabloids)
- contrasting attributed propositions of same Sayer, evaluating one of them as more reliable (broadsheets and tabloids)
- contrasting (partly evoked) positive and negative evaluation (broadsheets and tabloids).

As far as the use of BUT is concerned, it was also noticeable that it seems to function as a ‘signal’ of evaluation: in all but six occurrences of BUT, some sort of evaluation is taking place in the context – for example, an evaluation of EVIDENTIALITY (*visibly, audibly, appears to, clearly, showed*), EMOTIVITY (*nice, didn’t quite work, it worked, failed to, worsening*), RELIABILITY (*orchestrated, genuine, will, could, may*), MENTAL STATE (*they loved his impersonation, in shock, warm, ferocious*), CONTRAST (*despite, IDS did get a longer standing ovation, he did write*), CONTRAST/COMPARISON (*not, only*), IMPORTANCE (*serious damage, top hotels, severely*), COMPREHENSIBILITY (*clarify*) or NECESSITY (*needs*). The implications of this finding are that, in the news stories, BUT is a marker or signal of additional evaluation. Like CLEARLY, this could be used as a methodological tool for large-scale corpus analyses of evaluation.

EXPECTEDNESS: CONTRAST/COMPARISON

As outlined in Chapter 4, the sub-value of CONTRAST/COMPARISON refers to negation, which is in itself a very complex phenomenon (see e.g. Quirk *et al.* 1985: 778ff, Bublitz 1992). For instance, Hermerén (1986: 66) distinguishes between overt (formal) negation and covert (conceptual) negation: the former type of negation is negation by means of a negative morpheme (NO, NOT, negative affixes: *unwillingness*, *don't like*, *dislike*), the latter type of negation cannot be ascribed to a particular part of a word, but the word itself is negative in meaning (RELUCTANCE, LOATHE):

Table 5.4 Covert and overt negation

covert negation	– adverbs	SELDOM, RARELY, ONLY SCARCELY, HARDLY, BARELY
	– determiners	LITTLE, FEW
	– verbs	DENY, FORGOT, DOUBT
	– prepositions	WITHOUT
overt negation	– response word	NO
	– clause negator	NOT
	– negative determiners and pronouns	NO, NONE, NOBODY, NO ONE, NOTHING, NOWHERE, NEVER, NEITHER, NOR
	– prefixes and suffixes	IN-, UN-, DIS, NON-, A-, -LESS

In the news story corpus we find instances of both types of negation, overt negation (analytic: *not* and synthetic: *never*, *no*, *nobody*, *none*, *nothing*) and covert negation (*barely*, *hardly*, *scarcely*, *only*, *just*, *little*, *without*).

However, I have excluded *some* types of negation from the frequency analysis, namely, those where the notion of EXPECTEDNESS seemed to me secondary or weak (e.g. negation expressed by affixes, as in: *inability*, *unable*, *uninjured*, *unchanged*, *unannounced*, *unconnected*, *unprotected*, *unnamed*, *unused*, *undated*, *non-league*). Some types of covert negation (especially verbs such as ESCAPE, STOP, MISS, GIVE UP, WITHHOLD, SURVIVE, SILENCE, OMIT) have also been excluded for methodological reasons, because they are too easily overlooked in the manual analysis. Moreover, some expressions involving negations have been included as the ‘negative’ pole of certain parameters – for example, as INCOMPREHENSIBLE, NEGATIVE, UNEXPECTED, UNIMPORTANT, NOT POSSIBLE and as LACK OF EVIDENCE, LACK OF KNOWLEDGE, DISBELIEF and NON-VOLITION:

- COMPREHENSIBILITY: INCOMPREHENSIBLE: e.g. *less than definite*, *not clear*, *unclear*
- EMOTIVITY: NEGATIVE: e.g. *no satisfactory*, *didn't work*
- EXPECTEDNESS: UNEXPECTED: e.g. *not normally*, *unprecedented*

- IMPORTANCE: UNIMPORTANT: e.g. *no substantial*
- POSSIBILITY/NECESSITY: NOT POSSIBLE: e.g. *could not*
- EVIDENTIALITY: LACK OF EVIDENCE: e.g. *no proof that*
- MENTAL STATE: DISBELIEF: e.g. *unconvinced, doubts, not accept*
- MENTAL STATE: LACK OF KNOWLEDGE: e.g. *did not know, had no idea of*
- MENTAL STATE: NON-VOLITION: e.g. *refuse, will not, unwillingness*.

This leaves us with a reduced number of negations for the analysis. Many of these are simply used to refer to news actors' answers of 'no comment' to journalists' questions, or to the fact that they did not give any statements to the press, in other words, to what Geis calls 'null speech events' (Geis 1987: 87):

- Mr Burrell was in the United States promoting a book which is to be published next week and which is being serialised in the *Mirror*. He was *not* available for comment (Times 5)
- There was also *no* comment from the Spencer family (Telegraph 5)

Why should newspapers mention these 'null events' at all? After all, the fact that no comment was given is not particularly 'newsworthy' in itself. However, such reports may provide a justification for newspapers as far as their choice of 'accessed voices' (Hartley 1982: 46) is concerned. They explain to readers why the affected news actors are not quoted themselves.

More importantly, evaluations of CONTRAST/COMPARISON may trigger negative evaluation, depending on their context of occurrence. Here are some examples:

- With *none of* the ceremony of British courts, Judge Ribeyrotte [sic] read out the sentence in a soft monotone, *barely* looking at the former convent girl and business graduate from the Home Counties whose taste for money and excitement had landed her in the dock between two gendarmes. (Times 8)
- Inside his shattered Muqataa, *barely* rebuilt from the last time Israeli tanks razed its outbuildings, a pale Mr Arafat yesterday occupied the same tiny suite of rooms where he has spent the last two years under virtual [RELIABILITY/STYLE: HEDGE] house arrest. As his aides stockpile water, food and weapons in preparation for an Israeli raid which could [RELIABILITY: LOW] come any time the veteran [EMOTIVITY: POSITIVE] Palestinian leader, speaking so faintly that he could [POSSIBILITY/NECESSITY: POSSIBLE] *hardly* [EXPECTEDNESS: CONTRAST/COMPARISON] be heard, denounced [EVIDENTIALITY: HEARSAY/STYLE: ILLOCUTIONARY] the Haifa bombing. (Times 9)
- He [Paul Burrell] adds: 'No one is more aware than I of the knowledge locked away inside my head. In choosing to impart certain information to me the princess ensured I shared a historic knowledge.' The author does *not* say why he has hitherto chosen to keep that historic [EMOTIVITY: NEGATIVE] knowledge to himself. (Guardian 5)

- The extract also begs the question why [COMPREHENSIBILITY: INCOMPREHENSIBLE] Mr Burrell did *not* draw the authorities' attention to it in the aftermath of the Princess's death in August 1997. (Telegraph 5)
- Football is one of the few sports *not* to have signed up to the World Anti Doping Agency's code of practice, a failure [EMOTIVITY: NEGATIVE] that could [RELIABILITY: LOW] cost the sport £20m in government funding for grassroots football. (Guardian 10)

The negative evaluation that is triggered by the evaluation of CONTRAST/COMPARISON usually depends largely on negative evaluations that are expressed in the context, although, as in the first example, it may also depend on the reader's position: depending on his/her opinion about the ceremony of British courts, the evaluation expressed by *with none of the ceremony of British courts* may trigger positive or negative evaluation of Judge Rebeyrotte, although the 'preferred' evoked evaluation is probably negative, since this is the typical evoked evaluation for the ensuing proposition (*Judge Ribeyrotte* [sic] *read out the sentence in a soft monotone, barely looking at the former convent girl and business graduate from the Home Counties*). In the other examples, there are a lot of expressed and evoked evaluations. In the second example, for instance, Arafat is portrayed as the 'weak victim', whereas Israel is represented as the 'strong aggressor' with the help of a wealth of explicit and evoked evaluations, including the evaluations of CONTRAST/COMPARISON: *shattered Muqataa, barely rebuilt from the last time Israeli tanks razed its outbuildings, an Israeli raid which could come any time, the veteran leader, a pale Mr Arafat, tiny suite of rooms, virtual house arrest, speaking so faintly that he could hardly be heard*. This may evoke the reader's negative evaluation of Israel's actions and his/her pity and sympathy for Arafat. In the extract from the *Guardian*, the negative evaluation implied by *the author does not say why* seems to depend on the irony expressed by *historic*. In the next example, an evaluation of INCOMPREHENSIBILITY, which itself triggers NEGATIVE EMOTIVITY, seems to contribute to the fact that the negated utterance can also evoke negative evaluations of Paul Burrell. In the final example, the negative evaluation (expressed by negation) is again dependent on inscribed (*failure*) and evoked (*could cost the sport £20m in government funding for grassroots football*) EMOTIVITY. In all these examples the evaluation of CONTRAST/COMPARISON seems to signal the writer's disapproval (a possible evaluative paraphrase is 'why did he not do X as one would have expected him to do/as he should have done') in the context of other (partly evoked) evaluations.

There are other similar examples in the corpus, but I think the general thrust of the argument has become clear: evaluations of CONTRAST/COMPARISON have a high potential to evoke NEGATIVE EMOTIVITY, since they contrast and compare propositions with what readers might want or expect to happen. This evoked NEGATIVE EMOTIVITY depends crucially on the context (the occurrence of more evaluations) as well as the reader's

opinion. Only a reader who shares at least some of the *Daily Mail's* values, for instance, would evaluate the report that *overseas visitors to the UK – including asylum seekers – are not currently vetted for the HIV virus* as strongly negative. Contrasting behaviour to an alternative may also evoke POSITIVE EMOTIVITY, if this alternative behaviour is considered to be negative ('*Battered: But Diana felt no hatred towards Queen* (Express 5)), but this is much less frequent in the corpus, as is positive evaluation on the whole.

An evaluation of CONTRAST/COMPARISON may also evoke emotions – for example, schadenfreude or pity in readers, as in:

- Other attendees at the committee hearing did *not* manage to wriggle off the hook. (Independent 4)
- On her 44th birthday, Margaret MacDonald had *little* to celebrate as she was returned to prison in handcuffs from a court in Paris. (Telegraph 8)

This, again, crucially depends on the reader's position.

Other evaluations of CONTRAST/COMPARISON may be employed to implicitly evaluate the RELIABILITY of an attributed proposition as unreliable, by presenting evidence to the contrary. This discourse function of CONTRAST/COMPARISON is similar to one of the discourse functions expressed by BUT above:

1. MacDonald entered the court wearing a black tracksuit and a red scarf pulled over her head to hide from the cameras outside. She *scarcely* resembled the glamorous madam described by French police as 'fascinating, sophisticated and ruthless'. (Telegraph 8)
2. Her lawyer, Emmanuel Marsigny, added: 'She never made much money. If she made about £100,000 in a year, after advertising, phone and travel costs, the poor woman was left with barely £5,000.' That is certainly *not* a view shared by the French police. (Mail 8)
3. England manager Sven Goran Eriksson was also said to be seething about the decision. But publicly he would *only* say that he would have to 'accept orders' and that Ferdinand's exclusion was 'a pity'. (Mail 10)

In these examples the effect of the evaluators of CONTRAST/COMPARISON, together with their context, is clearly the evaluation of the propositions attributed to (1) the French police, (2) Emmanuel Marsigny and (3) Sven Goran Eriksson as highly unreliable.

Finally, a specific sub-group of evaluators of CONTRAST/COMPARISON is represented by JUST/ONLY + numeral/numeral + ALONE. Because of their affinity with negation, these have been classified as EXPECTEDNESS: CONTRAST/COMPARISON, though, clearly, they seem to shade into the expression of EXPECTEDNESS: UNEXPECTED, since they appear to be connected to surprise. In the corpus this pattern occurs mostly with a time-span (*seconds, minutes, hours, days, months, years*) or a length measurement (*miles*).

The numeral is not necessary in the case of 'vague language' (Channell 1994), as in *just hours after*. In one example (*Aqila al-Hashimi, one of only three women on the governing council*) the pattern may evoke NEGATIVE EMOTIVITY, but on the whole it appears to express emphasis or unexpectedness and functions to dramatize. Compare:

- The judgment which took *only a few seconds* to read marked an anti-climactic end to an extraordinary case, which shed light on the shadowy inner workings of the European escort industry and raised questions about the blurred distinctions between marriage agencies, dating services and procurement for sex. (Guardian 8)
- The Israeli attack came *just hours* after Hanadi Jaradat, 29, a lawyer from the West Bank city of Jenin, coldly shot dead a security guard then blew herself up inside restaurant Maxim in Haifa. (Sun 9)
- Having waited almost two months since the alleged offence, it seems perverse that the FA should have scheduled his hearing *just three days* before the game in Turkey, but Eriksson insisted he and Campbell were happy with the timing. (FT 10)
- The hitch was a serious blow to Mr Blair, who had flown to Belfast amid continuing concerns for his health *only two days* after a heart scare. (Times 6)
- PRINCESS DIANA claimed there was a plot to kill her in a car crash in a handwritten letter *only 10 months* before she died (Mirror 5)
- In the past *two months alone* there have been six suicide car bombings that have made innocent deaths an increasingly familiar tragedy. (Guardian 2)
- Deborah, who may have *only ten years* to live, said anyone who caught HIV has a 'human decency' to tell their sexual partners that they have it. (Mail 3)
- The attack – believed to have been carried out by F-16 bombers – flattened several targets in the Ein Saheb terror training camp *just 10 miles* from the capital Damascus. (Sun 9)
- Last month Aqila al-Hashimi, one of *only three women* on the governing council, was shot outside her home and later died. (Guardian 2)

Perhaps the usage of such expressions can be related to the news value of *superlativeness*, in the sense that expressions like ONLY and JUST might be considered 'reversed' superlatives.

Other evaluations of CONTRAST/COMPARISON have this potential of dramatization as well, it seems, albeit to a lesser extent, and are clearly influenced by their contexts:

- After a week of intrigue and conspiracy, the embattled Tory leader came out fighting with a passion and conviction *never* shown before and forged a powerful new bond with the party out in the country. (Mail 1)

- The latest controversy could *hardly* have come at a worse time for the England team, and the national game with its reputation in the doldrums (Independent 10)
- With all traffic stopped, there was a silence in the street broken *only* by the sound of falling glass as shopkeepers cleared away shattered panes. (Independent 2)
- After serving 16 months on remand, MacDonald will be eligible for parole in ten months – and the authorities in France know they will be powerless to stop the woman they have dubbed La Madame Anglais from spending her ill-gotten, and well-hidden, millions. Exactly how much money she salted away, *only* MacDonald herself knows. (Mail 8)

It does seem as if the propositional contents involving the evaluation of CONTRAST/COMPARISON are particularly dramatic: *could hardly have come at a worse time, only MacDonald herself knows, a silence broken only by the sound of falling glass*. If we substitute *a passion and conviction never shown before* with *with passion and conviction* the effect becomes obvious. However, it is not clear whether it is the evaluation of CONTRAST/COMPARISON that causes this effect or whether its context does. The answer is probably in the interplay of both.

Distribution

On the whole, evaluations of EXPECTEDNESS represent 9.5 per cent of all evaluations in the corpus, and are rather important for the news story genre (being related to the news value of *unexpectedness*). Before commenting on the distribution of the individual sub-values in detail, let us look at their overall distribution in the corpus:

Table 5.5 Distribution of evaluations of EXPECTEDNESS

EXPECTED- NESS	All	Broadsheets		Tabloids	
		occurrences	percentages	occurrences	percentages
UNEXPECTED	62	24	9.4%	38	16.2%
EXPECTED	12	7	2.7%	5	2.1%
CONTRAST	311	159	62.3%	152	66.7%
CONTRAST/ COMPARISON	105	65	25.5%	40	17%
all	490	255	100% of 255	235	100% of 235

The overall preference for the different values of EXPECTEDNESS is similar in both sub-corpora: CONTRAST > CONTRAST/COMPARISON > UNEXPECTED > EXPECTED. However, in the tabloids the frequency of occurrences of

CONTRAST/COMPARISON (17 per cent) is almost the same as the frequency of occurrences of UNEXPECTED (16.2 per cent), whereas in the broadsheets there is a 16.1 point difference between the two (25.5 per cent versus 9.4 per cent). This is explicable by two contrasting tendencies: (1) UNEXPECTED is more important for the tabloids than for the broadsheets; (2) CONTRAST/COMPARISON is more important for the broadsheets. This probably relates to the fact that the news value of *unexpectedness* seems to play a bigger role in the popular press than in the quality press. It may also be connected to the fact that evaluations of CONTRAST/COMPARISON are less explicitly evaluative than evaluations along the UNEXPECTED sub-value, and broadsheets, as suggested, shy away from such explicit evaluations. I shall now discuss individual tendencies in the sub-values.

EXPECTEDNESS: UNEXPECTED

Starting with the stylistic variety of evaluations of the sub-value UNEXPECTED, there are 19 different evaluators in the tabloids (*amazing, astonishing, bizarrely, cast aside usual, drama, dramatic, dramatically, even, extraordinarily, fully, no fewer than, sensation, sensational, sensationallly, spectacular, spectacularly, stunning, unexpectedly, unprecedented*) (a ratio of 0.6) compared to 13 in the broadsheets (*as it is, astonishingly, curious, even, extraordinary, in the event, no fewer than, not normally, strikingly, unexpected, unexpectedly, unprecedented, unusually*) (a ratio of 0.3). This is an exceptional case where the stylistic variety is greater in the tabloids, because this parameter seems more important for the popular press than for the quality press.

It was argued earlier that some of the evaluators in this category, namely *amazing, astonishing(ly), drama, dramatic(ally), extraordinarily, sensation(al)(ly), spectacular(ly), strikingly, stunning, unexpected(ly)* and *unprecedented* are the most explicit and emotionally 'intense' evaluators of this group, clearly relating to the news value of *unexpectedness*. It is thus interesting to compare the importance of these 'astonishing'-evaluators for the tabloids and for the broadsheets:




Figure 5.2 Distribution of 'astonishing'-evaluators

It is evident that these evaluators are much more important for the tabloids than for the broadsheets: 71 per cent of all their evaluations of EXPECTEDNESS: UNEXPECTED are instances of 'astonishing'-evaluators (29.2 per cent in the broadsheets). Not only are evaluations of EXPECTEDNESS: UNEXPECTED therefore more frequent in the tabloids, they are also more explicit and 'intense' than in the broadsheets.

Let us now move on to consider the most frequent evaluators in this category. The most frequent evaluator of the UNEXPECTED sub-value in the corpus is EVEN, making up 45.8 per cent of evaluations of EXPECTEDNESS: UNEXPECTED in the broadsheets and 18.4 per cent in the tabloids. If we compare the distribution of 'astonishing'-evaluators with the distribution of EVEN and other evaluators, we get the whole picture for evaluations of EXPECTEDNESS: UNEXPECTED:




Figure 5.3 Distribution of evaluations of EXPECTEDNESS: UNEXPECTED

This diagram shows that for the broadsheets EVEN is the most important evaluator, followed by 'astonishing'-evaluators and others, whereas for the tabloids, 'astonishing'-evaluators are the most frequent, followed by EVEN and other evaluators.

EXPECTEDNESS: EXPECTED

As there are only 12 occurrences of EXPECTEDNESS: EXPECTED in the corpus (and as these are also highly influenced by the topic), no detailed frequency comparison will be undertaken. For instance, since the Rio Ferdinand story is about a missed drug test, *routine* (as in *routine drug test*) is the most frequent evaluator in this group, but this is neither significant nor representative. The rare occurrence of such evaluations clearly deviates from Francis's (1995) findings (based on a 100-million-word version of the Bank of English, comprising written and spoken English) that 'we tend to evaluate life's situations as being basically what we would expect' (Francis 1995: 10), i.e. as *not/hardly surprising*.

EXPECTEDNESS: CONTRAST

Regarding the stylistic variety of evaluations of CONTRAST we can find only a slightly greater variety in the broadsheets, where 16 different evaluators occur (*although, as they are, but, despite, do-emphasis, however, in contrast with, instead, instead of, nevertheless, nonetheless, not only . . . but, rather than, still, though, while*) (a ratio of 0.43) in contrast to twelve evaluators in the tabloids (*although, as opposed to, but, despite, do-emphasis, however, instead, rather than, still, though, while, yet*) (a ratio of 0.37).

In both tabloids and broadsheets, BUT is the predominant contrastive conjunction (67.8 per cent of all contrastive expressions), followed distantly by HOWEVER, WHILE and ALTHOUGH (8 per cent, 6.4 per cent and 4.5 per cent respectively):




Figure 5.4 Distribution of contrastive evaluators

However, the percentage is slightly higher in the tabloids, with 111 out of 152 instances of evaluation expressed by BUT (73 per cent), compared to 100 out of 159 in the broadsheets (62.9 per cent). Not surprisingly, the data thus confirms the greater stylistic variety of the broadsheets. Moreover, the higher frequency of BUT in the tabloids may be explained by the fact that BUT is very frequent in conversation (Biber *et al.* 1999: 82), and that the tabloids use more vernacular language than the broadsheets. The other significant difference lies in the percentages of HOWEVER, WHILE, ALTHOUGH and THOUGH, which are all greater in the broadsheets (9.4 per cent WHILE, 8.2 per cent HOWEVER, 5 per cent ALTHOUGH, 3.8 per cent THOUGH) than in the tabloids (7.9 per cent HOWEVER, 3.9 per cent ALTHOUGH, 3.3 per cent WHILE, 2 per cent THOUGH), again reflecting this greater stylistic variety (see Figure 5.5).

Surprisingly, in both tabloids and broadsheets the percentage of ALTHOUGH is higher than that of THOUGH, although the former is usually considered as more formal than the latter (Quirk *et al.* 1985: 1097), and a preference for the latter would thus have been expected in the tabloids. The low frequency of HOWEVER can be explained by the fact that




Figure 5.5 Distribution of contrastive evaluators in the two sub-corpora

it is usually regarded as a ‘weak’ (Cotter 1996: 267) BUT, and that news stories have a preference for stronger contrasts.

EXPECTEDNESS: CONTRAST/COMPARISON

Starting with the stylistic variety of evaluations of CONTRAST/COMPARISON, there is again more variety in the broadsheets, where we can find 15 evaluators (*all, alone, barely, hardly, just, little, neither, never, no, none, not, nothing, only, scarcely, without*) (a ratio of 0.4) compared to only eight in the tabloids (*just, never, no, nobody, not, nothing, only, without*) (a ratio of 0.2).

The most frequent evaluators in the news story corpus overall are ONLY (30.5 per cent), NOT (30.5 per cent), NO (12.4 per cent) and JUST (5.7 per cent):




Figure 5.6 Distribution of ONLY, NOT, NO, JUST

However, if we group similar evaluators together, NO and NOT are most frequent (42.8 per cent).

Whereas NOT is almost equally important in both tabloids (30 per cent of all evaluations of CONTRAST/COMPARISON) and broadsheets (30.8 per cent), NO is more frequent in the broadsheets (13.8 per cent vs. 10 per cent). Interestingly, NO-negation has been described both as more characteristic of expressing judgement than NOT-negation, and as more emphatic than NOT-negation (Biber *et al.* 1999: 169). The trend towards a higher frequency of such negations in the broadsheets is thus contrary to the common tendency of more emphasis or intensity in the tabloid publications. JUST (10 per cent vs. 3.1 per cent) and ONLY (37.5 per cent vs. 26.1 per cent) occur more significantly in the tabloids. However, the broadsheets also employ BARELY, HARDLY, SCARCELY with meanings similar to that of ONLY/JUST. But even taking this into account, in the broadsheets CONTRAST/COMPARISON with NOT/NO is the most frequent (followed by ONLY/JUST/BARELY/HARDLY/SCARCELY and others), whereas in the tabloids it is the other way round:




Figure 5.7 Distribution of evaluators of CONTRAST/COMPARISON

The greater importance of ONLY, JUST, etc. in the tabloids, which often dramatize aspects of the reported event, suggests that dramatization plays a bigger part in this sub-corpus. Also, negations with NO/NOT are more context-dependent and their potential to trigger the reader's evaluations and emotions crucially depends on the reader's opinion.

The combination of expectedness and emotivity

In the discussion of EXPECTEDNESS: UNEXPECTED it was pointed out that this sub-value is often associated with NEGATIVE EMOTIVITY in that such evaluations can evoke, contribute to, or intensify NEGATIVE EMOTIVITY. It is thus not surprising that there are several evaluators which express these two parameters jointly, i.e. evaluate something as at the same time (UN)EXPECTED and as NEGATIVE. Interestingly, there are no evaluators in the corpus which express POSITIVE EMOTIVITY and EXPECTEDNESS, once again reflecting the importance of the news value of *negativity* for the press.

Discourse functions

There are different ways of combining these two parameters in one evaluator; it is for instance possible to judge the fact that something has not been done as both surprising and negative (*has yet to*), or to use an evaluator to refer to something that is at the same time both unpleasant and UNEXPECTED (*bombshell*), or to evaluate a news actor's behaviour as both UNEXPECTED and disapproved of (*sideswipe*):

- Publication of the letter will increase pressure on Michael Burgess, the coroner who *has yet to* hold an inquest into the death of Diana or Mr Fayed more than six years after their deaths. (Times 5)
- Paul Burrell *bombshell*: His secret Di letter (Sun 5)
- The *bombshell* programme, The Secret Policeman, went out on Tuesday night. (Sun 7)
- On the Liberal Democrats, the Tory leader accused the frontbench spokesmen of being spendthrifts – and took a *sideswipe* at the party leader, Charles Kennedy. (Independent 1)

The evaluator *plunged into* is connected both to the notion of unexpectedness and EMOTIVITY, in that it refers to a sudden change of a state of affairs which is for the worse (PLUNGE INTO has a clear semantic preference for negative collocates):

- The Northern Ireland peace process was *plunged back into* crisis last night. (Star 6)
- Football was *plunged* even deeper *into* crisis last night by the arrest of two Premiership footballers suspected of carrying out a serious sex attack. (Times 10)

More interesting are cases where something is evaluated as to be EXPECTED and NEGATIVE. Several examples can be found in the corpus:

- *Another* day in Iraq, *another* bomb – 84 dates that tell tale of mayhem (Guardian 2)
- Drugs, sexual assault, and a £60m deal: *just another* day in our national game (Independent 10)
- MacDonald has *inevitably* tried to play down her wealth (Mail 8)

According to an analysis in the Bank of English, the pattern *another* + N, *another* + N seems to have a weak preference for negative collocates. Generally speaking, it appears as if the neutral collocates potentially acquire negative evaluation in this pattern. Native speaker informants confirmed this clearly. The meaning of *another* + N, *another* + N is that 'The bad has become the routine', as one of them has put it. Even if the pattern does not automatically imply negativity, it certainly does so in this context. This negativity is reinforced by the preference of *tell tale of* for negative collocates. Although there are only 4 lines of this expression in the Bank of English, all four occurrences of *tell tale of* have negative collocates: *terror*,

Pak savagery, Uganda deaths, violent prisoner. A Google search for *tell tale of* came up with 2,760 hits. Looking at 50 of these I found 25 negative collocates (the rest were predominantly neutral descriptions of scientific discoveries and very rarely positive). With this pattern, the situation in Iraq is at the same time evaluated as **NEGATIVE** and as **EXPECTED** – this in turn establishes a negative evaluation of the ‘coalition troops’ responsible for the situation there. In the second example a similar function is fulfilled by *just another*: again, typicality (**EXPECTEDNESS**) and negativity are combined: the negative is to be expected in the context of football. This clearly evaluates football (and footballers) today as negative. The final example is similar: *Inevitably* seems to be applicable only to undesired, negative events (*‘she inevitably helped me’*), combining an evaluation of **EXPECTEDNESS** (‘this was to be expected of her’) with behaviour which is evaluated as **NEGATIVE**.

To evaluate something as both to be expected and negative 1) increases the negative evaluation of a news actor if his/her behaviour is evaluated at the same time as negative and to be expected (‘it is not a one-off mistake/bad behaviour, but in line with his/her general bad character’), extending an evaluation of negative behaviour to an evaluation of that person’s character, and 2) promotes a negative or pessimistic outlook on certain situations and a negative evaluation of the one(s) responsible for or involved in it. Since there are only twelve occurrences of this combination in the corpus (seven in the broadsheets, five in the tabloids), no comments will be made on their distribution.

5.4 IMPORTANCE

The analysis of the potential discourse functions of evaluations of **IMPORTANCE** shall be restricted to the **IMPORTANT** sub-value, because evaluations of **IMPORTANCE: UNIMPORTANT** are quite rare in the corpus.

Discourse functions

Evaluations of **IMPORTANCE: IMPORTANT** can contribute not only to one but to three different news values: (1) *attribution*, (2) *relevance* and (3) *eliteness*.

Firstly, evaluations along the **IMPORTANT** sub-value can be used to credentialize Sayers and Sensors. Remember that – according to the news value of *attribution* – sources that are affiliated with some institution have a high prestige and are preferred to unaffiliated sources. Such ‘elite’ Sayers or Sensors are often used as sources in the press. Evaluations of **IMPORTANCE** can make this eliteness explicit, as in:

- Richard Lugar and Joseph Biden, the *senior* Republican and Democrat on the Senate foreign relations committee (FT 2)
- Supt Martin Harding, the most *senior* black officer in GMP (Express 7)
- *top* psychologist Dr Peter Kindermann (Sun 5)
- *leading* Democrat (Mail 9)

- Members of the *influential* Treasury Select Committee (Independent 4)
- Freddy Zer-Aviv, a *prominent* surgeon (Mail 9)
- *supremo* Gordon Taylor (Star 10)
- SOCCER *star* Rio Ferdinand (Mirror 10)

The effect of such evaluations may be to lend reliability to the attributed propositions. A slightly different case is represented in the following example:

- A *significant* weather vane among MPs, Mr Yeo claimed it had only been a 'very small number of people who have been conspiring' (Guardian 1)

Here the evaluator *significant* does not really refer to the 'eliteness' of the Sayer in terms of affiliation, but rather in terms of his 'representativeness', as it were, and also renders the attributed proposition more reliable (though this is countered by the potentially distancing *claimed*).

Secondly, many evaluations of IMPORTANCE: IMPORTANT seem to be related to the news value of *relevance* (concerning the importance of the news story for the audience). However, the focus of such evaluations appears not so much on how far the news story is relevant or important for the particular audience, but rather on its general importance. The result may be a dramatization of aspects of the reported event. To name but a few examples:

- As the two opposition parties battle for second place in the polls, . . . it is a *crucial* battleground. (Guardian 1)
- . . . a *vital* early test of the Protestant community's verdict will come in the Assembly election (Independent 6)
- The *landmark* case may pave the way for other such prosecutions (FT 3)
- BRITISH vice queen Margaret MacDonald was jailed for four years yesterday for running the biggest prostitution *empire* in history (Sun 8)
- The judge in the case, Judge Nicholas Philpot, *made legal history* by ruling after two days of legal argument that passing on HIV amounted to inflicting GBH. (Sun 3)
- A man who knowingly infected two women with the HIV virus was convicted of causing 'biological' grievous bodily harm yesterday in a *historic* legal case. (Telegraph 3)
- As pressure mounts for British inquests on the couple, these tapes – stored in a climate-controlled vault at NSA's Fort Meade HQ near Washington – could be a *crucial* exhibit. (Star 5)
- The letter is likely to become a *key* piece of evidence in a forthcoming British inquest into Diana's death, which is likely to be held next year. (Mail 5)

- One of the wheels spun off the Irish peace process wagon in Belfast last night, causing a potentially *momentous* day to degenerate into an unexpected shambles. (Independent 6)
- Paul Burrell: The *book of the century* (Mirror 5)

A special case of such evaluation is concerned with emphasizing the importance of the story as such:

- Real reason Rio skipped drug testing – Star suffering ‘mystery’ infection – *Exclusive* (Express 10)
- Rio shops on drug test day – England ace seen in Harvey Nichols – *Exclusive* (Star 10)
- DIANA LETTER SENSATION: ‘They’re planning “an accident” in my car so Charles can marry again’ – Revealed: note that will stun world – Full astonishing story: pages 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 & 9 – *WORLD EXCLUSIVE* (Mirror 5)

This usage of course relates to the news value of *competition* and is usually found on the title page of the respective newspaper to attract the attention of the prospective audience.

Thirdly, evaluators along the IMPORTANT sub-value can be connected to the news value of *eliteness* (reference to elite persons/nations are considered very newsworthy). In other words, news actors are described as IMPORTANT even if they are *not* Sayers/Sensors. For example:

- The speech came at the end of a week when *senior* Tories and former ministers embarked on a co-ordinated attempt to secure the 25 names necessary to launch a leadership challenge. (FT 1)
- Her mastery of languages, including Japanese, Arabic and Greek, enabled her to communicate with a wide-range of *high-rolling* clients, while her time at Reims management school rounded out her business education. (FT 8)
- Brit TV *star* ‘among punters’ (Sun 8)
- The convent-educated supermama is now set to sensationally name and shame her *celeb* clients. (Sun 8)
- Axelle did not know the man but recognised his *superstar* girlfriend immediately. She said he came from a wealthy family, has a broken marriage and loves to party. His girlfriend has had a string of *famous* lovers including one *global celebrity*. (Sun 8)
- *Top* England players, including captain David Beckham, were yesterday on the verge of walking out on the team in support of Rio Ferdinand. (Mail 10)

The three main functions of evaluations of IMPORTANCE: IMPORTANT are thus connected to attribution, relevance and eliteness. Less frequently, IMPORTANT evaluators may also evoke POSITIVE EMOTIVITY. In the following examples, for instance, the context and the reader’s position might activate this potential:

- The Tory leader's more polished performance delighted the party faithful inside the Empress Ballroom, earning him a *climactic* 12-minute ovation. (Guardian 1)
- The judge in the case, Judge Nicholas Philpot, *made legal history* by ruling after two days of legal argument that passing on HIV amounted to inflicting GBH. (Sun 3)
- Paul Burrell: The *book of the century* (Mirror 5)

However, IMPORTANCE does not automatically imply POSITIVE/NEGATIVE EMOTIVITY.

Distribution

On the whole, evaluations of IMPORTANCE make up 2.4 per cent of all evaluations in the corpus, and are hence of some importance for the news story genre. Looking at the distribution of the respective evaluators more closely, we find that there are 29 different evaluators in the broadsheets (*at the centre of, climactic, crucial, decisive, emergency, exclusive, high-profile, high-rolling, historic, hot, influential, set a precedent that paves the way for, key, keynote, landmark, leading, major, make history, minor, modest, momentous, no substantial, profound, senior, significant, slightly, substantial, vital, STAR*) – a relative ratio of 0.77 – compared to 32 in the tabloids (*celeb, crucial, crunch, do-or-die, emergency, empire, exclusive, famous, global celebrity, importance, key, keynote, landmark, leading, made legal history, major, make-or-break, minor, prominent, raised the stakes, senior, showdown, significantly, slightly, superstar, supremo, the book of the century, top, urgent, vital, world exclusive, STAR*) – a relative ratio of 0.98. Again, this is an exception to the tendency for the quality press to be stylistically more varied than the popular press and reflects the general importance of this parameter for the tabloids.

If we compare evaluations of IMPORTANCE: IMPORTANT with evaluations of IMPORTANCE: UNIMPORTANT in the overall corpus, it becomes evident that there is a great discrepancy between these two sub-values of IMPORTANCE: 94.4 per cent of all evaluations of IMPORTANCE express IMPORTANT values, rather than UNIMPORTANT values. This is easily explicable by the above suggestion that IMPORTANT values can contribute to three different news values at the same time (*attribution, relevance, eliteness*). Overall, they are also slightly more important in the tabloids than in the broadsheets (see Figure 5.8).

Let us now look at the distribution of the different news values. Roughly a third (30.2 per cent) of all evaluations along the IMPORTANT value relate to *attribution* and qualify Sayers/Sensors who are quoted in the news story. Perhaps surprisingly, this is more important in the broadsheets (37 per cent) than in the tabloids (24.6 per cent). Apparently, the news value of *attribution* is more essential for the broadsheets than for the tabloids. The preferred evaluators in this context are *senior* and *top* (the latter only in the tabloids). Regarding the evaluation of the importance of the news story as




Figure 5.8 Distribution of evaluations of IMPORTANCE: IMPORTANT/ UNIMPORTANT

such (as an *exclusive*), such self-evaluations do not occur in the broadsheets in the corpus sample. As far as *relevance* is concerned, the importance of this news value seems the same in the broadsheets (38.9 per cent) and in the tabloids (38.5 per cent). *Eliteness*, however, seems to be more important for the tabloids: 23.1 per cent of all their evaluations of IMPORTANCE: IMPORTANT relate to the eliteness of news actors (18.5 per cent in the broadsheets). Comparing the importance of all the news values for evaluations of IMPORTANCE: IMPORTANT, the picture looks as follows:




Figure 5.9 Relevance, attribution and eliteness

It becomes evident that in both broadsheets and tabloids the news values are aligned in order of importance: relevance > attribution > eliteness. However, in the broadsheets attribution is almost as important as relevance, whereas for the tabloids eliteness is almost as relevant as attribution. (These frequency estimates relate only to evaluations of IMPORTANCE. There may,

of course, be other ways of expressing these news values that have not been captured in this analysis.)

Finally, let us look at the frequency of individual evaluators. In the overall corpus, the frequency of evaluators is as follows:

senior (22.2 per cent) > *STAR* (9.5 per cent) > *vital* (6.3 per cent) > *top* (5.5 per cent) > *crucial* (4 per cent) / *key* (4 per cent).

These are not evenly distributed among the two sub-corpora. In the broadsheets, *senior* is the most common evaluator, whereas in the tabloids it is *STAR* followed equally by *senior* and *top*.




Figure 5.10 Most frequent evaluators of IMPORTANCE

The overwhelming frequency of *senior* in the broadsheets is based on the fact that the news value of *attribution* (which is usually expressed by *senior*) is more important for the broadsheets than for the tabloids (see above), whereas the preference for *STAR* in the tabloids reflects the importance of the news value of *eliteness* for the tabloids, and their preoccupation with the life of the 'stars'. As Bell *et al.* (1999: 118f) point out, the tabloids carry about 15 to 20 celebrity stories every day, which attracts both advertisers and readers.

5.5 POSSIBILITY/NECESSITY

This parameter deals with the writer's evaluation of what is (not) necessary or (not) possible. As with the other parameters, there is a cline involved in that, for instance, different modals can express higher and lower degrees of POSSIBILITY/NECESSITY. Theoretically, the lexico-grammar allows writers to evaluate something as POSSIBLE, NOT POSSIBLE, NECESSARY or NOT NECESSARY, but in the corpus no instances of the last sub-value occur.

Discourse functions

Some evaluations of POSSIBILITY/NECESSITY occur in the immediate vicinity of what I call writer speculation, i.e. the writer's expression of his/her opinion of hypothetical states of affairs, or 'possible worlds' (Kiefer 1998: 1). Here, the writer expresses his/her opinion of POSSIBILITY/NECESSITY as contingent on certain circumstances: in the corpus the evaluations of POSSIBILITY/NECESSITY then refer to what would be NECESSARY *in the speaker's opinion* if certain circumstances occur:

- And Dr Burgess would *have to* decide what steps to take to retrieve them. (Star 5)
- But the cabinet's earlier decision is all the authority Mr Sharon *needs* if he does decide to remove Mr Arafat, and he will have been reluctant to face his ministers – who overwhelmingly are in favour of exiling the Palestinian leader – if he has decided against it for now. (Guardian 9)

The second example, in particular, is highly speculative, and involves many contingent predictions: *the cabinet's earlier decision is all the authority Mr Sharon needs IF [he does decide to remove Arafat], and he will have been reluctant to face his ministers . . . IF [he has decided against it for now]*.

More importantly, evaluations of POSSIBILITY/NECESSITY may evoke positive or negative evaluation, trigger emphasis, shift blame, or express writer sympathy and criticism:

1. The speech and its reception put the anti-Duncan Smith plotters on the spot. It will *take* a brave conspirator to wield the knife publicly after the party faithful gave their leader such a ringing endorsement. (Mail 1)
2. Asked about the terms of this offer, Mr Barrett said he did not know and *had to* consult Gary Hoffman, the Barclaycard chief executive. (Telegraph 4)
3. The day had started with all parties optimistic that 30 years of conflict would finally be buried, but ended with Mr Blair *having to* admit that further talks were needed to salvage the peace process. (Times 6)
4. Still *to be* disclosed are explosive video tapes Diana is said to have made herself earlier in her final year. (Star 5)
5. In the second paragraph of the document, written in October 1996, Diana explained in the plainest *possible* language that she was convinced of the plot to mastermind an accident. (Mirror 5)
6. For a journalist seeking evidence of extremist attitudes within police ranks, and in particular among new recruits, the material *could not* have been more damning, and more disturbing. (Independent 7)
7. As his aides stockpile water, food and weapons in preparation for an Israeli raid which could come any time the veteran Palestinian

- leader, speaking so faintly that he *could* hardly be heard, denounced the Haifa bombing. (Times 9)
8. The woman, who then found she was pregnant by him and *had to* have an abortion, ended the relationship shortly afterwards. (Telegraph 3)
 9. United and the player declined to attend, leaving Eriksson with *no choice but to* leave Ferdinand out (Guardian 10)
 10. . . . and this is how it *should* be: Pelé acting as an ambassador for the sport on a visit to Newcastle yesterday (Times 10)

The first example evokes negative evaluation of the ‘conspirators’ since it implies that there is no such thing as a ‘brave conspirator’, i.e. that they are generally cowards. In the second and third example, the text gives a general negative impression of the Sayers, Matthew Barrett and Tony Blair. The fourth example may express the writer’s criticism that the tapes have not been ‘disclosed’ so far and the following two examples (5, 6) – which co-occur with comparatives and superlatives – could be explained by reference to notions such as emphasis and intensity. With respect to the seventh example, the evaluation clearly expresses sympathy with Arafat, whereas (8) and (9) act to shift blame away from news actors (the woman *had to* have an abortion, Eriksson *had no choice*). The final example clearly expresses the writer’s view concerning the actions of football players in general.

Since there are so few truly evaluative (see Chapter 4) references to possibility and necessity in the corpus, no comments shall be made on their distribution. A possible reason for this might be that newspapers usually aim at objectivity in their news stories, and subjective (evaluative) modality seems easily recognizable by readers as non-objective. What is surprising however, is that even the tabloids seem to shy away from the use of modality in news stories. Apparently, its usage is simply not regarded as part of the genre of the news story by journalists, and is restricted to other genres such as commentaries.

5.6 RELIABILITY

As discussed above, the notion of reliability is used both to refer to evaluations of propositions (RELIABILITY: LOW/MEDIAN/HIGH), and to evaluations of entities (RELIABILITY: GENUINE/FAKE). Again, the discourse functions of these two kinds of evaluations will be discussed in turn.³

RELIABILITY: LOW/MEDIAN/HIGH

As with all evaluations, the linguistic expression of the speaker’s opinion does not necessarily reflect his/her ‘true’ opinion, and there are hence many reasons for evaluations of RELIABILITY:

How they [modal verbs] are further interpreted – as indices of determination, confidence, emphasis, etc. – is largely a matter of the context in which a given utterance is made, and of the interpreting partner's interests, assumptions, and perceptions of his or her relation to the speaker at the moment the utterance is uttered.

(Janney 1996: 213; see also Holmes 1984)

In the corpus, one important function or effect of evaluations of RELIABILITY is to comment on the RELIABILITY of Sayers:

- Margaret MacDonald, dressed in a black tracksuit, was a far cry from the tabloids' *fantasy figure* as she faced Judge Jacqueline Ribeyrotte in chamber 14 of the Paris law courts. (Times 8)

In this example it is clearly the tabloids' descriptions of Margaret MacDonald that are evaluated as highly unreliable, a fantasy. It seems as if the *Times* allows itself a little jab at the tabloids to appeal to its audience (who presumably have a low opinion of the popular press). Evaluating Sayers as not very reliable may thus additionally express a degree of writer disapproval. In the following examples, the evaluations of RELIABILITY all work similarly in their given context to evaluate Sayers as unreliable:

- 'The hope is that most of the associations will have had their faith in IDS restored and will come down on their MPs hard.' But a YouGov poll of grassroots Tory members, published yesterday, *put that in doubt* by revealing 53 per cent thought they had made a mistake in electing Mr Duncan Smith in the first place. (Express 1)
- Earlier, it had emerged that the 24-year-old star had gone shopping on the day he was meant to have taken the routine FA drugs test – *casting doubts* on his alibi that a house move that day made him to [sic] 'forget' about it. (Mail 10)
- 'If she made about £100,000 in a year, after advertising, phone and travel costs, the poor woman was left with barely £5,000.' That is *certainly* not a view shared by the French police (Mail 8)
- In a judgment the Hutton inquiry is *unlikely* to endorse, Mr Duncan Smith urged Mr Blair to resign. (Guardian 1)

Such usages are very clearly means of expressing newspaper bias towards particular Sayers. Nevertheless, it is also interesting to have a look at what other kinds of propositions are modified by evaluators of RELIABILITY.

Firstly, we find a lot of (partly) very confident predictions ('This is what will happen'), predictions that are probably based on some sort of evidence on the part of the newspaper. Here are just some of the many examples:

- Dica's lawyers said they would appeal, and the case is *likely* to go to the Lords. (Independent 3)
- A White Paper *to be* published in the next few days *will* revise consumer credit laws in an attempt to tackle soaring personal debt and to impose tougher rules on lenders. (Times 4)

- He is *almost certain* to be replaced in Istanbul by Chelsea's John Terry. (FT 10)
- Leading party figures, including *potential* successors like Michael Howard and Oliver Letwin, praised the 62-minute speech with as much enthusiasm as rank-and-file delegates. (Guardian 1)
- The Conservative party left its annual conference last night divided over whether to ditch Iain Duncan Smith as leader before Christmas, as rebels and loyalists geared up for a febrile weekend of politicking that *could* determine his fate. (FT 1)

An important sub-class of these refer to predictions of future states of affairs that are unpleasant (reflecting the overall importance of the news value of *negativity*) or pleasant for news actors:

- Senior Tory sources confirmed party whips would 'put the thumb-screws' on the plotters, some of whom are *likely to be threatened with deselection* by their constituency associations. (Express 1)
- Three officers suspended after the programme are *likely to be sacked* if they do not resign. (Guardian 7)
- Rio, who looks *likely to be charged* by the FA, *could face a hefty two-year ban* from the game. (Star 10)
- She has already served 16 months on remand and *can expect to spend another 10 months in jail* before being eligible for parole. (Star 8)
- But other MPs 'clearly identified' as working against the leader *could also be carpeted*. (Mail 1)
- The dissident MPs received a further warning that a lengthy leadership contest this winter *could wreck* the party's attempts to raise money to fight the next election. (Telegraph 1)
- He is facing a tense weekend during which the party *may fall further in the polls* after this week's open display of division and bloodletting, and MPs consult their constituency parties over the way ahead. (Times 1)

It was noted in passing above that evaluations of what is pleasant/unpleasant to news actors (as opposed to the writer) can evoke positive or negative evaluation, such as feelings of disapproval or outrage, indignation, or schadenfreude. This is particularly the case in the following examples (the comments in brackets refer to the (un)desirability of the action and the possible feelings that can be evoked depending on the reader's position):

- He [Dica] is *likely to* receive high-quality medical care in his jail's hospital wing. (Mail 3) [positive for Dica: *indignation*]
- By failing to disclose what could amount to vital evidence until now, Burrell *could* have hampered the Paris detectives who spent three years investigating the crash under judge Herve Stephan. (Express 5) [negative for detectives: *disapproval towards Burrell*]

- Football is one of the few sports not to have signed up to the World Anti Doping Agency's code of practice, a failure that *could* cost the sport £20m in government funding for grassroots football. (Guardian 10) [negative for grassroots football: *disapproval towards the fact that they have not signed up*]
- Even without the identity of the individual, the disclosure of the letter *will* fuel the lucrative output of books, magazine articles and documentaries based on claims rejecting the findings of the French investigation into the crash at the Pont d'Alma tunnel. (Independent 5) [positive for 'conspiracy theorists': *disapproval*]
- Police have never managed to trace her money, believed to be stashed in secret bank accounts and offshore trusts, meaning that MacDonald *will* be free to resume her life of luxury when she becomes eligible for parole in ten months' time. (Mail 8) [positive for MacDonald: *disapproval towards police/justice system*]

Other evaluations of RELIABILITY also potentially evoke evaluation in various ways:

1. And, in language which *would* be banned in Parliament, he [Iain Duncan Smith] twice branded him a 'liar', leading a 'corrupt' government. (Sun 1)
2. In the meantime, taxpayers *would* face spending up to £15,000 a year on his [Mohammed Dica's] treatment. (Mail 3)
3. But one detail she [Margaret MacDonald] *will undoubtedly* omit from her life story is exactly how much she earned, and where it is hidden (Mail 8)
4. But the lingering controversy within the speech *may* come from the tone of his attack on Mr Blair and on Charles Kennedy, the Liberal Democrat leader, whose urge to raise taxes would not extend to wines and spirits, Mr Duncan Smith quipped. (Guardian 1)

Arguably, it is not only the evaluation of RELIABILITY that has this potential in these examples, but the wider context. In example 1, it is the writer's judgement that the kind of language that Iain Duncan Smith uses would be banned in Parliament which evokes negative evaluation: Iain Duncan Smith is described as going beyond what is adequate and polite in politics. Example 2 confronts the readers (as taxpayers) with the possibility of having to do something that is undesirable for them (spend up to £15,000 a year on Mohammed Dica's treatment). Example 3 evokes negative evaluation of Margaret MacDonald by claiming that she will be secretive about certain aspects of her work, and by furthermore implying that she in fact earned a lot of money that is hidden away somewhere. The final example – example 4 – is quite complex: no explicit negative evaluation of Iain Duncan Smith's language is expressed (as in: *the inappropriate tone of his attack*); rather, what the tone of Iain Duncan Smith's speech is has to be inferred by the reader by virtue of the content of

the attributed proposition (*Charles Kennedy's urge to raise taxes would not extend to wines and spirits*) as well as the wider context. That the tone of his attack is somewhat problematic is indirectly suggested by the fact that it is described as causing *lingering controversy*.

Significantly, evaluations of RELIABILITY also modify evaluations along other evaluative parameters, especially EMOTIVITY, MENTAL STATE, IMPORTANCE and EXPECTEDNESS. Again, a few examples suffice to illustrate this:

- As Pelé, *perhaps* the greatest-ever [EMOTIVITY: POSITIVE] footballer, said when he flew into Newcastle yesterday, many of the country's young stars appeared to be losing touch with the qualities that once made them role models. (Times 10)
- The colourful Irish-Canadian executive's candid admission *may well* come as a surprise [MENTAL STATE: EMOTION] to some of the 9 million people who carry a piece of Barclaycard plastic. (Guardian 4)
- By failing to disclose what *could* amount to vital [IMPORTANCE: IMPORTANT] evidence until now, Burrell could have hampered the Paris detectives who spent three years investigating the crash under judge Herve Stephan. (Express 5)
- The police investigation into the death of Princess Diana *could* be dramatically [EXPECTEDNESS: UNEXPECTED] reopened following extraordinary revelations that she predicted her own death in a car crash. (Express 5)

Such usages can either strengthen (RELIABILITY: HIGH) or (more usually) mitigate (RELIABILITY: LOW) the respective evaluation.

RELIABILITY: GENUINE/FAKE

Concerning RELIABILITY: GENUINE/FAKE, it is noticeable that evaluations of the 'genuineness' of entities often evoke EMOTIVITY. Apparently, there is a cultural equation which states that what is genuine is 'good' and what is fake is 'bad'. It seems questionable whether we can evaluate something as real/genuine and as negative at the same time (see also White 2002: 12). In the news story corpus, too, we find only usages where evaluating something as GENUINE evokes POSITIVE EMOTIVITY and evaluating something as FAKE evokes NEGATIVE EMOTIVITY (and not vice versa):

- And while it was a carefully-choreographed show of support, there was no doubt that the warmth and enthusiasm for Mr Duncan Smith in the packed Blackpool conference hall was *genuine*. (Mail 1)
- The Tory leader spelled out his vision for Britain and won *real* applause for his onslaught over the EU Constitution. (Sun 1)
- Although the ovations were clearly stage-managed, there was *genuine* sympathy in the Blackpool conference hall for a man who has been under the severest strain all week. (Times 1)
- Scores of defiant delegates sat on their hands rather than be whipped into a mood of *artificial* enthusiasm. (Sun 1)

- The sense of shock felt among Britain's senior police officers yesterday was *genuine*. (Independent 7)

Evaluating the applause and sympathy for Iain Duncan Smith as *GENUINE* clearly evokes positive evaluation (but note the contrast with *choreographed*, *stage-managed* and *orchestrated*), whereas evaluating it as *FAKE* evokes negative evaluation. In the last example the evaluation of the police officer's *MENTAL STATE* (they *really* were shocked) may counter accusations of 'play-acting' against the British police and thus contributes to some sort of positive evaluation ('good people are shocked by racism').

But evaluations of genuineness do not *necessarily* evoke *EMOTIVITY*, as can be seen from the following examples:

- The letter appears *genuine*: it looks like her handwriting and has apparently never left Mr Burrell's possession. (Guardian 5)
- *Real* reason Rio skipped drug testing (Express 10)

In the first example the evaluation simply refers to the 'genuineness' of the entity involved: the letter said to be written by Diana. In the second example the *real* (in conjunction with its noticeable typography) implies that a false reason has been given by someone; the evaluator suggests that it is only the *Daily Express* that has uncovered the 'truth'. This evaluation may be related to the news value of *facticity* (making assertions more persuasive by implying that they are the truth).

In the following examples, too, the evaluations of *RELIABILITY* hardly evoke a large degree of *EMOTIVITY*:

- A day of carefully *choreographed* political announcements began when Downing Street gave a fresh date for assembly elections on November 26. (FT 6)
- But Unionist leader David Trimble pulled the plug on the carefully *choreographed* moves, attacking the IRA for shrouding the details of the weapons destroyed in secrecy. (Mirror 6)
- TONY BLAIR'S carefully *choreographed* attempt to kick-start the power-sharing executive in Northern Ireland fell apart last night when the Ulster Unionists unexpectedly refused to sign up to a deal. (Times 6)
- Tony Blair and Bertie Ahern, the Irish prime minister, had flown to Hillsborough to endorse a *choreographed* sequence of events designed to pave the way to the restoration of devolution after an election on November 26. (Guardian 6)
- Yesterday morning, as part of the planned *choreography*, the Sinn Fein president made a key speech underlining republican commitment to the peace process and their renouncing of violence. (Guardian 6)
- Investigative reporter Daly, 28, made his film after joining Greater Manchester Police using a *fake* CV. (Star 7)

Carefully has a certain 'neutralizing' or attenuating effect in such collocations (being careful is linked to positive rather than negative evaluation in

our culture (Janney 1996: 216)), and reduces the potential of *choreographed* to evoke negative evaluation. But even without this modification, to refer to events as *choreographed* apparently does not carry much NEGATIVE EMOTIVITY. Rather, it is a metaphor which helps us to understand the domain of politics in terms of the domain of ballet. This metaphor seems to be part of the ubiquitous and long-standing metaphor 'all the world's a stage', and is here applied to the world of politics (not necessarily consciously; it may simply be part of a habituated discourse on politics). In the last example, the crucial importance of whether an evaluation refers to human or non-human entities becomes apparent: because *fake* refers to an inanimate entity rather than a human being it does not evoke NEGATIVE EMOTIVITY, and is here just employed to give an explanation of how Mark Daly was able to join the police.

Distribution

On the whole, evaluations of RELIABILITY are of some importance for the news story genre, making up 3.9 per cent of all evaluations in the corpus (most of them evaluations of the reliability of propositions, rather than entities; see below). The following sections provide a summary of the distribution of the individual sub-values.

RELIABILITY: LOW/MEDIAN/HIGH

With respect to evaluations of RELIABILITY: LOW/MEDIAN/HIGH, the overall preference is for HIGH > LOW > MEDIAN, with no significant differences in the distribution of these sub-values in the two sub-corpora:




Figure 5.11 Evaluations of RELIABILITY: LOW/MEDIAN/HIGH

As becomes evident from Figure 5.11, the distribution is almost equal: in the broadsheets 48.5 per cent of the respective evaluations are evaluations of RELIABILITY: HIGH (48.2 per cent in the tabloids), 45.5 per cent are evaluations of RELIABILITY: LOW (44.7 per cent in the tabloids) and 5.9 per cent are evaluations of RELIABILITY: MEDIAN (7.1 per cent in the tabloids). News stories are thus both concerned with what is epistemically possible (what *could/may* happen) and with what is epistemically certain (what *will* happen). It is not surprising, then, that the most frequent evaluators in the whole corpus are WILL, COULD and MAY:




Figure 5.12 Most frequent evaluators of RELIABILITY

It is here that we can find crucial differences between the two sub-corpora:




Figure 5.13 Most frequent evaluators of RELIABILITY in the sub-corpora

Most strikingly, COULD and WOULD are much more significant in the tabloids than in the broadsheets, whereas in the broadsheets WILL, MAY

and BE TO are of some greater importance than in the tabloids. With BE TO this is explicable by the fact that it is more frequent in written British English than in spoken British English (apart from the spoken language of the radio, as shown by an analysis of BE TO in the BoE), and by the assumption that the tabloids use more casual language than the broadsheets. The other results are supported to some extent by Coates’s findings that epistemic COULD is usually found in informal English, whereas WILL expressing prediction is more frequent in written English (Coates 1983: 123, 185).

Regarding the stylistic variety of evaluators of RELIABILITY: HIGH/MEDIAN/LOW, the quality press again has more variegated evaluators than the popular press. There are 30 different evaluators in the broadsheets (*allegations, almost certain to, bound to, by no means certain, certain, could, could expect to, due to, fantasy figure, had been on the cards, likely to, may, may well, might, not necessarily, odds are longer, perhaps, potential, potentially, remains open to doubt, should, the fact that, the possibility that, the prospect of/that, there is no chance of, unlikely, will, would, (BE) TO, CLAIM*) (a relative ratio of 0.8), compared to only 23 different evaluators in the tabloids (*allegation, can expect to, casting doubts on, certain, certainly, could, due to, forthcoming, likely to, may, no doubt, on the verge of, on track for, possible, put that in doubt, set to, prospect of, threw further doubt on, undoubtedly, unlikely, will/’ll, would, (BE) TO*) (a relative ratio of 0.7).

RELIABILITY: GENUINE/FAKE

In the whole corpus evaluations of the reliability of entities are much less frequent than evaluations of the reliability of propositions: of 202 evaluations of RELIABILITY only 16 refer to evaluations of entities, i.e. 7.9 per cent. This preference for evaluations of propositions to evaluations of entities holds for both the tabloids and the broadsheets: 8.2 per cent of all evaluations of RELIABILITY in the broadsheets are evaluations of entities, compared to 7.6 per cent in the tabloids. As far as the corpus at hand is concerned, the usages are distributed almost equally:

Table 5.6 Evaluations of RELIABILITY: GENUINE/FAKE

	RELIABILITY: GENUINE	% of evaluations of RELIABILITY: GENUINE/FAKE	RELIABILITY: FAKE	% of evaluations of RELIABILITY: GENUINE/ FAKE
broadsheets	4	44.4%	5	55.6%
tabloids	3	42.9%	4	57.1%

The combination of reliability and emotivity

This combination concerns two different kinds of evaluation, the first relating to entities (the evaluation of entities as GENUINE/FAKE, and, at the same time, as POSITIVE/NEGATIVE), the second to propositions (evaluations of the reliability of propositions that additionally involve emotive values).

On the one hand, it was suggested above that evaluations of RELIABILITY when referring to entities frequently evoke EMOTIVITY in context, with a close connection between 'genuineness' as good and 'fakeness' as bad. This connection is exploited in the corpus by evaluators which in themselves inscribe both RELIABILITY and EMOTIVITY, such as STAGE-MANAGE, *orchestrated*, *phoney*, *fake* and *rigged* (they all evaluate something as FAKE and NEGATIVE).⁴ Again, there are no instances where the connection between genuineness and EMOTIVITY is reversed (genuine = bad).

On the other hand, evaluations of RELIABILITY may involve the notion of EMOTIVITY in that, for instance, evaluators such as *liable to* and *doomed to can* only be employed in connection with negative events.

FAKE/NEGATIVE

Evaluations of EMOTIVITY/RELIABILITY concerning entities are clearly employed to express writer disapproval. Most occur in the news story about the Tory Party conference, evaluating Iain Duncan Smith's effect on his audience negatively, thereby contributing to a negative evaluation of Iain Duncan Smith or the Tory Party in general:

- Mr Duncan Smith's speech was well received by Tory grassroots activists in the Blackpool Winter Gardens yesterday, with the help of a high degree of *stage-management* by his advisers. (Express 1)
- The audience punctuated the speech with 20 standing ovations – some *orchestrated* by Tory officials – and applauded for nine minutes at the end. (Independent 1)
- Delegates were forced to rise to their feet 19 times to take part in 'spontaneous' standing ovations *orchestrated* by a small group of fanatics. (Mirror 1)
- 'Get IDS' plot goes on as *phoney* ovations ruin his vital speech (Sun 1)
- It's a *fake* and flop (Sun 1)
- In a *stage-managed* rallying cry, he warned leadership plotters to 'get on board – or get out of the way'. (Sun 1)
- But, despite 20 *rigged* ovations, rebels were still on track for a November coup, as revealed in yesterday's Sun. (Sun 1)
- Some delegates shook their heads and refused to rise to the *orchestrated* applause. (Sun 1)
- Mr Duncan Smith's speech was punctuated by at least 17 standing ovations, many of them *orchestrated* by party workers placed at strategic points in the Winter Gardens. (Telegraph 1)

- Iain Duncan Smith acknowledges prolonged applause at the end of the Tory conference in Blackpool yesterday. Some standing ovations during his speech were *orchestrated* by party workers. (Telegraph 1)
- Much of the applause was *orchestrated* but was clearly genuine nonetheless as MPs voiced their sympathy with the leader after a torrid week. (Times 1)
- Although the ovations were clearly *stage-managed*, there was genuine sympathy in the Blackpool conference hall for a man who has been under the severest strain all week. (Times 1)
- An *orchestrated* operation involving the prime ministers of Britain and Ireland and the leaders of the main political parties collapsed because of a lack of detail over the IRA's biggest act of disarmament. (Times 6)

The *force* of such negative evaluations still depends on the context, however, and on the evaluator. For instance, the *Daily Express* mentions *a high degree of stage-management*; for the *Independent* only *some standing ovations* were *orchestrated*, whereas in the *Telegraph* both *many* (in the text body) and *some* (in the caption) ovations are described as *orchestrated*, and in the *Sun* it is exactly *20 ovations* that are *rigged*. The context also plays a big role in the *Mirror*, where additional evaluators of EMOTIVITY (*fanatics, forced to*) and RELIABILITY/STYLE/EVIDENTIALITY (*'spontaneous'*) contribute to the negative evaluation expressed. In the two examples from the *Times*, on the other hand, the negative evaluation expressed by *orchestrated* and *stage-managed* is contrasted with positive evaluations.

A slightly different example from another news story is the following:

- President George Bush and his senior officials launched a high-profile campaign in Washington last week to promote the view that life in Iraq was returning to normal. Yesterday's explosion in the heart of the capital, in a street crowded with shops, left those claims looking *hollow*. (Independent 2)

Here the proposition *that life in Iraq was returning to normal* is evaluated as *a view*, and, retrospectively, as *claims*. These *claims* are then given the status of entities that themselves are evaluated as *looking* [EVIDENTIALITY: PERCEPTION/RELIABILITY: HIGH] *hollow*. Consequently, the ones responsible for these statements, namely *President George Bush and his senior officials* are also evaluated rather negatively.

HIGH/NEGATIVE, MEDIAN/NEGATIVE

Let us now turn to evaluations of the reliability of propositions, which are combined with NEGATIVE EMOTIVITY of some kind. The corpus instances are:

- But *the harsh truth was that* [HIGH/NEGATIVE] he was a walking health time bomb and a serial liar. (Mail 3)

- A woman *doomed to* [HIGH/NEGATIVE] die after her lover infected her with the HIV virus said yesterday: ‘I have to live with this for ever. My sentence has just begun. (Mirror 3)
- However, her *fate seemed to have been sealed* [HIGH/NEGATIVE] when she admitted that ‘the client doesn’t pay the full price if he hasn’t consumed everything there is to consume’. (FT 8)
- PEOPLE who give their work colleagues flu could be *liable to* [MEDIAN/NEGATIVE] criminal prosecution after the conviction yesterday of a man who deliberately infected two women with HIV. (Times 3)

Here something negative (EMOTIVITY: NEGATIVE) is evaluated as being likely (RELIABILITY: MEDIAN) or certain to (RELIABILITY: HIGH) happen. However, in the corpus the evaluation of unpleasantness refers mainly to news actors, rather than the writer or the audience:

Table 5.7 Affected entities of evaluations of RELIABILITY/EMOTIVITY

Affected entity (‘negative for whom?’)	RELIABILITY	Negative event
a woman	doomed to	die
PEOPLE who give their work colleagues flu [may potentially include the writer or the audience]	[could be] liable to	criminal prosecution
Deborah	the harsh truth was that	he was a walking health time bomb and a serial liar.
her [MacDonald’s]	fate [sentenced to four years in a French prison and fined €150,000] seemed to have been sealed	

The meaning of some of the above evaluators (in particular *liable to* and *doomed to*) could probably be interpreted in terms of an inherent semantic preference for negative collocates, which is fulfilled in these instances. When they co-occur with collocates that are more or less neutral, these appear to be evaluated negatively by the speaker/writer:

- Educational practice is *liable to* sudden swings and changes (COBUILD, italics mine)

But in the corpus examples the evaluators are probably connected to the news value of *negativity*, and may additionally be employed for purposes of dramatization (*doomed to*), rather than expressing ‘real’ writer disapproval.

Table 5.8 Distribution of evaluations of RELIABILITY/EMOTIVITY

	RELIABILITY: FAKE/ EMOTIVITY: NEGATIVE	% of evaluations of RELIABILITY/ EMOTIVITY	RELIABILITY: HIGH/MEDIAN/EMOTIVITY: NEGATIVE			
			RELIABILITY: HIGH	% of evaluations of RELIABILITY/ EMOTIVITY	RELIABILITY: MEDIAN	% of evaluations of RELIABILITY/ EMOTIVITY
broadsheets	7	77.7%	1	11.1%	1	11.1%
tabloids	7	77.7%	2	22.2%	–	0%
all	14	77.7%	3	16.7%	1	5.5%

Distribution

For both types of RELIABILITY/EMOTIVITY, the occurrences are not frequent enough to produce a hypothesis about general differences in the evaluative style of tabloids and broadsheets (they make up only 0.35 per cent of all evaluations in the corpus). Like evaluations of the reliability of entities the usages are distributed almost equally in the two sub-corpora (see Table 5.8).

The combination of RELIABILITY with peripheral evaluative parameters (EVIDENTIALITY, MENTAL STATE, STYLE) will be discussed in Chapter 6.

Notes

1. However, these are discussed in Appendix 4, and were also taken into consideration in the frequency calculations (see Appendix 5). Apart from the two occurrences of *ironically* (compare the discussion in Chapter 4), this concerns only five combinations of evaluative parameters.
2. *The clearest sign that* (Times 1) expresses rather high reliability, because it implies that there are many other signs that also show that *the leadership realises the danger is not yet past*. In my classification (which does not take account of comparison) the expression involves two combinations of RELIABILITY (COMPREHENSIBILITY/RELIABILITY: *clearest* and EVIDENTIALITY/RELIABILITY: *sign of*) which reinforce each other. *The clearest sign* that is probably a unit of meaning in itself: *sign* (as noun) and *clear* co-occur in the Bank of English with a T-score of 13.3. (On T-score and MI-score see Hunston 2002: 70ff.)
3. Again, some comments must be made on the methodological decisions involved. As with the parameter of POSSIBILITY/NECESSITY (Chapter 4), some expressions of modality were excluded as more or less non-evaluative, for example:
 - Labour remains 2/9 *odds-on* favourite to win the election (BOOKIES' OFFICIAL EVALUATION) (Guardian 1)
 - His grandson Liran *would* have been four yesterday (Mail 9) (HYPOTHETICAL STATE OF AFFAIRS)
 - Mr Barrett endured the lion's share of the MPs' wrath, with heated exchanges over a current Barclaycard '0% forever' promotion which promises an interest rate of 0% for balance transfers from rival cards, provided the holder spends at least £50 a month on the card. This new spending cannot be paid off until the transferred balance has been cleared, and in the meantime it *will* accrue interest at a typical rate of 17.9%. (Guardian 4) (ACCORDING TO THIS OFFER)
 - The Crash: Did Diana foresee the tragedy in which she and Dodi, inset, *were to lose* their lives? (Express 5) (OBJECTIVE PAST: they did lose their lives)

- An election *due on* May 1 was cancelled (FT 6) (OBJECTIVE PAST)

However, in the analysis of this parameter I do not make use of Lyons's (1977) notion of *subjective modality*. He suggests that epistemic *may* in a sentence such as *Alfred may be unmarried* can mean two different things, depending on the speaker's knowledge. It is interpreted as objective if the speaker has evidence for his/her claim, i.e. if there is a mathematically computable chance that Alfred is unmarried, for instance if

there is a community of ninety people; one of them is Alfred; and we know that thirty of these people are unmarried, without however knowing which of them are unmarried and which are not. In this situation, we can say that the possibility of Alfred's being unmarried is presentable . . . as an objective fact.

(Lyons 1977: 798)

It is interpreted as subjective, if it is based merely on an inference of the speaker, a subjective qualification of the truthfulness of the proposition in terms of the speaker's certainty or uncertainty, and expressions such as *but I doubt it* or *I'm inclined to think that he is* may be added, indicating the subjectivity of the qualification (Lyons 1977: 797). However, as far as epistemic modality is concerned, the distinction between subjective and objective interpretation seems very questionable indeed. As Nuyts (2001b) points out, evidence, or better, judgement that is based on some kind of evidence is *always* implicitly involved in epistemic modality: 'In principle, if one does not have any kind of evidence pertaining to a state of affairs, one cannot evaluate its probability' (Nuyts 2001b: 386). Even if the distinction between subjective and objective epistemic modality were regarded as 'defensible on theoretical grounds', it is 'not a viable concept in everyday language' (Hoye 1997: 51). What were excluded from the calculation of frequency, however, were expressions of modality that refer to other people's evaluations and to objective states of affairs, and which could consequently be regarded as 'objective' rather than 'subjective'. I have also disregarded present tense references to future states (e.g. *paves the way for*, *has a book out next week*, *when she becomes eligible for parole*, *has only a few years to live*, *becomes chairman next year*, *lie ahead*, *is heading for*), but they were very infrequent in any case, and about equally distributed among all newspapers.

4. The difference between evaluations that evoke EMOTIVITY (the examples in the previous chapter) and those that inscribe EMOTIVITY (the examples here) is gradual only. Thus *orchestrated* and *genuine* lie somewhere between.

6 Evaluation in the press: peripheral evaluative parameters

This chapter continues outlining the findings of the corpus analysis, focusing on peripheral rather than core evaluative parameters: EVIDENTIALITY, MENTAL STATE and STYLE. Again, both their discourse functions and their distribution are discussed, including combinations with other parameters.

6.1 EVIDENTIALITY

Evaluations of EVIDENTIALITY are – at least in the news story corpus – for the most part combined with evaluations of other parameters. Occurrences of pure evidentials are mainly restricted to signals that indicate that (part of) a proposition is attributed, i.e. based on HEARSAY. Such signals include square brackets, tense shift, genre-deviant language (e.g. first person pronouns, swearing) and, most importantly, quotation marks:¹

- ‘Does he [*Trimble*] mean to tell us that, after all his hours and hours spent with Gerry Adams and Sinn Fein he didn’t know what was going to happen today?’ (Guardian 6)
- He said he was surprised and saddened at comments aimed at him ‘by a small number of officers’. But he *was* still proud to be a cop. (Sun 7)
- England’s Rio fights. *I’ve* never had drugs in *my* life (Sun 10)
- It’s built into your *f***** brain. Salkeld: Quit the Cheshire force (Express 7)
- Paul Bremer, the U.S. civilian administrator to Iraq said: ‘The terrorists know that the Iraqi people and the coalition are succeeding in the reconstruction of Iraq.
‘They do not share the vision of hope for this new Iraq.
‘They will do anything, including taking the lives of innocent Iraqis, to draw attention away from the progress made since liberation.’ (Mail 2)

Discourse functions

As has been pointed out in much research, direct speech lends reliability to the discourse as a whole, because it purports to report the original

speaker's actual choice of words. But although the proposition is perhaps evaluated as representing *reliably* what has been said by a source, there is no comment on the *reliability* of what is uttered (i.e. no evaluation of RELIABILITY). Direct quotes may additionally be used to dramatize and highlight important elements in a narrative (Mayes 1990, Fairclough 1988). Not surprisingly, they are extremely important for news stories in that eyewitness reports and quotations belong to the most significant strategies employed in news stories to give 'the illusion of truth' (van Dijk 1988a: 86), and are hence related to the news value of *facticity*.

In addition, direct speech may be connected to the news value of *personalization*, 'promot[ing] straightforward feelings of identification, empathy or disapproval' (Fowler 1991: 15), as in these examples:

- But one of his victims, who can only be identified as Deborah, sobbed as she said afterwards: 'My sentence has only just begun.' (FT 3)
- She [Princess Diana] says: 'I have been battered, bruised and abused mentally by a system for 15 years now . . . I am weary of the battles, but I will never surrender. I am strong inside and maybe that is a problem for my enemies.
'Thank you, Charles, for putting me through such hell and for giving me the opportunity to learn from the cruel things you have done to me. I have gone forward fast and have cried more than anyone will ever know.
'The anguish nearly killed me, but my inner strength has never let me down.' (Mail 5)

However, such evaluations of EVIDENTIALITY: HEARSAY only mark propositions as attributed, without giving the writer's attitude towards that attribution. It is thus arguable whether they should be included in a framework of evaluation. There are, nevertheless, two arguments in favour of their inclusion: (1) such attributions provide a basic evaluation of 'implied "relevance"' (White 2001c: 1), and (2) there is a cline between the neutral and the attitudinal use of quotation marks (cf. chapter 6.3).

Distribution

Since news stories are based on speech events, the high frequency of evaluations of HEARSAY is not surprising. With 1,121 occurrences in the corpus EVIDENTIALITY: HEARSAY is the second most important parameter of evaluation overall, representing 21.7 per cent of all evaluations. The parameter is about equally important in the broadsheets (21.5 per cent of all evaluations) and in the tabloids (22 per cent of all evaluations), which is another indicator for its overall significance. As far as evaluators are concerned, quotation marks represent the majority of evaluations of EVIDENTIALITY: HEARSAY (95.1 per cent) in both the broadsheets (94.7 per cent) and the tabloids (95.5 per cent).

The combination of evidentiality and reliability

Providing evidence has to do with providing authority (Du Bois 1986: 322), and with evidentials, speakers may indicate that they do not take full responsibility for the truth of their statements (Palmer 1995a: 12, Kiefer 1998: 17). Consequently, evaluations of EVIDENTIALITY usually express the writer's evaluation of the RELIABILITY of the proposition that is qualified.² The reason for this is that there is a correlation between the type of evidence or 'mode of knowing' (Chafe 1986: 266) that is given, and certainty of knowledge. Direct evidence (e.g. visual data), for instance, is considered by speakers to be 'the most certain kind of knowledge' (Sweetser 1984: 13). In my corpus GENERAL KNOWLEDGE, UNSPECIFIED and PROOF can express HIGH RELIABILITY. Conversely, LACK OF PROOF can signal LOW RELIABILITY. PERCEPTION – though it does express HIGH RELIABILITY in most cases – is further scaled and can also express MEDIAN RELIABILITY.

UNSPECIFIED/HIGH

All evaluators in this sub-group indicate that there is some sort of evidence for the modified proposition, without stating *explicitly* what this evidence is [EVIDENTIALITY: UNSPECIFIED]. For instance, EMERGE is defined as follows: 'If a fact or result **emerges** from a period of thought, discussion or investigation, it becomes known as a result of it' (COBUILD). It is not clear whether thought, discussion or investigation are the sources of the evidence at hand; this remains inexplicit and may only occasionally be inferred from the context. Additionally, the evaluators in this category express a high degree of certainty in the truth of the proposition [RELIABILITY: HIGH], for example:

- After MacDonald was led away in handcuffs, Emmanuel Marsigny, her lawyer, denounced what he said was the injustice of the sentence and promised to appeal. *That means* the trial will be staged again in a higher court, with possible outcomes ranging from acquittal to a more severe sentence. (Times 8)
- Fred Goodwin, chief executive of Royal Bank of Scotland, was also criticised after *it emerged* his bank had sent an application form for a gold credit card with a £10,000 spending limit to a dog called Monty, living in Manchester. (Guardian 4)
- Last night, *it emerged that* a Leeds United footballer and another player had been arrested in connection with the sexual assault of a 20-year-old girl on Monday evening. (Independent 10)
- The row was exacerbated when *it emerged yesterday that* Christian Negouai, a Manchester City midfielder, also missed a drugs test earlier this year but was let off by [sic] with a £2,000 fine, during a secret hearing at the FA. (Independent 10)
- Shares in the club soared when *it emerged that* the Irish racehorse

owners JP McManus and John Magnier now own almost a quarter of the business. (Independent 10)

EMERGE shades into an attributing expression, and sourced averrals qualified by *emerged that* are in fact very close to attributed propositions. As far as MEAN THAT/*that means* are concerned, their function can be explained in reference to the bases of evidential reasoning:

- Police have never managed to trace her money, believed to be stashed in secret bank accounts and offshore trusts (basis), *meaning that* (evidential) *MacDonald will be free to resume her life of luxury when she becomes eligible for parole in ten months' time.* (Mail 8)
- After MacDonald was led away in handcuffs, Emmanuel Marsigny, her lawyer, denounced what he said was the injustice of the sentence and promised to appeal (basis). *That means* (evidential) *the trial will be staged again in a higher court, with possible outcomes ranging from acquittal to a more severe sentence.* (Times 8)
- After the death of Helen Smith, a 23-year-old nurse whose body was found at the foot of a block of flats in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, in May 1979, the Court of Appeal ruled that coroners must hold inquests on the unnatural deaths of Britons overseas. The ruling (basis) *means that* (evidential) *coroners must open an inquest into any 'violent or unnatural death or sudden death of unknown cause wherever the death occurred', once the body is returned to his or her jurisdiction.* As the Surrey Coroner, Mr Burgess is expected to hold an inquest on Dodi Fayed because he was buried in the county. He is also Coroner to the Royal Household (basis), which *means that* (evidential) *he must also hold an inquest on the Princess.* (Times 5)

In these examples,

- the police's failure to find Margaret MacDonald's money and the belief that it is hidden away somewhere
- Emmanuel Marsigny's declaration
- the ruling that coroners must hold inquests as well as the fact that Michael Burgess is Coroner to the Royal Household

are, respectively, given as bases for the writer's evidential evaluation or reasoning. The evidentials are clear signals of writer evaluation, and indicate that the writer's utterance is based on some evidence that is mentioned in the previous proposition.

As far as the modified propositions in this sub-group are concerned, about half of them are further evaluations:

- Hollywood is *planning* [MENTAL STATE] a movie on her life
- the leadership is *taking* the threat of a challenge *seriously* [MENTAL STATE]
- coroners *must* [(objective) NECESSITY] open an inquest
- he *must* [(objective) NECESSITY] also hold an inquest on the Princess

- the trial *will* [RELIABILITY] be staged again
- MacDonald *will* [RELIABILITY] be free to resume her life of luxury when she becomes eligible for parole in ten months' time.

These evaluations appear 'objectified' (given some degree of 'factual' status) and attain HIGH RELIABILITY. In general, evaluations with such evidentials allow newspapers to express sourced averrals without naming their sources explicitly, whether these sources pronounce evaluative statements or not.

GENERAL KNOWLEDGE/HIGH

There is only one evaluator in the corpus which expresses this combination, namely *famously*. This evaluates a proposition both as reliable and as based on general knowledge. The dictionary definition of FAMOUSLY points clearly to these two meaning components:

'You use **famously** to refer to a fact [RELIABILITY: HIGH] that is well known [EVIDENTIALITY: GENERAL KNOWLEDGE] . . .' (COBUILD, underlining mine)

A large-scale corpus analysis would certainly reveal more about the discourse functions of FAMOUSLY. It appears often to be used with reference to people's statements, as in this example. There are in fact nine metalinguistic (or STYLE) verbs among the 50 most frequent collocates of FAMOUSLY in the Bank of English (*described, said, remarked, declared, asked, dismissed, replied, announced, wrote*). In the one example in the corpus it seems to draw the reader's attention to the propositional content as well as to establish consensus with the reader by including him or her in the same 'epistemic community' as the writer:

- Mr Burrell, who Diana *famously* called her 'rock', said: (Independent 5)

PROOF/HIGH

Stating that there is some proof for the truth of the modified proposition expresses HIGH RELIABILITY in that proposition by its very nature. Compare:

- During her trial she described herself as 'an excellent businesswoman' and the police have *good reason to* agree with that self-assessment. (Mail 8)
- *Tests found* he was driving at almost 70mph and was more than three times over the legal alcohol limit. (Express 5)
- When *blood tests confirmed* his first victim was HIV positive in 1997, Dica denied that he had given her the virus, insisting that Aids was a disease for 'the cursed' and 'homosexuals'. (Mail 3)³

Two of the three qualified propositions are states of affairs that have been verified by 'objective', scientific tests: *he was driving at almost 70 mph, was*

more than three times over the legal alcohol limit, his first victim was HIV positive. More interesting is the use of the evaluator *have good reason to*. This is here used to modify an evaluation of MENTAL STATE (*the police agree with that self-assessment*) which in itself attributes HIGH RELIABILITY to the attributed proposition *that MacDonald was 'an excellent businesswoman'* (containing an evaluation).

LACK OF PROOF/LOW

The same logic that is behind the assumption that PROOF means HIGH RELIABILITY, is behind the common-sense assumption that LACK OF PROOF indicates LOW RELIABILITY, as in these examples:

- Although the prosecution alleged that her clients included the rich and famous *no evidence* was presented in court supporting these claims. (Independent 8)
- But, there appeared *no proof that* the letter was addressed to Mr Burrell, her butler at Kensington Palace, who was acquitted last November of stealing hundreds of items from her estate, including correspondence. (Telegraph 5)

In the first example, the context contributes to this evaluation of LOW RELIABILITY, by evaluating the statements of the prosecution as being of LOW RELIABILITY (*alleged that, claims*). For an extensive discussion of the second example see Chapter 5.3. In both cases, the evaluators clearly express the newspaper's stance by evaluating the reliability of what has been stated by a news actor.

PERCEPTION/HIGH

Perception evidentials such as BETRAY, DISPLAY, LOOK, SHOW, SIGN, SOUND, REVEAL and VOICE make reference to a wealth of sensory evidence, which in itself is evaluated as highly credible and thus confers HIGH RELIABILITY to the modified (part of the) proposition. Newswriters are certainly aware of this, as becomes evident from Bagnall's comments on the usage of *visibly*: 'The only trouble might be that without it [*visibly*] the readers wouldn't believe the story. How did he know? Was it only hearsay? No, he *saw* it!' (Bagnall 1993: 91, italics in the original).

Such evaluations can be made of entities (usually mental states) as well as propositions. The great majority of propositions and entities evaluated as based on EVIDENTIALITY: PERCEPTION/RELIABILITY: HIGH are themselves evaluations – for example, of RELIABILITY, EVIDENTIALITY/STYLE and EMOTIVITY:

- But, despite 20 rigged ovations, rebels were still on track for [RELIABILITY] a November coup, as *revealed* in yesterday's Sun. (Sun 1)

- But the blast, aimed at a hotel full of American officials, *showed* the effectiveness [EMOTIVITY] of the resistance in its campaign to destabilise the US presence. (Independent 2)
- It was written in October 1996, two months after the princess's divorce from Prince Charles and *reveals* a strikingly self-pitying [EMOTIVITY], not to say paranoid [EMOTIVITY], mindset not dissimilar to that *on show* in her Panorama interview a year earlier. (Guardian 5)
- DIANA, Princess of Wales, predicted [EVIDENTIALITY/STYLE] her own death in a car crash ten months before it happened, newly published correspondence *showed* yesterday. (Times 5)
- Police under fire after BBC *spotlights racism* [EMOTIVITY] (FT 7)
- Rio, who *looks likely to* [RELIABILITY] be charged by the FA, could face a hefty two-year ban from the game. (Star 10)⁴

Modifying such evaluations with comments on the reliable source of the writer's knowledge makes them more objective in a sense, and perhaps hides their subjective nature. Moreover, they tend to work as mitigation devices, modulating the assertive force of utterances in order to avoid making absolute statements (Janney 1996: 209).

But the majority involve propositional contents that somehow comprise evaluations of MENTAL STATE. Here are just some of the many examples:

- Activists *showed* their anger with the rebels by warmly applauding Mr Duncan Smith's declaration that he would not bow to pressure to quit. (Telegraph 1)
- Perhaps the most disturbing event of the week for Mr Duncan Smith was yesterday's poll of activists *showing that* a majority now believe that they made a mistake electing him as leader. (Times 1)
- But a YouGov poll of grassroots Tory members, published yesterday, put that in doubt by *revealing* 53 per cent thought they had made a mistake in electing Mr Duncan Smith in the first place. (Express 1)
- Much of the applause was orchestrated but was clearly genuine nonetheless as MPs *voiced* their sympathy with the leader after a torrid week. (Times 1)
- A self-pitying princess, her butler, and a note that *revealed* her greatest fear (Guardian 5)
- Standing beside Mr Blair, Mr Ahern *sounded* less optimistic that a quick solution would be found. (Times 6)
- When she removed a red head scarf hiding her from photographers, she *looked* happy as, dressed in a shabby black tracksuit, she waved to friends in the gallery. (Mirror 8)
- She was brought into the dock handcuffed and initially *showed* the bravado she had *displayed* during her trial last month as she grinned and waved to friends in the public gallery, dressed in a shabby black tracksuit and red scarf. (Mail 8)

- Mr Palios's actions are *a sign of his determination* to reform the FA's approach to drugs. (Guardian 10)
- The row has left Eriksson looking isolated, and he *did little to hide his displeasure* when questioned about the loss of a first-choice player. (Guardian 10)
- In *voicing his anger*, however, Gordon Taylor, head of the PFA, revealed that a number of other players who had failed to provide a sample for a drugs test had been fined and their identities kept secret after their excuses had been deemed to be 'acceptable'. (Times 10)

Most evaluations of EVIDENTIALITY: PERCEPTION/RELIABILITY: HIGH hence concern the modification of propositions that include evaluations of a Senser's MENTAL STATE. Since MENTAL STATES are events that cannot normally be known to someone other than the Senser, this is necessary to validate their reporting. By pretending that these events are in fact observable phenomena, i.e. by mentioning sensory evidence for the existence of the respective mental state in the Senser's mind, the newspapers justify their report of them. The connection between mental state expressions and reliability is probably a general one, and is supported by findings by Biber *et al.* (1999: 491) and Scheibman (2002: 68).

PERCEPTION/MEDIAN

Other evaluators of EVIDENTIALITY: PERCEPTION evaluate the reliability of the modified proposition as MEDIAN. The great majority of propositions that are qualified by such evaluations are evaluations themselves, for example:

- But yesterday he *appeared to concede that* [EVIDENTIALITY/STYLE/EMOTIVITY/RELIABILITY] it might have been necessary for a reporter to go undercover to reveal the extent of racist behaviour among officers. (Independent 7)
- More than six years after her death, the ghost of Princess Diana retained the power to make mischief yesterday as her former butler released details of a handwritten note she wrote for him 10 months before her fatal crash in Paris, *apparently forecasting that* [EVIDENTIALITY/STYLE] 'they' were planning a car accident for her. (Guardian 5)⁵
- The letter *appears genuine* [RELIABILITY]: it looks like her handwriting and has apparently never left Mr Burrell's possession. (Guardian 5)
- But it also *appears to bring fresh importance* [IMPORTANCE] to a warning by the Queen that there were 'powers at work in this country about which we have no knowledge'. (Mirror 5)
- Having waited almost two months since the alleged offence, it *seems perverse* that [EMOTIVITY] the FA should have scheduled his hearing just three days before the game in Turkey, but Eriksson insisted he and Campbell were happy with the timing. (FT 10)

Again, evaluations that concern mental states are the most frequent among these, for example:

- Few in the street *appeared to* have any sympathy with the bombers. (Guardian 2)
- All of the attacks *appear to* have been aimed at preventing the American-run Provisional Authority stabilising its rule. (Independent 2)
- Mr Blair was forced to suspend Stormont last October amid allegations of an IRA spy ring, but the collapse of this deal is a particular shock because it comes after intense negotiations between unionists and republicans and what *seemed to* be the budding of unprecedented trust between Mr Trimble and Mr Adams who have had more than a dozen face-to-face meetings in recent weeks. (Guardian 6)
- But in the dock she *seemed relaxed*, smiled broadly and waved at friends on the public benches. (Express 8)
- Little wonder that Sven-Göran Eriksson's yearning to return to club management *seems to* grow with each passing day. (FT 10)

The discourse functions of APPEAR, APPARENTLY and SEEM are thus similar to those of LOOK, SHOW, BETRAY etc., while mitigating the modified propositions to a greater extent.

Distribution

Overall, the combination EVIDENTIALITY/RELIABILITY is rather infrequent (1.9 per cent of all evaluations in the corpus), but the differences between the tabloids and the broadsheets are at times striking. In Table 6.1 the frequency of all sub-values is listed:

Table 6.1 Frequency of sub-values of EVIDENTIALITY/RELIABILITY

Value	All	Broadsheets		Tabloids	
Frequency	<u>occurrences</u>	<u>occurrences</u>	<u>percentage</u>	<u>occurrences</u>	<u>percentage</u>
GENERAL	1	1	1.6	0	0
KNOWLEDGE/HIGH					
PERCEPTION/HIGH	49	28	43.7	21	63.6
PERCEPTION/MEDIAN	28	24	37.5	4	12.1
PROOF/HIGH	3	0	0	3	9.1
UNSPECIFIED/HIGH	14	9	14.1	5	15.2
LACK OF PROOF/LOW	2	2	3.1	0	0
all	97	64	100% of 64	33	100% of 33

Firstly, evaluations of EVIDENTIALITY/RELIABILITY overall are more frequent in the broadsheets (representing 2.4 per cent of all evaluations) than in the tabloids (1.3 per cent of all evaluations). Secondly, the importance of the different sub-values varies:

broadsheets:

PERCEPTION/HIGH > PERCEPTION/MEDIAN > UNSPECIFIED/HIGH > LACK OF PROOF/LOW > GENERAL KNOWLEDGE/HIGH

tabloids:

PERCEPTION/HIGH > UNSPECIFIED/HIGH > PERCEPTION/MEDIAN > PROOF/HIGH

Thirdly, if we disregard GENERAL KNOWLEDGE/HIGH, PROOF/HIGH and LACK OF PROOF/LOW, because their occurrences are not frequent enough to allow valid conclusions, the most crucial difference lies in the distribution of PERCEPTION/HIGH (e.g. LOOK, SHOW) and PERCEPTION/MEDIAN (e.g. APPEAR, SEEM), whereas UNSPECIFIED/HIGH is almost equally distributed. On the whole, evaluations of PERCEPTION/MEDIAN are much more frequent in the broadsheets than in the tabloids, whereas if we look at all evaluations of EVIDENTIALITY that also express HIGH RELIABILITY, these represent 87.9 per cent of all evaluations of EVIDENTIALITY/RELIABILITY in the tabloids and only 59.4 per cent of all evaluations of EVIDENTIALITY/RELIABILITY in the broadsheets. In other words, if tabloids employ evaluations of EVIDENTIALITY/RELIABILITY, they employ them to attribute HIGH RELIABILITY to propositions, whereas broadsheets employ them to express both HIGH and MEDIAN RELIABILITY. As far as EVIDENTIALITY/RELIABILITY is concerned, there is thus more mitigation in the broadsheets.

Comparing the distribution of the evaluators within the most frequent sub-values, i.e. PERCEPTION/HIGH and PERCEPTION/MEDIAN, the most frequent evaluators for both tabloids and broadsheets are LOOK (13 occurrences: seven in the broadsheets, six in the tabloids), and SHOW (ten occurrences: five in the broadsheets, five in the tabloids) for PERCEPTION/HIGH. Where PERCEPTION/MEDIAN is concerned APPEAR is by far the most frequent evaluator in the broadsheets (16 occurrences compared to six occurrences for SEEM and two for APPARENTLY). This might have to do with the fact that *appear* is less related to interpersonal interaction and personal involvement than *seem*. (An analysis of *seem* and *appear* in the Bank of English showed that *seem* occurs more often with first and second person pronouns (*I, you, we*) than *appear* – features that have been associated with an interpersonal dimension by Biber 1986: 394f.) In the tabloids it is not clear whether APPEAR or SEEM are preferred because of the low frequency of the value as a whole (there are only two occurrences each for APPEAR and SEEM).

Concerning stylistic variety, there is not a lot of difference between the tabloids and the broadsheets. For PERCEPTION/HIGH there are 13 evaluators in the broadsheets (*barely contained, did little to hide, display of, highlighted, on show, showing no signs of, sign of/that, sounded, spotlights, LOOK,*

REVEAL, SHOW, VOICE) (a relative ratio of 0.35), and ten evaluators in the tabloids (*audibly, betrays, bring back into sharp focus, displayed, no attempt to hide, revealed, signs of, visibly*, LOOK, SHOW) (a ratio of 0.30). For PERCEPTION/MEDIAN there are three evaluators in the broadsheets (APPEAR, APPARENTLY, SEEM) (a ratio of 0.08) compared to two evaluators (APPEAR, SEEM) in the tabloids (a ratio of 0.06).

6.1.1 EVIDENTIALITY/STYLE

Whenever attributing expressions are used, at least two parameters of evaluation are expressed: EVIDENTIALITY: HEARSAY (the attributed proposition is said to be based on hearsay) and STYLE (which concerns the evaluation of the speech event uttered by a Sayer). Such instances are classified as follows:

- Mr Yeo claimed it had only been a ‘very small number of people who have been conspiring’ (Guardian 1)

Table 6.2 Classification of EVIDENTIALITY: HEARSAY

Sayer	attributing expression	attributed proposition
Mr Yeo	claimed [EVIDENTIALITY/STYLE]	it had only been a ‘very small number of people who have been conspiring’ [EVIDENTIALITY: HEARSAY].

Within the parameter of STYLE I have classified such evidentials according to the following sub-values (see Chapter 4):

- NEUTRAL
- ILLOCUTIONARY
- DECLARATIVE
- DISCOURSE SIGNALLING
- PARALINGUISTIC.

These expressions convey the writer’s description of or comment on the type of utterance involved, but they cannot be said to express additional parameters such as EMOTIVITY, COMPREHENSIBILITY or RELIABILITY.

Discourse functions

Evaluations of EVIDENTIALITY: HEARSAY/STYLE: NEUTRAL (e.g. SAY, TELL) are in fact similar to evaluations of EVIDENTIALITY: HEARSAY in that they mark propositions as attributed, without giving the writer’s attitude towards that attribution. Evaluations of EVIDENTIALITY: HEARSAY/STYLE:

DECLARATIVE additionally convey something of the cultural institutions of the UK. The occurrences in the corpus (e.g. ADJOURN, RULE, CHARGE) reflect the topics of the news stories (both the Mohammed Dica story and the Margaret MacDonald story are reports of the outcome of the jurisdictional process), but also the social importance attached to such legitimization processes. In such a sense, a corpus of newspapers is fundamentally a 'cultural object', a 'window on our culture' (McCarthy 2004). DISCOURSE SIGNALLING attributing expressions are also fairly neutral but provide a sense of the ongoing discourse. Evaluations of EVIDENTIALITY: HEARSAY/STYLE: PARALINGUISTIC are important in a variety of ways: thus, Caldas-Coulthard (1994: 307) shows how the association of paralinguistic verbs with gendered news actors contributes to stereotyping women. Their usage in general 'increases the potential for subjectivity in news reports, and, thus, the potential for bias' (Geis 1987: 94). By giving indications of news actors' emotional state they may also trigger readers' emotions. Compare the following instances with respect to these three functions:

- 'There are others inside' she *screamed*, gesturing at the shop where minutes earlier she had been shopping when the bomb detonated. (Telegraph 2)
- Deborah *sobbed* to the jury 'Thank you'. (Mirror 3)
- The Inner London Crown Court jury's unanimous guilty verdicts on two counts of 'biological' grievous bodily harm were greeted with tears, applause and *shouts of* 'yes'. (FT 3)
- But he was clearly walking a tightrope. As he painted a grim picture of life in struggling Britain for the majority of people, he *whispered*: 'Listen, just listen, you can hear, steady as a heartbeat, the hurt and anger of the people of this country.' (Guardian 1)
- But some visibly flinched as he stooped to gutter politics with vicious personal attacks on political opponents. He said that after the death of weapons expert Dr David Kelly 'Tony Blair said he'd had nothing to do with his public naming. That was a lie. He chaired the meetings that made the fatal decisions. He is responsible. He should do the decent thing and resign.' One delegate *muttered*: 'Like you.' (Mirror 1)

Evaluations of EVIDENTIALITY: HEARSAY/STYLE: ILLOCUTIONARY (e.g. ACCUSE, BLAME, PROMISE) are highly interpretive (see also Verschueren 1985 and Wortham and Locher 1996 on their evaluative potential). As Fairclough points out, these function as devices 'predisposing interpretation by representing the illocutionary force of the secondary discourse' (Fairclough 1988: 131). This category in fact comprises a number of different types of ILLOCUTIONARY expressions. While not discussing all of these, a number of comments on those that might be related to EMOTIVITY is necessary (see Bednarek 2004 for analyses concerning other ILLOCUTIONARY expressions such as INSIST, ARGUE, DEFEND, DENY, DISPUTE, AGREE, ASSURE).

'Saying something good/bad about the target'

A specific sub-class of illocutionary attributing expressions may be regarded as linked to EMOTIVITY, because they 'say something [good or] bad about the target' (Thompson 1994: 43). Examples are ACCUSE, ATTACK, BLAME, BLAST, BRAND, LAMPOON, MOCK, RAGE, RAIL, SLAM, APPROVE, CONGRATULATE and PRAISE. However, in employing them the writer him/herself does not necessarily 'say something good or bad about the target'. Thus, such expressions are *not* classified as expressing EVIDENTIALITY/STYLE/EMOTIVITY, although this does not imply that such descriptions may not *trigger* the reader's evaluation of the Sayer.

Expressing desirability/undesirability

Related to the above group are attributing expressions such as WARN, THREATEN, PROMISE, VOW and PLEDGE. These embody some semantic feature of desirability (e.g. PROMISE) or undesirability (e.g. THREATEN). This has led some researchers to argue that they have negative or positive connotations. Thus, van Dijk states that in an example such as:

'Threats by women's organizations to nominate their own vice-presidential candidate and possibly to walk out – collapsed with Mondale's choice of New York Rep. Geraldine Ferraro as a running mate,' the use of the nominalized initial clause 'Threats . . .', presupposes that indeed such threats have been made. Second the very choice of the predicate 'threat' has negative implications. It pragmatically implies that noncompliance with the demands involved in a threat will result in negative acts against the person being threatened. The information might have been expressed, announced or even promised, which have less negative associations.

(van Dijk 1988a: 69)

But let us look at these expressions in more detail. Here are the extended concordance lines for (averred) THREAT(EN) in the corpus as found with the help of Wordsmith Tools (Scott 1999):

2 mally speak publicly – was an acknowledgement that
the leadership is taking the **threat of** a challenge
seriously. The dissident MPs received a further warning t
(Telegraph 1)

4 a "corrupt" government. IDS was counting on a
rapturous reception to stave off **threats to** his job. The
applause flowed thick and fast – but party stooges wea
(Sun 1)

5 he Tory chief whip, David Maclean, took the
initiative against dissidents whose **threats to** trigger
a leadership crisis have dominated the conference week.
The

(Guardian 1)

6 the next week". With MPs returning to Westminster on Tuesday, and dissidents **threatening to** find 25 names for a confidence vote, frantic soundings will be ta

(Guardian 1)

7 Europe, where he will campaign harder for a constitutional referendum, and the **threat of** still higher taxes, to warm applause. But the lingering controversy wi

(Guardian 1)

8 s attack on the government and the Liberal Democrats, but failed to see off **the threat** of a leadership challenge this autumn. Even shadow cabinet members ackno

(FT 1)

9 ips would "put the thumb-screws" on the plotters, some of whom are likely to be **threatened with** deselection by their constituency associations. Mr Duncan Smith

(Express 1)

11 customers whose average APR is 17.9 per cent. He is also currently facing the **threat of** a shareholder revolt over his promotion to chairman due to take place

(Express 4)

19 s-party executive have been suspended since last October after Ulster Unionists **threatened to** pull out their ministers in protest at fresh evidence of IRA activ

(FT 6)

21 's demand for a harsh response, but avoid carrying out the hugely controversial **threat to** "remove" – widely taken to mean exile or kill – Mr Arafat. Israeli D

(Times 9)

22 Israel **threatens** more air strikes against Syria By David Blair in Jerusalem Israel

(Telegraph 9)

24 a brother country." Yasser Arafat, the Palestinian leader who faces an Israeli **threat to** "remove" him, last night declared a state of emergency in Palestinian

(Telegraph 9)

27 m will be responsible to answer for their actions," he said. Last night Hamas **threatened to** avenge the attack. "Any assault on any Arab and Muslim country is

(Guardian 9)

30 e and the team." Ministers who have watched the week's events with dismay are **threatening to** axe funding to the Football Association unless it launches a crac

(Times 10)

31 t secret after their excuses had been deemed to be
 “acceptable”. Ministers are **threatening to** cut funding
 to the Football Association unless the sport moves to
 (Times 10)

32 s currently worth £6 million a year. National
 Lottery funding may also be **under threat** . . . and this is
 how it should be: Pelé acting as an ambassador for th
 (Times 10)

33 Man Utd **threaten** legal fight as FA drops Ferdinand
 over drug test By Chris Boffey
 (Telegraph 10)

34 ngiven the benefit of the doubt. They were so incensed
 that at one point they **threatened to** WITHDRAW their other
 four players from the England squad in protes
 (Sun 10)

35 mates also had an hour-long showdown with FA chief
 executive Mark Palios – even **threatening to** strike at one
 stage, days away from the vital European Championsh
 (Mirror 10)

44 ester United said the FA had compromised their
 player, and made a thinly-veiled **threat of** legal action.
 “At no point . . . has Manchester United agreed with
 the a
 (Guardian 10)

45 Football shamed England players **threaten to** boycott
 make-or-break game in support of Ferdinand
 (Express 10)


46 axe the £30 million star from the England team over
 his failure to take the test **threatened to** rip apart the
 side. Captain David Beckham was among players who we
 (Express 10)

49 uld bury an Asian under a train track and that Hitler
 had the “right idea”. He **threatened to** beat up an Asian
 colleague. “He’ll regret the day he was ever born
 (Independent 7)

Let us relate these to the three dictionary entries of THREATEN
 (COBUILD):

- 1 If a person **threatens** to do something unpleasant to you, or if they **threaten** you, they say or imply that they will do something unpleasant to you, especially if you do not do what they want.
- 2 If something or someone **threatens** a person or thing, they are likely to harm that person or thing.
- 3 If something unpleasant **threatens** to happen, it seems likely to happen.

In all its meanings, THREATEN seems to be connected with unpleasantness; Halliday defines its meaning as ‘offer: undesirable’ (Halliday 1994: 258). However, it depends on who or what is affected by this unpleasantness (for whom is it unpleasant?) whether or not negative EMOTIVITY is involved. Crudely speaking, we can make a distinction between THREAT(EN)¹ as an attributing expression which comments upon a linguistic activity (EVIDENTIALITY: HEARSAY/STYLE: ILLOCUTIONARY) and THREAT(EN)^{2,3} as a non-attributing expression. These two meanings can further be subdivided according to whether they represent unpleasantness to the writer (W) or a news actor (NA):



Whether or not attribution is involved is easy enough to establish, but it is far more difficult to discover whether the writer’s (dis)approval is involved or not: for instance, do *threatening to cut funding to the FA* (line 31) or *threaten to boycott make-or-break game* (line 45) imply that the writer thinks this is a bad thing, too, or do these examples simply *construe* someone for whom the event is negative (i.e. adopt the *perspective* of the affected news actor)? If *promise* is substituted for *threat* in some of the above examples, the effect is that a different perspective is taken; some news actor is construed for which the event is positive. Again, it is questionable whether the writer agrees with this perspective:

27 m will be responsible to answer for their actions,”
 he said. Last night Hamas **promised to** avenge the attack.
 “Any assault on any Arab and Muslim country is
 33 Man Utd **promise** legal fight as FA drops Ferdinand over
 drug test By Chris Boffey

The examples which seem to involve the writer most clearly are those that are non-attributing, such as *the threat of still higher taxes* (7), *funding may be under threat* (32), *the decision . . . threatened to rip apart the side* (46). All other occurrences (i.e. all the attributing expressions) seem to me borderline cases, indeterminate, or clearly refer to the undesirability of an event for a news actor. On account of this indeterminacy, I have taken the decision to classify all attributing THREATEN, VOW, PLEDGE, PROMISE as

EVIDENTIALITY/STYLE (rather than as expressing EMOTIVITY in addition). It seems too simplistic to assume that the use of THREAT(EN) and related expressions automatically indicates negative evaluation on the part of the writer, because we can always construe an audience towards whom this threat, vow, pledge or promise is addressed. However, such instances might still have an evaluative potential, precisely because of the perspective they adopt, and the problem of determining who is affected by the *threat*. Furthermore, superficial reading may well leave readers with the overall impression that something is considered a threat and hence negative.

Distribution

On the whole, EVIDENTIALITY/STYLE is the most important evaluative combination in the corpus – 32 per cent of all evaluations are evaluations of EVIDENTIALITY/STYLE, reflecting the characterization of news as embedded talk (cf. Chapter 2). This is true for both sub-corpora, although the broadsheets appear to use slightly more attributing expressions (32.7 per cent vs. 31.3 per cent).

Concerning the distribution of the different sub-values, NEUTRAL is most frequent (811 occurrences), followed by ILLOCUTIONARY (655), DISCOURSE SIGNALLING (100), DECLARATIVE (82) and PARALINGUISTIC (5). This supports Fairclough's (1988) findings (limited to five articles) that 'stylisticity' (Fairclough 1988: 130) (references to non-ideational, interpersonal meanings) is very low in the news. He explains this with reference to the fact that '[n]ews tends to be seen as very much a conceptual and ideational business, a matter of statements, claims, beliefs, positions – rather than feelings, circumstances, qualities of social and interpersonal relationships, and so forth' (Fairclough 1988: 134). Additionally, it could be argued that newspapers themselves avoid such expressions because their aim is to be or at least to appear objective. If we add the occurrences for NEUTRAL, DISCOURSE SIGNALLING, and DECLARATIVE, 60.1 per cent of all occurrences of EVIDENTIALITY/STYLE have no significant potential to evoke further evaluation. But this still leaves us with 39.9 per cent of instances where attributing expressions may trigger positive or negative evaluation. However, to demand a higher percentage of neutral attributing expressions in the news in order for news stories to be more 'truthful' is problematic. As Geis points out,

[t]here are several problems with the thesis that only neutral verbs like *say* should be used to report speech. The first is that resulting reports would doubtless be somewhat more monotonous than would those employing more lively language, and news consumers might become quickly bored with such reports and cease reading them or tune them out. Given that the news business is a business, it would hardly be surprising were journalists not to try to make their reports as interesting as possible. Another problem is that news reports that do not use affective verbs will be less accurate in many cases . . .

(Geis 1987: 93f)

Regarding the internal importance of these values in the popular and the quality press, from our preconceptions about the popular press we would expect to find a much lower degree of NEUTRAL and a higher degree of ILLOCUTIONARY and PARALINGUISTIC expressions. However, there are no significant differences in the distribution of these expressions between the tabloids and the broadsheets. 49.5 per cent of all evaluations of EVIDENTIALITY/STYLE in the broadsheets are NEUTRAL (tabloids: 48.5 per cent), 39.1 per cent are ILLOCUTIONARY (tabloids: 40.2 per cent), 5.9 per cent are DECLARATIVE (tabloids: 3.9 per cent), 5.1 per cent are DISCOURSE SIGNALLING (tabloids: 7.1 per cent) and 0.3 per cent are PARALINGUISTIC (tabloids: 0.25 per cent). This might be explained by the predilection of the tabloids for informal, spoken language, where an attributing expression such as SAY is very frequent. Obviously, attributing expressions such as SAY and TELL are also very easy to understand and may for this reason be preferred by the popular press.

The combination of evidentiality, style and comprehensibility

Some attributing expressions also make reference to the extent of COMPREHENSIBILITY involved in the attributed utterance, answering questions such as:

- how *explicit* was the Sayer in what s/he uttered?
- was the utterance a reaction to the need to elaborate on some otherwise somewhat *incomprehensible* situation?

Evaluators which relate to the first question and comment on the lucidity or explicitness of the utterance are MAKE CLEAR, MAKE PLAIN and HINT. EXPLAIN, on the other hand, is an evaluator that can be linked to the second question, although one could argue that a certain degree of delexicalization has taken place with all of these expressions.

Discourse functions

What is evaluated and how it is evaluated varies, but in most cases the evaluation of COMPREHENSIBILITY refers to the attributed proposition (and overlaps with evaluations of style). For instance, MAKE CLEAR and MAKE PLAIN provide an evaluation of the way something is said. The evaluation of COMPREHENSIBILITY may imply a stronger certainty on the part of the speaker that the event referred to in the attributed proposition will take place, or (if there is no future event referred to), it seems to comment on the emphasis that is put on the attributed proposition by Sayers:

- In his speech, Mr Duncan Smith *made clear that* he would not relinquish the leadership without a fight. (FT 1)
- The loudest cheers came when Mr Duncan Smith *made plain that* he would not go quietly. (Times 1)

- The IRA then issued a statement saying it was committed to ‘resolve the issue of arms’ and *making clear* it had authorised a further act of decommissioning. (FT 6)
- In a hard-hitting letter to the Guardian, chief constables from every police force in England, Wales and Northern Ireland, *made clear* there was no room in the police service for anyone with racist attitudes. (Guardian 7)

With HINT on the other hand, it seems less certain that the future event will happen (note also the co-occurrence of HINT and *may* in contrast to MADE CLEAR/PLAIN and *would*):

- Former cabinet minister John Redwood also *hinted that* IDS may go, saying of his speech: ‘We will have to see whether it works with the people outside.’ (Star 1)
- Mr Duncan Smith *hinted that*, if Mr Blair signed the European constitution, the Conservatives would fight the next election on a pledge to withdraw from it. (Telegraph 1)
- But the new prime minister did not elaborate other than to say that rival Palestinian security forces will be brought under a single command, *hinting that* the leadership may be preparing to meet an Israeli demand for a showdown with Hamas and Islamic Jihad. (Guardian 9)

Such evaluators hence provide writers with means to comment on the certainty of attributed predictions.

EXPLAIN is different, because it relates to the second type of question mentioned above. In fact, it evaluates something as necessitating an explanation, i.e. being in some way INCOMPREHENSIBLE. However, this something is simultaneously made more comprehensible by the very act of explaining (similar to CLARIFY/SHED LIGHT ON discussed in Chapter 5.1). In the following examples, for instance, both the fact that Deborah *vainly consulted up to 10 solicitors* and the fact that not *more information on the arms decommissioning had been given* have to be explained (and made more comprehensible):

- Deborah vainly consulted up to 10 solicitors for help. She *explained*: ‘Basically they were saying to me “It’s your own fault. You’re responsible for your actions”.’ (Mirror 3)
- *Explaining* why more information on the arms decommissioning had not been given, Andrew Sens, Gen de Chastelain’s colleague on the commission, said the IRA had insisted on exercising a right to restrict the details that the commission was allowed to disclose. (Telegraph 6)

Distribution

Overall there are only eleven occurrences of EVIDENTIALITY/STYLE/COMPREHENSIBILITY, and the combination may thus be regarded as rather

marginal. The COMPREHENSIBLE sub-value is about as frequent as the INCOMPREHENSIBLE sub-value (five versus six occurrences). The latter occurs in both the broadsheets and (more frequently) in the tabloids, whereas the former occurs only in the broadsheets. How far these findings represent general tendencies is not clear.

The combination of evidentiality, style and emotivity

Some attributing expressions have negative connotations which are activated in the context; in my corpus these are *bragged*, *fantasising*, *insistence*, *railed against*, and BOAST. They name illocutionary acts and evaluate a proposition as based on HEARSAY (EVIDENTIALITY: HEARSAY/STYLE: ILLOCUTIONARY), additionally providing a negative evaluation of the Sayer (EMOTIVITY: NEGATIVE).

Discourse functions

Apart from two instances in the *Mirror* and in the *Daily Express* (where Iain Duncan Smith and Matthew Barrett are evaluated negatively), all attributing expressions either refer to the policemen in the news story about racism or to Margaret MacDonald in the story about prostitution. The evaluation of the different newspapers concerning these news actors seems to be quite uniform, or congruent:

- But the revelations prompted *boasts* from far-right extremists *that* many serving officers throughout Britain were loyal to their cause. (Express 7)
- PC Rob Pulling, 23, the first officer to quit yesterday after he was described as the 'most racist' by Daly. In several taped conversations the rookie also:
Bragged Hitler had the 'right idea' (Express 7)
- Pulling, 23, also came out with a flood of racist bile and *boasted of* targeting Asians while on the beat. (Sun 7)
- Rob Pulling, 22, quit his job in North Wales after being filmed wearing a Ku Klux Klan-style hood, *fantasising about* 'killing a Paki' and saying black teenager Stephen Lawrence 'deserved' to be murdered. (Star 7)
- The first to resign was PC Rob Pulling, of North Wales Police, who was filmed wearing a Ku Klux Klan-style hood, *fantasising about* burying a 'Paki bastard under a railway line' and saying black teenager Stephen Lawrence deserved to be murdered. (Mail 7)
- The documentary also showed a recruit *boasting about* stopping an Asian motorist for a traffic offence and imposing a stiff penalty, but letting off white people for a [sic] similar offences. (Independent 7)
- Elsewhere in the programme officers *boasted about* how they stopped people and imposed on-the-spot fines simply because they were black or Asian. (Times 7)

- Brit Margaret MacDonald, 44, had *bragged* to friends *that* she'd be 'home for Christmas', but was given a four-year sentence by a judge in Paris. (Star 8)
- MacDonald, who was 44 yesterday, had *boasted* to friends *that* she would be 'home for Christmas' before her appearance in Paris's Palais de Justice. (Mail 8)
- MacDonald also *boasted* to the court of her business acumen. 'You use the same skills to sell computers as you do to sell other activities,' she said. (Independent 8)

Such evaluators clearly function to evaluate Sayers negatively, expressing newspaper stance towards news actors. The examples regarding the policemen differ in the popular and the quality press in that the tabloids identify the Sayers by name, whereas the broadsheets do not. Evaluations of specific news actors are probably stronger than those of unnamed officers or recruits, since one feels more connection with named Sayers than with unnamed Sayers, and since such 'psychological proximity' increases the intensity of emotion (Ortony *et al.* 1988: 63). They are also related to the news value of *personalization* which is 'most striking in the popular press' (Fowler 1991: 15).

Distribution

There are twelve occurrences of this combination in the corpus (i.e. 0.23 per cent of all evaluations), but only three of them occur in the broadsheets. Although the instances are rather infrequent, this finding supports the suggestion that broadsheets try harder to preserve the appearance of 'objectivity' than the tabloids.

The combination of evidentiality, style and reliability

As is well known in linguistic research, writers can also use attributing expressions to evaluate the reliability of propositions. For instance, expressions such as DISCLOSE, POINT OUT and REVEAL and attributing structures with AS (*as X said/acknowledged*) have frequently been associated with the writer's belief in the truth of the attributed proposition (e.g. Thompson 1994: 50), or a reclaiming of writer responsibility (Hunston 2000: 179), i.e. HIGH RELIABILITY (see also Thompson and Ye 1991). Other expressions like ALLEGE, ALLEGEDLY, CLAIM and REPUTED seem to imply the writer's doubt, i.e. LOW RELIABILITY. APPARENTLY in its HEARSAY meaning also expresses EVIDENTIALITY: HEARSAY/STYLE: NEUTRAL (like ACCORDING TO it does not comment on the style of the attribution) and RELIABILITY: MEDIAN (it is more reliable than ALLEGED(LY) but less reliable than POINT OUT). These evaluators all evaluate a proposition as based on HEARSAY (EVIDENTIALITY), comment on a speech event (STYLE) and additionally provide the writer's evaluation of the RELIABILITY of the attributed proposition (RELIABILITY).

Discourse functions

The discourse functions of evaluators of EVIDENTIALITY/STYLE/RELIABILITY are sometimes quite complex, depending on the evaluator involved. For example, an evaluator such as CLAIM can be regarded as expressing HIGH RELIABILITY, LOW RELIABILITY or NO RELIABILITY at all, depending on its context (Hunston 1995, Bednarek 2004).

Generally speaking, evaluations of EVIDENTIALITY/STYLE/RELIABILITY evaluate the RELIABILITY of the *attributed proposition*, but metonymically they can also evaluate its *Sayer*. Since unreliability is associated with negativity in our culture, evaluations of LOW RELIABILITY possibly have the effect of triggering the reader's negative evaluation of the respective Sayer, whereas evaluations of HIGH RELIABILITY may influence the reader positively with respect to the Sayer. Compare:

- He [Burrell] *claims* his forthcoming book, which is being serialised in the Daily Mirror this week and is published later this month, was written because he wanted to 'stand in the princess's corner and fight for her'. But having already made up to £500,000 out of his relationship with Diana through newspaper deals, TV interviews and public speaking engagements, Burrell knows that sales of his book could double that figure. (Mail 5).
- He was a refugee from Somalia, but *claimed to be* a lawyer and to have served as a soldier in the Gulf War. (Independent 3)
- But despite MacDonald's *claims of* innocence, there were reports yesterday that she had been involved in people-smuggling operations. (Express 8)

One function of such evaluators is thus as a device to express the newspaper's evaluation of news actors. This is especially striking in the *Daily Telegraph's* reporting of the 'Diana story', where the newspaper consistently employs CLAIM and ALLEGED(LY) when reporting Paul Burrell's utterances (in contrast to other newspapers which use REVEAL, for instance):

- Paul Burrell *claimed that* Diana, Princess of Wales believed that her life was being threatened and feared a car 'accident' would be rigged, 10 months before her actual death in a Paris car crash.
- . . . *claiming that* she told him: 'I'm going to date this and I want you to keep it . . . just in case.'
- Ex-butler *claims that* Princess told him of her fears 10 months before fatal accident
- Mr Burrell *claims that* the four-page letter was given to him by the Princess in a sealed envelope with his name on it.
- Mr Burrell *claims* the extract was written in October 1996
- He [Burrell] *claims that* the Princess wrote it at her desk
- Believing that her enemies were out to get her, she entrusted him with a letter, he *claimed*

- And as proof, he published extracts from the *alleged* letter in a tabloid newspaper
- Details from the *alleged* letter were published in the Daily Mirror yesterday
- In the extract, the Princess *allegedly* writes: 'I am sitting here at my desk today in October, longing for someone to hug me and encourage me to keep strong and hold my head high'.
- He admitted that his newspaper had not seen the whole of the 'letter', which *allegedly* runs to four pages and that 'we were only allowed to photograph from the original the very specific extracts used in the book. The whole letter does not appear in the book for various reasons'.

This usage is in line with the news story's general negative stance towards Burrell (compare e.g. the frequent use of the hedged *the 'letter'*) and towards the *Daily Mirror*, as seen from the following extract:

- the editor of the *Daily Mirror*, Piers Morgan, *claimed that* the letter was 'utterly sensational'. He admitted that his newspaper had not seen the whole of the 'letter', which allegedly runs to four pages and that 'we were only allowed to photograph from the original the very specific extracts used in the book. The whole letter does not appear in the book for various reasons'.

It is precisely because of this discourse context that CLAIM attains its unreliability meaning. However, not in all of the examples involving LOW RELIABILITY is the negative evaluation equally strong. Its strength depends on the context, and sometimes evaluations of LOW RELIABILITY only indicate doubt, as in the following example (where there is no explicit Sayer who could be evaluated negatively):

- MacDonald, *alleged to* have netted £40 million from the vice ring, aims to sell the rights to her life story and is looking for a Hollywood movie deal. (Sun 8)

A related function is the use of CONFIRM to support the credibility not of the Sayers of the attributed proposition but of other news actors: when the suggestion/statement that is said to be *confirmed* has been made by news actors rather than by a reporter, CONFIRM is used to support their credibility as well as the RELIABILITY of the attributed proposition:

- The IRA, in two brief statements, *confirmed* Mr Adams' assessment of its position was accurate and that it had carried out a further act of decommissioning. (Guardian 6)
- Neighbours yesterday *confirmed* Ferdinand *DID* move out of his £800,000 home in Wilmslow, Cheshire, the week he missed his dope test. (Sun 10)

The positive evaluation of the Sayer can also be explicitly present in the

context of the evaluator of EVIDENTIALITY/STYLE/RELIABILITY (here the AS-structure):

- As Pelé, perhaps the greatest-ever [EMOTIVITY: POSITIVE] footballer, *said* when he flew into Newcastle yesterday, many of the country's young stars appeared to be losing touch with the qualities that once made them role models. (Times 10)

Here the writer clearly agrees with Pelé's evaluation and indicates this by both evaluating him positively (*greatest-ever*) and by using an evaluator (as . . . *said*) that indicates HIGH RELIABILITY. Interestingly, the attributed proposition itself includes an evaluation (*many of the country's young stars appeared to be losing touch with the qualities that once made them role models*). Such evaluators are very clever devices to express evaluations while attributing them. A related example is:

- William Hill rated him an odds-on 1/4 to lead his party into the expected 2005 election, exactly as they did before he rose to deliver what was *rightly billed* as a make or break occasion. (Guardian 1)

Here the writer intrudes to evaluate an attributed proposition as highly reliable, thereby reclaiming responsibility for an evaluation of IMPORTANCE (*make or break*) made by an unnamed Source.

The 'triggering' or 'evoking' of positive/negative evaluation is not an automatic consequence of evaluators of RELIABILITY, however. In many cases, the evaluators CONFIRM, POINT OUT and RECALL evaluate the attributed proposition as true without seeming to trigger positive evaluation. Similarly, evaluations of LOW and MEDIAN RELIABILITY sometimes just appear to be used as 'protection devices', for instance, as a defence against possible libel actions brought against newspapers. APPARENTLY, REPUTED and ALLEGEDLY/ALLEGATION in particular are frequently employed in this way, as means of avoiding responsibility for a proposition without explicitly mentioning the source of the attributed proposition (although this is often clear from the context):

- It left United manager Alex Ferguson *allegedly* livid to the point of threatening to withdraw all of the club's England players from the game. (Mail 10)
- Ferdinand earns *a reputed* £50,000-plus a week. (Independent 10)
- To back its case, the Israeli army released video footage, *apparently* filmed by Iranian TV 18 months ago, showing a camp and underground munitions stores. (Mail 9)
- TENSION in the Middle East soared yesterday after Israeli jets bombed an *alleged* terror training camp in Syria. (Mirror 9)
- There is already a continuing police investigation into an *allegation* that Premiership players were involved in the rape of a 17-year-old girl at a London hotel. (Independent 10)
- Chief executive Matthew Barrett made the extraordinary admission

as he and other banking chiefs faced *allegations of profiteering on plastic*. (Mail 4)

A third function of evaluations of EVIDENTIALITY/STYLE/RELIABILITY is to enhance the newsworthiness of the attributed proposition. This is the effect of employing the evaluators REVEAL, REVELATION and DISCLOSE (evaluators of HIGH RELIABILITY). Compare some examples:

- Burrell *reveals that* as well as her fears of a plot to kill her, Diana was obsessed with the idea that her every move was being monitored by the security services. (Mail 5)
- The general [John de Chastelain] *had revealed that* the IRA had decommissioned more weapons and explosives than ever before. (Star 6)
- Matt Barrett *revealed that* he did not borrow money on credit cards because it was too expensive. (Independent 4)
- He [Sir John Stevens] *disclosed that* the Met intended to plant informers in its own training classrooms to root out racist recruits. (Times 7)

Since REVEAL, REVELATION, DISCLOSE all imply that the information is somehow new and has been uncovered, the news value of the information in the attributed proposition is enhanced (because of the news value of *unexpectedness*).⁶ A pretence at investigative journalism can be maintained.

To sum up, evaluations of EVIDENTIALITY/STYLE/RELIABILITY are related to four major functions:

- evaluation of RELIABILITY (+ potential triggering of positive/negative evaluation)
- evaluation of RELIABILITY (no positive/negative evaluation)
- usage as 'protection devices'
- to enhance newsworthiness.

Distribution

In the entire corpus there are 113 evaluations of EVIDENTIALITY/STYLE/RELIABILITY, representing 2.2 per cent of all evaluations in the corpus. Among the different combinations involving EVIDENTIALITY/STYLE and an additional evaluative parameter, this combination is thus the most important one.

Of all evaluations of EVIDENTIALITY/STYLE/RELIABILITY 55.7 per cent express LOW RELIABILITY, 40.7 per cent express HIGH RELIABILITY and 3.5 per cent express MEDIAN RELIABILITY. The picture changes when we take into account the different distribution of these values in the broadsheets and the tabloids:

Only 31.2 per cent of all evaluations of this combination in the broadsheets are evaluations of HIGH RELIABILITY, compared to 53 per cent in the tabloids. Vice versa, only 42.8 per cent of all evaluations of EVIDENTIALITY/

STYLE/RELIABILITY in the tabloids express LOW RELIABILITY, whereas this percentage is much higher in the broadsheets (65.6 per cent). Concerning MEDIAN RELIABILITY, the difference is not as strong (3.1 per cent in the broadsheets, 4.1 per cent in the tabloids), and the combination is too infrequent in any case. The situation is thus almost exactly reversed:




Figure 6.1 Evaluations of EVIDENTIALITY/STYLE/RELIABILITY: LOW/HIGH

In other words, evaluations of EVIDENTIALITY/STYLE/RELIABILITY are predominantly concerned with expressing LOW RELIABILITY in the broadsheets and HIGH RELIABILITY in the tabloids. This can be explained by the tendency of the broadsheets to mitigate their assertions to a greater extent than the tabloids. Deriving from this distinction, there are also differences concerning the preferred evaluators in the popular and the quality press. The most frequent evaluators are:

- broadsheets: ALLEGE + ALLEGATION + ALLEGEDLY (32.8%) > CLAIM (31.2%) > CONFIRM (9.4%) > REVEAL (7.8%)
- tabloids: REVEAL + REVELATION (30.6%)/CLAIM (30.6%)⁷ > CONFIRM (12.2%)/ALLEGE + ALLEGATION + ALLEGEDLY (12.2%)

These distributions of course reflect the fact that RELIABILITY: LOW (ALLEGE, ALLEGATION, ALLEGEDLY, CLAIM) is more important than RELIABILITY: HIGH (CONFIRM, REVEAL, REVELATION) in the broadsheets, whereas in the tabloids the situation is reversed. The additional element of surprise involved with REVEAL, REVELATION probably additionally explains their importance in the tabloids. Another difference is that *when* tabloids evaluate along RELIABILITY: LOW, they prefer CLAIM to ALLEGE, ALLEGATION, ALLEGEDLY, whereas the broadsheets use these evaluators almost equally frequently. This is perhaps because of the greater stylistic formality of ALLEGE, ALLEGATION, ALLEGEDLY, and the preference of the tabloids for less formal language.

As far as stylistic variety is concerned, this is about equal in both groups of newspapers, although still slightly higher in the broadsheets (15 different evaluators: *admitted that, alleged, allegedly, apparently, confirmed, disclosed,*

pointed out, what was rightly billed as, AGREE, ALLEGATION, AS-structure, CLAIM (N), CLAIM (V), REPUTED, REVEAL) (a ratio of 0.40) than in the tabloids (11 different evaluators: *allegedly, apparently, recalled, revelations, AGREE, ALLEGATION, ALLEGE, CLAIM (N), CLAIM (V), CONFIRM, REVEAL*) (a ratio of 0.33).

The combination of evidentiality, style, emotivity and reliability

The final combination involving EVIDENTIALITY, STYLE and other parameters is a combination of the four parameters of EVIDENTIALITY, STYLE, EMOTIVITY and RELIABILITY. This concerns the semantically related attributing expressions ACKNOWLEDGE, ADMIT, CONFESS and CONCEDE. The connection between ACKNOWLEDGE and NEGATIVE EMOTIVITY has been shown by the corpus analyses undertaken by Hunston (1995). Similarly, the semantically related CONFESS, CONCEDE and ADMIT appear to be concerned with negative evaluation (cf. White 2001c: 1f on CONCEDE). This has been suggested for ADMIT, which shows that a statement was produced reluctantly (Clayman 1990: 87), carries the implied assumption that some negative act has been committed (Hardt-Mautner 1995: 13) or suggests that the content of the reported proposition is negative. These verbs are also all part of Thompson's group of verbs which imply the writer's belief in the truth of the attributed proposition (Thompson 1994: 50). Consequently, such attributing expressions can be regarded as expressing four parameters of evaluation:

- they name ILLOCUTIONARY acts (STYLE: ILLOCUTIONARY) and evaluate a proposition as based on HEARSAY (EVIDENTIALITY: HEARSAY)
- they express negativity (EMOTIVITY: NEGATIVE)
- they signal the writer's belief that what the Sayer says is true (RELIABILITY: HIGH).

Discourse functions

The evaluative force of such expressions depends on the context, in particular on *what* is said to be admitted (i.e. the content of the attributed proposition). If the attributed proposition can be construed as a negative act committed by the Sayer, this clearly contributes to the negative evaluation of the Sayer:

- Lewin: *Admitted he was a racist* (Express 7)
- Yesterday, Craig Bellamy, 23, the £50,000-a-week Wales and Newcastle United footballer, was fined £750 after *admitting that he hurled a torrent of abuse outside a nightclub in Cardiff*. (Times 10)

Where the attributed proposition cannot be regarded as a negative act, it is just the Sayer's reluctance that is conveyed by the evaluator, and the negative evaluation is weaker:

- He [manager Sven Goran Eriksson] *admitted* it was 'a pity' he could not choose the star defender. (Star 10)
- he [Blunkett] appeared to *concede* that it might have been necessary for a reporter to go undercover to reveal the extent of racist behaviour among officers. (Independent 7)

Sometimes ADMIT can have the effect of evaluating the content of the attributed proposition as negative (for the Sayer or the writer), expressing criticism on the part of the writer:

- He [the editor of the *Daily Mirror*, Piers Morgan] *admitted* that his newspaper had not seen the whole of the 'letter', which allegedly runs to four pages and that 'we were only allowed to photograph from the original the very specific extracts used in the book. The whole letter does not appear in the book for various reasons'. (Telegraph 5)
- He [The acting deputy chief constable of North Wales, Clive Wolfendale] *admitted* there were just EIGHT cops from ethnic minorities in his 1,500-strong force. (Sun 7)

Moreover, the contents of the conceded propositions are represented as being true, allowing the writer to 'reclaim responsibility' (Hunston 2000: 191) for them. Strictly speaking, such cases should therefore be considered both attributions and averrals (cf. also White 2001c: 4). Like all attributing expressions that express either HIGH or LOW RELIABILITY, they are 'used to position the reader to attach more or less credence to the various pieces of information' (Hunston 2000: 178). This is extremely significant when the attributed propositions contain evaluations, since the evaluators then allow writers to express evaluations while seeming to report, i.e. to be subjective while appearing to be objective. If we compare the content of all propositions attributed with the help of such evaluators, it becomes evident that only twelve out of 56 do *not* contain evaluations of MENTAL STATE, NECESSITY, EXPECTEDNESS, EMOTIVITY, RELIABILITY, etc. The evaluators in this combination are thus apparently used to introduce (and evaluate) attributed propositions that themselves contain evaluations on the part of the Sayer (rather than the reporter). In other words, in such cases the reporter's evaluative voice intrudes to comment on the Sayer's evaluative voice.

Distribution

Let us now look at the distributional tendencies in the corpus. Overall, the combination seems about equally frequent in the tabloids and in the broadsheets (roughly 1.1 per cent of all evaluations respectively). With only 56 occurrences, the combination is not very important for the news story genre.

Regarding the frequency of individual evaluators, there are differences concerning 1) the preference for individual evaluators and 2) the stylistic variety within this combination. The distribution of the four evaluators

(ADMIT, CONCEDE, ACKNOWLEDGE, CONFESS) in the sub-corpora looks as follows:




Figure 6.2 Distribution of ADMIT, CONCEDE, ACKNOWLEDGE, CONFESS

As becomes evident, there is an overwhelming preference for ADMIT in the tabloids (92.8 per cent of all evaluators in this combination), but they also employ the more ‘intense’ CONFESS (7.1 per cent) which does not occur in the broadsheets. Although the broadsheets also like to use ADMIT (60.7 per cent), the distribution is more balanced, and CONCEDE (21.4 per cent) and ACKNOWLEDGE (17.8 per cent) also occur. There is therefore slightly more stylistic variety in the broadsheets (three different evaluators or a ratio of 0.08) than in the tabloids (two different evaluators or a ratio of 0.06).

6.1.2 EVIDENTIALITY/MENTAL STATE

The combination of EVIDENTIALITY and MENTAL STATE also concerns the use of attributing expressions, but only those that refer to a mental activity (rather than a linguistic event). Such instances are classified as follows:

Table 6.3 Classification of EVIDENTIALITY: MINDSAY

Senser	attributing expression	attributed proposition
They [Britain’s senior police officers] . . .	fear that [EVIDENTIALITY/ MENTAL STATE]	the following publicity will undo much of their hard work to foster better race relations (Independent 7) [EVIDENTIALITY: MINDSAY]

Among the sub-values of EVIDENTIALITY, such evaluators express MINDSAY, attributing propositions to a Senser's mental activity. Additionally, there are several sub-categories of MENTAL STATE (see Chapter 4), not all of them occurring in the corpus in combination with EVIDENTIALITY:

BELIEF:	Locals <i>believed that</i> it was also home to Israeli agents, although the US-led coalition has never confirmed that any specific security organisation was active behind its high, well-guarded walls. (Times 2)
DISBELIEF:	But the letter remained explosive enough to rouse conspiracy theorists, who have <i>never accepted that</i> the princess and her companion Dodi Fayed were killed by accident on August 31 1997. (Guardian 5)
EMOTION:	Police <i>fear</i> there could be other victims. (Telegraph 3)
EXPECTATION:	A meeting of the ruling Ulster Unionist council had already been called for next Wednesday and Mr Trimble clearly <i>anticipated that</i> the de Chastelain report would have given all the cover he needed to get a majority backing of the 900 members. (Times 6)
PROCESS:	But what was billed as the most significant deal since the Good Friday agreement descended into chaos when Mr Trimble <i>decided that</i> General John de Chastelain, head of the independent body that oversees arms decommissioning, had failed to give the detail necessary to inspire unionist confidence. (Guardian 6)
VOLITION:	Little wonder that Sven-Göran Eriksson's <i>yearning to</i> return to club management seems to grow with each passing day. (FT 10)

On the one hand, this classification stems from the view that Chafe's (1986) equivalent category of EVIDENTIALITY, namely, belief (Chapter 3), is not enough to capture the complexity of attribution in the news. On the other hand, it takes up suggestions of several researchers to sub-divide verb types that express MENTAL STATES (Quirk *et al.* 1985: 202ff, Dixon 1991: 85ff, Halliday 1994: 112ff), who distinguish between:

- intellectual states/thinking/cognition (KNOW, THINK, BELIEVE)
- states of emotion/attitude/liking/affection (LIKE, FEAR)
- states of perception/attention (SEE, HEAR, SMELL).

However, expressions of perception and bodily sensation are excluded here because they cannot be used to attribute propositions. The other differences in my classification reflect semantic differences between the evaluations of MENTAL STATE found in my corpus. They also stem from the belief that in discourse there is a crucial difference between saying that *S* believes *that Y* (BELIEF), *S* knows *that Y* (KNOWLEDGE) and *S* expects *that Y* (EXPECTATION), although these attributing expressions all refer to states of cognition and are qualified as such in the research mentioned above.⁸

The additional category of PROCESS is a less than ideal solution, since many other mental states could equally be argued to be processes – note Halliday's term 'mental processes' (1994: 112ff) for expressions denoting perception, affection and cognition. Nevertheless, expressions such as DECIDE and IMAGINE, which can be used to attribute, are arguably neither emotions, nor beliefs, nor express any of the other sub-values. Instead, they refer to a somewhat longer mental process (e.g. decision-making). The additional category of STATE-OF-MIND refers to evaluators which, if included as either BELIEF or EMOTION would take these notions too far.

Discourse functions

Mental states belong to the so-called *A-events*, i.e. events that are '[k]nown to A [the speaker], but not to B' (Labov and Fanshel 1977: 100). Thus, only the speaker is a competent judge of such an event; the hearer cannot verify it (Hill 1958: 207). A-events cannot easily be challenged or attributed to someone in ordinary conversation (³*No, you are not sad*, ²*You are feeling well*). Consequently, attribution with MENTAL STATE expressions is even more interpretive than attribution with ILLOCUTIONARY expressions. They represent instances of total interpretation or intervention on the part of the writer and add an additional layer of interpretation (Caldas-Coulthard, p.c.).

Like evaluations of MENTAL STATE, evaluations of EVIDENTIALITY/MENTAL STATE probably have a general potential for evoking evaluation and triggering emotions. Additionally, they can distance the writer from the attributed proposition(s). These discourse functions are shared by all occurrences of EVIDENTIALITY/MENTAL STATE. I shall now discuss the individual functions of the most frequent sub-values in turn: (DIS)BELIEF, EMOTION and VOLITION.

(DIS)BELIEF

Attributions involving MENTAL STATE: (DIS)BELIEF represent one of the alternatives to employing attributions involving HEARSAY. They may be regarded as being closest to EVIDENTIALITY: HEARSAY/STYLE: NEUTRAL in that they do not usually carry any positive or negative evaluation of the Sender or of the attributed proposition (Thompson and Ye 1991: 372). However, one of the discourse functions of such attributions may be a very implicit evaluation of RELIABILITY. The propositions that are attributed are attributed as *beliefs* rather than *sayings*, and beliefs in themselves seem to be less reliable than some sayings are. By varying the strength of the attributed belief, further nuances are made possible. Compare:

- Military *intelligence is that* Saddam Hussein loyalists have now turned to his oldest ally Syria for help in trying to wreck the rebuilding of Iraq. (Mail 2)

- There has also been an upsurge in violent behaviour on and off the pitch, adding to *a sense of* disciplinary crisis at the FA and the Premier League. (Independent 10)
- President George Bush and his senior officials launched a high-profile campaign in Washington last week to promote *the view that* life in Iraq was returning to normal. (Independent 2)
- Though some smart Tories watching on TV *thought* the performance too ‘mannered’ to appeal to the wider audience at home, the snap verdict in Blackpool, even among sceptics, was that it was far from the feared disaster and at least good enough to ‘get him through the next week’. (Guardian 1)
- U.S. officials *believe* one of the drivers was picked for the mission because of his resemblance to the many Westerners now working in Baghdad. (Mail 2)
- Detectives are *convinced* the evil romeo [sic] passed the illness to other women too. (Star 3)
- Mohammed Dica: police *believe* he has infected other women (FT 3)
- He also *thinks* Burrell may have been silenced by the same dark forces stalking the Princess. (Express 5)
- Harrods owner Mohamed Al Fayed, Dodi’s father, has spent tens of thousands of pounds on a private investigation, *convinced that* Diana and Dodi were murdered by British security services at the behest of Establishment forces. (Mirror 5)
- French police, who managed to find only a few thousand pounds in Channel Islands and other bank accounts, *assume that* she has funds in safer havens. (Times 8)

Thus, for instance, the proposition *that life in Iraq was returning to normal* is characterized as a *view* (that moreover has to be *promoted*), implicitly suggesting that this is ‘not the way it really is’. Such attributions hence work to give propositions the ‘status’ (Hunston 2000: 184) of belief. Other examples involve a further variation of the status of attributed propositions as stronger or weaker beliefs; for example the question of whether Dica has infected other women is presented as a stronger belief (and hence presumably more probable) by the *Star* (*convinced*) than by the *Financial Times* (*believe*). However, such attributions do not explicitly signal that the content of the attributed propositions is true (as with *factive* attributing expressions such as KNOW) or false (as with *counter-factive* attributing expressions such as PRETEND), but are *non-factive* in that writers withhold a clear judgement (Thompson and Ye 1991).

EMOTION

Generally speaking, emotional descriptions may evoke the reader’s similar or opposite emotion (Ungerer 1997: 309, 319). This explains the use of evaluations of EVIDENTIALITY: MINDSAY/MENTAL STATE: EMOTION in head-

lines, captions and other prominent positions in the text, as in these examples:

- Baghdad car bombs hit Bush's Iraq *hopes* (FT 2)
- As Aids assassin is jailed, *fears that* sad list of innocent victims may grow (Express 3)
- Paul Burrell: *hopes* letter will lead to a 'thorough investigation' (FT 5)
- Butler releases a handwritten note of Diana's *fears that* someone was planning 'an accident' in her car (Times 5)
- She *feared* Philip wanted her dead (Sun 5)
- Ulster peace *hopes* dashed at last minute (Star 6)
- Israel's Syria raid sparks war *fears* (Star 9)

As Crystal and Davy (1969) point out,

headlines have to contain a clear, succinct and if possible intriguing message, to kindle a spark of interest in the potential reader, who, on average, is a person whose eye moves swiftly down a page and stops when something catches his attention.

(Crystal and Davy 1969: 174; on headlines see also Lindemann 1990, White 1997, Schaffer 1995 or the contributions to Ungerer 2000)

Emotional descriptions seem to fulfil this purpose by appealing to the reader's emotions and most can be related to a small range of 'basic' (Johnson-Laird and Oatley 1989, Ungerer 1997) positive and (more frequently) negative emotions (see also 6.2 below).

Appraisal theory also suggests that emotional descriptions can trigger positive/negative evaluation, i.e. EMOTIVITY (White 1998: 101ff). This function becomes evident in the following examples:

- Then Ulster Unionist leader David Trimble stunned the other parties by demanding a full inventory of the weapons scrapped. He *fears* being dumped at next month's elections unless he can convince voters the IRA has destroyed its arsenal. (Sun 6)
- But Damascus officials – *fearful of* becoming the next target of a US anti-terror strike – said they would not retaliate and would exercise restraint. (Sun 9)

Again, the evaluation depends on the reader's position, but the following inferences might be drawn, which can result in a negative or positive evaluation of the respective Sensors:

- 'David Trimble only acted in the way he did because he is afraid of being dumped – he is selfish and does not care for the peace process'
- 'Damascus officials only act moderately because they are afraid (not because they want to prevent the conflict from widening)'

Finally, depending on whether the attributing expressions involve 'positive' (e.g. HOPE) or 'negative' (e.g. FEAR) emotions, the content of the attributed proposition can be evaluated as pleasant or unpleasant:

- Police *fear* there could be other victims. (Telegraph 3)
- Then Ulster Unionist leader David Trimble stunned the other parties by demanding a full inventory of the weapons scrapped. He *fears* being dumped at next month's elections unless he can convince voters the IRA has destroyed its arsenal. (Sun 6)
- The members are his power-base and he will be *hoping that* the warm response given him in the conference hall will have stopped the rot. (Times 1)
- *HOPES* for a historic breakthrough in Northern Ireland ended in chaos last night. (Mirror 6)

Sometimes it is not clear whether this relates only to the Senser (i.e. the content of the attributed proposition is (un)pleasant for him/her) or to the writer as well. This is particularly the case when the evaluations are not attributed explicitly to specific Senses:

- This latest twist in the saga of Diana's final months is set to bolster *fears that* she was the victim of a conspiracy. (Express 5)
- The hitch was a serious blow to Mr Blair, who had flown to Belfast amid continuing *concerns for* his health only two days after a heart scare. (Times 6)
- *The anxiety is that* the IRA initiative, even with clarification, might not be enough to halt the drift of support away from Mr Trimble, which has been evident for several years. (Independent 6)
- The attacks have sent a shockwave through Baghdad, sparking *fears of* a renewed spate of bombings similar to a prolonged terror campaign in the summer. (Times 2)
- *Hopes that* some of the mysteries would be unravelled were dashed last month. (Mirror 5)

The effect of this is difficult to pinpoint. Since no truth claims are made, it does not result in a change in the degree of RELIABILITY attached to the attributed proposition. Rather, such nominalizations appear to result in a *lower* degree of distancing from the emotions that are attributed, with the result that the newspaper itself somehow seems to share them.

VOLITION

Although evaluations of EVIDENTIALITY: VOLITION are included as attribution, the effect of this specific type of attribution is different from that of EVIDENTIALITY: (DIS)BELIEF and EVIDENTIALITY: EMOTION, since the attributed propositions express wishes and intentions that cannot be analysed in terms of reliability. Hence, the distancing (or transferral of responsibility) that is involved in all types of attribution does not result in a distancing from the reliability of the attributed proposition, but rather in a distancing from the wishes that are expressed.

It is questionable whether descriptions of news actors' wishes and

intention may evoke readers' emotions in the same way as emotional descriptions have been suggested to. However, evaluations of VOLITION are probably connected with the triggering of positive or negative evaluation (note that appraisal theory includes expressions of VOLITION within Affect), as in the following examples:

1. The terrorists' *aim is to* cripple reconstruction efforts and to stoke hostility towards the coalition and the governing council that the Americans have set up as an interim administration. (Times 2)
2. What was *meant to* be a roar turned into a bore as he delivered the longest speech in modern political history. (Mirror 1)
3. *It was meant to* convince his party he's tough. Instead it evoked images of another wannabe urged to make the clenched hand his trademark – tennis ace Tim Henman (insert). It didn't work for him either. (Sun 1)
4. The lack of an inquest and his prosecution for theft in 2002 steeled Burrell's *determination to* make public the princess's concerns for her security. (Mirror 5)
5. But Crispin Blunt, who until this week had been the only MP *willing to* put his head over the parapet by demanding a change in leader, expressed scepticism that the 25 names needed for a confidence vote would be collected. (Times 1)

In the first example the negative evaluation of the bombers in Iraq is both dependent on NEGATIVE EMOTIVITY in the description of the Sensors (*the terrorists*) as well as on what is attributed to be their aim (*to cripple reconstruction efforts and to stoke hostility*) – they themselves would perhaps define their aims differently. In the following two examples, the negative evaluation that can potentially be triggered is based on a contrast between intention (*meant to be a roar, meant to convince . . .*) and the failure of this intention. In the fourth example, the context suggests that the preferred evoked evaluation of Burrell is positive and in the fifth example, a positive evaluation of Crispin Blunt can be triggered in the context of *but* and *only*.

Evaluations of EVIDENTIALITY: MINDSAY/MENTAL STATE: VOLITION can also suggest that the attributed proposition is something that is regarded as desirable by the Sensor. However, in the case of passives and nominalizations it does *not* seem as if the writer shares this evaluation, even if the Sensors cannot be inferred from the context (as they usually can). Here are some examples:

- The Northern Ireland peace process was thrown into confusion last night, after negotiations *aimed at* restoring the power-sharing assembly hit a last minute snag when David Trimble, the Ulster Unionist leader, demanded further movement on IRA decommissioning. (FT 6)
- A carefully choreographed *plan to* revive the political process in Northern Ireland was in disarray last night after the Ulster Unionists

refused to accept IRA assurances that it was putting its weapons beyond use. (Telegraph 6)

- The breakdown in relations between English football's governing body and its leading club came after three days of frantic negotiations *intended to avert* the air of shambles presented yesterday at the official announcement of Eriksson's squad. (Guardian 10)
- It *was to be* yet another historic day in Northern Ireland – a day that would go like clockwork. (Guardian 6)

Distribution

In total, there are 184 evaluations of EVIDENTIALITY/MENTAL STATE in the corpus (representing 3.6 per cent of all evaluations), 98 in the broadsheets (3.7 per cent of all evaluations in this sub-corpus) and 86 in the tabloids (3.4 per cent). The combination is not very significant in comparison to the other evaluative combination used for attribution, namely EVIDENTIALITY/STYLE (1,653 occurrences). It seems that news stories prefer prototypical attributing expressions (commenting on language activities) to those attributing expressions that comment on mental states of news actors, perhaps avoiding the additional layer of interpretation involved with the latter.

In the entire corpus evaluations of (DIS)BELIEF are the most frequent (65 occurrences – 61 BELIEF, 4 DISBELIEF – i.e. 35.3 per cent of all evaluations of EVIDENTIALITY/MENTAL STATE), followed by VOLITION (51 occurrences/27.7 per cent), EMOTION (43 occurrences/23.4 per cent), PROCESS (18 occurrences/9.8 per cent), and EXPECTATION (7 occurrences/3.8 per cent). Comparing the distribution of those sub-values that occur more than 20 times ((DIS)BELIEF, VOLITION and EMOTION), we can find that these are not equally distributed in the two sub-corpora:




Figure 6.3 Distribution of BELIEF/EMOTION/VOLITION

BELIEF is the most important sub-value in the tabloids (34 occurrences, i.e. 39.5 per cent of all its evaluations of EVIDENTIALITY/MENTAL STATE),

followed by EMOTION (24 occurrences/27.9 per cent) and VOLITION (19 occurrences/22.1 per cent). In the broadsheets, on the other hand, there is hardly any difference between VOLITION (32 occurrences/32.6 per cent) and (DIS)BELIEF (31 occurrences/31.6 per cent), and EMOTION is least important (19 occurrences/19.4 per cent). It therefore seems more crucial for the broadsheets to talk about news actors' intentions, goals and motivations than it does for the tabloids. At the same time, emotional descriptions play a bigger role in the tabloids, no doubt connected to their discourse functions and the emphasis that is placed on emotions in the popular press in general.

The combination of evidentiality, mental state and reliability

Just as there are evaluations of EVIDENTIALITY/STYLE which additionally express the writer's evaluation of the RELIABILITY of the attributed proposition (Chapter 6.1), there are evaluations of EVIDENTIALITY/MENTAL STATE which do the same. This is the case with factive attributing expressions such as KNOW and BE FURIOUS THAT which presuppose the truth of the attributed proposition (RELIABILITY: HIGH) and in addition comment on the news actor's mental state (as KNOWLEDGE or EMOTION). Attributing structures with AS (*as X remembers*) are also connected to the writer's belief in the truth of the attributed proposition. In addition, attribution to general or common beliefs or expectations (*widely believed/expected to*) results in an evaluation of fairly high reliability (here classified as MEDIAN RELIABILITY). Finally, to attribute propositions to the beliefs or expectations of unknown Sensors (*expected to, believed to*) contributes to an evaluation of LOW RELIABILITY in comparison to the other evaluations in this combination. Such evaluations express LOW RELIABILITY *in contrast to* expressions that attribute mental states to general Sensors (*widely expected to*) and in contrast to factive attributing expressions. However, they express more certainty than, for example, CLAIM and MIGHT (which are also classified in their respective category as expressing LOW RELIABILITY). This is a central problem involved with scales of evaluation – that they are not directly comparable but are instead internally structured. Unlike with EVIDENTIALITY/STYLE passives *are* included as expressions of writer opinion. The difference is that if a proposition is attributed to unknown Sayers (e.g. *said to*) it is clear that the writer him- or herself cannot be the Sayer, but if a proposition is attributed to an unknown Sensor (*it is believed*) this does not automatically exclude the writer. Hence *it is believed that* sometimes stands for *I/we believe*.

MINDSAY/EMOTION/HIGH

Attributing expressions such as *appalled that, devastated at, furious about/that, sympathy that*, and *troubled that* presuppose the facticity of the attributed proposition, thereby lending HIGH RELIABILITY to its content, again

allowing one to regard them as both attributions and averrals. As soon as these attributed propositions contain evaluations of some sort or have the potential to trigger evaluation, they become rhetorically very important, since this evaluation is *shared* by the writer (s/he reclaims responsibility). Compare the following examples (potentially evaluative expressions including those that might evoke evaluation are underlined):

- They are *appalled that* these kind of attitudes still exist within the police and fear that the following publicity will undo much of their hard work to foster better race relations. (Independent 7)
- But despite mounting *concern about* the occupation, in particular the rising death toll, Mr Lugar said the US had no choice but to continue rebuilding Iraq. (FT 2)
- The MPs are *concerned about* the rising levels of consumer debt. (FT 4)
- The MPs are *furious about* various ruses, particularly in the small print of credit card deals, which they believe are used to cover up the true costs of using credit cards. (Mail 4)
- Manchester United is also *furious that* Ferdinand has been identified and punished without any disciplinary process. (Times 10)
- Now, plagued by that meeting and deeply *troubled that* there has still been no inquest in Britain into the death of Diana and her boyfriend Dodi Fayed, Burrell has come forward with the stunning new evidence. (Mirror 5)
- There appeared to be *some sympathy* from British officials *that*, having secured a significant act of disarmament from the IRA, Mr Trimble was not in a position to explain the details to his party or voters. (Times 6)

It becomes evident that in most cases of this kind of attribution some sort of evaluation is taking place in the attributed proposition. Like evaluations of EVIDENTIALITY/STYLE/RELIABILITY such evaluators are very clever devices to express evaluations while attributing them.

MINDSAY/KNOWLEDGE/HIGH

As Thompson points out, attributing expressions such as KNOW, DISCOVER, LEARN, REALIZE and FIND 'show that you [the speaker] have a positive attitude towards the information that is in the reported clause – that is, you accept that what the Senser finds out is in fact true' (Thompson 1994: 130). (This actually supports the parameter-based framework of evaluation because it allows us to explain this fact by reference to the parameter of EVIDENTIALITY where KNOWLEDGE as source of the writer's proposition is epistemically more certain than BELIEF.) The discourse functions are similar to those of the factive attributing expressions of EMOTION discussed above. Again, such attributions become particularly important when the attributed proposition involves evaluation, as in:

- The clearest sign that the leadership *realises* the danger is not yet past came when it confirmed that Mr Maclean is calling in the plotters. (Times 1)
- Unsuspecting, Deborah *knew* she had to tell him he was HIV positive. (Mirror 3)
- BARRETT *FINDS HIS CREDIT IS ALL USED UP* (Independent 4)
- But having already made up to £500,000 out of his relationship with Diana through newspaper deals, TV interviews and public speaking engagements, Burrell *knows that* sales of his book could double that figure. (Mail 5)
- After serving 16 months on remand, MacDonald will be eligible for parole in ten months – and the authorities in France *know* they will be powerless to stop the woman they have dubbed La Madame Anglais from spending her ill-gotten, and well-hidden, millions. (Mail 8)
- Exactly how much money she salted away, only MacDonald herself *knows*. (Mail 8)

In some of the examples above, the evaluations probably originate with the writer, but are attributed to a Senser. This kind of attribution is thus rhetorically of great importance because it can aver while attributing. Rather than blatantly stating, for example, *the authorities in France will be powerless to stop [MacDonald] from spending her ill-gotten, and well-hidden, millions; the danger is not past for the leadership or Deborah had to tell him he was HIV positive*, the newspapers simply ‘report’ that *the authorities know p*, *the leadership realises p*, *Deborah knew p* (where *p* stands for the evaluative proposition). This allows newspapers to ‘kill two birds with one stone’, so to speak: they mitigate their evaluations by seeming to attribute them while simultaneously increasing the RELIABILITY of the attributed proposition.

MINDSAY/PROCESS/HIGH

There is only one instance of this type of evaluation in the corpus:

- Ironically, last night’s challenge by the leadership to the dissidents that they put up a candidate or shut up is close to the one which drove John Major to resign the party leadership to flush out his enemies in 1995. In those days IDS was a leading rebel, *as today’s rebels clearly remember*. (Guardian 1)

In this case, both the AS-attribution and the attributing verb (*remember*) evaluate the attributed proposition (*in those days IDS was a leading rebel*) as highly reliable. This is potentially significant, since the attributed proposition involves an evaluation of IMPORTANCE (*leading*) and since this evaluation of IMPORTANCE in itself contributes to the evaluation of irony (*ironically*): the irony consists in the fact that IDS was a ‘leading rebel’ in 1995 and is now the one threatened by the ‘rebels’.

Attributions to common beliefs/expectations

Employing attributing expressions in conjunction with adjectives and adverbs such as WIDESPREAD, WIDELY and GENERALLY is an important device for manipulating the reliability of attributed propositions. The effect is that these propositions are presented as common opinion, what is believed by everyone apart from a few outsiders, and which must accordingly almost certainly be true. Again, this is particularly significant in cases where the attributed proposition inscribes or evokes evaluation:

- The *widespread sense was that not enough may have been done to revive the flagging electoral fortunes of Mr Trimble*, whose survival is viewed as vital to the survival of the peace process in its present form. (Independent 6)
- Although *the hotel is widely thought to be linked to the CIA*, that was denied by US officials yesterday. One said: 'It is not a CIA facility.' (Telegraph 2)
- *Government is widely expected to change the Consumer Credit Act, enforcing a standardised method on the industry*. (Independent 4)
- The raid on Syrian soil, believed to be the first since a 1976 strike on a similar camp, is seen as a manoeuvre allowing Ariel Sharon, the Israeli Prime Minister, to retaliate for the Haifa bombing in a way that will satisfy the Israeli public's demand for a harsh response, but avoid carrying out the hugely controversial threat to 'remove' – *widely taken to mean exile or kill – Mr Arafat*. (Times 9)
- *The generally accepted version is that their Mercedes limousine was crashed by Henri Paul, a chauffeur at Mohamed Al Fayed's Paris Ritz, who was unused to driving the car, intoxicated by drink and drugs and trying to drive through the tunnel at the Pont d'Alma far too fast for the camber of the road*. (Guardian 5)

In using these evaluators, all opinions that diverge from the 'general belief' are classified as not being part of the general knowledge consensus. The argument is probably something like: 'If everyone believes this to be the case it most certainly is the case, and people who do not believe what everyone else believes are probably wrong.' Thus, the Americans' denial is additionally evaluated as more or less unreliable by the *Telegraph* above, and the *Guardian* evaluates all 'conspiracy theories' regarding Diana's death as more or less unreliable – as by implication not part of what is generally accepted. Hence, such evaluations can at the same time confer MEDIAN RELIABILITY to an attributed proposition and evaluate diverging opinions (and their Sensors) as unreliable (potentially evoking negative evaluation).

Attribution to unknown Sensors

Structures that attribute propositions without mentioning explicit Sensors include the passivization and nominalization of attributing expressions –

for example, *understood to*, *believed to*, *sense that*, *viewed as*. Bagnall (1993: 22) gives an interesting and amusing 'translation' of some of the expressions analysed in this section:

It is believed ≈ can't say who by, but probably true

It is understood ≈ firmer than the above.

Such expressions, then, appear to indicate a lower reliability of the attributed proposition than evaluations with factive attributing expressions and those referring to common beliefs. As with all examples in the combination of EVIDENTIALITY, MENTAL STATE and RELIABILITY, the effect of such evaluations may depend on whether the attributed propositions contain evaluations or not.

In fact, the majority of attributed propositions refer to propositions which do *not* contain any explicit evaluations, but simply make statements for which the newspapers do not want to take responsibility, as exemplified by the following corpus instances:

- A third footballer *is understood to* have been interviewed by police about the alleged incident, which is *thought to* have taken place after they met the woman in a bar. (Times 10)
- As the Surrey Coroner, Mr Burgess *is expected to* hold an inquest on Dodi Fayed because he was buried in the county. (Times 5)
- *It is not believed that* any Americans were killed. (Star 2)
- Dica, who was told yesterday to expect a lengthy jail sentence, *is also thought not to* have long to live. (Times 3)
- The other officers who quit *are thought to* be Constables Carl Jones, Tony Lewis and Adrian Harrison, from Greater Manchester Police, and PC Steve Salkeld, from Cheshire police. (Times 7)
- The air raid targeted *a suspected* Islamic Jihad training base in retaliation for Saturday's horrific suicide bombing in the Israeli port of Haifa, which killed 19 people in a restaurant. (Star 9)
- The attack – *believed to* have been carried out by F-16 bombers – flattened several targets in the Ein Saheb terror training camp just 10 miles from the capital Damascus. (Sun 9)

On the one hand, this allows newspapers to state 'facts' which are not verifiable (no Senser is mentioned who could be asked), and whose reliability cannot be evaluated by readers (based on what they know about the Senser). As Du Bois (1986) states, critical readers ask four questions of a text that 'stand at the core of the problem of reliability' (Du Bois 1986: 232):

- (1) How does the speaker know?
- (2) What are his interests, and how might interest distort assertions?
- (3) Is he sincere, or is he lying?
- (4) Is he fallible?

(Du Bois 1986: 232)

With nominalizations and passives of all kinds when employed in connection with attributing expressions (whether EVIDENTIALITY: HEARSAY or EVIDENTIALITY: MINDSAY), these questions cannot be asked by the critical reader (because they have no way of knowing who the Sayer or Senser is).

On the other hand, such expressions mitigate the information in the attributed proposition and make the statement less assertive. The difference in effect can easily be seen when we compare the newspapers' reporting of the conflict in Iraq. The situation in the 'real world' is as follows: a bomb exploded outside a hotel in Baghdad which may or may not have been used by the CIA. Depending on their stance, the news stories either a) do not mention this possibility, b) mitigate their report by employing evaluations of EVIDENTIALITY/MENTAL STATE/RELIABILITY, c) simply state that the hotel has been used by the CIA:

No mention of CIA, 'spies' etc.:

- The White House faced deepening problems over Iraq yesterday as two powerful car bombs exploded outside a central Baghdad hotel used by *coalition officials*, killing at least six Iraqis and wounding a further 25. (FT 2)
- The building was filled with U.S. *security officers, western contractors and members of the Iraqi Governing Council*. (Mail 2)
- The midday blast at The Baghdad Hotel – used by *US officials* – shook buildings blocks away. (Mirror 2)
- At least 10 people were killed yesterday when a suicide bomber attacked a hotel in Baghdad used by *top US officials*. (Star 2)

Mitigated report:

- The hotel is also home to American contractors, and *CIA operatives are also understood to be using it as a base*. (Guardian 2)
- Suicide bombers driving two cars attacked a central Baghdad hotel yesterday where senior US officials and *CIA agents are thought to have been staying*. (Independent 2)
- The bomber tried to drive a car into the Baghdad Hotel, which is used by Americans and *believed to be closely connected to the CIA*, but failed to get past concrete security barriers that had been placed outside the hotel in recent weeks. (Telegraph 2)
- A SUICIDE bomber smashed a car full of explosives at high speed into a hotel compound *believed to house the Baghdad offices of the CIA and FBI yesterday*, killing six people and wounding dozens more. (Times 2)

Unmitigated report:

- Bullets fail to stop suicide driver who kills six in car blast outside hotel *used by CIA agents* in Iraq (Express 2)

- A suicide bomber killed at least six people yesterday when he blew up his car outside a hotel *used by American spies* in Iraq. (Express 2)
- It is believed the attack, in which dozens were wounded, was a deliberate bid to kill *CIA agents who have been staying there*. (Express 2)
- SEVEN people died yesterday when two suicide car bombers blasted a hotel in Baghdad *used by the CIA*. (Sun 2)

In my view, mentioning that CIA agents are involved is somewhat more critical of the Americans than not reporting this; its mitigated reporting on the other hand is less critical than its unmitigated reporting. In general, there is a huge potential for bias in such structural alternatives of news reporting, allowing newspapers to mention ‘facts’ that are probably evaluated positively or negatively by readers while avoiding responsibility for them. However, the mitigated proposition may simply be one for which there is not enough evidence, without necessarily triggering any positive or negative evaluation (e.g.: *The diner was thought to be one of the few spots where Jews and Arabs mix in Haifa*. (Mirror 9)), though as usual with evoked evaluation there is a cline or continuum of evaluative potential.

In addition, a considerable number of attributed propositions contain explicit evaluations along one or more parameter of evaluation, for example:

- Israel *had been expected to* retaliate for the bombing by expelling – or even assassinating – Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat. (Sun 6) [EXPECTEDNESS]
- But Government officials *were understood to be* frustrated by the ‘absurdity’ that although it was known AK47s and Semtex explosive had been given up, this could not be stated. (Express 6) [MENTAL STATE]
- General John de Chastelain, the head of the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning, had added to *the sense of* choreography by saying that the IRA had completed a third act of decommissioning. (Telegraph 6) [RELIABILITY]
- Activists showed their anger with the rebels by warmly applauding Mr Duncan Smith’s declaration that he would not bow to pressure to quit. It *was seen as a* clear message that the party membership did not want a leadership contest. (Telegraph 1) [COMPREHENSIBILITY]
- The house in Cheshire that he shares with his wife, Maria, and their two sons had been searched 18 months earlier by police officers who said they were looking for ‘the Crown Jewels’ – *thought to have been a reference to* potentially damaging letters and tape recordings that the Princess had possessed. (Times 5) [RELIABILITY]
- The widespread sense was that not enough may have been done to revive the flagging electoral fortunes of Mr Trimble, whose survival *is viewed as* vital to the survival of the peace process in its present form. (Independent 6) [IMPORTANCE]

This again is a clever way of avoiding explicit averrals of evaluations by simply attributing them to inexplicit Sensors. Naturally, the evaluations may originate with these Sensors (rather than the newspaper) in the first place, but there is no way of telling if this is the case.

Distribution

On the whole, there are only 89 evaluations of EVIDENTIALITY/MENTAL STATE/RELIABILITY in the corpus, representing 1.7 per cent of all evaluations (1.8 per cent in the tabloids, 1.7 per cent in the broadsheets). As far as the distribution of the individual sub-values in the whole corpus is concerned, evaluations of MINDSAY/BELIEF/LOW are in general the most frequent (46.1 per cent), followed by MINDSAY/KNOWLEDGE/HIGH (28.1 per cent), MINDSAY/EMOTION/HIGH (10.1 per cent), MINDSAY/EXPECTATION/LOW (9 per cent), MINDSAY/BELIEF/MEDIAN (4.5 per cent), MINDSAY/EXPECTATION/MEDIAN (1.1 per cent) and MINDSAY/PROCESS/HIGH (1.1 per cent). However, comparing the importance of the values in the sub-corpora some differences become apparent:




Figure 6.4 Distribution of sub-values of EVIDENTIALITY/MENTAL STATE/RELIABILITY

Apparently, the popular and the quality press prefer different sub-values within the parameter. Whereas for the broadsheets BELIEF/LOW is by far the most important (54.5 per cent), followed by KNOWLEDGE/HIGH (13.6 per cent), EMOTION/HIGH (11.4 per cent), BELIEF/MEDIAN (9.1 per cent) and EXPECTATION/LOW (6.8 per cent), for the tabloids KNOWLEDGE/HIGH is most significant (42.2 per cent), then BELIEF/LOW (37.8 per cent), EXPECTATION/LOW (11.1 per cent) and EMOTION/HIGH (8.9 per cent). (The other combinations are extremely infrequent: there is only one occurrence each in the broadsheet sub-corpus and no occurrences at all in the tabloid sub-corpus.)

Within this evaluative combination, then, the tabloids clearly have a greater preference for evaluations involving HIGH RELIABILITY than the broadsheets (which prefer mitigation). This mirrors the findings for evaluations of EVIDENTIALITY/STYLE/RELIABILITY. The popular press seems to like to use such evaluations to promote the persuasiveness of their statements and evaluations, although some mitigation also occurs in the tabloids. Moreover, there is a preference for evaluations of BELIEF/MEDIAN in the broadsheets (no occurrences in the tabloids) in contrast to evaluations of EXPECTATION/LOW in the tabloids (11.1 per cent versus 6.8 per cent). It is also surprising that we can find a slightly higher percentage of EMOTION/HIGH in the broadsheets.

These distinctions are reflected in the difference in frequency of individual evaluators. The most frequent evaluator in the broadsheets is *thought to* (9), followed by *believed to* (5), *understood to/that* (5) and *expected to* (3). In the tabloids the most frequent evaluators are *believed (to)* (8) and KNOW (8), followed by DISCOVER (7), *expected (to)* (5), *thought that/to* (4) and *understood to* (3).

Whereas the tabloids' preference for *expected* is easily explained by the greater frequency of this parameter in general and, vice versa, the broadsheets' preference for *understood to/that* is explicable by the greater significance of BELIEF/LOW in this sub-corpus, the preference of the tabloids for *believed* (in contrast to the broadsheets' predilection for *thought*) is very strange. Normally, tabloids would be expected to use the more 'spoken' variety, but in fact all word forms of THINK are more frequent in spoken British and American English than those of BELIEVE (as shown by an analysis in the Bank of English). This can only be accounted for by reference to the assumption that *believed to* signals slightly higher reliability than *thought to* (Susan Hunston, p.c.), and by reference to the above-mentioned preference for HIGH RELIABILITY in the popular press within this combination of evaluative parameters.

Finally, concerning the stylistic variety within this combination, the broadsheets exhibit their usual greater variability (22 evaluators, i.e. a ratio of 0.6 vs. 14 evaluators, i.e. a ratio of 0.4).

6.2 MENTAL STATE

The difference between evaluations of MENTAL STATE and evaluations of EVIDENTIALITY/MENTAL STATE is that there is no attribution involved in MENTAL STATE evaluations. The following extracts exemplify this:

- Little wonder that Sven-Göran Eriksson's [Senser] *yearning* [EVIDENTIALITY: MINDSAY/MENTAL STATE: VOLITION] to return to club management [attributed proposition] seems to grow with each passing day. (FT 10)
- Asylum seeker [Senser] guilty of *deliberately* [MENTAL STATE: VOLITION] infecting women with HIV (Mail 3)

- Confused Princess Diana [Senser] lived *in terror that* [EVIDENTIALITY: MINDSAY/MENTAL STATE: EMOTION] various people were out to kill her [attributed proposition]. (Sun 5)
- IDS GETS TOUGH. Nobody [Senser] *scared* [MENTAL STATE: EMOTION]. (Mirror 1)

In other words, evaluations of MENTAL STATE deal with averrals, whereas evaluations of EVIDENTIALITY/MENTAL STATE are used to introduce attributions. In the following, I will only outline the discourse functions of EMOTION and (NON)VOLITION, since these are most frequent (for (DIS)-BELIEF and STATE-OF-MIND cf. Bednarek 2004).

MENTAL STATE: EMOTION

The first thing that is noticeable with evaluations of MENTAL STATE: EMOTION is the general difference between positive and negative emotions, i.e. emotional experiences that are generally regarded as pleasant (love) or unpleasant (fear) in the Western world (Marty 1908: 199f, Hübler 1987: 366). Like evaluations of EVIDENTIALITY/MENTAL STATE these positive and negative emotions are more or less classifiable as being related to a small range of ‘basic’ (Johnson-Laird and Oatley 1989) emotions (see Chapter 6.1). Here are the examples from the corpus:

Table 6.4 Examples of MENTAL STATE: EMOTION

negative:	
<u>anger:</u>	<i>anger, angri(ly), appalled, bitter(ly), disgruntled, enraged, furious(ly), fury, incandescent, incensed, inflamed, outrage, outraged, resentment, scorn, seething, wrath</i>
<u>fear:</u>	<i>alarmed, anxiety, anxious, concern, desperate(ly), dismay, fear, frantic, panic, scared, terror, tied himself in knots</i> (‘get very confused and anxious’, COBUILD), <i>worries</i>
<u>sadness:</u>	<i>betrayal</i> (<i>feeling a bitter sense of betrayal</i>), <i>devastated, disaffected, disappointed, disappointment, displeasure, disturbing, distraught, distress, distressed, downcast, flinched, frustration, loneliness, lonely, pain, plagued by, sombre, stressful, tension, torment, turmoil, [in] shame</i>
<u>disgust/hate:</u>	<i>could not stand, disgust</i>
positive:	
<u>joy/happiness:</u>	<i>charmed, cheered, delighted, emboldened, encourage, enthusiasm, enthusiastic, euphoric, happy, hopes, jubilant, loved, optimism, optimistic, passion, pleasing, pleasure, rapturous, rapturously, relief, strike a chord, salute, sympathy</i>

Generally speaking, only negative emotions can be connected to the news value of negativity (this explains the higher frequency of negative emotions described below). A special case is surprise, which cannot easily be classified as 'positive' or 'negative'. If we compare evaluators that express this notion it seems that some conceptualize it as rather negative to news actors (SHOCK, STUN), others as more or less neutral (SURPRISE). Thus, the evaluators SHOCK and STUN appear to involve the news values of both *negativity* and *unexpectedness* (which might explain their frequency in the tabloids), whereas SURPRISE is connected to the news value of *unexpectedness* only. The importance of surprise as an emotion in news stories can be explained by reference to the news value of *unexpectedness*: although it is not the writer him/herself who is surprised, references to a news actor's surprise are still related to the notion of unexpectedness:

news value of *unexpectedness* — $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{unexpected to } S \text{ [EXPECTEDNESS]} \\ \text{unexpected to news actor [MENTAL STATE: EMOTION]} \end{array} \right.$

Both references to writer expectations and references to news actors' expectations appear to be connected to this value, even though the former are more important than the latter. The following examples show how different kinds of evaluations that involve expectedness can accumulate:

- How the millionaire boss of Barclays Bank *stunned* [MENTAL STATE: EMOTION] MPs yesterday with an *astonishing* [EXPECTEDNESS: UNEXPECTED] admission (Mail 4)
- The scale of republican moves *surprised* [MENTAL STATE: EMOTION] many observers, who *expected* [EVIDENTIALITY: MINDSAY/MENTAL STATE: EXPECTATION] more, since Mr Trimble had personally worked out details of the deal with Mr Adams. (Independent 6)

Moreover, the usage of such evaluators can evoke negative evaluation. In my corpus, it looks as if what (or who) causes the surprise is usually evaluated as negative, whereas the one who is surprised may be evaluated as neutral or as positive (but not necessarily so):

- How the millionaire boss of Barclays Bank *stunned* MPs yesterday with an astonishing admission (Mail 4)
- IRA warlords then destroyed large numbers of Armalite and AK47 automatic rifles, almost a ton of Semtex explosives, detonators, SAM missiles and rocket-propelled grenades. All this was confirmed by independent observer General John de Chastelain. Then Ulster Unionist leader David Trimble *stunned* the other parties by demanding a full inventory of the weapons scrapped. (Sun 6)
- The scale of republican moves *surprised* many observers, who expected more, since Mr Trimble had personally worked out details of the deal with Mr Adams. (Independent 6)

- Mr Duncan Smith *surprised* some MPs with his personal attacks. (FT 1)
- Twelve years after Gerald Ratner infamously described some of his jewellery as 'total crap', the boss of Britain's biggest credit card company yesterday *stunned* his customers with what appeared to be a similar vote of no confidence in his own product. (Guardian 4)
- The shaming of Britain's racist policemen: five quit after documentary *shocks* the force (Independent 7)
- But yesterday that so-called 'stunt' was causing *shock waves* throughout the police service as it was forced to face up to yet another racism crisis. (Independent 7) (borderline case)
- CHIEF constables were in a state of *shock* yesterday after an undercover television reporter exposed deep-seated racism among recruits. (Times 7)

But let us turn to the overall discourse functions of emotional descriptions. Even more than evaluations of EVIDENTIALITY: MINDSAY/MENTAL STATE: EMOTION evaluations of MENTAL STATE: EMOTION tend to occur in headlines, captions and other prominent positions in the text, for example:

- *Torment*: Infected Deborah (Star 3)
- How the millionaire boss of Barclays Bank *stunned* MPs yesterday with an astonishing admission (Mail 4)
- *Anger* as Diana's butler cashes in by revealing secret letter (Mail 5)
- Di's *terror* (Sun 5)
- Loyalists *scorn* arms surrender (Express 6)
- The shaming of Britain's racist policemen: five quit after documentary *shocks* the force (Independent 7)
- POLICE CHIEF'S *DISGUST* AS FIVE RACIST COPS QUIT OVER TV FILM (Mirror 7)
- British madam *distraught* as she is jailed for running Europe's biggest vice ring (Express 8)
- *Pleasure* (Star 8)
- *Devastated* Rio hits back (Mirror 10)
- Revealed: note that will *stun* world (Mirror 5)
- Police chiefs *shocked* by race-hate exposé (Times 7)

The emotional descriptions here function to attract the interests of the potential audience, trying to catch their attention by appealing to their natural interest (a kind of voyeuristic tendency) in other people's emotions.

In addition, some researchers suggest that it is not reasonable to believe 'that the reader can process emotional descriptions without any kind of emotional response' (Ungerer 1997: 319). According to Ungerer, described emotions may invoke either related emotional reactions (e.g. fury, anger, etc.) or the opposite reaction (pity) (Ungerer 1997: 309, 319). And, as we have seen, appraisal theory also suggests that emotional descriptions evoke evaluation, 'sympathetic or unsympathetic responses in the

reader/listener' (White 1998: 102). Thus two basic discourse functions of evaluations of MENTAL STATE: EMOTION have been identified by research: (1) to trigger emotional responses in readers, (2) to trigger positive or negative evaluations in readers. The first might be the case in the following examples:

- At a bookshop hit by the explosion a woman stood covered in blood, clutching her hand where the bones showed through. She was surrounded by *anxious* Iraqis. (Telegraph 2)
- 'If they can do that to the CIA and FBI, imagine what they can do to people like us,' one witness, who was too *scared* to give his name, said. (Times 2)
- One of his victims spoke *bitterly* of the death sentence he imposed on her. (Mail 3)
- *Devastated* Rio hits back (Mirror 10)

Here the emotional descriptions could give rise to emotional reactions of the readers. In the following examples, the triggering of evaluation seems more central (the potential evaluations are indicated in square brackets):

1. *Desperate* party chiefs instructed 50 constituency party chairmen to keep the applause going. (Mirror 1) [negative evaluation of Tory Party and Iain Duncan Smith]
2. Their website asks: 'Who do you favour leading the party into the next general election?' The *panic* move fuelled fresh murmurs over the leadership and overshadowed a performance which won mixed reviews in the conference hall. (Sun 1) [negative evaluation of Tory Party]
3. After a week of intrigue and conspiracy, the embattled Tory leader came out fighting with a *passion* and conviction never shown before and forged a powerful new bond with the party out in the country. (Mail 1) [positive evaluation of IDS]
4. Loyalists *scorn* arms surrender (Express 6) [negative evaluation of loyalists]
5. The *distress* of the high-ranking officers was shared by thousands of ordinary coppers across the nation. (Sun 7) [positive evaluation of policemen, who are described as being distressed by racism]
6. Urged by Dica, Deborah left her partner because she *could not stand* two-timing him. (Mirror 3) [positive evaluation of Deborah, because she is described as not being comfortable with cheating on her partner]

These examples suggest that although it is tempting to assume a correlation between positive emotions and positive evaluation (as in example 3) and negative emotions and negative evaluation (as in examples 1, 2, 4), this correlation is not automatic (as seen by examples 5, 6). Instead, the evaluation that may be evoked depends crucially on the context as well as the reader's position. In the following examples, positive emotions are a

reaction to behaviour that is evaluated negatively by the newspaper, resulting in a potential negative evaluation of the respective Sensors:

- Most *pleasing* to delegates was the *harsh* language directed personally against Tony Blair and his fantasy 'Blair World'. (Guardian 1)
- Iain Duncan Smith won a temporary reprieve yesterday as the Tory conference in Blackpool wrapped a security blanket around him and gave a *rapturous* response to his *scathing* personal attack on Tony Blair. (Independent 1)

Furthermore, evaluations of MENTAL STATE: EMOTION may not only be used to provoke emotional reactions or to trigger evaluations, they may also contribute to the news value of *facticity*, and the persuasive force of the news text: facts that involve attitudinal or emotional aspects are in fact 'better represented and memorized' (van Dijk 1988a: 85).

MENTAL STATE: (NON)VOLITION

Within evaluations of MENTAL STATE: (NON)VOLITION, we must first distinguish between VOLITION and NON-VOLITION. Evaluations of VOLITION seem to evoke either positive or, more frequently, negative evaluation:

- She *readily* admitted that she had been an escort herself and conceded that the meetings she arranged often led to sex. (Guardian 8)
- An asylum seeker who *deliberately* infected two lovers with the 'death sentence' Aids virus was behind bars last night as police warned: (Express 3)


Like *carefully-choreographed* (cf. 5.6), the modification of *admitted* by *readily* seems to work as a 'neutralizer' of the inherent negative emotivity of ADMIT. The usual assumption, that a statement was produced only reluctantly, is explicitly denied by *readily*, which might be said to render the whole verb phrase neutral, if not positive. In contrast, attributing purposefulness to Mohammed Dica in the act of infecting the two women with HIV can make him seem particularly 'evil' to some readers.

A completely different effect is achieved in the following example, especially on account of the different types of evaluation that occur in the context of the MENTAL STATE evaluation:

- England manager Sven Goran Eriksson was also *said to* [EVIDENTIALITY: HEARSAY/STYLE: NEUTRAL] be seething [*attributed* MENTAL STATE: EMOTION] about the decision. *But* [EXPECTEDNESS: CONTRAST] publicly he *would* [MENTAL STATE: VOLITION] *only* [EXPECTEDNESS: CONTRAST/COMPARISON] *say that* [EVIDENTIALITY: HEARSAY/STYLE: NEUTRAL] he would have to '*accept orders*' [EVIDENTIALITY: HEARSAY] and that Ferdinand's exclusion was '*a pity*' [EVIDENTIALITY: HEARSAY]. (Mail 10)

The effect of all this seems to be that although Eriksson's alleged emotional state (*seething*) is marked as based on hearsay (*said to*), its reliability is enhanced by the fact that Eriksson's statement (*he would have to 'accept orders' and that Ferdinand's exclusion was 'a pity'*) is embedded in an evaluative context of contrast and non-volition (*But publicly he would only say that*). Implicitly, it is suggested that Eriksson's statement does not reflect his 'true' feelings. The adverb *publicly* also contributes to this effect by showing the contrast between the public and the private world, implying that news actors 'say[] something quite different in public from what they were saying in private, which is the usual way to signal that what is being reported on is not to be taken too seriously' (Geis 1987: 109).

Let us now turn to evaluations of NON-VOLITION, which are significantly more frequent in the corpus. Here I have identified two sub-types: (1) instances where news actors do something against their will (I shall refer to this type as *unwilling acting*), (2) instances where news actors are unwilling to do something (and consequently do not do it) (I shall refer to this type as *refused acting*). The latter has two further sub-types, one where the journalist is involved, the other where s/he is not involved:



Unwilling acting

In this group, news actors are described as unwilling to do something, but as doing it anyway, against their will. Usually this is because they have no choice:

- Then just 72 hours after his heart scare, he found *himself drawn into* a last-minute wrangle in Belfast that ended in total deadlock. (Sun 6)
- So how did such an intelligent, cultivated and, in her youth, extremely attractive woman *end up* running the world's biggest international vice ring? (Mail 8)
- After a difficult week, Mr Duncan Smith was *forced to* devote a key part of his hour-long address to taking on his critics head-on. (Independent 1)
- But yesterday that so-called 'stunt' was causing shock waves throughout the police service as it was *forced to* face up to yet another racism crisis. (Independent 7)

Expressions such as *found himself drawn into* or *end up* can be related to the shifting of blame: in both cases the negative event referred to is not the

news actors' fault, since they arrive in this situation 'by accident' rather than by volition. However, the more important evaluator in this group is FORCE, which can imply two things: (1) the unwillingness of the one who is forced to do something, and (2) consequently, the negativity of the act for the person involved. This can trigger negative evaluation towards those that are forced to do something if what they are unwilling to do is considered as desirable by the reader. Depending on the reader's position, this may possibly be the case in these examples:

- Led by captain David Beckham, they tried to *force* the sport's chiefs to include 24-year-old Ferdinand in the squad for Saturday. (Mirror 10)
- CREDIT card companies are to be *forced to* give customers a fairer deal after the head of Barclays admitted that he would never borrow on his card because it was too expensive. (Times 4)
- Those found to have 'questionable attitudes' could be sacked – or *forced to* undertake remedial development. (Guardian 7)

If, however, the enforced action is not regarded as desirable by the reader, the effect can be different and FORCE can evoke sympathy with the news actor who is forced to do something, or negative evaluation of the human enforcers responsible:

- But yesterday that so-called 'stunt' was causing shock waves throughout the police service as it was *forced to* face up to yet another racism crisis. (Independent 7)
- After a difficult week, Mr Duncan Smith was *forced to* devote a key part of his hour-long address to taking on his critics head-on. (Independent 1)

In some cases, the negative evaluation of FORCE is so unequivocal and strong that the evaluator can be regarded as a signal of writer EMOTIVITY:

- Delegates were *forced to* rise to their feet 19 times to take part in 'spontaneous' standing ovations orchestrated by a small group of fanatics. (Mirror 1)
- The applause flowed thick and fast – but party stooges wearing earpieces, and strategically seated near the platform, kept leaping to their feet on cue. It *forced* a circle of supporters – including Shadow Cabinet rivals – to follow suit. In parts of the hall, there were clear signs of resentment. Scores of defiant delegates sat on their hands rather than be whipped into a mood of artificial enthusiasm. (Sun 1)

Clearly, the 'enforced' action is evaluated as undesirable rather than desirable in these examples – as indicated by the writer's use of evaluators in the context (e.g. the hedged 'spontaneous' and the negative emotivity of *orchestrated*, *fanatics* and *party stooges*), and the news actors ultimately responsible for this situation are consequently negatively evaluated.

Refused acting

In this group, news-actors are described as unwilling and refusing to do something. There are two sub-types: one of them involves the journalist and concerns reports of 'no comment' utterances, i.e. reactions to journalists' questions in interviews:

- Ferdinand's mother Janice *refused to* comment but lifelong friend Sevhan Zort said: . . . (Express 10)
- Trevor Rees Jones, the Princess's bodyguard who survived the crash but suffered terrible head injuries, *declined* yesterday to comment on the letter. (Express 5)
- Trinity Mirror, publisher of the *Daily Mirror*, *refused to* comment on reports that it had printed an extra 300,000 copies of the newspaper . . . (Independent 5)
- Washington pointedly *refrained from* commenting publicly . . . (Telegraph 9)

It has been pointed out by Clayman that such 'nonanswers' (Clayman 1990: 93) may trigger readers' inferences as to 'plausible explanations for the spokesperson's non-answering conduct. Depending on the reader's orientation, he or she may be predisposed to attribute worthy reasons to the action . . . or more sinister motives' (Clayman 1990: 96), in other words, the evoking of negative or positive evaluation. Like the 'null events' that were mentioned in Chapter 5.3 such reports may also provide a justification for newspapers as far as their choice of 'accessed voices' (Hartley 1982: 46) is concerned. They explain to readers why the affected news actors or more reliable sources are not quoted themselves.

To be distinguished from such 'nonanswers' is the second sub-type of *refused acting*, namely, descriptions relating to behaviour that does not concern reporter-source interaction. Here there is a distinction between unwillingness to say something (linguistic behaviour), unwillingness to mentally experience something (mental behaviour) and unwillingness to do something else (general behaviour):

- Chairman John McFall asked what they would call an 'excessive' interest rate. Most said 20 to 25 per cent. But Mr Barrett, 59, who earned £1.7 million last year, *refused to say*. (Sun 4) (linguistic behaviour)
- A carefully choreographed plan to revive the political process in Northern Ireland was in disarray last night after the Ulster Unionists *refused to accept* IRA assurances that it was putting its weapons beyond use. (Telegraph 6) (mental behaviour)
- The women in yesterday's case had both consented to intercourse with Dica, but had asked him to wear a condom. He had *refused*, claiming that he had had a vasectomy. . . . (Times 3) (general behaviour)

Generally speaking, it looks as if such evaluations have a potential to trigger negative evaluation, whether they comment on linguistic, mental or general behaviour. DECLINE, which is considered as more polite behaviour, has less of this potential than REFUSE. This potential can be activated by the context to greater and lesser degrees, although it may also depend on the reader's position. Thus, the 'preferred meaning' (Hall 1994: 207) of some examples is negative, determined by their evaluative context:

- An election due on May 1 was cancelled after the terrorist group *refused* to meet Mr Blair's demand for a clear declaration that its war was over. (FT 6)

However, there is no automatic correlation between refusal and negative evaluation: refusal to do something that is evaluated negatively by the writer is not connected to negative evaluation, but (if anything) to positive evaluation, as in the following example:

- Some delegates shook their heads and *refused* to rise to the orchestrated [RELIABILITY: FAKE/EMOTIVITY: NEGATIVE] applause. (Sun 1)

Distribution

Overall, evaluations of MENTAL STATE are quite important for the news story genre, making up 4.9 per cent of all evaluations in the corpus. As far as the frequency of the individual sub-values is concerned, the preferences are similar in both sub-corpora (disregarding the infrequent occurrence of evaluators of PROCESS, EXPECTATION, (LACK OF) KNOWLEDGE). Both broadsheets and tabloids prefer EMOTION to (NON-)VOLITION to STATE-OF-MIND to (DIS)BELIEF (in the broadsheets (NON)VOLITION and STATE-OF-MIND are equally important, however):




Figure 6.5 Evaluations of EMOTION, (NON)VOLITION, STATE-OF-MIND and (DIS)BELIEF

This, again, is explicable by reference to news values. According to the news value of *colour*, news stories should highlight emotionally relevant aspects, which accounts for the high frequency of MENTAL STATE: EMOTION. NON-(VOLITION), which is next frequent, can also be said to deal with emotional values (as is the case in appraisal theory). STATE-OF-MIND evaluations are next – they often overlap with evaluations of EMOTION. Together, these three make up 92.2 per cent (tabloids) and 90.3 per cent (broadsheets) of all MENTAL STATE evaluations respectively.

With respect to evaluations of EMOTION several interesting tendencies can be observed. Firstly, the number of negative emotions by far outweighs the number of positive emotions (excluding surprise and related notions, 20.9 per cent of all emotions are clearly positive, 63.6 per cent are clearly negative). This predominance of negative emotions is once again caused by the news value of *negativity*, which decides that it is the negative that is reported rather than the positive. This applies to both the broadsheets and the tabloids, although it is more important in the latter than in the former: 29 of 52 occurrences in the broadsheets refer to negative emotions (55.8 per cent), whereas in the tabloids 53 of 77 instances do so (68.8 per cent).

Secondly, where the usage of emotional descriptions in headlines and other prominent places is concerned, this is about twice as frequent in the tabloids than in the broadsheets. With respect to the broadsheets, it is predominantly the *Times* that employs emotional descriptions in such positions. This is congruent with the fact that the *Times* also employs the most emotional descriptions among the broadsheets in general (19 occurrences, compared to 15 in the *Guardian*, four in the *Financial Times*, eight in the *Independent* and six in the *Daily Telegraph*), and is thus, as far as evaluations of MENTAL STATE: EMOTION are concerned the closest to tabloid usage. Incidentally, this backs the suggestion by McLachlan and Golding that the *Times* 'is becoming more tabloid-like' (2000: 81).

Thirdly, the figures support the above-made assumption that surprise is quite an important emotion as far as the newspapers are concerned, as is reflected by the presence of no fewer than 20 evaluators in the corpus. If we consider the internal significance of this emotion, this is actually higher in the broadsheets (19.2 per cent) than in the tabloids (13 per cent). However, the tabloids do prefer the more 'intense' and more 'negative' lexical items SHOCK and STUN in contrast to the broadsheets which employ SURPRISE more frequently.

Finally, this sub-value is in general much more significant in the popular press than in the quality press, which is not altogether surprising. 41.9 per cent of all evaluations of MENTAL STATE in the broadsheets deal with emotions, compared to 60.2 per cent in the tabloids.

Concerning evaluations of NON-VOLITION, these are again more significant for the broadsheets (24.2 per cent of all evaluations of MENTAL STATE) than for the tabloids (17.2 per cent). On the whole, the higher frequency of MENTAL STATE: EMOTION in the tabloids is thus countered by a higher

frequency of MENTAL STATE: STATE-OF-MIND, BELIEF and NON-VOLITION in the broadsheets.

6.3 STYLE

As proposed in Appendix 4, the parameter of STYLE will only be discussed in connection with other parameters. We have already encountered quite a few combinations of STYLE with other evaluative parameters above, mostly those concerning EVIDENTIALITY. The remaining combinations both relate to RELIABILITY, if in different ways.

The combination of reliability and style

The combination of RELIABILITY and STYLE concerns a certain kind of hedge, and is roughly equivalent to the notion of *focus* in appraisal theory. The combination is different from most of the other parameters in that no sub-values are attached to it, and the contention that hedges can evaluate along these two parameters is not self-evident. This classification therefore warrants some elaboration: I here employ the term *hedge* in a definition which is partially based on Lakoff's (1972) original one:

A hedge is a particle, word, or phrase that modifies the degree of membership of a predicate or noun phrase in a set: it says of that membership that it is partial, or true only in certain respects, or that it is more true and complete than perhaps might be expected.

(Brown & Levinson 1987: 145)⁹

Hedges thus can be regarded as devices which express the speaker's view concerning the degree to which the verbal means s/he uses are suitable means of coding; they do not evaluate the propositional content of an utterance on its own, but rather the fit between language and experience in this particular utterance. They are best classified as metalinguistic devices that comment on the word-to-world fit of language, if we define *metalinguistic* as Haiman (1989) does: 'the purview of metalinguistic terms . . . is not the world of things but rather the relationship between linguistic labels and things' (1989: 132).

Focusing on the metalinguistic aspect of hedges, their classification along the STYLE parameter seems somewhat justified. However, hedges also appear to offer a comment on the reliability of the proposition (Biber and Finegan 1989: 98), precisely by problematizing the word-to-world fit. By commenting on the 'reliability' of language for coding experience, they may influence the speaker's evaluation of the reliability of the utterance as a whole. Arguably, they can function as 'metalinguistic markers of reliability', in other words as evaluations of RELIABILITY/STYLE.

Discourse functions

The hedges that occur in the corpus seem mainly to relate to emphasis (e.g. truly *international*), and are hence perhaps connected to what Holmes identifies as 'boosting' (Holmes 1984):

1. He [Iain Duncan Smith] said that Mr Blair was leading the 'most dishonest, corrupt and incompetent government of modern times' and *came close to* blaming him personally for the death in the summer of David Kelly, the Iraq weapons expert. (Telegraph 1)
2. And, as IDS sat down from his keynote speech, Chief Whip David Maclean *effectively* stoked mutiny rumours by calling rebels in for a 'career development interview'. (Sun 1)
3. It was written in October 1996, two months after the princess's divorce from Prince Charles and reveals a strikingly self-pitying, *not to say* paranoid, mindset not dissimilar to that on show in her Panorama interview a year earlier. (Guardian 5)
4. Hers [Margaret MacDonald's] was a *truly* international operation that embraced London, Rome, Vienna and the Riviera as well as Paris. (Mail 8)
5. Inside his shattered Muqataa, barely rebuilt from the last time Israeli tanks razed its outbuildings, a pale Mr Arafat yesterday occupied the same tiny suite of rooms where he has spent the last two years under *virtual* house arrest. (Times 9)
6. He [Iain Duncan Smith] repeatedly called Tony Blair a liar and *virtually* blamed him for the death of David Kelly; he labelled the Government corrupt; and for good measure he delivered a barely-veiled attack on Charles Kennedy's drinking habits. (Times 1)

In all of these examples, it seems to me that the hedge also draws attention to what it modifies, and in addition, hedges like *came close to*, *effectively* and *virtual*(ly) can be regarded as 'protection-shields' for the newspapers. Iain Duncan Smith for instance, cannot accuse the newspapers of saying that he blamed Tony Blair because they only described him as *virtually* doing so or as *coming close to* doing so. However, the use of these hedges allows the newspapers to explicitly mention this 'virtual' action, and hence to potentially evoke negative evaluation of Iain Duncan Smith.

Distribution

There are only six occurrences in the corpus (representing just 0.12 per cent of all evaluations), four of them in the broadsheets (0.15 per cent of all evaluations in this sub-corpus) and two of them in the tabloids (0.08 per cent of all evaluations) – too few to draw any general conclusions. It appears as if the use of such hedges is simply not regarded as part of the genre of the news story by journalists.

The combination of reliability, style and evidentiality

This combination also refers to certain kinds of hedges (however, of a different kind). Again, there are no sub-values involved. The kinds of hedges that are analysed here are the type of hedges that are mentioned by Stubbs as expressing writer commitment towards lexical items (Stubbs 1986: 4), for instance *so-called*, *what x (would) call*. In addition, however, they indicate HEARSAY and I will call them *hearsay hedges* to emphasize this aspect of their usage. It is important to distinguish between hedges such as *virtual*(ly) and hearsay hedges because they have very different discourse functions, as will be seen presently.

Discourse functions

There are three different kinds of hearsay hedges in the corpus: quotation marks (*'letter'*), *so-called* and 'WH-structures' (*what X call(s) Y*). All can express evaluative values ranging from distance to scepticism to disapproval, but it is often difficult to tell which of these is involved. The use of such hedges has been much commented upon both in journalistic guidebooks (Bagnall 1993: 170–172) and in linguistic research. For instance, Stubbs calls them markers of 'detachment' (Stubbs 1986: 13). They indicate that the meaning of the modified item is somehow problematic, and convey the speaker's group membership or his/her attitude towards the referent (Stubbs 1986: 13). In Sperber and Wilson's terms such hearsay hedges indicate that a lexical item is being 'mentioned' (Sperber and Wilson 1981: 556) (hence their classification as expressing HEARSAY). Quotation marks, for example, can be employed by writers to explicitly signal that the linguistic expression is not in fact their own, and may additionally imply criticism of or sarcasm towards either the source and/or the linguistic expression that is quoted (Haiman 1989, Weizman 1984). They are then sometimes described as 'scare' or 'snigger' quotes.

Examples from the corpus support these assumptions: the quotation marks express distance, scepticism or disapproval. The context gives us some clues as to their evaluative meaning, but this may also depend on the reader's attitude. The evaluative strength can be seen to vary from hedge to hedge so that there is a cline from the usage of quotation marks as 'mere' markers of HEARSAY to their usage as *hearsay hedges* expressing additional evaluation, ranging from distance to disapproval (pure hearsay markers are not listed):

- Mr Barrett was given a £1.3 million '*golden hello*' when he was poached from the Bank of Montreal in 1999. (Mail 4)
- One of Ms MacDonald's former '*escorts*', Axelle Guerin, who testified on her behalf, described the judgment as scandalous. (Independent 8)
- Although it employed a handful of men, her agency, which charged up to £800 per '*meeting*', was a 'partnership among women'. (Times 8)

- Diana '*plot*' terror (Sun 5)
- Star suffering '*mystery*' infection (Express 10)
- The '*ooh-la-la, those saucy French*' dimension to the story has also attracted British tabloid journalists to Paris in numbers not seen since the death of Princess Diana in a car crash in an underpass by the river Seine in 1997. (FT 8)
- Israeli planes launched their deepest raid into Syria in 30 years yesterday to attack a Palestinian '*terrorist training base*' north of Damascus in retaliation for the suicide bombing of a Haifa restaurant that left 19 people dead, including four children. (Guardian 9)
- But the bombing has also raised other questions about two of Mr Sharon's tactics in combating what he calls 'the terror' – the targeted killings of Palestinian fighters and the '*security fence*' carved through the West Bank. (Guardian 9)
- The United defender refused all entreaties to discuss how he had '*forgotten*' to take a drugs test on September 23 because he was moving house. (Telegraph 10)
- Delegates were forced to rise to their feet 19 times to take part in '*spontaneous*' standing ovations orchestrated by a small group of fanatics. (Mirror 1)
- It was dismissed by the Home Secretary on Sunday as a 'stunt' rather than a real news story. But yesterday that *so-called* 'stunt' was causing shock waves throughout the police service as it was forced to face up to yet another racism crisis. (Independent 7)

Some of these hedges seem to express distance without implying disapproval (e.g. '*golden hello*'), others indicate doubt as to the appropriateness of the label ('*escorts*', '*meeting*'), some may involve some disapproval or unreliability evaluation ('*plot*', '*mystery*', '*ooh-la-la, those saucy French*', '*terrorist training base*', '*security fence*', '*forgotten*') and still others are quite strongly negative and indicate high unreliability, expressing the writer's disapproval towards members of the Tory Party ('*spontaneous*') and the Home Secretary David Blunkett (*so-called*).

WH-structures (*what X calls Y*) have similar functions: They explicitly deny responsibility for the utterance, providing a subtle comment by the writer regarding the propriety of the utterance: 'This is what he said, but I do not know whether he was right or not' (Thompson 1994: 52). Depending on the reporting verb employed, the attitude may be more negative (Thompson 1994: 52). It also seems as if the attitude that is being expressed may depend on whether direct or indirect attribution follows, with direct attribution being more negative than indirect attribution. This is because the quotation marks that are used for indicating direct speech may be interpreted as additional distancing devices:

- But he said these were just a curtain raiser for *what he branded* the Prime Minister's 'blackest act'. (Independent 1)

- But the bombing has also raised other questions about two of Mr Sharon's tactics in combating *what he calls* 'the terror' – the targeted killings of Palestinian fighters and the 'security fence' carved through the West Bank. (Guardian 9)
- And he highlighted *what he described* as Mr Blair's 'blackest act' – using Dr David Kelly as 'a pawn in its battle with the BBC'. (Mail 1)

Such relative clauses are used in order to incorporate attributed propositions as direct objects or as prepositional complements. They provide writers with a concise way of doing so, relating to the news value of *brevity*. At the same time the hearsay hedges mark the attribution very explicitly as HEARSAY and distance the writer from it. In a sense, it can be argued that the evaluation depends on the reader's 'internal or "imagined" prosodic prominence' (Quirk *et al.* 1985: 1355) of the hearsay hedge: *What 'HE calls* ... seems intuitively more sceptical than *What he 'CALLS*.

Distribution

In total, there are 31 hearsay hedges in the whole corpus (making up 0.6 per cent of all evaluations in the corpus), 20 in the broadsheets (0.8 per cent of all evaluations in this sub-corpus) and 11 in the tabloids (0.4 per cent).

In both sub-corpora quotation marks are used more frequently as hearsay hedges than WH-structures. There are no significant differences between the tabloids and the broadsheets here:




Figure 6.6 Evaluators of RELIABILITY/STYLE/EVIDENTIALITY

Roughly 60 per cent of all hearsay hedges are quotation marks, compared to about 36 per cent WH-structures. The preference for these two types of hearsay hedges may be explained by the fact that they are ambiguous as to their evaluative meaning. As mentioned previously, there is a cline

between simple markers of HEARSAY and such hearsay *hedges*. Moreover, quotation marks and attributing expressions are, in general (i.e. in their other usages) very frequent in the corpus.

Notes

1. Since it is not always possible to say whether quotation marks indicate HEARSAY or MINDSAY I have classified all quoted speech as HEARSAY. Presumably the conventional expectation is that such explicitly quoted utterances have in fact been uttered by Sayers.
2. This is a reason why research often classifies evidentiality as a special sub-category of epistemic modality (e.g. Palmer 1995a, Willett 1988, Bybee *et al.* 1994, Perkins 1983: 81) or simply as overlapping with epistemic modality (Bybee and Fleischman 1995b: 4, Anderson 1986: 308ff). Even those that distinguish between epistemic modality and evidentiality (de Haan 1999, Nuyts 2001a, Palmer 2001) state that there are intricate relations between the two concepts, that they are not easily differentiated (Nuyts 2001a: 28) and 'not always wholly distinct' (Palmer 2001: 24). These assumptions are taken account of in my evaluative framework by the analysis of most evidential expressions as evaluations of EVIDENTIALITY/RELIABILITY.
3. Examples such as *tests found* and *tests confirmed* are close to attribution, and also very similar to evaluations of PERCEPTION (*tests revealed/showed*). There is no clear-cut distinction between these evaluators.
4. *Looks likely* is a collocation and probably one unit of meaning, as well as rather delexicalized. Likewise SEEM co-occurs with reliability adjectives such as LIKELY, UNLIKELY, and POSSIBLE in academic discourse. Such instances can be regarded as 'doubly marked' evaluation (Biber *et al.* 1999: 441).
5. Note that APPARENTLY has two possible meanings:
 - 1 You use **apparently** to indicate that the information you are giving is something that you have heard, but you are not certain that it is true: *Apparently the girls are not at all amused by the whole business.*
 - 2 You use **apparently** to refer to something that seems to be true, although you are not sure whether it is or not: *The recent deterioration has been caused by an apparently endless recession.* (COBUILD, underlining mine)

APPARENTLY¹ expresses EVIDENTIALITY: HEARSAY/STYLE: NEUTRAL (like ACCORDING TO)/RELIABILITY: MEDIAN (more reliable than ALLEGEDLY, less reliable than POINT OUT). APPARENTLY² expresses EVIDENTIALITY: PERCEPTION/RELIABILITY: MEDIAN. This explains why APPARENTLY has alternatively been classified in the literature as involving hearsay (Chafe 1986: 268, Thompson 1994: 20) or perception (Greenbaum 1969: 204). In fact the two meanings often shade into each other and it is only the reader's common sense and the context that

distinguish them. APPARENTLY¹ is not discussed in this section but in the chapter on EVIDENTIALITY/STYLE/RELIABILITY.

6. REVELATION (REVEAL) has not been classified as an evaluator of EXPECTEDNESS: although it implies that the information is new, it does not always imply that the information is completely unexpected. Even though one of its meanings does express unexpectedness, it is difficult to tell which of its meanings is involved in a given occurrence (COBUILD):
 - 1 A **revelation** is a surprising or interesting fact that is made known to people.
 - 2 The **revelation** of something is the act of making it known.
7. I have listed only those usages of CLAIM that express LOW RELIABILITY. However, there are two additional occurrences of CLAIM which express HIGH RELIABILITY (in the context of supporting evidence), which would make CLAIM the most frequent evaluator in the tabloids, if they were included.
8. Expectation might possibly also be classified as a kind of belief, but it seems worth treating it in its own right. Throughout this book I have argued for a special status of expectedness – hence to include expectation as BELIEF would have been counter-intuitive. There is a cline between BELIEF and EMOTION in that HOPE THAT, FEAR THAT, and OPTIMISTIC THAT arguably also involve belief to some extent.
9. In this sense, *hedge* corresponds only roughly to Prince *et al.*'s term 'approximator' (Prince *et al.* 1982: 85), but *hedging* (Chapter 3) corresponds more or less to what they define as 'shields' (Prince *et al.* 1982: 85). Shields and approximators have little in common, they say (Prince *et al.* 1982: 86). Channell (1994) calls approximators such as ABOUT instances of vague language. In my analysis I make a different suggestion (distinguishing *hearsay hedges* from *hedges*, and distinguishing both from *hedging*), and have excluded certain kinds of approximators, like ALMOST and ABOUT (as well as other expressions of vague language such as the usage of *estimated* in examples like *an estimated £500,000 advance*), if they do not evaluate along any of the parameters proposed. Lexical expressions such as *almost* can either be used as *hedges* (to comment on the word-to-world fit (*He is almost a linguist* in the sense of *according to my view, he is a kind of linguist*) but, more often, they indicate that a number is near the maximum pole of a given scale (*He waited almost 2 months*). The latter usage has nothing to do with category membership or word-to-world fit as defined here.

Part Three

Empirical and theoretical issues

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7 Evaluation: broadsheets vs. tabloids

The individual descriptive results of the study of (combinations of) evaluative parameters in the British press were summarized in the relevant sections of Chapters 5 and 6. Consequently, I want to provide only a ‘broad brush’ account of those results which allow to some degree the generalization from the corpus at hand to an overall difference in the evaluative style of British tabloid and broadsheet publications.

7.1 Evaluative parameters: differences and similarities

Let us first have a look at the evaluative parameters which are the most important in the whole corpus. In Table 7.1 I have ordered these in terms of their apparent significance for the news story genre:

Table 7.1 Distribution of parameters in the corpus

Parameter	% of all evaluations
EVIDENTIALITY/STYLE	32
EVIDENTIALITY	21.7
EMOTIVITY ¹	11.7
EXPECTEDNESS	9.5
MENTAL STATE	4.9
RELIABILITY	3.9
EVIDENTIALITY/MENTAL STATE	3.6
IMPORTANCE	2.4
EVIDENTIALITY/STYLE/RELIABILITY	2.2
EVIDENTIALITY/RELIABILITY	1.9
EVIDENTIALITY/MENTAL STATE/RELIABILITY	1.7
EVIDENTIALITY/STYLE/EMOTIVITY/RELIABILITY	1.1
RELIABILITY/STYLE/EVIDENTIALITY	0.6
COMPREHENSIBILITY	0.58
RELIABILITY/EMOTIVITY	0.35

Table 7.1—*continued*

Parameter	% of all evaluations
EMOTIVITY/IMPORTANCE	0.33
COMPREHENSIBILITY/RELIABILITY	0.23
EVIDENTIALITY/STYLE/EMOTIVITY	0.23
POSSIBILITY/NECESSITY	0.23
EXPECTEDNESS/EMOTIVITY	0.23
EVIDENTIALITY/STYLE/COMPREHENSIBILITY	0.21
RELIABILITY/STYLE	0.12
RELIABILITY/MENTAL STATE/EMOTIVITY	0.06
EXPECTEDNESS/IMPORTANCE	0.06
EVIDENTIALITY/RELIABILITY/EMOTIVITY	0.02
MENTAL STATE/COMPREHENSIBILITY	0.02
RELIABILITY/IMPORTANCE	0.02

As can be seen from this table (and compare also Appendix 5), some (combinations of) parameters occur very infrequently (fewer than 30 occurrences). These parameters are clearly negligible as far as the news story genre is concerned. The main basis for the comparison of the two sub-corpora is therefore the occurrences of just fourteen (combinations of) evaluative parameters, whose distribution is shown in Figure 7.1:




Figure 7.1 Representative evaluative parameters in the corpus

It must be pointed out that there are both similarities between the broadsheets and the tabloids (relating to the fact that they both belong to the same genre) and differences (concerning their aims and readerships).

Concerning the internal order of frequency of these fourteen parameters in the two sub-corpora, the differences concern only the less frequent parameters (the numbers in brackets refer to the percentage of all evaluations in the respective sub-corpus made up by the individual evaluations):

Broadsheets	Tabloids
1. EV/ST (32.7)	1. EV/ST (31.3)
2. EV (21.5)	2. EV (22)
3. E (9.8)	3. E (13.6)
4. EX (9.7)	4. EX (9.3)
5. MS (4.7)	5. MS (5.1)
6. R (4.2)	6. R (3.6)
7. EV/MS (3.7)	7. EV/MS (3.4)
8. EV/ST/R (2.4)	8. I (2.7)
9. EV/R (2.4)	9. EV/ST/R (1.9)
10. I (2.2)	10. EV/MS/R (1.8)
11. EV/MS/R (1.7)	11. EV/R (1.3)
12. EV/ST/E/R (1.1)	12. EV/ST/E/R (1.1)
13. R/ST/EV (0.8)	13. R/ST/EV (0.4)
14. C (0.7)	14. C (0.4)

The most significant parameters (where no differences in the order of frequency can be found) are clearly related to the genre of newspaper reportage and its aims:

- news is embedded speech (the parameters EVIDENTIALITY/STYLE, EVIDENTIALITY and EVIDENTIALITY/MENTAL STATE are used for attribution)
- newspapers express a certain emotive stance on events they are reporting in order to attract readers (EMOTIVITY)
- news is concerned with what contrasts with the norm and with what is unexpected (EXPECTEDNESS)
- references to news actors' mental states are supposed to catch the attention of readers (MENTAL STATE)
- news stories use evaluations of RELIABILITY to make predictions as well as to mitigate assertions.

Regarding the *differences* in the internal order, three main points can be made:

- EVIDENTIALITY/STYLE/RELIABILITY (ALLEGGE, REVEAL, etc.) is slightly more important to the broadsheets, whereas IMPORTANCE (TOP, VITAL, etc.) is slightly more significant in the tabloids.
- Evaluations of EVIDENTIALITY/MENTAL STATE/RELIABILITY are more

important for the tabloids, and evaluations of RELIABILITY/STYLE/EVIDENTIALITY (hearsay hedges) are slightly more significant in the broadsheets.

- Evaluations of EVIDENTIALITY/RELIABILITY (APPARENTLY, AUDIBLY, etc.) are more important in the broadsheets than in the tabloids.

If we compare the frequencies in the table on page 191 directly, and also take into account the differences in the sub-values of some of these parameters (cf. the respective sections of Chapters 5 and 6) it becomes possible to speak of a distinctive *evaluative style* of British tabloids and broadsheets, which can be summarized as follows (Table 7.2):

Table 7.2 The evaluative style of British tabloids and broadsheets

Parameters	Broadsheets	Tabloids
<i>Core evaluative parameters</i>		
COMPREHENSIBILITY	(+)	(-)
EMOTIVITY	-	+
EXPECTEDNESS	(+)	(-)
EXPECTEDNESS: UNEXPECTED	-	+
EXPECTEDNESS: CONTRAST/COMPARISON	+	-
IMPORTANCE	(-)	(+)
RELIABILITY	+	-
RELIABILITY: LOW	+	-
<i>Peripheral evaluative parameters</i>		
EVIDENTIALITY	(-)	(+)
EVIDENTIALITY/RELIABILITY	+	-
EVIDENTIALITY/STYLE	(+)	(-)
EVIDENTIALITY/STYLE/RELIABILITY	+	-
EVIDENTIALITY/MENTAL STATE	(+)	(-)
MENTAL STATE	(-)	(+)
MENTAL STATE: EMOTION	-	+
RELIABILITY/STYLE/EVIDENTIALITY	(+)	(-)

(In this table + stands for ‘internally more important/significant’, - stands for ‘internally less important/significant’; (+) and (-) stand for *small* differences in the two sub-corpora. The parameters marked - or (-) can still be important compared to other parameters; for instance, EVIDENTIALITY is the second most frequent parameter in the broadsheets.)

Starting with the *core evaluative parameters* we find that there are slightly more evaluations of COMPREHENSIBILITY (Chapter 5.1) in the broadsheets than in the tabloids. As pointed out, these are all evaluations of COMPREHENSIBILITY: INCOMPREHENSIBLE, perhaps explicable by the fact that it is not as important for the quality press as it is for the popular press to deliver

what seems to be a story without gaps or any missing information (related to the news value of *unambiguity*). In contrast, evaluations of EMOTIVITY (5.2) are more frequent in the tabloids, no matter how emotive meaning is calculated, and such evaluations – if they occur – are also more inexplicit in the broadsheets. With the parameter of EXPECTEDNESS (5.3), two main contrasts become apparent: evaluations of EXPECTEDNESS: UNEXPECTED are more important for the tabloids (related to the news value of *unexpectedness*), whereas evaluations of CONTRAST/COMPARISON (less explicitly evaluative) are more significant in the broadsheets. The higher frequency of the parameter of IMPORTANCE (5.4) in the tabloids seems to derive from the fact that the news value of *eliteness* is more important for them than for the broadsheets (whereas evaluations of IMPORTANCE in connection with the news value of *attribution* are more frequent in the broadsheets). With respect to RELIABILITY: LOW, we must in fact look at all combinations of evaluative parameters that involve this sub-value:

Table 7.3 Evaluative combinations involving RELIABILITY: LOW

Parameter	Broadsheets	Tabloids
sub-value	RELIABILITY: LOW	RELIABILITY: LOW
C/R	–	1 (0.04 %)
EV/MS/R	27 (1 %)	22 (0.9 %)
EV/R	2 (0.08 %)	–
EV/R/E	–	–
EV/ST/E/R	–	–
EV/ST/R	42 (1.6 %)	21 (0.8 %)
R	46 (1.7 %)	38 (1.5 %)
R/E	–	–
R/I	–	–
all	117	82
%	4.4% (of 2,639)	3.3% (of 2,518)

As becomes apparent, evaluations of LOW RELIABILITY are in all cases more important for the broadsheets, reflecting the fact that they tend to mitigate their assertions more than the tabloids.

Moving on to the *peripheral evaluative parameters* now, the parameter of EVIDENTIALITY (6.1) is actually almost equally important in both the popular and the quality press – they are only very slightly more frequent in the tabloids (seeming to relate to a very slight higher proportion of quoted speech in the latter). The parameter of EVIDENTIALITY/RELIABILITY (6.1), on the other hand, is of greater importance to the quality press, which uses them partly to mitigate their statements. Concerning EVIDENTIALITY/STYLE (6.1.1) the differences between the two types of newspapers are again very small, but such evaluations are slightly more frequent in the

broadsheets, which appear to use more attributing expressions to introduce quoted speech than the tabloids. With the parameter of EVIDENTIALITY/STYLE/RELIABILITY (6.1.1), the higher frequency of this parameter in the broadsheets seems to be derived from their usage as expressing LOW RELIABILITY, again related to mitigation. With EVIDENTIALITY/MENTAL STATE (6.1.2) and MENTAL STATE (6.2), the most important finding is that in both cases the sub-value EMOTION is much more significant in the tabloids than in the broadsheets. Finally, RELIABILITY/STYLE/EVIDENTIALITY ('hearsay hedges', 6.3) is more frequent in the quality press than in the popular press, perhaps explicable by the suggestion that they are ambiguous as to their evaluative meaning and rather inexplicit markers of evaluation.

To sum up these findings very roughly, we can say that the evaluative style of broadsheet newspapers is characterized especially by its preference for mitigation and negation, whereas the evaluative style of tabloid newspapers is particularly marked by its expression of EMOTIVITY and unexpectedness as well as by its frequent references to emotion. Furthermore, as has become apparent during the analysis (even though it was not quantified), the tabloids are characterized by the intensity and explicitness of their evaluations, and a general preference for exaggeration and 'drama'.

In order to provide an exemplification of this difference in evaluative style, and simultaneously point out some limitations of a purely distributive analysis, let us look at the following illustrative analyses of a longer section of one text each from the tabloids and the broadsheets. With both of these stories, most readers will intuitively recognize that they are highly evaluative, but only a linguistic framework allows us to say why this is so and how it comes about. Here is the analysis of the beginning of the 'IDS' story in the *Guardian*:

- 1 Party critics told to [EVIDENTIALITY: HEARSAY/STYLE: ILLOCUTIONARY] put up or shut up after Duncan Smith wins [EMOTIVITY: POSITIVE] time with aggressive [MENTAL STATE: STATE-OF-MIND] speech
- 2 No [EXPECTEDNESS: CONTRAST/COMPARISON] more Mr Quiet Man [EMOTIVITY: NEGATIVE]
Michael White, political editor
- 3 Senior [IMPORTANCE: IMPORTANT] Conservatives last night launched a ferocious [MENTAL STATE: STATE-OF-MIND] counteroffensive against Iain Duncan Smith's party critics after unanimously proclaiming [EVIDENTIALITY: HEARSAY/STYLE: ILLOCUTIONARY] their leader's Blackpool conference speech to be the decisive triumph they had demanded.
- 4 The Tory chief whip, David Maclean, took the initiative against dissidents whose threats to [EVIDENTIALITY: HEARSAY/STYLE: ILLOCUTIONARY] trigger a leadership crisis have dominated the conference week.

- 5 The former treasury minister, John Maples, and four other suspects are to [RELIABILITY: HIGH] be summoned to Mr Maclean's office for a 'career development interview' [EVIDENTIALITY: HEARSAY] and told to shut up, ship out to their City jobs or put up a candidate to test Mr Duncan Smith's true level of support against their own.
- 6 But [EXPECTEDNESS: CONTRAST] such rallying talk will [RELIABILITY: HIGH] not [EXPECTEDNESS: CONTRAST/COMPARISON] disguise the fact that [RELIABILITY: HIGH] Mr Duncan Smith's speech in which he told [EVIDENTIALITY: HEARSAY/STYLE: NEUTRAL] plotters [EMOTIVITY: NEGATIVE] in the hall that the choice is him or Tony Blair – 'there is no third way' [EVIDENTIALITY: HEARSAY] – has won [EMOTIVITY: POSITIVE] him only [EXPECTEDNESS: CONTRAST/COMPARISON] enough time to regroup and see if the flatlining opinion polls improve.
- 7 The Tory leader's more polished [EMOTIVITY: POSITIVE] performance delighted [MENTAL STATE: EMOTION] the party faithful inside the Empress Ballroom, earning him a climactic [IMPORTANCE: IMPORTANT] 12-minute ovation.
- 8 His attacks [EVIDENTIALITY: HEARSAY/STYLE: ILLOCUTIONARY] on Labour's high taxation, bureaucracy and policy on Europe were also rewarded with 17 standing ovations as the speech was delivered.
- 9 Most pleasing [MENTAL STATE: EMOTION] to delegates was the harsh [EMOTIVITY: NEGATIVE] language directed personally [EMOTIVITY: NEGATIVE] against Tony Blair and his fantasy 'Blair World' [EVIDENTIALITY: HEARSAY].
- 10 Deploying 11 pejorative adjectives against 'the most corrupt, dishonest and incompetent government of modern times', [EVIDENTIALITY: HEARSAY] Mr Duncan Smith accused [EVIDENTIALITY: HEARSAY/STYLE: ILLOCUTIONARY] the prime minister of 'a lie' [EVIDENTIALITY: HEARSAY] over his direct responsibility for the 'outing' [EVIDENTIALITY: HEARSAY] of the weapons inspector, David Kelly.
- 11 In a judgment the Hutton inquiry is unlikely to [RELIABILITY: LOW] endorse, Mr Duncan Smith urged [EVIDENTIALITY: HEARSAY/STYLE: ILLOCUTIONARY] Mr Blair to resign.
- 12 'He won't of course, he won't do the decent thing, he never does,' [EVIDENTIALITY: HEARSAY] he added [EVIDENTIALITY: HEARSAY/STYLE: DISCOURSE SIGNALLING].
- 13 In a reference to last year's much-mocked [EMOTIVITY: NEGATIVE] self-description, the Tory leader also told [EVIDENTIALITY: HEARSAY/STYLE: NEUTRAL] his own party critics: 'The quiet man is here to stay and he's turning up the volume' [EVIDENTIALITY: HEARSAY] – though [EXPECTEDNESS: CONTRAST] at times he spoke in a near-whisper.

(Guardian 1)

Some basic evaluative tendencies of this text become apparent:

- It is dominated by evaluations of EVIDENTIALITY: HEARSAY and EVIDENTIALITY/STYLE, reflecting simply its status as a news text that is based on news actors' utterances.
- Next most frequent are explicit evaluations of EMOTIVITY (mostly NEGATIVE), which are predominantly directed against Iain Duncan Smith (*Mr Quiet Man, harsh language directed personally against Tony Blair, much-mocked*).
- Apart from the *explicit* evaluations of NEGATIVE EMOTIVITY other utterances with evaluations (mostly involving EXPECTEDNESS) can be said to *evoke* such EMOTIVITY: (6) *but such rallying talk will not disguise the fact that*, (11) *in a judgment the Hutton inquiry is unlikely to endorse* and (13) *the Tory leader also told his own party critics: 'The quiet man is here to stay and he's turning up the volume' – though at times he spoke in a near-whisper*.

Let us now look at the tabloid text reporting the same story:

- 1 GRRRRR!
- 2 IDS GETS TOUGH.
- 3 Nobody [EXPECTEDNESS: CONTRAST/COMPARISON] scared [MENTAL STATE: EMOTION]
- By James Hardy, Political Editor
- 4 He gritted his teeth and tried his best to sound tough, but [EXPECTEDNESS: CONTRAST] the hardman image didn't quite work [EMOTIVITY: NEGATIVE] for Iain Duncan Smith yesterday.
- 5 What was meant to be [EVIDENTIALITY: MINDSAY/MENTAL STATE: VOLITION] a roar turned into a bore [EMOTIVITY: NEGATIVE] as he delivered the longest speech in modern political history.
- 6 The Tory leader droned on [EMOTIVITY: NEGATIVE] for an hour and two minutes as the Tory conference in Blackpool limped [EMOTIVITY: NEGATIVE] to a painful [EMOTIVITY: NEGATIVE] finale.
- 7 Delegates were forced to [EMOTIVITY: NEGATIVE] rise to their feet 19 times to take part in 'spontaneous' [RELIABILITY/STYLE/EVIDENTIALITY: HEARSAY HEDGE] standing ovations orchestrated [RELIABILITY: FAKE/EMOTIVITY: NEGATIVE] by a small group of fanatics [EMOTIVITY: NEGATIVE].
- 8 Desperate [MENTAL STATE: EMOTION] party chiefs instructed [EVIDENTIALITY: HEARSAY/STYLE: ILLOCUTIONARY] 50 constituency party chairmen to keep the applause going.
- 9 Mr Duncan Smith spent most of the time staring at his own feet – because the autocue was bizarrely [EXPECTEDNESS: UNEXPECTED] at floor level.
- 10 He claimed [EVIDENTIALITY: HEARSAY/STYLE: ILLOCUTIONARY/RELIABILITY: LOW] he would see off critics and lead the party back into power.

- 11 'The quiet man is here to stay and he's turning up the volume,' [EVIDENTIALITY: HEARSAY] he declared [EVIDENTIALITY: HEARSAY/STYLE: ILLOCUTIONARY] in his most menacing [EMOTIVITY: NEGATIVE] croak [EMOTIVITY: NEGATIVE].
 - 12 He added [EVIDENTIALITY: HEARSAY/STYLE: DISCOURSE SIGNALING]: 'We must destroy this double dealing, deceitful, incompetent, shallow, inefficient, ineffective, corrupt, mendacious, fraudulent, shameful, lying Government once and for all.' [EVIDENTIALITY: HEARSAY]
 - 13 And he urged [EVIDENTIALITY: HEARSAY/STYLE: ILLOCUTIONARY] his critics: 'Don't work for Tony Blair, get on board or get out of our way for we have got work to do.' [EVIDENTIALITY: HEARSAY]
 - 14 Delegates cheered and clapped as he railed [EVIDENTIALITY: HEARSAY/STYLE: ILLOCUTIONARY/EMOTIVITY: NEGATIVE] against Europe, asylum seekers, taxes, the NHS and the school system.
 - 15 But [EXPECTEDNESS: CONTRAST] some visibly [EVIDENTIALITY: PERCEPTION/RELIABILITY: HIGH] flinched [MENTAL STATE: EMOTION] as he stooped to [EMOTIVITY: NEGATIVE] gutter [EMOTIVITY: NEGATIVE] politics with vicious [EMOTIVITY: NEGATIVE] personal attacks [EMOTIVITY: NEGATIVE] on political opponents.
 - 16 He said [EVIDENTIALITY: HEARSAY/STYLE: NEUTRAL] that after the death of weapons expert Dr David Kelly 'Tony Blair said he'd had nothing to do with his public naming. That was a lie.
'He chaired the meetings that made the fatal decisions. He is responsible. He should do the decent thing and resign.'
[EVIDENTIALITY: HEARSAY]
 - 17 One delegate muttered [EVIDENTIALITY: HEARSAY/STYLE: PARALINGUISTIC]: 'Like you.' [EVIDENTIALITY: HEARSAY]
- (Mirror 1)

In the tabloid text, the main evaluative tendencies are:

- Explicit evaluations of NEGATIVE EMOTIVITY are clearly of the greatest significance in the tabloid text and more frequent even than in the broadsheet text; at times, up to three or four such evaluations occur in the same sentence (6, 7, 15) and there are no evaluations of POSITIVE EMOTIVITY.
- Many of the other evaluations have the potential to evoke negative evaluation in their context. Examples are the expression of the contrast between what the speech *was meant to be* and what it turned out to be (5), the contrast between what Iain Duncan Smith tried to achieve, and the fact that it 'didn't work' (4), the contrast between Iain Duncan Smith 'getting tough' and 'nobody being scared' (2, 3), the hearsay hedge (7), the MENTAL STATE evaluations in (8) and (15), the evaluation of EXPECTEDNESS in (9) and the evaluation of EVIDENTIALITY: HEARSAY/STYLE: PARALINGUISTIC in (17). Furthermore, an evaluation

of EVIDENTIALITY/STYLE/RELIABILITY evaluates Iain Duncan Smith's utterance in (10) as potentially unreliable.

Although it can thus be demonstrated that both newspapers express a negative stance towards Iain Duncan Smith (and clearly do not aim at 'objective' reporting), their means of achieving this stance are different: the negative evaluations are much more explicit and more frequent in the tabloid text than in the broadsheet text, exemplifying the findings of the frequency analysis undertaken above. The textual analysis also suggests that the clustering of evaluation might be more frequent in the popular press than in the quality press.

The analysis of the texts also demonstrates again the important evaluative potential of contrasts, and the significance of the notion of evoked evaluation. As White (2002) notes, to exclude evoked evaluation 'mean[s] that much of the evaluative work being done by texts would simply be missed out' (White 2002: 6). Although such evoked evaluations were encountered many times during the textual analysis they could not justifiably be included in the frequency analysis because no valid methodology exists to ascertain that their analysis is objective enough.

7.2 Evaluation and news content

Another interesting question concerns the connection between evaluation and news content. Looking at the topics covered in the corpus it becomes clear that some stories contain only about 50 evaluations per 1,000 words ('Iraq' story) whereas others contain as many as 89–99 ('IDS' story):

Table 7.4 Distribution of evaluations according to news story

Topic	Broadsheets			Tabloids		
	Evaluations	word count	per 1,000 words	Evaluations	word count	per 1,000 words
Barclays	173	2,649	65	193	2,407	80.2
Diana	308	4,754	64.8	332	4,695	70.7
HIV	193	2,308	83.6	372	4,016	92.6
IDS	408	4,570	89.3	308	3,104	99.2
IRA	327	4,008	81.6	176	2,111	83.4
Iraq	179	3,459	51.7	93	1,884	49.4
Israel	244	3,551	68.7	170	2,475	68.7
Prostitution	250	3,908	64	282	3,766	74.9
Racism	286	3,958	72.3	281	3,138	89.5
Rio	271	4,239	63.9	312	5,200	60

If we establish an internal rank order of the stories in terms of the number of evaluations they contain, it becomes apparent that the differences between the tabloids and the broadsheets are rather insignificant:

Broadsheets	Tabloids
1. IDS	1. IDS
2. HIV	2. HIV
3. IRA	3. Racism
4. Racism	4. IRA
5. Israel	5. Barclays
6. Barclays	6. Prostitution
7. Diana	7. Diana
8. Prostitution	8. Israel
9. Rio	9. Rio
10. Iraq	10. Iraq

As can be seen from this list there are no differences concerning the most evaluative (IDS, HIV) and the least evaluative (Rio, Iraq) news stories. With respect to those stories where the popular press differs from the quality press we can find contrasting tendencies: in the broadsheets it is the 'political' stories (IRA, Israel) that contain more evaluations, whereas in the tabloids it is the 'human-interest' stories (Racism, Prostitution) that contain more evaluations. However, these tendencies are not strong enough to warrant general conclusions. The fact that even where the tabloids differ from the broadsheets the differences are mostly not very great (IRA: third place broadsheets – fourth place tabloids; Racism: third place tabloids – fourth place broadsheets; Barclays: sixth place broadsheets – fifth place tabloids; Prostitution: eighth place broadsheets – sixth place tabloids) seems to suggest instead a high dependence of evaluation on topic.

What are the potential reasons for this correlation? A possibility is the degree of newsworthiness of a particular news story; as seen from the analyses above, many of the evaluations contribute to the newsworthiness of a story. We might thus expect that a story that is inherently rather newsworthy contains fewer evaluations than a story that is less newsworthy. In my view there are at least two indicators for newsworthiness: space and position. Consequently, we can assign a rank of newsworthiness to all of the news stories in terms of space (i.e. number of words as automatically calculated) and position (page number), and a combined rank of newsworthiness that takes into account both of these factors. Table 7.5 provides a comparison of the news stories in terms of these aspects and compares newsworthiness with evaluation.²

Table 7.5 Newsworthiness and evaluation

Rank in terms of size			Rank in terms of position		Combined rank of newsworthiness		Rank in terms of evaluations		
Broadsheets		Tabloids	Broadsheets		Tabloids		Broadsheets		Tabloids
1	Diana	Racism	IRA	Diana	IDS	Diana	IDS	IDS	
2	IDS	Rio	IDS	Barclays	IRA	Rio	HIV	HIV	
3	Rio	Diana	Israel	Rio	Diana	Racism	IRA	Racism	
4	IRA	HIV	Rio/Racism	Israel	Rio	Barclays	Racism	IRA	
5	Prostitution	Prostitution	HIV/Diana/ Barclays	IDS	Israel/Racism	HIV/Israel/ IDS	Israel	Barclays	
6	Racism	IDS	Iraq	Racism	Prostitution	Prostitution	Barclays	Prostitution	
7	Israel	Israel	Prostitution	HIV	Barclays/Iraq	IRA	Diana	Diana	
8	Iraq	Barclays		IRA	HIV	Iraq	Prostitution	Israel	
9	Barclays	IRA		Iraq			Rio	Rio	
10	HIV	Iraq		Prostitution			Iraq	Iraq	

As becomes evident, there are no clear correlations between newsworthiness and the number of evaluations per story, no matter how newsworthiness is calculated. The initial hypothesis of a correlation between inherent newsworthiness and evaluation must thus clearly be dismissed, and the relationship between topic and evaluation must be regarded as more complex. It appears as if the correlation between topic and evaluation may have a number of possible reasons: for instance, a purely political story like the news story about Iain Duncan Smith allows the newspapers to express their own political stance through evaluations – moreover, Iain Duncan Smith was generally very much disliked by the British press. The high level of evaluation in the ‘HIV story’, on the other hand, can be explained by the fact that Mohammed Dica was officially declared ‘guilty’ (i.e. convicted by a court) and is thus perhaps allowed to be evaluated negatively, because his guilt is regarded as an ‘objective’ fact. The low level of evaluation in the ‘Rio Ferdinand story’, on the other hand, might best be explained by reference to the hypothesis that sports stories in general attract fewer evaluations than political and human interest stories, but this remains speculative. Where the Iraq story is concerned it seems that the reported event (a bombing in Iraq) can be described with much ‘disaster vocabulary’ (Ungerer 1997: 315) and, particularly in the broadsheets (!), with the help of very graphic descriptions:

- In the aftermath, a huge fog of black smoke rose over the city, while several bodies lay in the courtyard of the hotel. (Guardian 2)
- Amar Mahdi, a driver, his skin bloody where it had been punctured by flying glass and metal, said: (Independent 2)
- Luai Ali was lying in a bed in al-Kindi hospital, his T-shirt soaked with blood (Independent 2)
- At a bookshop hit by the explosion a woman stood covered in blood, clutching her hand where the bones showed through. (Telegraph 2)
- As smoke billowed across central Baghdad and as petrol tanks in nearby cars caught fire and exploded, rescue teams carried out the wounded on stretchers or helped hastily bandaged guards to limp to ambulances. Bullets from weapons abandoned by guards in the explosion fired off occasionally off [sic] as the flames engulfed them, sending rescue workers scampering. (Times 2)

On account of such descriptions (which were excluded from the analysis of EMOTIVITY), the story’s newsworthiness is *already* enhanced (relating to the news value of *negativity*), and also gains a high emotional potential. Consequently, it may not need additional evaluation to enhance its newsworthiness.

Since not all evaluations contribute to newsworthiness, other factors must also be taken into account, such as the question of whether a news story is particularly well suited to accommodate quoted Sayers – in which case we can expect a high degree of evaluations of EVIDENTIALITY and EVIDENTIALITY/STYLE. All in all, the finding that evaluations are highly

dependent on topic clearly deserves more attention,³ and also necessitates the careful compilation of corpora for the analysis of evaluation.

7.3 Evaluation and newspaper style

This section addresses the connection between evaluation and newspaper style and discusses the internal variation of the sub-corpora. In fact, the individual newspapers differ quite considerably in terms of the numbers of evaluations that they contain (see also Appendix 6):




Figure 7.2 Distributions of evaluations in the newspapers

As to be expected, the broadsheets as a whole contain fewer evaluations (an average of 70.5 per 1,000 words) than the tabloids (an average of 76.8 per 1,000 words). Particularly evaluative in the latter sub-corpus are *The Sun*, *The Star* and *The Mirror*, whereas *The Daily Express* and *The Daily Mail* are less evaluative. This distinction mirrors exactly the distinction between the downmarket (*Sun*, *Star* and *Mirror*) and the midmarket (*Express*, *Mail*) tabloids. Where the broadsheets are concerned, *The Financial Times* is surprisingly the most evaluative,⁴ followed by *The Guardian* (with more evaluations than the midmarket tabloids), *The Daily Telegraph*, *The Times* and *The Independent*. (The latter is traditionally said to have no explicit political stance, having been founded in 1986 specifically with the mission to be ‘beholden to no one political party’ (Simon Kelner, editor-in-chief, *The Independent/Independent on Sunday*, www.news.independent.co.uk/low_res/story.jsp?story=116349&host=1&dir=1). Perhaps this political neutrality is responsible for the fact that there are the fewest evaluations in this particular newspaper.) In general, the internal variation in the sub-corpora is probably best explained by the differences in the individual newspapers’ ‘house style’ and their political stance.

7.4 Broadsheets vs. tabloids: a summary

Summing up the results of the empirical analysis, we can say that despite a variation between individual newspapers the two sub-corpora exhibit a distinct evaluative style, characterized by mitigation and negation in the case of the broadsheets, and by EMOTIVITY, unexpectedness and references to emotion in the case of the tabloids. Overall the broadsheets also contain fewer evaluations than the tabloids. Last but not least, the analyses in Chapters 5 and 6 have pointed to a different extent of stylistic variety in the two sub-corpora, which is usually, but not always, greater in the broadsheets, and have shown the preference for different evaluators in the popular and the quality press. However, it should be pointed out that in many cases the differences between the two types of newspaper are smaller than to be expected from our preconceptions (compare Figure 7.1).

The above analysis has also demonstrated that even the hard news item is not 'faceless' (Biber and Finegan 1989), but exhibits a large number of evaluations, pointing to the limits of large-scale corpus-based approaches to stance which can only take into account a limited number of linguistic features. It must not be forgotten that the British press has traditionally never been impartial, and that impartiality is not a legal requirement (Bell *et al.* 1999: 114). Evaluations in newspapers can be used to express emotive values in order to attract a certain implied readership (their target audience), and can be regarded as 'means by which communicative personae are set up', who 'instantiate attitudinal assumptions which can then operate within a shared world of discourse, so contributing to the pragmatic interpretation of what is said' (Sell 1991: 140–141). In other words, newspapers will try to construct a text which is in line with what they think are the opinions, attitudes and feelings – hence, the evaluative stance – of (the majority of) their readers. This principle can be called 'audience design' (Bell 1991: 105) – writing for your audience. As one guidebook for journalists advises: 'Once you have an audience in mind, then you can decide in what tone of voice you want to address them' (Bagnall 1993: 135). Ultimately, this can lead to what Fowler calls 'a dichotomous vision of "us" and "them"' (Fowler 1991: 16): by addressing particular social groups (the stereotyped reader of Chapter 2), newspapers create a system of shared values, a framework of a shared ideology. They report stories in a way that is intended to establish a certain set of values and to aim at a certain evaluative response, thereby creating an in-group (the readers of the particular paper) vs. an out-group, or a supposed Other. (In how far this process can contribute to a 'manipulation' of readers will be discussed below.)

Furthermore, the study has demonstrated that evaluations are often employed to make the reported event more newsworthy, and that they can be related to the many different news values which are so important to the newsmaking process. Most linguistic analyses of the news so far have predominantly concentrated on the first function of evaluation (addressing

readerships). Nevertheless, this second aspect should not be neglected, since it helps to embed the news story in the complex business of newspaper production, the 'selling of the news'. Using evaluations is one of the means by which the newsworthiness of a story is accentuated. In other words, not only does news value 'rule[...] the content of the news pages' (Cotter 1999: 174), it also influences the linguistics of the news pages. The reporting of newsworthy events is even more important nowadays because of the overall decline in circulation which affects British newspapers (Bell *et al.* 1999: 111). To ensure that they survive, newspapers must attract readers in order to make profit. As far as financing is concerned, broadsheets and tabloids differ considerably: the finances of the quality press is driven by advertising, and consequently, they must attract a high proportion of educated and affluent readers in order to remain attractive to advertisers who are advertising expensive products. They want more readers, but only those that can afford these consumer products (Tunstall 1996: 12). The tabloids, on the other hand, only partially benefit financially from advertisement, and hence focus on maximizing sales revenue (Tunstall 1996: 12f). This difference can explain the distinctions in the evaluative style of these two types of newspapers: it is adapted to, or designed for the (stereotyped) wants of the audience. The broadsheet newsmakers adopt a less explicit, subtle, mitigated and stylistically varied evaluative style in order to attract the educated and affluent readers that make up their target audience, whereas the tabloid newspapers adopt a more explicit, 'intense', emotional and stylistically simpler evaluative style in order to attract a larger, less educated and less affluent audience. In contrast to received wisdom, both types of newspapers make use of evaluations in their hard news stories – the most significant difference lies in the way the evaluation is presented, in evaluative style rather than evaluative content.

7.5 Evaluation and bias

A last point that remains to be addressed in this chapter is the connection between evaluation and bias, since evaluations can be used to create in-groups and out-groups, and establish certain sets of values. In fact, evaluation can and does contribute to newspaper bias but it is neither an automatic means of expressing bias nor the only means of expressing it.⁵ How such newspaper bias in itself affects its readership is 'the source of the biggest debate surrounding media audiences because so little has really been discovered about the way that audiences receive and make sense of media texts' (Bell *et al.* 1999: 17). According to Bell *et al.* (1999: 17ff) there are four competing theories of the influence of media on their audience:

(1) The 'Hypodermic syringe model'

According to this hypothesis, the audience is very passive, 'receive an "intravenous interjection" of a media text – which could be nega-

tive (eg violent murder) or positive (eg heroic act) and are stimulated into a response' (Bell *et al.* 1999: 18).

(2) The 'Inoculation model'

Here the audience are also considered as passive and made 'immune' by 'long term exposure to repeated media messages' (Bell *et al.* 1999: 18).

(3) The 'Two-step flow model'

This is a 'semi-active' model of the audience which postulates 'a two-step communication flow from the medium through the opinion leader to the individual' (Bell *et al.* 1999: 19).

(4) The 'Uses and gratifications model'

Here the audience is regarded as active, and their interaction with the media is influenced by what they need from it. Four possibilities for such needs are a reinforcing of their personal identity, interaction, information and entertainment/diversion (Bell *et al.* 1999: 20).

It is thus problematic to give a straightforward answer to the question of to what extent newsreaders are susceptible to manipulation, and I shall not attempt to do so here. However, in my view any model which assumes that readers are passive recipients of ideological content – without taking into account their activity, their needs and their degree of involvement as well as their interaction with other discourses outside the media – cannot fully capture the effect of newspaper bias. Our values, and what we know and think about the events, people and situations portrayed in the press are fashioned by the many discourse types of our socialization: for example, fiction, non-fiction, television, comics, movies, and talk with friends or colleagues (cf. also van Dijk 1988b: 217). Where events are reported with a particular slant, the question is to what degree newsreaders agree with this slant and to what extent they challenge it. For instance, many right-wing tabloids are in fact read by people who are in favour of the other parties (McNair 1994: 139). Similarly, Tunstall (1996) observes that generally only about 50 per cent of news readers share their daily newspaper's partisanship, whereas about 25 per cent are in fact in favour of the opposite party. Moreover, some readers do not read the political news stories very often (Tunstall 1996: 242). McNair notes that 'the suggestion that newspapers have the power to influence voting behaviour, or any other type of behaviour, is highly problematic. If they can, why do so many *Sun* and *Star* readers support the Labour Party?' (McNair 1994: 140). Furthermore, accusations of manipulation presuppose a conscious intent by the news producer to manipulate his/her readers which cannot always be upheld: the evaluations that are expressed may work subconsciously rather than consciously (White 1998: ii; also Fowler 1991: 24). Additionally, such accusations have the tendency to be elitist (Jung 2001: 277). As Humphrys asks: 'Are we really saying that the public is so gullible, so incapable of

seeking out information for themselves, that they can be led by the nose by a cynical media into believing something they don't want to believe?' (quoted in Wells 2004). Hall (1994: 209) suggests three positions for decoding television discourse, a suggestion which can also be applied to newspaper texts:

- (1) The *dominant-hegemonic* position: here 'the viewer takes the connoted meaning . . . full and straight, and decodes the message in terms of the reference code in which it has been encoded, . . . is *operating inside the dominant code*' (Hall 1994: 209).
- (2) The *negotiated* position: here decoders adopt a negotiated code which 'acknowledges the legitimacy of the hegemonic definitions to make the grand significations (abstract), while, at a more restricted, situational (situated) level, it makes its own ground rules – it operates with exceptions to the rule' (Hall 1994: 210). That is, the preferred reading is accepted at an abstract level, but rejected at a more personal level (e.g. when a worker agrees to the hegemonic definition that strike is against the national interest, but is still willing to go on strike) (see Hall 1994: 210f for this example).
- (3) The *oppositional* position: here viewers decode the message 'in a *globally contrary way*' (Hall 1994: 211, original emphasis) to the hegemonic discourse, and use their own framework of interpretation. For instance, a viewer who 'reads' every mention of the "national interest" as "class interest" (Hall 1994: 211).⁶

With regard to the evaluators that are used in reporting, it is possible to advance the hypothesis that the potential for manipulation also depends on the nature of the evaluations involved. In as far as evaluations are expressed in very subtle, indirect ways, or as 'given' information, it is naturally much more difficult for readers to recognize and challenge them (Francis 1994, Thompson and Hunston 2000). Concerning the results of this study one might then conclude that 'perhaps there is some rationale for suggesting that the overt bias of the tabloid press is preferable to the covert bias of the broadsheet newspapers' (Bell *et al.* 1999: 114).⁷

To sum up, news is socio-economically constructed. It does not necessarily consist of '*new information on recent events*' (Reah 1998: 9) or an 'unbiased recording of "hard facts"' (Fowler 1991: abstract). Rather, it consists of selected information with gaps and swings: which events are reported and how they are reported does not reflect the intrinsic importance of those events, but rather the operation of an artificial set of criteria for selection and transformation (Fowler 1991: 2). But bias loses some of its threatening image if we dispense with the view of the completely passive (and hence easily manipulated) reader. Manipulation exists but it is perhaps overestimated. If ultimately it resides in the reader, then education is the only possibility to encounter it, i.e. helping people to become 'critically literate in the language of the media' (Fairclough 1995a: 201).

In any case, the above-made assumptions on manipulation are just that – assumptions: as previously mentioned, there is an ongoing debate on the social role of journalism, and the effect of newspaper coverage in particular (see e.g. McNair 1994: 15ff), and the issue has not been resolved in a satisfactory way yet. McNair, however, offers an interesting solution: whether or not newspapers really have the power to manipulate their readers, what is important is that social actors *think* that they do. This means that they ‘tailor their “performances”’ accordingly, i.e. that the *perception* of manipulation has effects on the social process as a whole whether or not this manipulation exists or not (McNair 1994: 22f).

Notes

1. This calculation includes all types of emotive meaning, rather than limiting the analysis to those types of emotive meaning used for comparing the tabloids and broadsheets in Chapter 5.2. Expressions were counted as emotive if:
 - they are marked in COBUILD as signalling approval or disapproval or as being subjective (Chapter 5.2)
 - their definition in COBUILD involves clearly evaluative items – for example, BRUTAL: ‘A **brutal** act or person is cruel and violent.’ (COBUILD, underlining mine)
 - their definition in COBUILD lists typical ‘unpleasant’ or ‘pleasant’ collocates; for instance: EXACERBATE: ‘If something **exacerbates** a problem or bad situation, it makes it worse.’ (COBUILD, underlining mine)
 - a corpus analysis (of the Bank of English or the Internet) clearly shows that they co-occur predominantly with positive or negative collocates
 - several native speakers unanimously agree on the negative or positive EMOTIVITY of evaluators (this was necessary because not all expressions in the news stories could be found in the dictionary or analysed fruitfully by corpus analyses, e.g. *plank*)
 - research on EMOTIVITY identifies the expression as emotive in some respect.
2. However, the number of words devoted to a particular topic is not just an indicator of newsworthiness but may also depend on layout and other factors in the newsmaking process. A potential additional factor of newsworthiness, type size, could not be considered.
3. For instance, the fact that the Barclays story contains more evaluations in the tabloids is perhaps related to the fact that they consider their readers as ‘ordinary’ people and try to appeal to them by negatively evaluating the ‘elite’, i.e. Matt Barrett.
4. This might be explicable by the fact that the *Financial Times* sub-corpus includes one news story (Rio Ferdinand) from the sports section rather

than the news section, and that this story is the most evaluative of all *Financial Times* news stories. Perhaps this newspaper allows more evaluation in the sports section than in the news section.

5. See, for example, Maclean (1981), Glasgow University Media Group (1976, 1980), Trew (1979), Hartley (1982), Fairclough (1988, 1995a, 1998), Fowler (1991), Lee and Solomon (1991), Wortham and Locher (1996), van Dijk (1988a, 1988b, 1998), Caldas-Coulthard (2003), and the numerous individual studies in Critical Discourse Analysis for other devices to express bias or ideology.
6. A fourth possible reading position would be the 'tactical' reading of linguists (Martin and White 2005: 206). On how newspapers are read by different newsreaders see Bruck and Stocker (1996).
7. Moreover, newsreaders are relatively helpless where the *selection* of reported events is concerned: if newspapers do not regard an event as newsworthy, it will not be covered and readers will not even know that the event took place at all (unless informed by other sources). Theoretically, newsreaders at least have the possibility to inform themselves via other sources (which may or may not provide enough information for them), but they have to take action themselves. As such, under-represented events are clearly in the disadvantage, and public opinion will not heed them much. Selection also concerns the question of which aspect of the reported event is presented as the 'crisis point . . . [or] "angle"' (White 1998: 284), which may naturally result in a particular representation of the given event and may thereby potentially contribute to the reader's manipulation (for a detailed discussion and examples see White 1998: 283ff).

8 Implications for a new theory of evaluation

This final chapter returns to some of the theoretical issues concerning evaluation, stressing the importance of context for evaluation, commenting on the semantics and pragmatics of evaluations, and outlining some directions of future research.

8.1 Evaluative prosody: evaluation and context

The empirical analyses above, and the illustrative analysis of longer sections of texts in Chapter 7.1 have demonstrated again and again the importance of the wider context for the analysis of evaluation. For example, it was found that the negative stance present in the whole text can increase the potential of other evaluations to evoke negative evaluation. In analogy to Bublitz's (2002) concept of emotive prosody (concerning the parameter of EMOTIVITY) we can speak of the 'evaluative prosody' of each text (see also Halliday 1970, 1994, Macken-Horarik 2003 and White 2004a on prosody in connection with modality/interpersonal meaning/appraisal/attitude). Thus, both texts exhibit a predominantly negative *evaluative prosody*, but differ in terms of their *evaluative style*. The evaluative prosody (the overall attitudinal 'halo') of a text arguably has a bearing on the evaluations expressed in the whole text. In short stretches of texts this is quite obvious, as when the normally neutral *linguists* becomes 'loaded' with negative evaluation in its context:

In my youth and later, the question of when it was correct to write and say *shall* and *will* (and *should* and *would*) was a matter of continual discussion. Wilson Follett, as unstuffy a man as ever put pen to paper, had twenty-three papers on the question in 1966, and not all the other participants were schoolteachers or swots or petty usage-fanatics or linguists.

(Amis 1997: 204f)

For longer texts the effect has been demonstrated by Bublitz (2003). Other interesting phenomena of context influence include retrospective (anaphoric) and prospective (cataphoric) evaluations (Lemke 1998). The following example shows retrospective evaluation: the MENTAL STATE

evaluations that are attributed to the Tory delegates in (1) and (3) work to evaluate them negatively because they are seen as responding in a positive way (they are said to be delighted and pleased and to applaud strongly) to something that is evaluated as negative by the newspaper (*the harsh language directed personally against Tony Blair*):

- (1) The Tory leader's more polished [EMOTIVITY: POSITIVE] performance delighted [MENTAL STATE: EMOTION] the party faithful inside the Empress Ballroom, earning him a climactic [IMPORTANCE: IMPORTANT] 12-minute ovation.
- (2) His attacks [EVIDENTIALITY: HEARSAY/STYLE: ILLOCUTIONARY] on Labour's high taxation, bureaucracy and policy on Europe were also rewarded with 17 standing ovations as the speech was delivered.
- (3) Most pleasing [MENTAL STATE: EMOTION] to delegates was the harsh [EMOTIVITY: NEGATIVE] language directed personally [EMOTIVITY: NEGATIVE] against Tony Blair and his fantasy 'Blair World' [EVIDENTIALITY: HEARSAY].
(Guardian 1)

Prospective evaluation is present in this example

- His 62-minute address was targeted not on the wider TV audience but at the crowd in the hall – and it worked. The speech and its reception put the anti-Duncan Smith plotters on the spot. (Mail 1)

where the event that is described in the second sentence is evaluated positively by virtue of the positive evaluation in the first sentence (*it worked*). (The effect can be seen by the fact that the full stop can easily be substituted by a colon.¹)

There are also examples that work very indirectly to express evaluation and where a close analysis of the context is necessary:

- Israeli warplanes attacked a Palestinian terrorist training camp deep inside Syria yesterday following Saturday's suicide bombing which killed 19 people. The retaliation *sent a tough signal to Syria* to stop supporting the extremists. (Express 9)
- The case has become *a symbol of* the centre-right government's determination to stamp out prostitution from the streets and top hotels of a city that prided itself on being the capital of forbidden pleasures. (FT 8)

Here the first example suggests that Israel thinks Syria should stop supporting the extremists, without, however, including an evaluation of EVIDENTIALITY: HEARSAY or EVIDENTIALITY: MINDSAY as such. The second example tells us that some people believe that the government is determined to stamp out prostitution, and that the reason why they believe so is this court case.

The complex interplay of evaluation and context shows that manual text analysis is an indispensable methodological tool when analysing evaluation and points to the pressing need to analyse the systematics of context influence on evaluation in more detail (along the lines of Lemke 1998 and Jordan 2000). We still seem to know only little about the actual workings of context influence on meaning. Evaluation is just one example where this influence becomes very obvious for example when lexical items with a more or less 'neutral' dictionary meaning become evaluative in their context. Here lexical items can become a site of negotiation and debate: an example from politics is provided by the discussion, during the argument on the war in Iraq in 2002/03, on 'old Europe', in which Donald Rumsfeld designated France and Germany as part of 'old Europe', where *old* was to be understood in a negative way, as 'outdated'. Some German and French politicians and philosophers reacted to this by confirming that they were indeed part of 'old Europe', while trying to emphasize the positive evaluations of *old*, associating *old* with history, tradition, culture and experience.

System networks (in appraisal theory) and parameter-based frameworks (in this book) of evaluation may need to be elaborated upon in order to incorporate these kinds of phenomena. As Macken-Horarik (2003) argues, '[i]f we are to develop an analytical apparatus that takes account of this evaluative reality [the prosodic quality of evaluations], we need frameworks that are sensitive to the way that texts as a whole go to work on readers' (Macken-Horarik 2003: 314).

8.2 The semantics and pragmatics of evaluations

As we have also seen, evaluations can be both *inscribed* or *evoked* by the lexicogrammar of English, so that both explicitly evaluative and apparently factual utterances can express the same meaning dimension (or parameter) of evaluation (for a detailed discussion of cases where evaluation of one parameter is evoked by inscribed evaluation of a different parameter see Bednarek 2006c). When these evaluative meanings are realized in discourse, and depending on the context, they fulfil certain discourse functions, for example expressing critique, involvement or mitigation. For example:

He is an idiot. [inscribed EMOTIVITY] → possible discourse function: critique

He does not know anything about linguistics. [evoked EMOTIVITY (but inscribed CONTRAST/COMPARISON and MENTAL STATE)] → possible discourse function: critique

It is in this specific sense that we can speak of the semantics and the pragmatics of evaluation:




Figure 8.1 The semantics and pragmatics of evaluation

The analysis of evaluative parameters and their functions in actual discourse (see Appendix 7 for a full summary) has provided a number of insights concerning their semantics and pragmatics:

- there is no one-to-one equivalence between meaning and function: evaluations can fulfil a number of different functions in discourse
- generalizations are often difficult, since the function of evaluations is highly context-dependent
- no comprehensive listing of all potential discourse functions of evaluations is possible, since the analysis is restricted to the description of the given corpus
- the findings represent tendencies, in contrast to strict rules.

Nevertheless, the empirical analysis has given us a first glance at the discourse functions of evaluations in British newspaper discourse. Some of these functions seem to be specifically related to newspaper discourse (e.g. those concerning news values), whereas others seem more general and are perhaps transferable onto other types of discourse (e.g. mitigation, dramatization, evoking evaluation). In any case, the difference between inscribed and evoked evaluations and their possible discourse functions must be upheld in any analysis of evaluation, whether news discourse or other genres are concerned.

8.3 The way forward

In this final section I want to suggest some possibilities for future research on evaluation and on newspaper discourse. Generally speaking, research could deal more systematically with:

- the connection between evaluation and manipulation
- the establishment and refinement of (additional) parameters of evaluation
- the ‘collocation’ of evaluative parameters (cf. Chapter 4)
- the evaluative power of pictures (with the help of multimodal discourse analysis; cf. Lemke on political cartoons: www.personal.umich.edu/~jaylemke/papers/polcart.htm)
- the use and limitations of (corpus and other) techniques in the identification of evaluation (cf. Hunston 2004)
- a systematic account of the variability and difference involved in evaluation as well as the establishment of a sound methodology for dealing with it more thoroughly
- the role of system networks for analysing evaluation in texts, especially the problems that arise ‘if an overarching appraisal system is presented with values attached’ (Macken-Horarik 2003: 318)
- an automated analysis of evaluation: there is a growing awareness of the importance of this field in artificial intelligence research (www.clairvoyancecorp.com/research/workshops/AAAI-EAAT-2004/home.html), and proposals have been made for automated analyses making use of the appraisal system (Taboada and Grieve 2004).

More specifically, the evaluative function of intensity is certainly worth more attention, even though it is best not considered an evaluative parameter, but rather a *modulator* of evaluation (see Chapter 4). Intensity might turn out to be *the* defining factor that differentiates tabloids and broadsheets in terms of evaluation. This hypothesis derives both from the overall impression created by the analyses undertaken in this book, and from the assumption that exaggeration, sensationalism and melodrama are more characteristic of the tabloids than of the broadsheets (Conboy 2002: 89, Bagnall 1993: 34), and that the linguistic reflex of these notions lies in increased intensity (see White 1997 on intensification in hard news stories).²

Future research could also deal more systematically with evaluations in attributed speech. As White suggests, ‘external voices can be read as surrogates for the authorial voice’ (White 1998: 277). Thus, in a text which quotes only criticisms of a particular situation, the newspaper’s critical stance as a whole is supported (White 1998: 278). Compare also the evaluation implied by the following example:

- He *pledged to* cut taxes while reforming public services, scrap student fees, drive out asylum seekers, flood the streets with police, make pensioners wealthy and build better schools and hospitals. (Mirror 1)

By accumulating such a variety of promises in one utterance, and through the contrast expressed by *while*, the text seems to suggest that it is not reasonable for the reader to assume that this promise can be fulfilled. In effect, the newspaper may cause us to ask the question ‘How can Iain Duncan Smith promise to cut taxes while promising all these other things that cost a lot of money?’ Answering this question makes us doubt Iain Duncan Smith’s sincerity: clearly, he cannot do all: either he will cut taxes or he will not fulfil his promises. Iain Duncan Smith is here shown to be pledging something that cannot be attained simply in order to gain votes, and is hence evaluated negatively. Undoubtedly, attributed propositions may contribute to newspaper bias in a variety of ways. Thus, Gruber (1993) points out that Sayers’ evaluative utterances may contribute to a negative evaluation on the part of the reader if their content violates the reader’s norms (Gruber 1993: 482). If the attributed speech involves negative evaluations this may also cause the reader to think negatively of the source:

- The FA’s (S) *decision to dump Ferdinand before he has been charged with any offence* is unprecedented. (Mail 10)

Here, the attributed proposition *to dump Ferdinand before he has been charged with any offence* includes a verb that may potentially indicate disapproval (*dump*) as well as an implicit evaluation of EXPECTEDNESS (*before he has been charged with any offence*), evaluations that may evoke a negative evaluation of the Football Association on the part of the reader if s/he thinks this decision was fundamentally wrong.

Furthermore, a complete classification of the kind of entities, situations, states of affairs, propositions, etc. that *are* evaluated and that *can* be evaluated would be rewarding – what has alternatively been called ‘evaluated entity’ (Thetela 1997: 103) and ‘attitudinal target’ (White 2001f: 1; for a preliminary classification compare White 1998: 116f). In this context it would be fruitful to analyse whether there is a general connection between human and non-human agentivity and the evaluative force of evaluations (as suggested by the analysis of FAKE above, and by Channell’s 2000 analysis of FAT).

Further research could also address the distribution of evaluations in the news narrative (see e.g. White 1997, 1998). Thus, Gruber (1993: 476) shows that in Austrian newspapers unattributed evaluations occur ‘only in text-initial position, i.e. as the first sentences of the lead of a newspaper report’ (Gruber 1993: 476; see also Vestergaard 2000: 155).

More research is also needed into positive EMOTIVITY (including positive semantic preference), an area that has been neglected by most research so far. As Channell (2000) suggests,

negative polarities seem more obvious, and more frequent, than [sic] positive ones. During the writing of CCED [Collins COBUILD English Dictionary, 1995], compilers noted more than double the number of negatively loaded words to positively loaded ones. It is too early to know why that might be, or even if it is a

substantive observation. It might be, for example, that compilers were more sensitive to negative items because the social consequences of an error with a negative item are much greater than those arising from misuse of a positive item. (Channell 2000: 55)

It would be possible to look at text types such as book reviews (e.g. Suárez-Tejerina 2004) and political texts in tabloids which are in favour of 'their' candidate as a basis for such research.

More research into the functions of evaluations in other types of discourse (the 'pragmatics' of evaluations) is also clearly needed. An example of such an analysis is provided by Mittmann's (2005) application of the parameter-based framework to spoken British and American conversational discourse.

Finally, much more systematic linguistic research is needed into the difference between tabloids and broadsheets (broadening the scope of research such as Crystal and Davy 1969, Ljung 1997, Jucker 1992, Biber 2003, Ni 2003). The results from this book are limited to only one aspect, namely the difference in evaluation in the hard news story. Other aspects, such as syntactic, semantic, pragmatic, lexical, rhetorical and macro-structural differences concerning both the hard news story and other newspaper sub-genres remain to be researched in much more detail. In general, linguistic research on British newspapers has been dominated by research on broadsheet publications, although a systematic, large-scale comparison between the two types of newspapers might yield interesting results. Such research could also provide the basis for introducing even more text work on the basis of tabloid publications into the English classroom. This kind of text work would offer several advantages: the language that is used in tabloids is easier to understand for the pupils, the topics that are discussed might appeal to them to a greater extent, and it allows for an instruction in 'critical media literacy' (Fairclough 1995a: 201), the overt expression of bias, and the variation between tabloid and broadsheet publications.

8.4 Conclusion

This book has attempted to provide new insights into the broadsheet-tabloid distinction in the British press with respect to their evaluative style, as well as to shed light on the nature of evaluation itself on the basis of a new, parameter-based approach. It has been shown that this framework helps us to identify a distinctive evaluative style of the tabloids and the broadsheets. The theory has also contributed to the solution of two major problems in the theory of evaluation: how to identify common aspects without too much simplification, and how to take account of complexity without making the theory as complex as the data (Susan Hunston, p.c.). By establishing a limited number of evaluative parameters but allowing for their combination in a variety of ways, the parameter-based framework of

evaluation can help to overcome these problems, as well as showing more flexibility than competing approaches such as stance and appraisal (which only sometimes allow double codings). In fact, one of the disadvantages of an SFL approach (such as appraisal) is that

An S/F [systemic-functional] grammar analyses language as networks of options which constitute distinct systems associated with three metafunctions. The analysis requires disjunctive categorization . . . Essentially linguistic analysis is disjunctive. Language experience, on the other hand, is not: in language use, we commonly find a complex functional *conjunction* of features across categories.

(Widdowson 2004: 26)

The parameter-based framework, in contrast, allows for the analysis of evaluative interplay (Chapter 4), and cases where different parameters of evaluation are conjoined. The framework is useful for manual text analyses but can in fact also be applied in large-scale corpus analyses (Bednarek 2006b, Mittmann 2005).

Returning to the question asked at the beginning of this book – whether our preconceptions about the popular press are correct where evaluation is concerned – the answer must be both yes and no. On the one hand, some of the findings might seem predictable (e.g. the tabloids' preference for explicitness, frequent references to emotions, etc.); on the other hand, there are far fewer differences between the broadsheets and the tabloids than might be expected, and many of the more subtle differences that exist could not have been predicted.

Both evaluation and newspaper discourse are pervasive in our everyday life; newspaper discourse helps us to comprehend what is happening in the world in which we live, whereas evaluation fulfils a myriad of different functions in all kinds of text types, genres and registers. The important implications of evaluation for the persuasive effect of texts have recently been pointed out in connection with the Butler report on the use of intelligence reports before the war in Iraq:

The report includes a handy appendix laying out the raw intelligence material alongside the finished, political product. It makes clear how almost all the qualifiers – the maybes and possibly – were removed, giving the impression the government had a much firmer fix on Saddam's arsenal than it ever did. This was a 'serious weakness', said Butler. The dossier should have made clear the limits of the knowledge that underpinned it. Many people will regard the removal of these qualifiers, turning possibilities into certainties, as a material change to the document, hardening it up, firming it up – even sexing it up.

(Freedland 2004)

Thus, evaluation in language clearly plays a crucial role in both the political and the private world of everyday discourse and its research should remain an imperative for linguistics.

Notes

1. On anaphoric, cataphoric and 'catanaphoric' evaluation with the help of labels see Francis (1994), Schmid (2000: 8, 92ff) and Jordan (2000).
2. Sensationalism, melodrama and exaggeration appear to be 'part of a popular way of understanding and accepting the relatively helpless position of ordinary people; entertainment and consumerism offer . . . a temporary and vicarious way out' (Conboy 2002: 89), 'belong[.] quite clearly to the oral tradition of sensational and hyperbolic gossip' (Conboy 2002: 169), and the tabloids' focus on the extraordinary, the anomalous also seems to stem from folklore (Goss 1994).

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Appendices

Appendix 1 The compilation of the corpus

The corpus consists of 100 news stories from ten national British broadsheets and tabloids. Researchers have made the following proposals for distinguishing between these two types of newspapers (Table A1):

Table A1 Broadsheets vs. tabloids

Tunstall (1996)	upmarket	<i>The Guardian, The Independent, The Daily Telegraph, The Times, The Financial Times</i>
	midmarket	<i>The Daily Mail, The Daily Express, Today</i> (closed in 1995)
	downmarket	<i>The Daily Mirror, The Star, The Sun</i>
Bell <i>et al.</i> (1999)	popular dailies	<i>The Sun, The Mirror</i>
	mid-market dailies	<i>The Daily Express, The Daily Mail</i>
O'Driscoll (2000)	quality papers/ broadsheets	<i>The Guardian, The Independent, The Daily Telegraph, The Times, The Financial Times</i>
	popular papers/ tabloids	<i>The Daily Mail, The Daily Express, The Daily Mirror, The Star, The Sun</i>

For the purposes of this book I only distinguish between the tabloids and the broadsheets. No doubt it would be more precise to distinguish between upmarket broadsheet newspapers, midmarket tabloids and downmarket tabloids because this distinction combines the social factor with the traditional dichotomy between tabloids and broadsheets. In fact, an even more appropriate approach might be to adopt the ‘“continuum” model’ proposed by Sparks (2000: 14f) between five different types of newspapers rather than just two. However, it was beyond the scope of this study to analyse systematically more than two potential sub-corpora. The main

distinction, in any case, appears to be between the popular and the quality press (Jucker 1992: 48).

Concerning the individual news stories, it must be mentioned that it is a characteristic of tabloids that several articles sometimes blend into each other. I have used new headlines, different subject matters and non-linguistic cues as a signal that a new story begins, though such stories should still be regarded as closely related.

The ten topics in the corpus were selected within a period of three weeks, where a week is defined as starting on Monday and ending on Friday; weekend editions were excluded from the corpus because 'the outputs on Saturdays, Sundays and public holidays differ in major ways from those published on weekdays' (Ljung 2000: 132). A stratified sampling (over a whole year) would have been even better (to avoid seasonal preoccupations which can skew the media content; see Bell 1991: 22), but the alternative solution adopted here for practical reasons was to include a variety of subject matters (sports, politics, finance, human interest) while remaining within the hard news section. Another criterion was that the stories were published on the same day in all newspapers, and that the section from which they were chosen was the news section (rather than sports or finance/business) of the respective newspaper. (There are a few exceptions to this principle: the story about footballer Rio Ferdinand was front page news in most newspapers (in the news section) but in *The Financial Times* it was included in the sports section. The news story reporting Barclays' chief executive Matthew Barrett's comments on credit cards also appeared in the business section of one newspaper (rather than in the news section). The report of Diana's letter was published on 20 October 2003 in *The Daily Mirror*, but there were follow-ups on the story in the nine other newspapers on the following day.)

Because the object of investigation is a comparison of *print* media, the corpus is not based on articles downloaded from the Internet. A preliminary finding of a comparison of the web-version and the print version of news stories found at times significant differences (although some versions were almost identical). Moreover, not all of the British tabloids have a website of their own or only publish some of their articles on the Internet. (For some characteristics of electronic newspapers cf. Rademann, who even calls them a 'new subgenre' (Rademann 1997: 251).) The print version was compared to the Internet version if such a version existed. This Internet version was then downloaded, transformed to a Word document, edited manually (eliminating the differences in the two versions), and double checked against the print version. As a result of this the obtained document was identical to the print version. Otherwise, the print version was typed in manually to obtain a word document. While bylines, captions and headlines were included, images were not. In the final stage, the word documents were transformed into txt-format to form a corpus that could be used for the analysis. The result was a 70,000 word corpus consisting of 100 British broadsheet and tabloid news stories.

(Note that previous research on newspaper discourse is often based on fewer texts; for example, Biber and Finegan's 1989 analysis relies on 44 news texts, Short *et al.* 1999 use 40 text samples, White 1998 is based on 22 texts, Ni 2003 makes use of data from the British component of the International Corpus of English which comprises 20 text samples of news discourse and Martin and White 2005 is based on a corpus of 60 news-page and 15 comment-page items. The number of words of the texts or text samples used in these analyses is either lower than in my corpus or only slightly higher, even in specifically corpus-based, quantificational approaches.)

Appendix 2

Table A2 Comparison of approaches to evaluation¹

Appraisal	Francis (1995)	Thompson and Hunston (2000)	Conrad and Biber (2000)
Attitude	—		attitudinal
— Affect			stance
— Judgement	rationality value/	positive–	
— Appreciation	appropriacy	negative	
		parameter	
	predictability		
	obviousness	expectedness/	
		obviousness	
	truth modality		epistemic
		certainty	stance
Engagement			
	importance	relevance/	
		importance	
			style stance
	ability		
Graduation			
— Force			
— Focus			

Biber and Finegan (1988)	Lemke (1998)	Parameter-based framework
<i>amazingly</i> adverbials: expressing attitudes towards the content independent of its epistemological status	humorousness/seriousness	(—)
	desirability/inclination	EMOTIVITY
		MENTAL STATE
<i>actually</i> adverbials: expressing actuality, emphasis, greater certainty/truth than expected <i>maybe</i> adverbials: expressing possibility, likelihood, questionable assertions, hedging <i>surely</i> adverbials: expressing conviction or certainty	usuality/expectability	EXPECTEDNESS
	comprehensibility/obviousness	COMPREHENSIBILITY
	warrantability/probability	EVIDENTIALITY
		RELIABILITY
	importance/significance	IMPORTANCE
<i>honestly</i> adverbials: expressing manner of speaking <i>generally</i> adverbials: expressing approximation, generalization		STYLE
	normativity/appropriateness	POSSIBILITY/NECESSITY
		— RELIABILITY/STYLE

Appendix 3: A system of evidentiality

Figure A1 lists a preliminary system of evidentiality for English, based on the newspaper corpus. I have classified the expressions on the right according to the evaluative parameters they express – for example, all those expressions involving EVIDENTIALITY: HEARSAY indicate that the proposition is based on what a Sayer has uttered. The various sub-values relate to whether the attributing expression is NEUTRAL, ILLOCUTIONARY, DISCOURSE SIGNALLING, DECLARATIVE or PARALINGUISTIC. These sub-values are interpreted as referring to the parameter of STYLE. Moreover, some attributing expressions represent an indication of HIGH RELIABILITY, MEDIAN RELIABILITY or LOW RELIABILITY. ADMIT in addition carries some negative evaluation towards the Sayer (EMOTIVITY: NEGATIVE). All the expressions involving EVIDENTIALITY: MINDSAY indicate that the proposition is based on what a Senser has thought, felt, experienced, etc. (i.e. mental states). The possible mental states are classified as BELIEF, EMOTION, EXPECTATION, PROCESS, VOLITION, KNOWLEDGE and STATE-OF-MIND. Some additionally involve a comment on the part of the writer concerning the reliability of the attributed proposition, namely factive predicators, referring to KNOWLEDGE (KNOW), EMOTION (APPALLED THAT), and STATE-OF-MIND (PUZZLED THAT) as well as AS-structures and adverbs like RIGHTLY, which presumably can occur with all kinds of STYLE evaluations (though more research is needed to ascertain this). They presuppose the truth of the attributed proposition. Moreover, attributions to inexplicit sources with WIDELY, GENERALLY, WIDESPREAD, etc. are regarded as providing an additional evaluation of RELIABILITY: MEDIAN, whereas passives like *understood to* indicate a lower degree of reliability. All expressions involving EVIDENTIALITY: HEARSAY or MINDSAY are attributions – they are explicitly attributed to Sayers or Sensers other than the writer/speaker. Underneath these we can find sourced averrals (which in my view shade into attributions so that there is no strict dividing line between attributions and sourced averrals), where we find indications concerning the source of the speaker's knowledge, as based on GENERAL KNOWLEDGE, UNSPECIFIED evidence, PERCEPTION or PROOF. The type of evidence that is mentioned usually involves an additional evaluation of RELIABILITY (e.g. GENERAL KNOWLEDGE implies HIGH RELIABILITY, LACK OF PROOF suggests LOW RELIABILITY). Evaluators like NOTORIOUSLY and INFAMOUSLY also imply that someone is well known for something negative (EMOTIVITY: NEGATIVE). At the other pole there are non-sourced averrals – not attributed and not evaluated as based on any source.²

	PARAMETER: VALUE	PARAMETER: VALUE	PARAMETER: VALUE	PARAMETER: VALUE	Example (invented)
Attribution	EVIDENTIALITY: HEARSAY	STYLE: NEUTRAL	—	—	He said that they were right.
	EVIDENTIALITY: HEARSAY	STYLE: ILLOCUTIONARY	—	—	He stated that they were right.
	EVIDENTIALITY: HEARSAY	STYLE: DISCOURSE SIGNALLING	—	—	He added that they were right.
	EVIDENTIALITY: HEARSAY	STYLE: DECLARATIVE	—	—	He ruled that they were right.
	EVIDENTIALITY: HEARSAY	STYLE: PARALINGUISTIC	—	—	He shouted that they were right.
	EVIDENTIALITY: HEARSAY	STYLE: <i>all?</i>	RELIABILITY: HIGH	—	As he said (etc.), they were right.
	EVIDENTIALITY: HEARSAY	STYLE: <i>all?</i>	RELIABILITY: HIGH	—	He right.ly/justly said that they were right.
	EVIDENTIALITY: HEARSAY	STYLE: ILLOCUTIONARY	RELIABILITY: HIGH	—	He revealed that they were right.
	EVIDENTIALITY: HEARSAY	STYLE: NEUTRAL	RELIABILITY: MEDIAN	—	Apparently, they were right.
	EVIDENTIALITY: HEARSAY	STYLE: ILLOCUTIONARY	RELIABILITY: LOW	—	He claimed that they were right.
	EVIDENTIALITY: HEARSAY	STYLE: ILLOCUTIONARY	RELIABILITY: HIGH	EMOTIVITY: NEGATIVE	He admitted that they were right.
	EVIDENTIALITY: MINDSAY	MENTAL STATE: BELIEF	—	—	He thought that they were right.
	EVIDENTIALITY: MINDSAY	MENTAL STATE: EMOTION	—	—	He feared that they were right.
	EVIDENTIALITY: MINDSAY	MENTAL STATE: EXPECTATION	—	—	He expected them to be right.
	EVIDENTIALITY: MINDSAY	MENTAL STATE: PROCESS	—	—	He decided that they were right.
	EVIDENTIALITY: MINDSAY	MENTAL STATE: VOLITION	—	—	He wanted them to be right.
	EVIDENTIALITY: MINDSAY	MENTAL STATE: <i>all?</i>	RELIABILITY: HIGH	—	As he remembered, they were right.
	EVIDENTIALITY: MINDSAY	MENTAL STATE: <i>all?</i>	RELIABILITY: HIGH	—	He right.ly/justly remembered that they were right.
	EVIDENTIALITY: MINDSAY	MENTAL STATE: KNOWLEDGE	RELIABILITY: HIGH	—	He found out that they were right.
	EVIDENTIALITY: MINDSAY	MENTAL STATE: EMOTION	RELIABILITY: HIGH	—	He was appalled that they were right.
Sourced <i>averral</i>	EVIDENTIALITY: MINDSAY	MENTAL STATE: STATE-OF-MIND	RELIABILITY: HIGH	—	He was puzzled that they were right.
	EVIDENTIALITY: MINDSAY	MENTAL STATE: EXPECTATION	RELIABILITY: MEDIAN	—	They were widely expected to be right.
	EVIDENTIALITY: MINDSAY	MENTAL STATE: BELIEF	RELIABILITY: MEDIAN	—	They were widely taken to be right.
	EVIDENTIALITY: MINDSAY	MENTAL STATE: BELIEF	RELIABILITY: LOW	—	They were understood to be right.
	EVIDENTIALITY: GENERAL KNOWLEDGE	—	RELIABILITY: HIGH	—	It's well known they were right.
	EVIDENTIALITY: UNSPECIFIED	—	RELIABILITY: HIGH	—	It emerged that they were right.
Non-sourced <i>averral</i>	EVIDENTIALITY: PROOF	—	RELIABILITY: HIGH	—	Evidently, they were right.
	EVIDENTIALITY: PERCEPTION	—	RELIABILITY: HIGH	—	There are clear signs they were right.
	EVIDENTIALITY: PERCEPTION	—	RELIABILITY: MEDIAN	—	They appeared to be right.
	EVIDENTIALITY: LACK OF PROOF	—	RELIABILITY: LOW	—	There was no proof that they were right.
Averral	EVIDENTIALITY: GENERAL KNOWLEDGE	—	RELIABILITY: HIGH	EMOTIVITY: NEGATIVE	Notoriously, they were right.
	Non-sourced <i>averral</i>	—	—	—	They were right.
Gradience					

Figure A1 A preliminary system of evidentiality

Appendix 4: Methodological decisions

Typographical and other conventions

(1) As mentioned previously, capitals refer to lemmas, whereas italics refer to word forms. That is, we can find evaluators such as *has raised other questions about*, *questions were raised over*, *raised questions about*, which are treated as simple variations of the evaluator RAISE QUESTION. In contrast (as indicated by italics) only the word form *clarify* (versus *clarified*, *clarifying*, *clarifies*) occurs in the corpus. It is thus on purpose that examples in the corpus are referred to both with italics and with capitals.

(2) The normal order of discussing the evaluative parameters is alphabetical. However, in the sections on EVIDENTIALITY in Chapter 6 I diverge from the normal alphabetical order because it is more sensible to discuss all combinations involving sourced averrals before commenting on those concerning attributions. I hence comment on EVIDENTIALITY/RELIABILITY and EVIDENTIALITY/RELIABILITY/EMOTIVITY before discussing combinations involving EVIDENTIALITY and STYLE and EVIDENTIALITY and MENTAL STATE.

(3) The order in which parameters are placed in evaluative combinations (e.g. EVIDENTIALITY/RELIABILITY/STYLE) is arbitrary to some extent. Often it is not obvious which of the parameters is more central to the meaning of evaluators in the respective category.

Calculations

(1) As far as the calculation of stylistic variety is concerned, different word classes are counted as different evaluators (CLAIM (N) and CLAIM (V) are two distinct evaluators), whereas word forms are not (*claim*, *claiming*, *claims*, *claimed* are treated as one evaluator). As Hunston (2002) states, '[t]here is some debate as to whether two word-forms belong to the same lemma if they belong to different word classes (for example, do the adjective *stylistic* and the noun *stylistics* . . . belong to the same lemma or not?)' (Hunston 2002: 18).

(2) Regarding the frequency analyses, I have classified as an *evaluator* the smallest possible unit of meaning. For instance, the expression *faces the prospect of* was identified as containing two evaluators (*faces* and *the prospect of*), although it is clearly a collocation and makes up a meaningful unit in itself. I have thus encountered the same problems as Lemke (1998) in that there was 'some uncertainty about criteria for segmenting evaluators in connected text' (Lemke 1998: 41). However, the percentages remain fairly valid since the criteria remained relatively consistent during the analysis.

What has been excluded from the discussion or analysis:

(1) There are five combinations of evaluative parameters that do not occur more than three times in total and that are not discussed in detail:

(1) EVIDENTIALITY/RELIABILITY/EMOTIVITY (*infamously*), (2) EXPECTEDNESS/IMPORTANCE (*twist, reverberations, upsurge*), (3) MENTAL STATE/COMPREHENSIBILITY (*pointedly*), (4) RELIABILITY/IMPORTANCE (*on the brink of*), (5) RELIABILITY/MENTAL STATE/EMOTIVITY (*bravado, put on a brave face*). In how far the combinations of evaluative parameters are involved in these lexical expressions becomes clear when we try to paraphrase their meaning:

- *infamously*: ‘**Infamous** people or things are well-known [EVIDENTIALITY: GENERAL KNOWLEDGE; in connection with a proposition this implies HIGH RELIABILITY] because of something bad [EMOTIVITY: NEGATIVE]’ (COBUILD, underlining mine).
- *twist*: ‘an unexpected [EXPECTEDNESS: UNEXPECTED] and significant [IMPORTANCE: IMPORTANT] development’ (COBUILD, underlining mine).
- *reverberations*: ‘serious [IMPORTANCE: IMPORTANT] effects that follow a sudden, dramatic [EXPECTEDNESS: UNEXPECTED] event’ (COBUILD, underlining mine).
- *upsurge*: ‘sudden [EXPECTEDNESS: UNEXPECTED], large [IMPORTANCE: IMPORTANT] increase’ (COBUILD, underlining mine).
- *on the brink of*: ‘If you are on the **brink** of something, usually something important [IMPORTANCE: IMPORTANT], terrible, or exciting, you are just about to [RELIABILITY: HIGH] do it or experience it.’ (COBUILD, underlining mine).
- *pointedly* suggests that the described behaviour is clear and direct (COMPREHENSIBILITY: COMPREHENSIBLE) and, at the same time, implies that this clarity was specifically intended by the actor (MENTAL STATE: VOLITION).
- Both *bravado* and *put on a brave face* imply that the mental state that is projected by a Senser is not his/her genuine [RELIABILITY: FAKE] emotional state. This is evaluated as negative in the case of *bravado* [EMOTIVITY: NEGATIVE] and as positive in the case of *put on a brave face* [EMOTIVITY: POSITIVE].

(2) For methodological reasons, the parameter of STYLE was analysed only in combination with other parameters. But combinations of EMOTIVITY/MENTAL STATE (e.g. SELF-PITYING, PARANOID) and EMOTIVITY/STYLE (e.g. CROAK, ABUSE, ADMIT) have been disregarded. The classification of these proved too difficult and too fuzzy (e.g. RANT, TIRADE, WRANGLE involve both STYLE and MENTAL STATE). This would have resulted in even further sub-classifications, and the analysis would have had to include all the sub-values for MENTAL STATE (EMOTION, KNOWLEDGE, STATE-OF-MIND, etc.) and STYLE (NEUTRAL, DISCOURSE SIGNALLING, DECLARATIVE, PARALINGUISTIC, ILLOCUTIONARY) which was impossible to implement. Therefore, the decision was taken not to list such combinations separately but to include them instead as evaluations of EMOTIVITY since the emotive evaluation seems to be the one that is most important.

(3) 'Null speech events' (Geis 1987: 88), i.e. 'cases in which journalists tell us what someone *didn't* say or make prophesies about what people *will* say' (Geis 1987: 87, emphasis mine) and 'quasi-quotations' (Hänlein 1999: 152) that 'do not refer to a specific speech event' (Hänlein 1999: 152) were excluded from the frequency analysis – for example, *they will be summoned to a meeting* (Mail 1). This does not skew the distribution because such events are distributed fairly equally across the corpus.

(4) I have also excluded from the analysis of EVIDENTIALITY names and titles (e.g. *a dog called Monty*; *The Burrell book*, *A Royal Duty*; *The bombshell programme*, *The Secret Policeman*; *identified as Deborah*).

(5) Lexical items whose meaning involves some less prominent notion of importance, such as INITIATIVE ('important act or statement', COBUILD), ISSUE ('an important subject', COBUILD), WEIGH IN ('make a significant or important contribution', COBUILD 1995) as well as those with a semantic preference for IMPORTANCE (SACRIFICE, RISK) have been excluded from the frequency analysis because they are too easily overlooked in the manual analysis. I have also excluded descriptive labels such as BOSS, CHIEF, EXPERTS, OFFICIALS, POLITICAL LEADERS, etc. although they might be regarded as contributing to an evaluation of IMPORTANCE. Lexical items indicating 'largeness' (MAMMOTH, BIG) and power (STRONG, POWERFUL) might also have a connection with the notions of importance and/or intensity but were similarly disregarded in the analysis. White, for instance, mentions adjectives such as MINUSCULE, TINY, HUGE and GARGANTUAN as amplifiers (White 1998: 113).

Further comments on the evaluative parameters

COMPREHENSIBILITY VS. EVIDENTIALITY

I distinguish between evaluations of COMPREHENSIBILITY and EVIDENTIALITY, which *additionally* may express RELIABILITY (e.g. CLEARLY, APPARENTLY), and those evaluators that only evaluate along the parameter of RELIABILITY *without* expressing any additional meaning (e.g. MAY, PERHAPS, CERTAIN). Compare also de Haan's (1999) arguments for distinguishing between evidentiality and epistemic modality, rather than treating evidentiality as 'a kind of epistemic modality' (de Haan 1999: 83). However, it must be noted that evaluations of COMPREHENSIBILITY such as CLEAR and CLEARLY might possibly be subsumed under the parameter of EVIDENTIALITY: PERCEPTION rather than COMPREHENSIBILITY. It seems that there is some overlap here and more research is needed both on the parameter of COMPREHENSIBILITY and on the parameter of EVIDENTIALITY. Future research will address this issue.

EVIDENTIALITY: PERCEPTION VS. EVIDENTIALITY: HEARSAY

The difference between EVIDENTIALITY: PERCEPTION and EVIDENTIALITY: HEARSAY is very small. Where there is a human source s/he is classified as

Sayer and an expression such as REVEAL as an attributing expression of STYLE (e.g. *Burrell reveals that as well as her fears of a plot to kill her, Diana was obsessed with the idea that her every move was being monitored by the security services*, Mail 5). Where there is a non-human source, this is classified as Source and there is no attribution involved (though EVIDENTIALITY is!). There is no Sayer to whom the proposition can be attributed; rather, the proposition derives from the human *interpretation* of a source (a written document, a test, findings), as in: *A self-pitying princess, her butler, and a note that revealed her greatest fear* (Guardian 5). Passives are problematic, but their normal interpretation seems to be as HEARSAY (Susan Hunston, p.c.):

- America's 'spies in the sky' eavesdropped on Princess Diana in the months before she died, it was *revealed* last night (Star 5)
- Confused Princess Diana lived in terror that various people were out to kill her, it was *revealed* last night. (Sun 5)

POSSIBILITY/NECESSITY

Halliday (1994) distinguishes between low (e.g. *allowed*), median (e.g. *supposed*) and high (e.g. *required*) obligation (1994: 358), and it is generally acknowledged that different modals express different degrees of obligation. Thus, MUST/HAVE GOT TO are regarded as stronger than SHOULD/UGHT TO (Coates 1983: 31, Palmer 1995a: 33, Bybee *et al.* 1994: 177, Høye 1997: 112; but cf. Myhill and Smith 1995 for contrary assumptions). MUST does not allow the states of affairs not to occur, as is pointed out by the contrast of **He must come tomorrow, but he won't* and *He should/ought to come tomorrow, but he won't* (Palmer 1995a: 123; see also Palmer 2001: 73, Hermerén 1978). Hence, the modals of obligation seem to lie on a cline extending from strong obligation (MUST/HAVE GOT TO) to weak obligation (SHOULD/UGHT TO). However, the notion of scale does not seem to be as important as with epistemic modality. With permission it is questionable whether such a scale exists, at least as far as the modal verbs are concerned: CAN, MAY and MIGHT, which can all be used to express permission do not seem different in terms of 'strength of permission': rather, MAY/MIGHT are formal variants of CAN and are both primarily used to express epistemic meanings (Coates 1983: 106), though Palmer suggests that MIGHT may be stronger than MAY (2001: 74). As Hermerén notes, permission does not seem subject to grading to the same extent as is obligation and subdivisions are often arbitrary (1986: 75). This is why the sub-values of the parameter of POSSIBILITY/NECESSITY are restricted to the four categories of POSSIBLE, NOT POSSIBLE, NECESSARY and NOT NECESSARY rather than further scaled values.

Connections between parameters

It would be interesting to do more research on the connection between IMPORTANCE and intensity/emphasis as well as on the connection

between ‘newness’ and EXPECTEDNESS. Thus, it could be argued that lexical items referring to (great) size (MAMMOTH), strength (POWERFUL, STRONG) or power (BOSS, CHIEF) are additional evaluators of IMPORTANCE (see above) or perhaps related to the notions of intensity/emphasis (cf. also White 1998: 111f where he also discusses the question whether expressions like *serious threat/key figure* indicate importance or intensity). And lexical items that refer to the ‘newness’ of entities (NEW, LATEST) could perhaps be regarded as evaluators of EXPECTEDNESS: UNEXPECTED.

Appendix 5

Table A3 All evaluations

Parameter	Tabloids					Broadsheets						
	EXP	Mail	MIR	STA	SUN	All	FT	GUA	IND	TEL	TIM	All
C	1	5	4	1	—	11	1	6	4	2	6	19
C/R	1	—	—	—	3	4	—	2	—	—	6	8
E	73	84	60	47	79	343	48	67	52	42	51	260
E/I	2	2	1	2	—	7	3	2	—	2	3	10
EV	130	144	124	62	94	554	70	127	120	135	115	567
EV/MS	21	22	12	14	17	86	9	22	23	16	28	98
EV/MS/R	7	11	14	8	5	45	2	7	10	7	18	44
EV/R	8	12	7	3	3	33	5	16	17	11	15	64
EV/R/E	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	1
EV/ST	181	198	171	88	151	789	124	171	203	185	181	864
EV/ST/C	—	—	1	2	—	3	2	2	1	2	1	8
EV/ST/E	3	2	1	2	1	9	—	—	2	—	1	3
EV/ST/E/R	6	5	5	6	6	28	2	5	4	7	10	28
EV/ST/R	6	9	7	11	16	49	7	11	14	13	19	64
EX	53	64	39	40	39	235	41	66	52	45	51	255
EX/E	—	1	1	1	2	5	—	2	2	1	2	7
EX/I	1	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	1	—	1	2
I	12	12	9	12	22	67	10	16	15	7	11	59
MS	27	31	33	7	30	128	13	30	26	20	35	124
MS/C	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	1
PN	—	1	1	2	—	4	—	2	1	2	3	8
R	24	29	10	16	13	92	17	27	25	11	30	110
R/E	1	1	2	—	5	9	1	—	2	2	4	9
R/I	—	1	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—
R/MS/E	1	1	—	—	—	2	—	1	—	—	—	1
R/ST	—	1	—	—	1	2	—	1	—	1	2	4
R/ST/EV	3	4	2	—	2	11	4	4	4	5	3	20
IC	—	1	—	—	—	1	—	1	—	—	—	1
ALL	561	641	504	324	489	2,519	359	589	578	517	596	2,639

IC = ironic contrast (*ironically*) (compare discussion in Chapter 4)

Appendix 6

Table A4 Evaluations in the newspapers

	Newspaper	Evaluations	Word count	Per 1,000 words
<u>Broadsheet</u> <u>sub-corpus</u>	FT	359	4,434	81
	GUARDIAN	589	7,921	74.4
	INDEPENDENT	578	8,599	67.2
	TIMES	596	8,845	67.4
	TELEGRAPH	517	7,605	68
	all	2,639	37,404	70.5
<u>Tabloid</u> <u>sub-corpus</u>	SUN	489	5,965	82
	STAR	324	3,949	82
	MAIL	641	8,826	72.6
	MIRROR	504	6,258	80.5
	EXPRESS	561	7,798	72
	all	2,519	32,796	76.8

Appendix 7

Table A5 Discourse functions of evaluations

Evaluative parameter	Discourse functions
<i>Core evaluative parameters</i>	
COMPREHENSIBILITY	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> commenting on language activity (evaluation of style) dramatization negative evaluation
COMPREHENSIBILITY/ RELIABILITY	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> lending reliability to expressions of speaker subjectivity mitigation
EMOTIVITY	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> expression of approval/disapproval with the potential for manipulation, the triggering of emotions/evaluations and the construction and maintenance of the reader–writer relationship
EMOTIVITY/ IMPORTANCE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> contributing to the news values of <i>negativity</i> and <i>relevance</i> dramatization

Table A5—*continued*

Evaluative parameter	Discourse functions
EXPECTEDNESS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • contributing to the news value of <i>unexpectedness</i> • intensification • evoking positive/negative evaluation and emotion • contrasting propositions (attributed with attributed, attributed with non-attributed, same or different Sayers) • contrasting positive and negative evaluation • contrast with norm • signalling evaluation • justifying choice of mentioned Sayers • dramatization
EXPECTEDNESS/ EMOTIVITY	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • increasing negative evaluation of news actors • promoting the negative as routine (pessimism)
IMPORTANCE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • credentializing Sayers • contributing to the news values of <i>eliteness</i>, <i>attribution</i>, <i>relevance</i> and <i>competition</i> • evoking positive/negative evaluation
POSSIBILITY/ NECESSITY	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • evoking positive/negative evaluation • shifting blame
RELIABILITY: LOW/ MEDIAN/HIGH	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • evaluating Sayers • strengthening or mitigating evaluations
RELIABILITY: GENUINE/FAKE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • evoking positive/negative evaluation • news value of facticity
RELIABILITY/ EMOTIVITY	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • criticism, expressing disapproval • news value of negativity
<i>Peripheral evaluative parameters</i>	
EVIDENTIALITY	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • lending reliability to the discourse as a whole • dramatization, highlighting • contributing to the news values of <i>facticity</i> and <i>personalization</i>
EVIDENTIALITY/ RELIABILITY	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • mitigation • increasing the reliability of propositions by providing evidence

Evaluative parameter	Discourse functions
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ‘objectifying’ evaluations • justifying reports of mental states
EVIDENTIALITY/STYLE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • providing a sense of the reported discourse • evoking positive/negative evaluations/emotions • shifting blame
EVIDENTIALITY/ STYLE/ COMPREHENSIBILITY	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • implying degrees of reliability of proposition
EVIDENTIALITY/ STYLE/EMOTIVITY	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • evaluating Sayers positively or negatively, expressing newspaper stance
EVIDENTIALITY/ STYLE/RELIABILITY	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • triggering positive/negative evaluation of Sayers • supporting the credibility of news actors • expressing evaluations while attributing them • ‘protection’ devices • enhancing the newsworthiness of propositions
EVIDENTIALITY/ STYLE/EMOTIVITY/ RELIABILITY	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • reclaiming responsibility: expressing evaluations while attributing them • expressing stance towards Sayers
EVIDENTIALITY/ MENTAL STATE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • evoking positive/negative evaluation, triggering emotions • attaching status to propositions • raising interest of readers
EVIDENTIALITY/ MENTAL STATE/ RELIABILITY	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • reclaiming responsibility: expressing evaluations while attributing them • evaluating diverging opinions • mitigation • stating non-verifiable ‘facts’
MENTAL STATE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • triggering positive/negative evaluation and provoking emotional responses • contributing to the news value of <i>unexpectedness</i> • raising interest of readers • dramatization

Table A5—*continued*

Evaluative parameter	Discourse functions
RELIABILITY/STYLE	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• emphasis, ‘boosting’• protection shields
RELIABILITY/STYLE/ EVIDENTIALITY	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• scepticism, disapproval, distance

Notes

1. There is no one-to-one equivalence between the notions in the same vertical row: the respective researchers often comprise different aspects under a similar term. For instance, the Attitude system of appraisal includes evaluations of IMPORTANCE.
2. Self-attribution (I *claim/state/say/fear that* . . .) is regarded as a special case and is not discussed here.

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